Why the UN? Why Now?

Porphyrogenitus (here and here) and Armed Liberal (here and here) are both unhappy about the President's apparent decision to cave to the UN, and ask for "peacekeepers".

When I first heard about this, I too was deeply unhappy, because it seemed to me that the last thing we wanted to do was win the war in Iraq, over the strident objections of the UN, and particularly the Axis of Weasels, only to then give those same countries/organizations the power to derail the entire reformation of Iraqi society. If not for the reformation, why did we fight the war? Without the reformation, the war was just kicking the can downfield.

However, I've learned since the first Gulf War that the best way to treat media reports on political negotiations is in hindsight, and I'm not convinced that the media's portrayal of the Bush administration's position is correct. For one thing, it seems that the US is trying to get a force assembled more like the aftermath of Korea than the aftermath of the various Balkans wars. In other words, it appears that we are seeking a UN force under US command, which is quite different from the "peacekeeping" model. For another, it doesn't make a lot of sense. Boots on the ground are not in short supply; and while we want to rotate them home faster than we have been, and have more forces for contingencies elsewhere, what is really needed is not UN police and soldiers, but Iraqi police and soldiers. These we are making as fast as we can.

I've been trying to figure out exactly what's going on, and here are the possibilities I see, in no particular order:

We really did/will cave politically for foreign-policy reasons.

In this scenario, the Weasels have won. We have recognized that they were entirely right about the reconstruction, if not the war itself. We don't have the ability to do this without the UN, the NGOs and the French. From now on, we must realize our limitations and move only with the consent of other nations, even if their commercial interests oppose our interest in continuing to exist.

Needless to say, I find this extraordinarily unlikely, since it would mean that the Bush administration is even more crass, craven and opportunist than the Clinton administration; even more tone deaf on foreign policy than the Carter administration; and in fact was acting against their "better" judgement for the past 2 years.

The early signposts for this will be deligitimization of the Iraqi governing council, replacement of Bremer by a UN staffer, or failure to get US command authority over troops deployed to Iraq under UN auspices.

We really did/will cave politically for domestic reasons.

In this scenario, the Democrats have won. We have recognized that they were entirely right about the reconstruction, if not the war itself. We don't have the ability to do this without the Democrats. From now on, Republicans must realize their limitations and move only with the consent of the Democrats, even if Democrat electoral and policy interests oppose Republican electoral and policy interests or even the national interest.

This, too, is unlikely in the extreme. It would mean that the Republicans have given up on any independent existence, in the face of overwhelming public approval. It would mean that President Bush would rather be a Leftist than reelected. (It should be noted that some Democrats appear to believe this. In the Times article we find: "Democratic leaders and candidates for president seized on today's announcement as evidence that Mr. Bush was belatedly changing strategy and seeking help from Security Council members he had until now held at arm's length. "It's been a long time in coming," said Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota, the minority leader in the Senate.")

The early signposts for this would be a series of Republican policy shifts which effectively put the Democrat agenda in play, while blustering about increasing Republican influence.

We really don't think we can increase the size of the military.

It may be that we think that we need to have this level of force in Iraq for the next several years, and that we cannot (for fiscal or political reasons) increase the size of the active military, nor activate the Guard and Reserves more than they have already been called up. If so, then using foreign auxiliaries under US control makes sense. However, the underlying policy decision - that a broadly popular President in the midst of a long series of campaigns cannot afford the political capital to either raise taxes back up somewhat, or better yet cut non-defense spending (such as the prescription drugs plan), in order to increase the size of the military - is ludicrous.

This is certainly possible, though it would make me (and likely other conservative centrists) think less of the Bush administration. For one thing, it would mean that they don't realize that more boots on the ground won't help. It's the way those troops are employed that counts. For another, it would mean that they are politically craven.

I'm not sure that this would look like anything other than business as usual, actually. Domestic and international politics would basically continue unchanged, except that we'd be willing to give some small concessions to the UN (not political or military control over Iraq) in order to get international troops deployed.

We are preparing for action elsewhere.

It could also be that we have a new target, which we have to address with some immediacy. We could increase the size of our forces, but not in time to meet the expected contingency. This implies a definite target (not Korea, since we already have forces tasked for that), a clear casus belli and a short time frame. If these allegations are correct, it could be that the President feels that we will have to take on Saudi Arabia next year, for example. Because the timeframe is so short, there is limited ability to raise or deploy forces - with available assets mostly consisting of the Marines and whatever unit is about to be relieved by US-based units, or the relieving force itself (such as 1CAV, slated for Iraq in May, if I remember correctly). However, in a case where a small force/short war is all that's needed (again, using SA as an example, if we just want to sieze the oilfields to cut off the financing of terrorists), this might well be enough force. The problem would be that we would then have an additional occupation ongoing, and less forces than ever to patrol Iraq.

I actually think that this is possible. At least, it's not as unreasonable as either of the "cave-in" scenarios or the refusal to take political risks by increasing the military scenario. The early signpost of this would be if, after the deal with the UN were agreed and began to be implemented, the President were to call for increasing the size of forces, or activating more Reserve and Guard heavy units.

We are trying to make the UN irrelevant.

In this scenario, the administration has decided that the UN must go, but we don't feel we have the political capital to destroy the UN. We do, though, have the ability, the will and the desire to ensure that the UN is not even considered for any of the rest of the war on terror. To do this, we have to show that the UN is patently uninterested in anything other than full control and thwarting the US, while extracting as much money and concessions as possible from the US and Iraq. In order to do that, the plan is to negotiate with the stated aim of trading some control for some commitment of force. If the negotiations work, we can use the forces to relieve our own. If the negotiations don't work, we call the UN out on it, and publically state in explicit terms that the UN is incapable of being a vehicle for establishing world order, because of which the US now views the UN as a forum for discussion, but not an organization capable of acting in the interests of world peace.

This is not likely, most of all because it won't work. The reality is that the Left and anti-American forces overseas see the UN as the perfect place to tie down the US. As a result, constant pressure would be exercised on every American President to put the UN back in "its proper place". It doesn't take a lot of foresight to see that most Presidents would do so rather than fight the political battle over what they see as a side issue.

The signpost for this would be the reaction of the US at the conclusion of negotiations.

We are trying to destroy the UN.

This scenario is similar to the above, except we've realized that the UN won't go away if we sideline them, so we've got to destroy them instead. So we go about this the same way, but when the UN refuses to agree to anything that doesn't leave the Weasels in charge, we declare that the UN is no longer capable of acting as a force for good in the world, and therefore the US is withdrawing from the UN.

This scenario, too, is unlikely in the extreme. The US would lose a huge amount of political goodwill abroad for a measly financial gain and little more actual freedom of action.

The signpost for this would be the reaction of the US at the conclusion of negotiations.

We are trying to move towards the Afghan model.

It could be that we are trying to move Iraq towards the Afghan model, with effective local control being authorized by the Iraqis, UN cover and UN troops providing some of the police functions in major cities, and a smaller-than-current US troop level to train Iraqi forces, and provide muscle to the indigenous government. In consequence thereof, we are trying to set up the institutions now, so that we can make the transition more easily and more quickly later.

Actually, except for the UN involvement, this is already our announced plan. As a result, I think that this is a very likely scenario.

The signpost would be if a limited agreement is reached, giving political cover to the US (and keeping control with the US), legitimizing the Iraqi governing council and giving small concessions to the UN (particularly in freedom of action of the NGOs).

We are trying to create political cover for other nations.

This scenario, like the previous one, fits in well with currently-announced American policy. We want a division or two from nations like India and Brazil. This would significantly ease the strain on the US Army, without decreasing our control by any significant amount. Currently, it is difficult for these nations to aid us, because there is such an ingrained respect for the UN in the Third World (and with some cause, as the UN has consistently been on the side of Third World rulers, no matter how terrible they may be, against foreign powers (such as the US) and even their own people) that it is not possible for these nations to commit forces without UN authorization. With a resolution such as the one the US is apparently seeking, India, for example, would have the cover to put troops into Iraq without the current government suffering electorally for it.

This scenario is fairly likely. The signpost would be a UN resolution which is very bland and minimal, giving essentially no power to the UN and only a tepid authorization of deployment of international forces.

We are trying to lift the perception of weakness without making sacrifices.

Right now, a lot of forces in the world are looking at the US as overcommitted. As a result, our enemies (and even some of our putative friends) are being much more aggressive in attacking the US and trying to pull off things they couldn't otherwise. If the US wants to stop this, we will need to remove the perception that we don't have the capacity to act. One way to do this is by acting, and another way is to make the cause of the percieved weakness - overdeployment in Iraq - go away. By deploying additional foreign troops in Iraq, and rotating more of our units home, we would have additional forces on hand for immediate deployment, and thus would be able to better contain the brushfires currently cropping up unattended.

Certainly, we could also do this by simply mobilizing more forces, but this is potentially politically costly, and would certainly be an election issue. This is really just another variation on the "can't make a bigger military and save the tax cuts" issue, and has the same pitfalls and caveats. I don't think it's at all likely. The signpost would be the US acting more aggressively abroad as we replace US troops in Iraq with international troops.

This is one of those strange political circle jerks.

In the end, it is never unwise to assume that politics - especially foreign affairs - seem odd because politicians are playing large, high-stakes games with partial information and unclear end goals. This could all be one big masturbation session, where the UN tries to get concessions out of us, we try to get concessions out of the UN, everyone throws ideas around, and nothing comes of it.

Frankly, that's where I'd put my bet.

UPDATE (9/5): Stephen Den Beste relates this issue to ongoing US grand strategy.

Posted by Jeff at September 4, 2003 12:39 PM | Link Cosmos