January 29, 2007

Yes. Yes, it Was

There are some things so stupid that only an academic could believe them. One would think that being an expert on French history would have taught him the dangers of appeasement. If he has deeper reading in European history that led up to France, he should understand the long-term danger posed by radical Muslims. Moreover, he very quickly gives away his fundamental misunderstanding of the threat and the "overreaction" he derides:

Certainly, if we look at nothing but our enemies' objectives, it is hard to see any indication of an overreaction. The people who attacked us in 2001 are indeed hate-filled fanatics who would like nothing better than to destroy this country. But desire is not the same thing as capacity, and although Islamist extremists can certainly do huge amounts of harm around the world, it is quite different to suggest that they can threaten the existence of the United States.

Well, the enemy (at least he calls them that!) demonstrated the ability to kill our civilians in large numbers, and their willingness to do so is not disputed even by Professor Bell. Is the Professor then suggesting that we wait until they have the ability to kill us in total before ending the threat is something other than "overreaction"? Is the Professor suggesting that waiting until the only possible way to end the threat is genocide is somehow measured and well-considered reaction?

Finally, and above all, this is exactly the reason we are fighting a slow war: to prevent the kind of genocide that would be necessary if we failed to act until the enemy has the capacity to annihilate us.

Posted by jeff at 6:58 PM | TrackBack

January 7, 2007

Unsurprising to Me

Wizbang notes that the Sunday Times is reporting Israeli plans for a nuclear strike on Iran to cripple the Iranian nuclear program. While this report may or may not be true, it's certain that the possibility is unsurprising to me, since I have been writing about it off and on for at least two years. But it's likely that the Sunday Times report is not any advanced warning of imminent attack; more likely it's a strategic leak designed to make Iran think seriously about the possible consequences of its intransigence.

Posted by jeff at 9:50 AM | TrackBack

December 19, 2006

Among the Reasons I am Unsuited for Diplomacy

Were I the US lead negotiator at a conference such as this, where the North Koreans basically demanded that we recognize N. Korea as our equal in standing, give them all kinds of money and goodies (including a nuclear reactor and energy help in the meantime), back off our strangling of their counterfeiting (of US money) operations, and accept N. Korean nuclear weapons before they would even agree to talk to us, I'd toss their lead negotiator a Sacagawea dollar, advise he use it to get a sandwich because he's looking a little thin, and walk out. But that's just me.

Posted by jeff at 5:24 PM | TrackBack

November 20, 2006

There's a Word for This

And that word is "insurrection," and it is cause enough for the Mexican military to go in and arrest every person involved in this phony government. Of course, given the situations in Oaxaca (about which see Mark in Mexico) and Chiapas and along the US border, it's doubtful the government will take the action necessary to prevent Mexico from sliding into a more serious revolution; the federales are slowly losing control of the country, bit by bit.

Posted by jeff at 11:00 PM | TrackBack

October 20, 2006

Then What

Fran Porretto has an interesting post on the decreasing supply of people supporting our war effort as a good policy. There is a question the war skeptics, and moreso the outright anti-war or (more usual) anti-Republican-as-President-and-whatever-he-might-do, have failed to answer: if we fail in Iraq, whether outright or by declaring victory and leaving the job unfinished, then what?

We cannot reasonably hope for the enemy to go (or stay) home; were that true, the 9/11 raids would not have happened. Nor can we sustain a policy of occupying the oil fields for the benefit of Western nations and fighting off all comers, because we are morally opposed to robbery in that sense (odd, given the income tax, but there it is). Nor can we sustain a policy of simply bombing to destruction any nation that sufficiently antagonizes us, as witness the situation in N. Korea in 1994 and in Iran today. Nor could we sustain a policy of sequestration, as Fran has advocated for in the past. Nor could we depend on others, either moderate Muslims or other first-world allies, to go into the Middle East and fight the jihadis on any terms.

Even ignoring the cascading failures that would inevitably follow in Afghanistan, Pakistan and around Israel; even ignoring the damage to our reputation which confirming the Vietnam precedent would do, after decades of trying to salvage our reputation, and the further threats, provocations and attacks that would invite; even ignoring how our military's morale would collapse — even ignoring all of this, what could we do to defend ourselves?

If we fail in Iraq with our current policies, which is certainly possible, and we can not change the situation by occupying the oil fields, or by killing the enemy and a lot of civilians from afar, then what? We could certainly surrender, which is exactly what we would we be doing if we cocoon ourselves and depend on defense. But the most likely course is that we will withdraw into a cocoon, periodically striking out ineffectually, as we tear ourselves apart internally for a while.

Meanwhile, the next real crisis will come not with a falling tower, but with fallout; not with war, but with genocide. I have yet to hear anyone who suggests leaving Iraq to its fate come up with any strategy to prevent this.

Posted by jeff at 3:51 PM | TrackBack

October 9, 2006

Crossing the Rubicon

In detonating a nuclear weapon in an underground test, North Korea has provided a clarifying event. While there seems to be a lot of discussion about who is to blame (focusing on Clinton v Bush or N. Korea v China v S. Korea v Japan), the reality is that it does not matter, in strategic terms, how North Korea came to this point, only that it has. While there is still some small room for denial (sure, they have nuclear weapons, but can they deliver them?), the nations of northeastern Asia must now add the certainty of North Korean nuclear weapons to their strategic calculations.

While this situation is useful for China if everything rolls their way, Japan and South Korea in particular (and to a lesser extent Taiwan and Russia) have to reconsider their interests rather dramatically. The North Korean regime bases its legitimacy on a religious worship of military force. (In a very real way for the North Korean leadership, this test is an act of worship, the programs developed only through starving the people are an act of sacrifice to their demonic and insane gods.) But the North Korean state is teetering on the brink of collapse, brought about largely by the famines induced by the leadership's constant brinksmanship and failure to allow any but the most pure Communist theory into such practical areas as agriculture and transportation.

Would the North Koreans, in the act of their eventual collapse strike out at South Korea and Japan, even at China? Does massive food aid, per South Korea and Japan for the last decade, stave off the crisis or merely prolong it? Does giving food aid make the North Korean military more capable, or make the population less likely to revolt in desperation, or both, or neither? What does North Korea plan on doing? What would they do if their plans were frustrated? And in all cases, the neighboring countries must be asking themselves two questions: how does this affect me, and what can I do to make the situation fall more in my favor.

My guess is that the "sunshine policy" is now dead letter; neither Japan nor South Korea can afford to give aid to North Korea hoping either to buy favor or to buy time: the favor is clearly not forthcoming and the time has clearly passed. China will likely not halt food and fuel shipments to North Korea, even though that is the one move that anyone other than the North Koreans could take that would be most likely to bring about an end to the North Korean nuclear and missile programs.

I would also assume that Japan will re-militarize. At least to the extent of building up their military, and particularly their air force and anti-missile systems (which they are developing in cooperation with the US). Japan might very well develop nuclear weapons themselves, or purchase them from the US or France (we'd probably not sell, but the French probably would). If Japan were to go down this route, they could have sophisticated and deliverable nuclear weapons within a very short time. They have the technical expertise, the sources of fuel and the industrial base necessary. I suppose we'll know in two years or less.

South Korea, in a similar position to Japan but complicated by land borders, might well be too paralyzed by fear of North Korean collapse to do anything at all productive. They would likely cut off aid to the North (see above), but would be far less likely to develop nuclear weapons. However, if China were to provide North Korea with sufficient political cover, and especially if the US were to withdraw from the Korean peninsula, South Korea might feel the need for nuclear weapons of its own. In that event, North Korea is much like Japan: it would have working, deliverable nuclear weapons within two to three years.

Taiwan is not directly threatened by North Korea's move. However, if China succeeds in brandishing North Korea as a deniable threat to keep others from interfering in the region, Taiwan could see this as prelude to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Whether Taiwan's internal resistance (provided by the former mainland Chinese who fled to Taiwan in 1948) to military procurement and self-defense would weaken is an open question. Whether Taiwan would acquire nuclear weapons is even more doubtful. It is likely that Taiwan's policies would not change over this, unless China becomes a much more looming threat than they are today.

For the US, the worst thing we could do would be to withdraw our troops from South Korea. While I generally favor doing so (the South Koreans can defend themselves), such a move at this point would encourage those seeking nuclear weapons (particularly Iran) as well as the North Koreans themselves, to think that the US will backdown from even a miniscule nuclear threat. That would result in much worse consequences down the line, because any minor crisis between the US and a nuclear or nuclear-seeking state would immediately be escalated into a serious risk of nuclear war. Just because it's the worst thing we could do does not mean that we won't do it. Sometimes we are that dumb.

The second worst thing that we could do would be to do more than make pro forma diplomatic noise. We don't want to hand North Korea a propaganda victory, and Dave's advice (linked above) to not panic is good advice. We should continue the policy of politically minimizing North Korea, making sure that no one is unaware of North Korea's fundamentally-evil regime, but not giving North Korea the legitimacy it seeks. In other words, we would be making a mistake if we change anything about our negotiations policy based on this; that would be escalating North Korea's position and stature, which largely derives from how much they get other nations to bend to their will. And even if their will is simply to get us talking again so that they can walk out on us again, we buy their regime life simply by taking them too seriously in the international arena.

I do think that we should pressure China to crack down on North Korea, and that we should (as part of that and independent of that) encourage Japan at least to obtain a nuclear counterweight to North Korea and China. It also seems to me to be a good idea to issue a declaration that any nuclear or radiological explosion in the United States, Europe, Japan, or the territory of any other US ally would be met with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear attack on North Korea, on the assumption that North Korea either undertook the attack or supplied the weapons, and that this policy will be extended to any other nations (such as Iran) that develop nuclear weapons and support terrorism. Pakistan can be left out of that list, or added in, as circumstances require it. (We'd be wiser to leave Pakistan off the list, I think, at least while Musharraf is in power.) The idea there is to replace NPT's failed attempt with a more brutal (but more likely workable) form of pressure.

Speaking of which, the NPT is dead and we should stop pretending it is alive. We should announce that given the obvious failure of the NPT, we will not rely on its mechanisms alone or even primarily to ensure that states like Iran remain non-nuclear. Rather, we will use all of the instruments of our power to that end, and will ignore the NPT mechanisms where they are not producing concrete results in meaningful time. Yes, this means that we should explicitly make clear that we would use force if necessary, without regards to the UN's positions or anyone's negotiations, to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

Posted by jeff at 10:00 AM | TrackBack

September 29, 2006

Target! Tank: 8600 meters. Sabot.

There are five basic classifications of weapons: melee weapons, missile weapons, mines, chemical weapons and nuclear weapons. A melee weapon is a sword, knife, club or similar instrument that does its damage by being bashed against the enemy, pushed into him, or some similar manner of employment. Missile weapons are weapons that throw some object away from the launcher, and do their damage when (if) that object hits its target. For the purposes of what I want to talk about the rest of the types are academic.

Missile weapons themselves can be operated in two distinct modes: direct fire and indirect fire. Direct fire means that you see your target, adjust for distance (a projectile falls due to gravity as it travels from its launcher) and other factors (some modern systems adjust for humidity and reported cross-winds half-way to the target!), and fire a projectile at that target. The principle is the same for bow and arrow, rifle and bullet, or cannon and shell. Today, of course, computers do much of the work for tank guns and artillery, such that a modern American tank can reliably hit targets with one shot at 4000 meters. (Which is why our invasions of Iraq and Kuwait were so seemingly easy: the enemy was destroyed before he could come within his own 2000 or so meter effective range.)

Indirect fire, on the other hand, is a mathematical game. Rather than taking an enemy and putting your gunsight on him, you determine where the enemy is in relation to you, do some math, and fire a shell along a parabolic arc which (hopefully) intersects that point. For that reason, you can shoot at targets 20-50 miles away with artillery (and anywhere in the world with large missiles) with a pretty good chance of hitting the enemy. Modern guided (usually GPS or laser) artillery shells have an excellent chance of hitting the target with one or two shots at 30 or more miles, if there is a person near enough to observe the target.

The primary difference between direct and indirect fire is simply that of seeing the enemy. Because a tanker or infantryman sees the enemy, he can choose his own targets. Because artillerymen cannot see the enemy, their fires have to be directed by observers who can see the target. But the US has just changed the equation in a fundamental way: the US has introduced a tank shell that has scored a kill at 8600 meters!

In other words, US tanks equipped with the MRM can now offer direct fire on targets that it cannot observe directly, giving the benefits of direct fire (pick an enemy and kill him without outside assistance) and indirect fire (range and difficulty, to the enemy, of returning fire or defending themselves) in one platform.

This is as much of an advance over WWII as WWII was over the US Civil War. In other words, once this is in full-scale use, there is not a conventional army in the world, regardless of size that can expect to win against the US Army. Which means we had better get very, very good at counter-guerilla work, because we're going to be seeing a lot more of it in the future, at least until we have an adversary rich enough and sophisticated enough to keep up, should that ever again happen.

Posted by jeff at 11:26 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack

September 20, 2006

Chavez Who?

Here's the thing about rants like Chavez' UN spew: it's just the squeaking of the impotent, inconsequential and unimportant looking for a little attention. He wants to feel big. It's kind of like my four year old when he's really tired and wants to get his way: he cannot get it by persuasion or moral force, so he lies on the floor kicking and screaming. But of course, Chavez is all grown up, on the outside. Which just takes us back to impotent, inconsequential and unimportant.

UPDATE: And I gotta love the idea of Noam Chomsky "loving" America like an abusive husband "loves" his wife. He had to beat her up: it's for her own good.

Posted by jeff at 11:12 PM | Comments (5) | TrackBack

September 19, 2006

Full of Crap

Hossain Derakshan opines
that Iran should develop nuclear weapons:

[E]ven if Iran becomes the most peaceful, secular and progressive, yet still independent state on the planet, the U.S. would be unable to tolerate it. The U.S. would seek new excuses to topple Iran's government and install their favorite instead.

Quick: name the last secular democracy that the US invaded.

For this reason, I believe Iran needs to produce nuclear weapons as a defensive mechanism, to deter the U.S. today and the ever-expanding and equally energy-hungry China tomorrow.

Here's the thing: if Iran were a secular and progressive country, I would have no objection to them developing nuclear weapons. I don't mind Israel, India or (formerly) South Africa having nuclear weapons. I wouldn't mind Taiwan or Japan or South Korea or Australia or Brazil having nuclear weapons. I only mind Pakistan having nuclear weapons because they are so politically unstable, and I only mind China having nuclear weapons because I am unsure of their insularity. As long as China doesn't attack its neighbors, I have little problem with China having nuclear weapons at all. I only have problems with Russia having nuclear weapons because they don't have a very good nuclear safety record, and I worry that they will lose a few to terrorists who are more concerned with getting the weapons than the Russians are with keeping them from being taken.

I worry about North Korea having nuclear weapons, and would worry more if I were more confident that the North Korean weapons work, or if I didn't feel that we could engineer North Korea's fall (and are trying to) via financial and political pressure. I worry enough about that that I would be willing to declare an embargo against anything coming out of North Korea by land, sea, or air and would be willing to go to war to enforce it, because North Korea is not beyond selling a nuclear weapon to terrorists in the way that Kos is not beyond attacking President Bush for any failing, real or imagined.

But Iran is an expansionist theocracy which has been attacking the US, overtly and covertly, for 27 years, and which is fighting an undeclared low-level war against the US in Iraq as we speak, and which recently fought (undeclared) against Israel alongside Hizb'allah, and which is otherwise acting inimically to US interests immediately, and to my personal interests (to the extent they diverge from US interests) over the long term. So I don't just worry about Iran having nuclear weapons: I find the prospect unacceptable.

(hat tip: Glenn Reynolds)

Posted by jeff at 7:13 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

September 13, 2006

Seventeen Words

In an offhand comment, in seventeen words, Wretchard managed to say what I've spend perhaps a few thouseand words in a dozen posts, as recently as yesterday, trying to say: "[T]he prospect of asymmetric warfare becoming symmetric that is the principal danger in the war on terror." At the point where we see Westerners adopting the enemy's organization, we will know our governments have failed to protect us. At the point where we see Westerners adopting the enemy's organization, we will know our civilization has failed to balance survival and liberalism.

Posted by jeff at 5:59 PM | TrackBack

September 12, 2006

Armies of Davids

If the Army of Davids thesis is true, and I believe it is, there are some things we should be seeing happen as a natural consequence. In particular, there are two types of NGOs we should be seeing form. The first type is organizations formed around the idea of nourishing Westernization and modernization in the Arab world, and the second type amounts to vigilante groups (operating internally in the West) and private armies (operating externally to the West).

Organizations intending to nourish Westernization and modernization in the Arab world (and probably in Africa and possibly elsewhere) would essentially be a private effort to "shrink the Gap." Such organizations would probably initially consist of providing security for Western firms or local people trying to do things like building a modern economy (banks, factories, and so on) or culture (schools, churches, and so on). They would almost certainly evolve into bringing in additional investments and programs. This would actually cause a huge amount of disruption, because it would bring massive cultural change to areas not noted for their tolerance to cultural change. On the other hand, governments like those of Iran, Iraq, and possibly Jordan would welcome the idea of having stronger economies, and would likely be at least somewhat willing to take the short-term rise in violence for the long-term rise in economic activity.

Organizations built around a more aggressive model of confronting Islam would likely take two forms, and might take a third. One form would essentially be vigilantes, working domestically to uncover jihadis and Islamists, with the intent being anything from pressuring authorities to arrest and charge such people, to trying to drive them out. This type of group would form if people felt endangered by the Muslims in their community, and didn't feel that the police could or would protect them. Something like this,
but with a different objective.

The second type would be private armies, operating abroad to kill or capture enemies where the government could not or would not. This could be something like the Abraham Lincoln Brigade of the Spanish Civil War, with people volunteering in nations at risk, or it could be something more like WWII's USFIP. Such an organization might adopt the structural organization of guerilla (and terrorist) groups: small cells operating independently. It might instead operate more like a brigade, operating as a large unit with detachable parts. Much about its structure would depend on whether it were operating under legal sanction (such as by obtaining a letter of reprisal) or were extra-legal.

The really scary form, that hopefully will not come about, is the organization that adopts the terrorists structure and methods to "terrorize the terrorists". There is some evidence that such a group might be forming in Britain.

I think that seeing organizations like the hospitallers, but non-religious, is a good thing, as it would lead in the long term to a more tolerant society, as well as making business and social changes safer in the interim (though likely with a lot of fighting, but now on both sides instead of only the enemies' side). If vigilante organizations form, it will be because of a lack of confidence in the government's ability or willingness to enforce the law, which would be a bad thing (though the groups themselves would not necessarily be a bad thing). If private armies form to operate in areas where the government can't or won't go, that would be a good thing, as long as they didn't turn into terrorists themselves, in that it would remove sanctuaries the enemy currently enjoys.

The question I have is, which of these groups are already forming, somewhere out of sight?

Posted by jeff at 5:42 PM | TrackBack

How do you Achieve Something?

When I read posts like this (also found here, with more intelligent comments), I wonder how people who could write such a thing ever achieve any goal they set. In my world, you set a goal, along with a cost you are willing to pay to attain that goal; formulate a strategy to attain the goal, complete with some set of observable metrics that tell you whether you are progressing towards attaining the goal; design a plan to implement the strategy, complete with alternatives and options that would be invoked based on the situation as it changes; and set about performing the tasks called for by the plan. Mike Reynolds' ('sideways') world does not appear to work that way, and some of the comments on the Donklephant post indicate that there are some whose worlds are even more divergent from mine.

Let's take the specific incident that Reynolds writes about: Pakistan's recent agreement to withdraw from tribal areas. Reynolds, like Roggio (the link in the last sentence), has a very pessimistic take on this, most prominently indicated by his title: "Did We Just Lose?" (I am cautiously hopeful.) Another indicator of deep pessimism is this:

Our goal was to deny Al Qaeda a safe haven in the near east. If this deal is what it looks like, we appear to have failed.

If this deal is what it looks like, we aren’t even back at square one: we’re wishing we could get back to square one.

In fact, if this deal is what it looks like, we just lost a war.

Um, OK, let's take it from the top. The President set the national goal for the war on September 20, 2001:

Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. ... [T]he only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.

In the same speech, the President began to lay out the strategy he would follow:

We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.

This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat.

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.

[snip]

We will come together to improve air safety, to dramatically expand the number of air marshals on domestic flights, and take new measures to prevent hijacking. We will come together to promote stability and keep our airlines flying, with direct assistance during this emergency.

We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home. We will come together to strengthen our intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they strike.

We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America's economy, and put our people back to work.

The strategy was made very explicit in 2002. Obviously, two parts of the plan were to eliminate the enemy's safe haven in Afghanistan, and to eliminate a major sponsor of terrorism in Iraq. Both of these have been done.

So if Reynolds' and Roggio's most profound fears are true, and the enemy acquires a new sanctuary, a more difficult sanctuary for us to attack than was Afghanistan (and now would be the time to remind everyone that most people who knew anything about Afghanistan thought that the enemy's Afghan sanctuary was more or less immune to serious attack), does this mean that we have lost the war, that our goals are unattainable? Hardly. Indeed, such an outcome, while a setback, would not even mean that our strategy was obviously wrong. It might merely indicate that Michael Ledeen's constant refrain, "faster please," should get more attention than it has heretofore. It might indicate that our strategy needs to be compressed in time, or that we need to modify or even completely rethink our strategy. It does not mean that we have lost.

But there is another side to this as well. What if this development opens the way for US troops to go into Waziristan and fight the enemy directly, with the enemy having no border as easy to hide behind as they do between Afghanistan and Pakistan? What if this development means that the tribal leaders are going to stop their cross-border raids and kick out the terrorists? What if this development is a way for Musharraf, knowing the agreement will be violated, to develop a domestic political consensus to commit real force to the area for the first time? Would this then even be a setback, in retrospect?

Unfortunately, we have developed a serious analysis problem. Our communications are so fast that we get almost instant news of what happens in even the remotest corners of the globe. But we only get that news, generally, if it is in the interest of mainstream journalists to provide it, and when they do, they often get the whole point so completely wrong that the information that is communicated is more false than true. This leads to bad, but rapid, analysis; to incorrect, but rapid, responses. We need to learn to sit back and let events unfold without feeling we have to respond immediately to each and every one. And we need to think through all the possible consequences, not just the most facile rationales or the most immediately horrifying or gratifying possibilities. First reports from the field, goes the military dictum, are generally wrong. We need to remember that.

But more importantly even than that, we need to remember that some goals are important to achieve. We need to remember that goals often have costs that need to be paid, and in this case, while the ashes were still settling over Manhattan, we put a very high price indeed on this particular goal. The world situation has not so changed as to make the goal unreasonable, or unnecessary to achieve. So we must attain our goal.

And we must remember that strategies sometimes are not quite right, but that it is better to do something that makes incremental gains than to do nothing, or worse still to pretend to be doing something while really just hoping the problem goes away. Worst of all is to pretend to be doing something useful while actually doing something guaranteed to make it harder, even impossible, to obtain our goals. If our strategies aren't quite right, we need to adjust them. We do not need to scrap them. If going to the store to get something turns out to be a bad idea, because that store doesn't carry that particular item, it doesn't mean you go to the park instead; it means you find the store that has the item you need.

Further we must remember that any plan we make will be flawed, and even if nearly perfect, will require many changes of direction as contingencies change the situation we are responding to. Worse, we could have to rethink the plan if it is not working. You don't throw up your hands if the store is sold out of the item you want; you get an alternate brand, or you go elsewhere, or you wait for the store to restock. Finally, the enemy gets a say in the situation, too. Imagine trying to get milk from the store while being shot at, and you are closer to the problem the military has.

It's possible, of course, to just throw up your hands at the slightest impediment and throw a screaming fit. Most two year olds do it. I've know forty year olds to do it. But those are people who don't get what they want, and who alienate everyone around them along the way. This war is important; this goal must be achieved, if we are to have a hope of leaving a peaceful, free, and prosperous life. And for that reason, we must not throw up our hands at every setback, must not throw a fit when things are imperfect (I'm picturing Andrew Sullivan right now). Instead, we must get the job done, and where we are making mistakes, we must fix them.

Reynolds' approach, though, to declare defeat when something happens that might be bad, or might not, is hardly a way to set about that process. At least, not if we care to win.

Posted by jeff at 7:20 AM | TrackBack

September 11, 2006

Five Years

I has been five years since the 9/11 raid changed the world. Five years since 2996 Americans and foreign guests were murdered in the most spectacular attack on America since 1941. Five years since the idea of the end of history died in all but the most deluded minds. Rather than talk about the day, adding meaningless chatter to meaningless chatter, I would simply like to remember the dead, in two ways. First, in the extended section of this post, is a list of the victims. Second, throughout the day, the events as they happened, taken from the 9/11 Timeline, will be posted at the corresponding times.

WORLD TRADE CENTER

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 11,

from Boston, Massachusetts, to Los Angeles, California, crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center with 92 people on board.

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 77,

from Washington to Los Angeles, crashed into the Pentagon with 64 people aboard.

UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 175,

from Boston, Massachusetts, to Los Angeles, California, was the second hijacked plane to strike the World Trade Center, plowing into the south tower. Two pilots, seven flight attendants and 56 passengers were on board.

UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93,

from Newark, New Jersey, to San Francisco, California, crashed in rural southwest Pennsylvania, with 45 people on board.

PENTAGON

Posted by jeff at 12:01 AM | TrackBack

September 6, 2006

Establishing Ground Rules

Brian Dunn is worried, as am I and as are many who want the experiment in Iraq to work, that the US will cut and run, as soon as the Democrats gain any measure of power. While this might or might not be good for Democrats' electoral prospects (depending on what follows after and how it's spun), it would be disastrous for our ability to fight against terrorism. Not fighting now, after such a commitment of national effort, would be tantamount to utter surrender, and both our friends and our enemies would know it. This is true even if you call it "redeployment" instead of "retreat", and it's as true of Afghanistan as of Iraq.

We would be abandoned by Muslim allies in droves, because they would make accurate judgments about their life and death chances with or without us. No Europeans would come forward to aid us any more, because they would make accurate cost/benefit choices, too. Iran would become massively emboldened, as would Syria. Iraq would devolve into a bloodbath, and probably suffer invasions from Iran and Syria and possibly even Turkey.

The problem is that President Bush can only control events, to the extent even he can control events, until the end of his term. After that, it's up in the air. But there is a way to powerfully influence events now and in the future, that is so easy of a call that I cannot believe we haven't done it. Why haven't we established 50 year leases on a couple of bases in Iraq, with the intention of basing an Army division and an Air Force squadron or two there more or less permanently? It would certainly make our intentions clear, and would make it much harder for future administrations to undo our commitment to changing the Middle East.

Posted by jeff at 6:56 PM | TrackBack

Carpe Diem

Bill Roggio analyzes Pakistan's apparent surrender to the jihadis in Pakistan's tribal territories. (hat tip: Instapundit) Roggio ends with deep pessimism:

The jihadi dreams of al-Qaeda's safe havens in western Pakistan have become a reality. And the gains made by the Coalition in Afghanistan have now officially been wiped away with the peace agreement in the newly established Islamic Emirate of Waziristan.

He might be right, but there is at least one circumstance under which Roggio may be dead wrong. If the government of Pakistan is washing its hands of Waziristan, and saying that it doesn't care what happens there — in effect, if the government of Pakistan is withdrawing its sovereignty from Waziristan — then the US has an opportunity to crush this troubling haven for jihadis, including apparently bin Laden and Zawahiri. Because you see, there is an open declaration of war against those responsible for 9/11, and these guys qualify.

The whole reason that we haven't taken out these sanctuaries before now, is that Pakistan has wanted to deal with the problem themselves, which would have the nice side benefit of keeping Pakistanis from rising up out of fury at an American invasion. But if this agreement opens the door for us, I say we grab the opportunity. It could be a chance we've never had before, and won't easily get again.

Posted by jeff at 5:23 PM | TrackBack

September 4, 2006

It Was Only a Matter of Time

It has come to this in Britain. The only surprise to me is that it took so long, and that it was in Britain rather than France or the Netherlands. Why are they adopting the tactics of the terrorists? Because they work.

The next step will be when they begin to carry out their threats. The authorities will crack down much harder on non-Muslim Britons attacking Muslims than they have on the Muslims for their attacks and incitement; such is the nature of the "white guilt" cult. But these crackdowns will lead to increased, not decreased, attacks on Muslims as more people become convinced that the government will not protect them against a thuggish Muslim subculture. Unfortunately, the non-thuggish Muslims will also be attacked. They will radicalize, in self defense. And this will drive the cycle downwards.

I have long maintained three things: 1) people will fight the war against the jihadis if their governments don't; 2) Europe will have a civil war (Muslims v everyone else) in our lifetime; 3) Europe's politics, at the next tipping point, will go radically right wing to the same degree that they have been radically left wing since before WWII. I believe that this is evidence that the first point is starting to come about, and that it will lead to the second.

Posted by jeff at 9:14 AM | TrackBack

September 3, 2006

It's Worse than That, It's Physics, Jim

So, why would Iran be pursuing nuclear fuel enrichment and a long-term reactor plan when the don't have the uranium domestically available to sustain it, but do have the oil and natural gas energy to sustain their energy usage far longer and at a lower price? I mean, if Iran's motivation were to break the dependence on imports of refined petroleum (they mostly just produce the raw materials), they could build refineries, yes? And if their concern were with maximizing revenue through oil sales abroad, they would still want to minimize costs to generate those revenues, because what they would really need to maximize is profit, yes? So if there's not a rational case to be made for Iran's nuclear program, then what could they possibly be using it for?

I mean, they've threatened to "wipe Israel off the map", and that was at the follow-on conference to the one where they were talking about how to have a "world without the Great Satan". They've blocked the IAEA from inspecting sites that Iran would have a perfect right, under the NPT, to operate, were they only for a peaceful nuclear program. They've stalled negotiations repeatedly, and rejected incentives that directly address the goals stated by their negotiators (such as having a domestic energy infrastructure not subject to foreign disruption) while bringing up terms and conditions unrelated to a peaceful energy program.

What could they possibly have in mind? And why does this remind me of something in recent history? Could it be that Iran, like North Korea, is seeking nuclear weapons? Could it be that since Iran is pursuing the same tactics as North Korea, in a similar strategic environment and with similar sources of expertise and materiel, that Iran is pursuing the same goal that North Korea was: a nuclear arsenal?

My guess is that, yes, Iran is doing exactly that. In fact, I think that the evidence is as strong or stronger than it was against Saddam. (And before you object that Saddam did not have an active nuclear program, I would ask you to go back to the time prior to the invasion and find people who consistently thought that. In the post-9/11 world, if you behave like a megalomaniac desperate to acquire nuclear weapons to use against America, we're likely to believe you. So why should we take the Iranians at their word, when if we are wrong, the inevitable outcome is nuclear genocide?) And the real question is, what do we do about it? There is a small window, maybe 2 years, maybe 5, maybe less than 1, in which we can definitely prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons and prevent a nuclear war. There is another window, perhaps 5 years, maybe even less, from when the first window closes, during which we can end the Iranian threat without the destruction of Israel or a US or European city, but this would likely entail a nuclear war. (For example, if Iran has a few nuclear weapons and threatens Israel, almost a certainty, would Israel hesitate before obliterating any chance of that arsenal being used? When the alternative is the utter destruction of Israel? How sure are you?)

After that ten years, I think that the odds rise steadily to a near certainty that Iran would, directly or through proxies, attempt to destroy Israel with nuclear weapons, possibly first decapitating US political leadership in order to disorganize and delay any American response, while pleading with the world to "prevent an unnecessary nuclear catastrophe" caused by US "aggression".

In other words, I think we are looking at several curves of probability: that Iran possesses nuclear weapons (near zero now, rising to near certainty within ten years, and likely much less), that America and/or Israel believe that Iran has nuclear weapons (probably trending slightly ahead of the Iranian possession curve), that Israel or the US would pre-empt the Iranian weapons program they believe to exist (well below the belief curve, but rising sharply as certainty rises, eventually surpassing the belief curve), and the probable casualties curve (the multiple of the US/Israel belief curve with the US/Israel action curve). The point of maximum danger is when the probability of Iran's possession of a nuclear weapon becomes high enough that the US/Israel belief curve equals or exceeds the probability of Iran having nuclear weapons and the probability of action curve equals or exceeds the belief curve. At that point, it is a certainty that the US or (more likely) Israel would act to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and given that the belief would be (at that point) that Iran does have nuclear weapons, the odds of a nuclear first strike on Iran would be staggeringly high. Ironically, the odds go up if the media succeeds in significantly delaying action against Iran, because that means that the probability of action curve would be sloping more steeply at the end, which would indicate that the attacker (Israel or the US) would feel in far more imminent danger than they would had there been a steady escalation towards a pre-emptive attack.

In other words, I believe that if we do not act to destroy the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon well before that possibility can be actualized, then we drive the probability of nuclear warfare up dramatically. I am of the opinion that we would be better off to minimize the curve that indicates probability of a nuclear attack than to minimize the probability of the curve that indicates a war. The maximum likely casualties would be lower that way.

Posted by jeff at 10:58 PM | TrackBack

September 1, 2006

Anything at All

Today is the second anniversary of Beslan, which was the event that took me from "we must defeat terrorists" to "we must destroy the jihadis and probably the Islamists utterly". And Gerard's pieta, which I linked, is probably the saddest thing I have ever read. I have four sons, and yes, I would do anything, anything at all, to keep them out of that picture.

Posted by jeff at 8:34 PM | TrackBack

Is There a Better Way?

Dave at The Glittering Eye commented (in a post containing much more) that he would rather consolidate our intelligence functions back into the military. (Dave also makes a mistake: the military and State Department both had intelligence offices before the CIA was formed, though the military's OSS was used as the basis of the CIA.) Mark at ZenPundit defended civilian intelligence agencies.

What I really have a problem with, and what the 9/11 Commission recommendations that created the DNI did not solve, was that there is no separation between gathering and evaluating intelligence. Let me start over, because this is something that's been bothering me for a long time.

At its root, we say "intelligence" to mean a process with many distinct parts: gathering raw data of many kinds from many sources (open source like magazines, electronic signal interception, overhead imaging, human spying, documents captured in military raids and so on); deciding what data to gather; evaluating the value of sources and methods; aggregating raw data into summary chunks; analyzing those summaries to identify useful information; and using that information to derive conclusions about the state of the world, and in particular, our enemies. Moreover, we seldom distinguish between the reliability of intelligence on capability (usually high) and intent (usually very, very low).

I divide these functions up into a few small categories: gathering data, evaluating the dependability of the data, using the data to create information, and using the information to make decisions. The last category is necessarily distributed throughout the government by its very nature: we have different people making decisions on different things. Right now, every other category is largely under the control of the DNI, and largely (with the exception of much of the data gathering) in the CIA. I would organize the intelligence community somewhat differently, but first, we need to understand why our intelligence agencies are structured as they are: Pearl Harbor.

The entire structure of our intelligence agencies — military and civilian, agency- (CIA, FBI) or department- (State, Defense) based — is structured to prevent an enemy from acquiring the capability, and acting on the intent, of using their military to attack an unprepared United States. At that function, our intelligence agencies are supremely good, probably unmatched except by the British and possibly the Israelis.

But our intelligence agencies are unable, due to the very structure that makes them good at preventing a Pearl Harbor repeat (think 9/11 with bombers instead of terrorists), from institutionally understanding non-state actors the way they can understand states. And since that is structural, nothing short of structural reform will fix it: Dave is absolutely correct there. But I do agree with Mark, also: we don't want this to be a purely military function.

What I would suggest as an organizational model is a broadly-distributed network with minimal bottlenecks and control nodes. There should be small agencies geared to particular methods of intelligence gathering (electronic intercept, covert spying, reading the newspapers of the world, etc) or particular types of information (military construction, equipment design, agricultural output, talking points in negotiations, etc). These agencies should feed the information and the source of the information into a single agency whose job it is to evaluate the intelligence's credibility based on past experience with that source or method rather than on how "believable" the intelligence is, and to sanitize the information to include the evaluation of reliability, but remove any information that would identify the source or method used. This evaluated information could then be used by analysis cells attached to every policy decision maker, as well as feeding into certain field operations (most notably, the military). Organizations with particular needs (battlefield and theater intelligence for the military, political intelligence for an embassy) would retain the ability to gather intelligence themselves, and use it directly, while also feeding it into the evaluation agency for the rest of the government to use.

Covert warfare should either be a military mission, be directed by the Congress through letters of marque and reprisal, or abandoned.

This structure would have several benefits: it would be more adaptive and quicker to respond to critical information; it would be less politicized, because policy makers couldn't bury intelligence that didn't fit their world view; since each agency would be small, they would be able to individually take larger risks in gathering information or making a call on what intelligence means, because they bureaucratically have much less to lose; it would be harder for the enemy to track what we are doing; it would be easier for us to track what the enemy is doing, even a non-state enemy (perhaps especially a non-state enemy); we would be less likely, due to redundancy, to miss critical information. There would be downsides, too, particularly competition between agencies if more than one has access to the same kind of intelligence gathering abilities (like more than one human spying agency, or more than one agency operating satellites), so care would have to be taken in that regard.

But overall, I think we would be far better served by such a set of organizations than by the set we have now.

Posted by jeff at 6:57 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack

August 31, 2006

More Trouble with Maps

During the Iraq invasion, I posted The Trouble with Maps, which pointed out that if you looked at a map and listened to the Iraqi spokemen's explanations of what was going on, you noticed that the Iraqis appeared to be defeating Americans at locations invariably closer to the capitol than the previous day's "defeat". Now Lorie Byrd graphically illustrates the progress in having the Iraqi army take control of Iraq. It is the kind of demonstration that just blows the media narrative into its component lies. Which is why you won't see these maps on news programs.

Posted by jeff at 9:46 PM | TrackBack

August 18, 2006

Evidence Mounts

I realize that it is fashionable among many to believe that all the problems in the world are the fault of the Bush administration, or the Republicans, or the Americans, depending upon where those people come from and what their political leanings are. But you know, the evidence continues to mount that the Islamists really mean what they say, and that they really are at war against not Bush, or the Republicans, or even just the Americans (and Israelis), but against the entire non-Muslim world. Of course, if one can dismiss all the evidence of Islam's bloody borders and the large numbers and often massive scale of successful terrorist attacks carried out by Muslim jihadis, dismissing a failed bomb plot in Germany — failed because of incompetence, not police or military effort — should be child's play. And since the terrorists were not caught, they can learn from their experiences, and try again, giving the doubters yet another reason to say that there is not a war between the jihadis and the West. Well, unless they are on the wrong train...

Posted by jeff at 4:35 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

August 17, 2006

What Works is Replicated

The obvious result of rewarding methods of terrorism is that you get more of them. The real question is, will it be Hizb'ullah or the new group that is fighting for the Sheba'a Farms area? (hat tip: Pajamas Media)

Posted by jeff at 8:26 PM | TrackBack

August 16, 2006

Standards of Victory

Watching the political fallout of the war in Lebanon has been somewhat amusing. In particular, I note that the West and the Arabs have different standards for what constitutes a victory.

West

All enemy fighters are out of the field. A certain percentage, perhaps 5% may be killed or wounded. The others must be convinced to lay down their arms peacefully and go home.
No enemy civilians killed or wounded; no enemy infrastructure destroyed unless it is on a clearly marked military base; no civilian services in the enemy country interrupted.
The enemy's population comes to love us unreservedly, admits that we were fully justified, and joins future "peace" movements.

Arabs

We're not all dead.

Posted by jeff at 6:36 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack

August 15, 2006

Exactly Backwards

Nadim Shehadi, in an editorial in Ha'aretz (hat tip: Pajamas Media), is completely off-base:

What is the logic that will emerge from this war? If Israel can exist only by destroying the neighborhood, then it's time to declare it a failed state. The Zionist dream has turned into a nightmare and is not viable. If the future holds more of the same, then the time has come to reconsider the whole project. Every state has a duty to defend its citizens, but also it has a duty to provide them with security and the two are different. The prospects are for more destruction, fanaticism, violence and hatred. No unilateral separation can isolate Israel from this, nor can the region or the world live with the consequences. This seems to be the only choice, and Israel must do itself and others a favor and go away.

This is yet another example of twisting terms out of all meaning for political ends. The term "failed state" specifically is used to refer to a state (that is, the government of a country) which is unable to govern its nation (that is, the people and territory). This is clearly not the case with Israel. Indeed, if this were the standard to be applied, that conflict with neighbors invalidates a state, then almost every state must have been a failed state for most of its existence. That clearly makes no sense.

No, it is the rest of the paragraph that sets out Shehadi's true political agenda: Israel's only legitimate option, per Shehadi, is to cease to exist. Again, he turns language on its head: "Every state has a duty to defend its citizens, but also it has a duty to provide them with security and the two are different." And so, of course, per Shehadi, any state that has enemies determined to kill it has already failed — indeed cannot but fail, as any conflict invalidates the state. Having enemies is in and of itself, Shehadi implies, sufficient to make a state "failed", unless that state can unilaterally solve the problem of its enemies (without, apparently, fighting them, as that would clearly involve "more destruction, fanaticism, violence and hatred"). Of course, Shehadi only applies this standard to Israel, and ignores the obviously failed state (in real terms) of Lebanon, the pseudo-states of Hizb'allah and Palestine which have also obviously failed, and much of Africa and southern Asia. Indeed, Shehadi describes Lebanon as "resiliant". No, it is only Israel who must disband because of her enemies. Asking the Jews to politely lay down their arms and accept slaughter, slavery or another millennia of stateless wandering strikes me as somewhat unrealistic, as well as morally abominable.

How this is "do[ing] itself ... a favor" is unclear to me, and I suspect to most Israelis. The editorial continues to go downhill from there, such as by admitting that there was deliberate targeting of civilians, but that it was by Israel. On the matter of Hizb'allah, Hamas and so on targeting civilians deliberately, and on their hiding among civilians in order to ensure civilian casualties should Israel respond to the terrorists' increasingly violent attacks, Shehadi is silent. Near the end, Shehadi delivers his verdict: "If the fundamental moral logic is flawed, then it is time to give up, pack up and go."

He's right, of course, about the consequences of flawed moral logic. He's just utterly, irredeemably wrong about morality and logic. It is not Israel, but Israel's enemies, that should knock it off. And that includes, apparently, Shehadi.

Posted by jeff at 5:46 PM | TrackBack

August 12, 2006

No Such Luck

Tigerhawk asks what it would take to militarize the West. No such luck, I think, and here is why:

There are only three conceivable military acts the jihadis and their supporters could take that would spark war beyond where we are now: invasion of another country, another attack on the scale of 9/11 or greater, or a nuclear/biological/chemical attack on a Western city. Anything short of these would not be considered sufficient to react to other than as we are now, or as a police matter, in the Western public opinion.

Now, invasion of another country wouldn't be seen as a reason to militarize. Israel and India and Turkey, the pro-Western countries actually threatened by Iran or Syria or Pakistan, are all capable of defending themselves. Wars in Russia — how would they differ from Chechnya? Wars in Lebanon or other Arab countries — how would they differ from the war ending now in Lebanon? Invasion or Iraq or Afghanistan would get our ire up, but let's face it, there are no conceivable conventional military scenarios in either country that couldn't be handled by our military as it now is.

An attack on the scale of 9/11 or greater might provide further impetus to the West to fight as it has been; or it might induce the will to surrender amongst a large percentage of the Western public. Unless it was obvious that the only way to root out such an attack were to heavily militarize and attack multiple Arab/Muslim countries simultaneously (that is, unless there were a large number of these attacks in very close proximity in time), I don't see how that changes the current assumptions. If anything, it should just harden current positions.

A WMD attack on a Western city would also not lead to militarization; it would lead to genocide. Having not taken the war seriously in its breadth (including the multiple lines of domestic political attack against operations in Iraq), we would have no other options than to use nuclear weapons against our attacker, if we could figure out whom our attacker was. If we could not, would we hesitate to respond at all, or would we use nuclear weapons against the various terror-supporting states in a spasm of fear and hate? I suspect the latter.

Frankly, absent a large series of large terror attacks, or a dynamic leader on the lines of Reagan or Thatcher, I simply do see militarization as a likely route in the West. I think, instead, we will muddle along until genocide (ours or theirs) is unavoidable.

Posted by jeff at 4:05 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack

August 11, 2006

Flypaper

Soon after 9/11, I came to the conclusion that there were three simultaneous conflicts driving world events. The obvious conflict is between the jihadis and the West. Less obvious was the conflict for control of the West, being argued mostly peacefully (since the end of the Soviet Union and their sponsorship of Leftist terrorist groups) between the statists and the individualists. Even less obvious to Western eyes was the Muslim civil war, which at the time looked to be between jihadis and Pan-Arab nationalists.

Well, the Muslim conflict has decisively altered: the Pan-Arab nationalists have lost. The Palestinians have gone over to Islamism; the Syrians have become little more than Iranian sock-puppets; the Egyptians and Libyans have abandoned Pan-Arabism for simple dictatorship; and the Jordanians seem to be Westernizing as an eventual constitutional monarchy. The battle within Muslim countries now seems to be whether fundamental Sunni jihadis like al Qaeda or fundamental Shi'a jihadis like Hizb'allah will lead the Muslim world. However, the outcome is still the same: each group is fighting against the West to score points with uncommitted Muslims, because Muslims killing Muslims is not seen as a good thing by uncommitted Muslims.

McQ and QandO makes the point that Hizb'allah has gained the upper hand in this struggle, and I think McQ is correct. Hizb'allah is after all killing Jews, and al Qaeda is largely hiding in caves, dying in Iraq, or being penetrated and taken apart in Britain and Europe generally. This gives Hizb'allah major mojo among Islamists, because to them it looks like Hizb'allah is making progress. The strong horse, as it were.

But this has another implication as well. If al Qaeda's role was diminished by a combination of removing their unfettered sanctuary in Afghanistan (despite the failure to subdue Waziristan in the Pakistani tribal areas) combined with al Qaeda's mistakes in Iraq (fighting against the US military directly, combined with killing a lot of uninvolved Muslim civilians), this means that we are winning against the Sunni brand of jihad. It also suggests a path to winning against the Shi'a brand of jihad: first, remove any sanctuaries; second, provide a battlefield where the enemy must fight and cannot win.

So here's my take: to defeat the Shi'a jihadis, we will likely have to take down Iranian and Syrian governments, and one of those two countries (my guess would be Syria) will have to be done in such a way as to ensure that the Shi'a see it as fight here or die.

Now for the bad news: we simply do not have the forces to do this without a massive mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves, or a sustained build-up of forces to the level we had at the end of the Cold War, and we don't have the public will to do either right now. Almost worse, the actions in Afghanistan and Iraq that have been so successful in marginalizing al Qaeda are constantly propagandized by the Left as failures, to the point that most Americans and Europeans seem to take that view as a given (see the note about the struggle between statists and individualists for control of the West). This makes it unlikely that, absent another massive terror attack on the US, we will recover our public will any time soon, and that should we do so, we will have learned the lessons of what can and should be done. I think that is much of what is behind Bill Quick's rant (hat tip: Instapundit) in which he says, among other things:

The first administration of the first century of the American Third Millennium will, in my estimation, be remembered as one of the biggest failures of that century. Bush's great failure was, not invading Iraq, but not weathering the adversity that followed through acts of real leadership, and then pressing on with the necessary military destruction of the other regimes he, himself, named as most dangerous five years ago.

I've been feeling pretty depressed about our mid-term prospects lately. While Bill Quick's hope of a "fast war" would have been possible after 9/11, even as late as early 2003, I don't believe that it is possible now, without greater changes than a single election can bring. We're winning now tactically, and I believe we'll win in the end strategically, but I think we are going to have to go through some very painful episodes before we actually begin as a nation to focus on "victory" instead of "peace" as the marker for when the war is over.

Posted by jeff at 6:36 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

August 9, 2006

Israel's Grand-Strategic Dilemma

Israel has been put into a quandary of vast proportions, and most of its ways out have been foreclosed. When your strategic goal is to live in peace, as I believe is Israel's goal, and your enemies' strategic goal is for you to die, your options are to convince your enemy to abandon their goal, to make it impossible for your enemy to carry out their goal, to destroy the enemy, or to abandon your own goal.

Israel's initial strategy was to prevent Israel's enemy from following through on their goal of the destruction of Israel, by handing the enemy several military defeats of stunning magnitude. In 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973, Israel showed that Arab armies would not conquer Israel under any combination of circumstances. This finally led to Israel convincing both Egypt and Jordan to abandon their goal of destroying Israel. Israel discovered that, perhaps, under some circumstances, they could induce their enemies to abandon their goals.

Israel's earlier victories had two unfortunate outcomes for the long term: Israel had adopted a land-for-peace strategy after 1979, and Israel had taken charge of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, and the populations thereof. The first convinced the less sane of Israel's Arab enemies that they could get concessions from Israel until Israel succumbed, and the second convinced the Israelis that defense could be more trouble than it was worth. While laudable, land-for-peace failed. And the tar baby of the occupation reduced Israel's options dramatically, especially after Israel made a pair of strategic blunders.

In an attempt to pacify and abandon the occupied territories, Israel invited Arafat to take over territories under Israeli occupation. During the floundering peace process that followed this move, Israel abandoned their buffer zone in Lebanon. Those two blunders, which were really just attempts to get the Palestinians and Hizb'allah to abandon their goals, failed utterly, and came to their logical culmination when first the Palestinians, then the Hizb'allah, crossed into Israel from territory previously under Israeli control, but abandoned in the hope of peace, to kidnap and kill Israeli soldiers.

So Israel's options now are very, very limited: they cannot logically seek peace with the Palestinians and Hizb'allah; both have sworn to destroy Israel or die in the attempt, and have done everything in their power to follow through. Nor can Israel simply try to ignore the Palestinians and Hizb'allah: the kidnappings and rockets make that quite clear. So what can Israel do?

As I see it, Israel only has three options: ethnic cleansing, genocide, or a vastly risky war against Iran and Syria. Israel will morally (and correctly) shy away from genocide; the Israelis are not monsters, and know the meaning of genocide more than most. Israel could try ethnic cleansing, evicting the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, and taking southern Lebanon and evicting everyone from there. But even were Israelis not to settle those areas, modern rockets have sufficient range that such a strategy is impractical: Israel would have to continually expand their buffer zone, and Israel cannot reasonably defend such a large area as would be needed to guarantee their safety. This only leaves, in practical terms, a very risky option: war against Iran and Syria.

In real terms, Iran and Syria are the only true enemies that still have power to hurt Israel. By working through proxies (the Palestinians and Hizb'allah), these two countries are pursuing a strategy of bleeding Israel, while simultaneously demonizing Israel for daring to respond, which inevitably (and by the design of the terror groups) results in some civilian casualties. For Syria and Iran, this is a low-risk strategy. Basically, Syria and Iran are banking on Israel's, and the West's, moral sense to keep Israel from defeating them. They may have overplayed their hand, though.

If Israel were to strike Syria, Syria would be defeated in short order. This would make it very difficult for Hizb'allah and the Palestinians to continue to operate, and Iran's logistics would become much more difficult. But Iran would still be able to get supplies through, and if Syria were allowed to recover, it too would eventually be able to resume proxy operations against Israel. While Israel could keep Syria down by force, it cannot do so to Iran, because Iran is too far away for sustained Israeli force projection.

And this leads to Israel's only option against Iran: nuclear genocide.

For Israelis, there is no strategic solution that is a permanent win, except to abandon morality for survival. Absent an American take-down of the Iranian regime, Israelis are in for years more war, and many more threats to their existence, no matter what they do in the short term.

Posted by jeff at 6:56 PM | Comments (4) | TrackBack

August 8, 2006

Conspiracy Theory

There has been a great deal of both smoke and fire lately about Reuters' use (and subsequent laudable retraction) of doctored photographs of fighting in Lebanon taken by Adnan Hajj, and of the possibility of much of the Qana photography (including photographs by Hajj) as probably being staged. I haven't really written about this much, other than to comment on others' blogs, but such lapses are of critical importance. The public's judgement is informed only to the extent that personal experience of the world or the testimony of others informs it. Since our personal ability to be wherever news is breaking is quite limited, and our capacity to directly connect to those who might be where news is breaking is also quite limited, the majority of the information we get about the world comes from the news media, either by watching/reading the news, or by talking to people who have. Indeed, in many cases, the news media barely reports the factual basis of the news at all these days, instead simply having on pundits who analyze the facts, complete with judging which facts are important and to what degree, for us and present us their digested and (theoretically) considered view of what those facts mean.

This is a dangerous situation for a free people, because we often think that we are being informed when we are actually being manipulated. Consider the infamous case of NBC's faked reporting on the "danger" of pickup trucks with side-mounted fuel tanks. This could easily have led to government-mandated safety standards which could have increased costs and decreased safety, because judgements would have been skewed by bad information. But this is only an example of news media being caught faking the news: how many times have they not been caught on issues where public policy was at stake? Or consider "Rathergate"; in an earlier age, without the blogs' fact-checking of the media, this kind of faked news could have changed the results of a presidential election, which no one can reasonably dismiss as small stakes. With that dynamic in mind, it is clear that faked news about the war in Lebanon could easily lead the public, because of its bad information, to pressure the government to make bad decisions about foreign policy. That is, in fact, almost certainly the goal of Hizb'allah.

After all, it's not as if Islamist groups have not been staging news for years. Staging news to create wrong impressions is the very basis of effective Islamist terrorism: create an outrage, manipulate public opinion, force the enemy (us) to retreat or withdraw from shame or fear, repeat. The goal is, eventually, to so weaken the West and Israel that we stop resisting the Islamists, at which point they can take over and establish the Caliphate (Muslim theocracy) and subject infidels (that's us again) to conversion, slavery or death. If this seems extreme, it is. But it's not me being extreme; it is the Islamists. Don't take my word for it: read their thoughts on the topic. (Hat tip and analysis: FrontPage Mag)

So Shane Richmond can make of The Telegraph insinuations or outright allegations of blogs succumbing to conspiracy theories akin to "the moon landing was fake" and "Bill Clinton was profiting from drug running, and had someone killed at the Mena airport to cover it up" or "the US government destroyed the World Trade Center on 9/11" (and sometimes, it does look that way), but that is missing the point. The whole basis of ridicule of such outlandish conspiracy theories is that they are so ludicrous: they rely on a massive cover-up by thousands of people, sometimes over decades, which only the intrepid conspiracy theorist has been able to unravel, due to the slight difference in shading in the bottom left corner of frame 184 of this film. No, really! Look closely! But conspiracy theories are not equally subject to ridicule when there really is a long-running, well-documented conspiracy afoot. And in this case, there is.

I do not believe the media is intentionally co-operating with terrorists. Amend that, I do not believe that most of the media is intentionally co-operating with terrorists. But I do believe that the terrorists have crafted a public relations campaign aimed at defanging Western resistance to the Islamist project to reestablish the Caliphate around the world; that that campaign is aimed at the needs, preferences and biases of Western media; and that Western media has, by and large, been unable or unwilling to see that they are being manipulated.

Posted by jeff at 8:39 AM | TrackBack

August 6, 2006

A Few Moral Questions

Let's say that a young person, Smith, were to get involved in gangs, and were to convince nine friends and acquaintances to agree to a scheme to defraud insurance companies. Let's say, further, that a tenth person didn't actually decide to go along, but was a room mate of one of the ten who did, and got caught up semi-unknowingly in the fraudulent scheme (that is, he knew that his room mate was a gang banger, and was involved in a insurance fraud, but did not do anything to stop it; however, he was not part of the origin of the scheme, nor did he benefit from it). Since this person is important to the questions, let's call him Jones. Let's further stipulate that Jones did not get involved to stop the scheme because he really needed a place to stay, and had no other options, and his room mate would have killed Jones if Jones had made any effective protest of the room mate's actions.

For one minor, fun addition, let us also suppose that Smith hates Jones' neighbor across the hall with all of his being, in part for thwarting some of Smith's previous schemes, and in part because the neighbor across the hall, Davis, is black, and Smith is a white supremacist who openly hates black people even when they weren't involved in thwarting his insurance scams. In fact, if Smith weren't a minor, he certainly would have done hard jail time. Worse still, though, there were some property disputes in the past between Smith and Davis, which resulted in fist fights and lawsuits, and while Davis eventually ceded the property to Smith, Davis was angry enough over the dispute that he (Davis) spent a great deal of time trying to figure out Smith's schemes and thwart them.

Now let's say that, after several different frauds, in which Smith profited handsomely, and Smith's nine acquaintances made tangible gains, that Smith, unbeknownst to his acquaintances, bought life insurance on them. Then let's say that Smith got all of the acquaintances together at Jones' apartment, and started throwing Molotov cocktails (incendiary devices) into the open door of the apartment across the hall (which Smith smashed down on the way in), in order to kill Davis. Now this is win-win for Smith, because he might kill Davis, and if he burns down the building and kills his (Smith's) acquaintances, he gets their insurance money as well. In fact, even if Davis escapes, Smith would still get the life insurance payoff on any of his acquaintances who were killed.

Now, as this is happening, let's say that Davis, instead of just trying to put out the fire in his apartment, first steps across the hall and shoots at Smith with a handgun he keeps. Now for the moral questions:

1. Has Smith done anything wrong? Have the acquaintances done anything wrong? Has Davis done anything wrong? Has Jones done anything wrong?
2. If Davis manages to kill Smith, without hurting anyone else, has Davis done wrong?
3. If Davis kills one of Smith's acquaintances, but misses Smith, has Davis done wrong?
4. If Davis kills one or more of Smith's acquaintances, wounds several others, but misses Smith, has Davis done wrong?
5. If Davis kills or wounds one or more of Smith's acquaintances, and wounds Smith, has Davis done wrong?
6. If Davis kills or wounds one or more of Smith's acquaintances, and kills Smith, has Davis done wrong?
7. Do the answers to any of these questions change is Jones, the semi-innocent room mate, is killed or injured?
8. Does the answer to any of the above questions change if Smith does not succeed in hurting any of Davis' family prior to Davis starting shooting?

Now, there is a ninth question, but it's important to write down the answers to the first eight before you answer the last question, so do that now.

OK, done?

Now, go back through the above questions and make these substitutions:

For Smith, substitute Hizb'allah.
For the acquaintances, substitute the Lebanese who support Hizb'allah.
For Jones, substitute the Lebanese who do not support Hizb'allah.
For Davis, substitute Israel.

9. If you answer the questions now, with the above substitutions, do your answers change? If so, why?

Posted by jeff at 11:17 AM | Comments (2) | TrackBack

August 3, 2006

The Possibility of Peace; The Possibility of Unending War

The Middle East is convulsing, with pressure applied by the US and coalition on the one hand, democratizing (though not liberalizing, which is likely a mistake) Afghanistan and particularly Iraq, and Iran on the other hand, both stirring the pot in Iraq and using its Hizb'allah proxy to attack Israel. These convulsions are large enough that the Middle East will not return to its former shape afterwards. The question remains open, whether the region will change to a more or less peaceful area, in the mold of, say, South America, or instead will change into a region dominated by Iran, exporting jihadis throughout the world from a restored Caliphate.

For a long time, the idea of Middle East peace was tied to Israel, and resolving its problems with its neighbors. And for a long time, no one had a reasonable plan for peace, because Israel's minimum condition is unthreatened existence and its enemies' minimum condition was Israel's elimination as a state, and the slaughter of the Israeli people. But the land-for-peace formula emerged, under which the Israelis would trade captured territory in exchange for peaceful relations, and the US would foster such agreements with bales of cash. This was first tried out in 1979, with the treaty between Egypt and Israel, under which Israel gave back the Sinai (not the Gaza strip, though: Egypt wouldn't take it) in exchange for Egypt not deploying its army into the Sinai. To help this out, the US gave bundles of cash to Israel and Egypt, and stationed troops along the border, inside the Sinai, to keep the armies apart. The stunning thing is that this actually worked, and Israel and Egypt have not fought directly, by proxy, or even by exchanging artillery fire since the agreement. This may have been the one and only true foreign policy success of the Carter administration.

And suddenly, when land-for-peace worked, it became the accepted formula for peace, except perhaps in Israel, where it was only tentatively accepted. But then something happened: Israel's occupation of Lebanon, and Hizb'allah's long war against Israel, was resulting in a constant trickle of Israeli soldiers dying. This was coincident with a maturing Israeli society, which had seen no realistic threats from its main enemies for more than a decade, and had no threat on the horizon, either. Left-wing Israeli peace groups like the "Four Mothers" and Peace Now actually succeeded in convincing Israelis that the occupation of Lebanon was morally wrong, and that land-for-peace would work for Israel. Israel pulled out of Lebanon, and for six or seven years, had relative quiet on the northern border.

While no agreement could be reached with Syria, it looked for some time like a solution could be found for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. Until Arafat renounced not only Israel's best possible offer — essentially everything Arafat wanted except the "right of return" — but in the process started a terrorist campaign against Israel from within the occupied territories. That was, really, such a heavy blow to the idea of negotiating land-for-peace that the land-for-peace formula seemed unlikely to recover. But Ariel Sharon, a hardheaded warrior and Israeli hero, came up with a new idea: if Israel could not negotiate land-for-peace, and could not bring itself to slaughter the Palestinians, perhaps it would work if Israel simply disengaged. That is, Sharon built walls and fences along the border with the Gaza strip, and began doing the same with the West Bank. Israel dismantled the Israeli settlements in Gaza, and withdrew from the area, leaving it entirely in Palestinian hands.

And then came the second body blow to land-for-peace: the Palestinians converted Gaza into a full-scale base for terror and rocket attacks against Israel, utterly rejecting any efforts to improve their economic or political situation and essentially declaring that to the extent Gaza was a Palestinian nation, it was a nation at perpetual war with Israel.

But it was the one-two punch of first Hamas, then Hizb'allah, crossing the border into Israel and killing/capturing Israeli soldiers that has destroyed the land-for-peace formula, probably forever. It is absolutely clear that the Palestinians and Hizb'allah will not rest until they or Israel are destroyed utterly. It is likely that Syria will continue to foment action by Hamas and Hizb'allah until they are held accountable, likely by the destruction of their military (again) and their economy (again) by an outside attack. While Israel may have a cold peace with Egypt and Jordan, and might be able to get the same with Lebanon if Hizb'allah is destroyed, there is simply no point in giving up land, particularly strategic land like the Shebaa farms (a part of the Golan Heights) in exchange for empty promises and agreements that will never be implemented on the Arab side.

How far gone is the idea? Far enough that members of the Four Mothers agree it doesn't work. (Hat tip: Wretchard) Far enough that the defense minister prosecuting the war against Hizb'allah and Hamas, a former leader of Peace Now, is finally turning up the level of violence and realizing that this is an existential struggle for Israel. Far enough that Ehud Olmert is backing off, at least for now and under strong public pressure, on unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank.

So now what are the possibilities of obtaining peace in the Middle East? The only alternatives to obtain peace are the destruction of Israel, or the destruction of the Islamists. The main obstacle in the way of destroying Israel is that Israel is powerful enough that it cannot be destroyed by its enemies, absent their acquisition of nuclear weapons or Israel's acceptance of a Muslim majority with full citizenship. Israel would use its own nuclear weapons to prevent their enemies from obtaining nuclear weapons. Israel will never grant the "right of return" and attendant demograhic suicide. So the obvious logical conclusion is that Israel is not going to be destroyed.

But how to destroy the jihadis? The first thing that must be recognized is that the jihadis are really just one manifestation of a broader ideology: Islamism. Essentially, Islamism is the ideology of restoration of the Caliphate (Muslim equivalent of the Holy Roman Empire) by creating a single Muslim empire, and then the expansion of that empire to cover the whole world, with the emphasis on killing or converting non-Muslims, and imposing Sharia law universally. The jihadis are the "fast war" expression of Islamism: essentially this is a continuation of the violent conquest techniques pioneered by Mohammed, and long neglected by Muslims, who after being thrown back in Europe, and stopped Asia and Africa, resorted to petty barbarism, piracy and the like instead. The jihadis are out to conquer their enemies (moderate or somewhat-secular Muslims, Jews, atheists, Christians, Pagans, and, well, everyone but the Islamists really) by force of arms. The "slow war" version consists of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and a lot of the European and American groups (like CAIR, for example, or the Muslim Association of Britain). These groups have decided that creating a unified mindset among Muslims (by intimidation and terrorism, generally), and taking control of new areas by immigration and constant demands for more and more rights for themselves, and more and more restrictions for others, would be a more sure and less resisted route to establishing global Islamic hegemony. The Islamists have the same goals as the jihadis and no objection to the jihadis' methods; they simply believe there is a less risky way to obtain those goals. This is critical because the threat will not be ended until the Islamist ideology is ended; simply killing the terrorists is insufficient, because the Islamist groups will create new jihadis wherever and whenever they are useful.

The key to the jihadi groups is that they cannot be successful without the sponsorship of states. Afghanistan and Iraq were both sponsors of jihadis, and we have removed those countries' sponsorship of the jihadis. But they were not the only sponsors of jihadis; there are three others. Iran is probably the biggest sponsor of jihadi groups, giving training, equipment, money, cover and sanctuary to many jihadi groups. The combination of Iran's quest for nuclear weapons and its support of the jihadis is the largest obstacle to peace at present, and the largest threat to the other nations of the world (including the Russians, who for some reason won't stop arming people who are sworn to destroy them).

Syria and Pakistan are both sponsors of jihadi groups as well, but in a more specialized way than Iran. Syria sponsors Hamas and Hizb'allah, among others, who are specifically dedicated (for now) to attacking Israel. Pakistan, similarly, sponsors groups largely dedicated (for now) to attacking India. In addition, Pakistan gives sanctuary to the Taliban and al Qaeda, and parts of the Pakistani government almost certainly directly aid those groups.

In the short term, ending the jihadi threat will require destroying the government of Iran and preventing another Islamist government from taking their place. If this can be done prior to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, simply bringing down the government and making a peace with conditions about the type of government that Iran can have should be sufficient. "Simply" sounds like the wrong word until you consider what happens if we wait for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. In that case, either the US will have to invade and occupy Iran, which is a very much tougher problem than Iraq, or the US or Israel will have to destroy Iran. Israel would have to use nuclear weapons to do this. The US might have to do so, although the US has the option to use conventional bombing and limited invasions (of Khuzistan and the area around the Straits of Hormuz) as long as Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons actually in its posession. (Once Iran obtains nuclear weapons, they would use them to defend against any US attack, and that would lead to an overwhelming nuclear response by the US.)

It might be necessary, in order to end the immediate threat, to destroy the government of Syria, and to pressure Pakistan into allowing the US to operate with impunity in the provinces bordering Afghanistan, or to actually take on and defeat the jihadis inside of Pakistan. If Iran were taken out, it is possible that the Syrians would seek a Libyan solution: surrender in exchange for integration and aid. Similarly, absent Iran, Pakistan might be more inclined to take on their internal jihadis, whose resources would be much diminished by the overthrow of the Ayatollahs.

Over the long term, the problem is largely Saudi funding of Islamist groups, mosques and madrassas outside of Saudi Arabia. To end this longer-term threat, though, there are three methods that can be applied short of war, and because of this I frankly do not think that we will need to use military means to resolve the longer term problem. The first alternative is pressuring Saudi Arabia to end its support and founding of Islamist groups; this will probably not work, because the world needs Saudi oil, and that gives them a vast ability to resist such pressure, and the Sauds know that doing this will mean their overthrow (many of the Saudi people are very, very fundamentalist). The second method would be to develop either alternate energy sources to oil for most purposes (nuclear is the big option here, and of course would be bitterly resisted, ironically, by Western environmentalists), or cheaper methods of extracting oil from oil sands and oil shales. Either of those would essentially bankrupt the Sauds in short order. Finally, we can develop antibodies within the liberal democratic societies. For example, the Islamists would find little ground in the US and Europe if we were to deport Islamists who were not citizens, not allow further Muslim immigration, and in general make it socially taboo to be an Islamist. This is actually fairly unlikely, absent another attack or five on the scale of 9/11, because tolerance of others' beliefs (even of violent beliefs, as long as the violence is never carried out) is a major keystone of liberal democratic societies. In any case, some combination of these three methods in some degree should be sufficient to end, mitigate or at least contain the long-term Islamist threat, so long as they do not revert to force.

It is also possible, although I now think it unlikely, that George Bush's gamble of bringing democracy to Iraq as a seed for democratizing the Middle East will actually work, and these cultures over time could learn to compromise and live with others peacefully. I think that, had we set about liberalizing Iraq and Afghanistan, instead of democratizing them, we would have had better long-term chances for peaceful change. On the other hand, this would likely be regarded by most Muslims (even moderate Muslims) as intolerable: it would require changing long-standing cultural practices and, more importantly, reinterpreting key parts of the Koran. Maybe after democratization we can try for liberalization, but I think it far more likely that the nascent democracies will return to strong-man rule fairly soon for cultural and religious reasons.

So there it is. In a nutshell, the price of peace in the Middle East is the destruction of Iran's government by force of arms, and possibly the destruction of Syria's government by force of arms, combined with the destruction of the (by then weakened) jihadi groups, and any new state sponsors who might be feeling lucky. The price of long-term peace is ending or containing Islamism. And the consequence of not doing this will be wars for decades, perhaps centuries, to come.

It is going to be a very violent, bloody and unpleasant couple of decades.

Posted by jeff at 1:30 PM | Comments (4) | TrackBack

July 28, 2006

A Matter of Time?

A few years ago, a Muslim man shot up an El Al (Israeli airline) counter at LAX. Authorities said it wasn't terrorism.

A few years ago, two Muslim men went on a sniping spree in the Washington, DC area, killing several. Authorities said it wasn't terrorism.

Now a Muslim man has shot several Jewish women in Seattle, killing at least one. Undoubtedly, authorities will say it wasn't terrorism. (They have already said that there is no indication the shooter was linked to a terrorist organization. Their powers of investigation must be superhuman.)

The problem with these kinds of denials by the authorities is that people have a sense of self-preservation, and they're not idiots. Why is that a problem? What is the smallest group that we can act against and still be safe from this kind of attack? The authorities seem to be letting it narrow down to "Muslim men", because they are not facing up to the reality of what kind of people are committing these attacks.

My bet: we'll soon learn that the shooter in Seattle was from a middle-class to wealthy family, and was entirely secular, but started attending a Saudi-funded mosque and became very religious and pious, and also quite judgmental. That has, after all, been pretty much the pattern of this kind of attack in the US and Europe to date.

But the thing is, these attacks will almost certainly continue, and intensify. And then when we decide to take preventive measures, because it's becoming crystal clear that the government doesn't have the stomach for it, against whom will we turn? Not against just the actual terrorists, because we don't have any information on who they are. Instead, we will turn against Muslims in general, because we can't get much closer than that, and the authorities won't get that close.

I hope I am wrong, but I fear that it is just a matter of time until there start to be actual attacks on Muslims in the US, rather than just in CAIR's fever dreams.

UPDATE: What I fear right now is this: "But this guy does belong to a "larger organization", the largest terror organization in the world called ISLAM."

And this: "If anyone practices Islam they are a terrorist, again pure and simple. Time to get all of them out of the country, voluntary or by force, including deadly force. This shows you can't trust any of the slime balls."

If these comments become widespread belief, there will be much more blood shed than is necessary. We have to take our PC blinkers off — that is to say, the government has to do so — and solve the problem of figuring out which are the dangerous fanatics in our midst. Otherwise, eventually, people will take matters into their own hands. And in the end, vigilantism is both effective at solving the original problems, and dangerous for any innocents in the wrong place, or wrong skin, at the wrong time. I'd rather avoid that, thanks.

Posted by jeff at 10:16 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack

July 27, 2006

Ambulances or Troop Carriers?

Here is footage of fighting in the Gaza strip. It's a little unclear to me exactly what is going on; it looks almost like the Red Crescent ambulance is being ambushed. Regardless, as the firing breaks out, a UN ambulance comes up, and the fighters climb in and are driven away.

Now there is more than one explanation possible here. Yes, the UN could be actively assisting the fighters. Or the ambulance could have been stolen, or the driver could have been forced by a gunman inside the vehicle to pick the fighters up. But here's the thing: Israel has to know that fighters are using ambulances to get around, in order to not be targeted by the Israelis. It doesn't really matter how the ambulance came to be in enemy hands; it is enough that the enemy uses ambulances as troop transports. Because Israel will target ambulances in the middle of a fight, and in fact there have been several news stories over the years where Israelis have fired on ambulances, and these are always presented to show the Isrealis as barbaric for firing on ambulances.

But who is the barbarian, really?

Posted by jeff at 11:48 PM | TrackBack

July 26, 2006

Israel Might Just be Serious About Destroying Hizb'allah

Transit Umbra posts an interesting take on where Israel's invasion of Lebanon is going.

I actually have been coming around to thinking that Israel intends to utterly smash Hizb'allah. It would be relatively simple for Isreal to race along the roads and take the whole South, but in doing so they would be operating with an enemy in their rear, because large number of Hizb'allah fighters and their weapons and ammunition would be bypassed in bunkers behind the advance.

Hizb'allah seems to have been counting on Israel fighting the same war as they did in 1982, and Hizb'allah was prepared for that. (Some commenters seem to be operating under the same assumption.) In fact, I would say that, had Israel fought this way, we would already be seeing signs of major disaster, as Israeli forces would be being cut off and defeated in detail by the "left behinds". For those who have been paying attention, this seems to have been part of Saddam's strategy as well, with the Saddam Fedayeen coming out to fight the supply units after the combat units passed by. It might have worked in Iraq had we not had a lot of flat terrain in which to maneuver, as well as unexpectedly-tough logistics units. (Despite the tragic wrong turn that led to the killing and capture of supply soldiers, most well-known being Jessica Lynch, there was also the battle at "Moe", "Larry" and "Curly", where supply troops fought hard to enable the breakthrough into Baghdad that collapsed the Saddam regime.)

The way to avoid this is to destroy the enemy stronghold by stronghold, tunnel by tunnel. It's not a style of war Israelis or Americans are used to seeing any more, but it is very, very effective. There is simply no way that Hizb'allah can fight from the areas that Israel has already captured. As a result, Israel has captured less territory, but has destroyed the enemy's capability entirely in the area it has captured. (The exception being where Israel has raided out from its salient and then withdrawn; those areas have gone right back to Hizb'allah control.)

The wild card is how long Israel is prepared to fight. Most people seem to be making the assumption either that Israel's will to fight will crumble over enemy civilians being killed, or that the US will force Israel into a cease fire. In either case, the assumption is that Israel has a week to finish this. That of course, has been the assumption for the last two weeks, and there is no evidence of either weakness in Israel's will or in the US's support for Israel's actions. Nor is there much evidence that Israel would succumb to US pressure in any case; Israel regards this conflict as existential for them, and I tend to think that they are right: if they fail, Hizb'allah becomes the government of Lebanon and Israel can expect more, and more brutal, attacks than heretorfore.

But Israel can destroy, not just degrade, Hizb'allah, critics' cries to the contrary notwithstanding. The reason for this is that Hizb'allah depends on public perception even more than Israel does. If Hizb'allah's opponents within Lebanon see Hizb'allah as defeated, they will fight Hizb'allah's attempts to gain hegemony over Lebanon. If Hizb'allah's supporters see Hizb'allah as weak, they'll look for stronger groups to defend them. If Iran and Syria see Hizb'allah as ineffective, they will withdraw support for Hizb'allah and put it to other uses. Israel can bring all of this about, but it will be costly and difficult.

To destroy Hizb'allah, Israel must occupy southern Lebanon, destroying all Hizb'allah infrastructure there. Israel must so weaken Hizb'allah elsewhere that Hizb'allah cannot rationally be seen as having beaten the Israelis. It will help if Hizb'allah's top leaders, particularly Nasrallah, are killed, and an "accidental" bombing of the Iranian embassy in Beirut — strike that, a fully public (but not pre-declared) bombing of the Iranian embassy in Beirut — could bring that about. Let Iran openly declare war, or back down and be seen as cowards. Either way is more advantageous to Israel than giving Hizb'allah an invulnerable base in Iran. Israel must only leave Lebanon when non-Hizb'allah troops capable of and willing to fight Hizb'allah's attempts to regain control, should that be necessary, are in place; Israel cannot allow Hizb'allah to declare victory as they did when Israel last pulled out of Lebanon.

If Israel does these things, Hizb'allah will be seen, in Osama bin Laden's memorable phrase, as a weak horse, and will lose its public support. That loss of support will destroy Hizb'allah much more completely than merely killing Hizb'allah's trained soldiers can do.

Regardless, I wish Israel well. They have been too battered for too long and for too little reason.

Posted by jeff at 5:48 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack

July 25, 2006

Three Horns of a Trilemma

The dilemma of a free people in wartime is generally shown as a continuum between Security and Liberty. To gain more Security, you have to sacrifice more Liberty, and any gain in Liberty likewise constitutes a loss of Security; at least, that is the general claim, and I'm willing to take it at face value for present purposes, even though it leaves out the messy reality of inefficient, ineffective, or incompetent governments. But that view is quite obsolete, now, for Western nations; there is another element of sacrifice that must be put into the pot: Humanitarianism.

To be quite blunt about it, there is no fundamental threat to the security of the United States that is not immediately solvable. Don't believe me? What's your example? Let's take the hard and intractable problem of terrorists who hide amongst civilians. There are a number of scenarios here, and none of them fundamentally threaten the United States, or pretty much any Western nation.

In Lebanon, Hizb'allah has so deeply embedded itself in the civilian infrastructure that troops (I'm being more generous to Hizb'allah's terrorists than is really merited) are barracked in civilian houses; armories are in civilian houses; observation posts are co-located with UN observation posts to make it difficult for Israel to strike without hitting the UN post; spokesmen and decision-makers are housed in the largest city in Lebanon, often amongst either civilians or government officials; many of Hizb'allah's capabilities are "owned" by the Lebanese army, rather than by Hizb'allah itself. How can the problem of Hizb'allah terrorism be solved? Surely, Israel cannot destroy Hizb'allah, because doing so would mean thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of dead Lebanese civilians.

Here is how Israel can solve the problem: it can kill, easily, thousands or tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of Lebanese civilians, if it must do so to solve the problem. If Hizb'allah retreats to Syria, Israel can do the same to Syria, if necessary, and so on. The only thing that stops Israel from doing this is its Humanitarian nature.

Like most Westerners, Israelis cannot imagine a condition where they would be willing to slaughter innocents, presumed innocents, possible innocents, even outright enemies in such numbers. This is a good thing, most assuredly, because if it were not so, those people would certainly have been slaughtered in every Arab country surrounding Israel, and in the occupied territories as well: no nation on Earth has resisted the number, severity and consistency of attacks on its civilians as has Israel. All to be called "evil" and worse, by people who would be far more barbaric in the same circumstances.

Similarly, with Iran's support of terrorists and pursuit of nuclear weaponry, the US could end the problem in about half an hour and with zero US casualties. It would take a bit longer if we wanted to avoid using nuclear weapons, and we would take a few casualties, but the result would be much the same. How much of an insurrection would have followed Saddam Hussein's fall had we simply leveled every city and killed everyone other than coalition troops? We could have done so; it is within our capacity.

Fortunately for the world, and for our conception of self, we have not had to resort to that level of barbarity. Anyone who thinks that we are not capable of it, though, should first read up on Dresden and the Pacific campaign in WWII, the last time we were called upon to exercise our barbarianism. I assure you, we were nearly as peaceful in 1938 as we are today, yet seven years later we leveled entire cities with our only second thought being whether we could get enough bombers and incendiary bombs in place to be thorough about it. Afterwards, we slept the sleep of the Just. We can do so again, and will do so if pushed to it.

If you think that maybe some Western nations, perhaps the sainted France, are actually beyond this, it only indicates that you haven't been reading about France's actions in the Ivory Coast over the last few years. As to Germany, no comment should be needed. Other Western nations are similar, though for many their tests have been so far back in time, or they have been so overmatched, that it's not readily apparent. The West is civilized not because we are above bloodshed, but because we have collectively crammed our arms in blood up to the shoulders for hundreds of years. The survivors have learned, mostly, how to live with each other.

For the Arab world, the ability to slaughter wholesale, as opposed to personal service, is a very recent development. That ability was developed in the West, as war after war drove our astoundingly creative and inventive forebears to develop astoundingly creative and inventive new ways to protect themselves from the old ways of being killed, followed by developing astoundingly creative and inventive new ways to kill each other. The Arabs simply bought the old leftovers the West no longer needed, as have the Africans. Suddenly, between the end of WWII and the middle of the 1960s, the Arabs went from resourceless barbarians in the trackless desert, killing each other with knives and small arms, to barbarians in a trackless desert over a sea of oil, killing each other with tanks and aircraft and chemical weapons.

But they were stopped cold by Israel, which had partaken of Westernism in fact, rather than by distant observation. In war after war, even when taken in the utterly worst possible military posture (1973), the Israelis mopped the floor with Arab nations outnumbering it something like 50 to 1 or more. Unlike the Arabs, Israel could build the weapons it used: Israel had the understanding of the Western way of war; the Arabs had only the tools. That is still true. But the Arabs have in consequence fallen back on their barbarian natures, updated with suicide bombs and rockets fired from the roofs of hospitals. They have not absorbed the Western way of war, so they have not absorbed the necessity of living without killing each other wholesale. They only have the tools of wholesale slaughter, not the morality to prevent themselves from engaging in it.

So the question John Podhoretz asks is, will we be capable of giving up, at least for a while, some of our Humanitarianism, to preserve our Security and our Liberty? My question is slightly different, because I assume that we can give up our Humanitarianism and still sleep the sleep of the Just; we've done it before. My question is, will we give up our Humanitarianism a little bit early, or altogether after the balance between Liberty and Security becomes moot, because we have neither?

Posted by jeff at 10:02 PM | TrackBack

July 23, 2006

If I Were in Israel's Place

I would wait until Nasrallah (leader of Hizb'allah) has a press conference — even if this is after the end of the current fighting — and then bomb it. These are, after all, announced in advance, and the criticism Israel would get for brutality (and even more, from the press, for killing reporters) would do less damage than leaving Nasrallah living, while at the same time making foreign enemies think twice about fighting Israel. As a further plus, any enemy of Israel would then have to carefully reconsider his press manipulation strategy.

Posted by jeff at 9:29 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack

Why Aren't we Going After Insert Enemy Here?

QandO has a post that notes: "Interestingly, one of the recent arguments from the left, as some of our liberal commenters here have echoed, is that we should've gone after Iran. they are the real bad guys, and all we're doing in Iraq is simply making the Iranians stronger."

I heard this meme tried out on (Fox, I think; I was listening on the radio, and it could have been one of several channels) today, with regards to Hizb'allah: of course we should have gone after Hizb'allah, because they are the real enemy. Going after Iraq just makes terrorists stronger&tm;.

I don't buy it. The reality is, we cannot go after every enemy, much less every unstable or failed regime, at once. I truly believe that we are at the beginning of a shakeup in international affairs unseen in its scope since the Treaty of Westphalia, and seldom ever seen in history. The whole World of Order Friedman was talking about (hat tip: QandO again) is nothing more than the Westphalian order: states have borders and sovereigns, and cannot be legitimately interfered with within the borders of their territory. The Westphalian order is collapsing. Pretending that borders are always meaningful because some set of people have agreed to them, that we know what a civilian and a combatant are (and that they are necessarily distinct), or that any given issue will have a point of consensus where everyone agrees what should be done and are willing to do it — these were the long-standing games of international order, but they cannot be meaningful any more. The terrorists and their supporters have so blurred the lines that the Westphalian order is fast falling into ruin.

What this means in practical terms is that there are going to be wars and battles and other forms of conflict for the next fifty or even hundred or more years, if we are fortunate enough not to first see a genocide along the way, to determine whether Islam really will be the world's single religion, and after that (and assuming the jihadis do not win), to determine how power can be legitimately exercised short of war, and what the valid reasons are for going to war. We will not likely see the end of this, and our children might not, either.

So to pretend that we have the unlimited resources to attack every enemy and solve every challenge immediately is simply fantasy. Well, more precisely, it is simply a rhetorical gimmick useful for beating on one's political opponents. It does nothing to help us get to a new world order (there is a phrase which the elder President Bush probably regrets, both for its prescience and for its difference from what he thought we were moving to). In fact, if anything, it makes it harder to solve these wicked problems.

This will get worse, far worse, before it gets better.

Posted by jeff at 9:07 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack

July 22, 2006

Detailed Map of Lebanon

Anyone interested in following the news and actually locating points in Lebanon may find this detailed map of Lebanon useful.

UPDATE: And Falling Rain can help to locate towns. (Hat tip: Belmont Club.)

Posted by jeff at 8:36 PM | TrackBack

Examining Israel's Gound Campaign

There has been a lot of punditry and analysis about the Israeli campaign in Lebanon, and with the likely imminent start of a major ground campaign, I was looking for an analysis of what form the attack might take. Finding none, I've decided to do it myself. The military uses an analysis framework known as METT-T: Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time. The analysis is from Israel's point of view, since Israel will have the initiative.

Mission

Israel has several major and minor goals. How they prioritize them is unclear, but the goals themselves are pretty obvious. These include: stopping the shelling of Israeli cities for the long term; removing Hizb'allah from the border and from rocket range of Israel; degrading or destroying Hizb'allah's fighters and leadership, as well as their arsenal; cutting off or weakening Iran's and especially Syria's influence in Lebanon; recapturing the two soldiers whose capture started the current conflict (more a morale and propaganda goal than a military goal); preventing the widening of the war to Syria and/or Iran. Some of these goals can simply not be obtained without troops on the ground for an extended period. For example, Hizb'allah has hidden significant weaponry in tunnels that are not visible except close up — you cannot find them from the air. Without destroying those tunnels, Israel will be back in the same position they are now within just a few months.

Enemy

There are two immediate enemies or potential enemies in Lebanon: Hizb'allah and the Lebanese army. In addition, Israel must be immediately concerned with how Hamas and the Syrian military. In an extreme case, Israel has to be concerned with what Iran might do.

Hizb'allah is the major enemy, of course, and it should not be underestimated. Hizb'allah has about 6000 full-time fighters, who are probably among the best Arab light forces in the world. A few days ago, they forced the Golani Brigade — well, a portion of it, actually — to withdraw under fire. That is no small feat, even if the Israeli intention at that time was reconnaissance, as it likely was. (On a reconnaissance mission, you don't want to engage decisively, because you want information, not a kinetic fight.) These are most likely concentrated on the Israeli border to engage the Israeli ground troops as they come across, then stage a fighting withdrawal.

In addition to this, Hizb'allah can probably call on up to 30000 additional fighters, of varying levels of training and with varying equipment. Hizb'allah's greatest weaknesses are lack of mobility and lack of air assets.

In addition to the rockets, anti-ship missiles and small arms that have been in evidence, Hizb'allah has mortars, artillery, RPGs and heavy anti-tank missiles. They are a formidable force.

The Lebanese army is basically a non-factor in operational terms. There are about 40000 troops, but they are lightly armed and badly trained. (This is also one reason why they have not taken on Hizb'allah for control of the South.) They have said that they would fight alongside Hizb'allah if the Israelis invade, but they would be quickly crushed if they did so.

A more pressing problem for Israel is that the Palestinians could cause trouble. In Gaza, that's not a problem, because the Israelis are already fighting there (though that fighting does tie down Israeli troops). In the West Bank, however, any fighting would mean more Israeli troops would be diverted and unavailable for the northern front. This would not be a serious threat to the Israeli plans, but it could be significant if the Syrians intervene.

The Syrians probably wouldn't intervene. While Syria has a large military, it is not terribly well-equipped and it has a long history of utter disaster when facing Israeli forces. Syria likely wants this to remain a proxy war. If Syria does get involved, it is a huge problem for Israel, because there is both the need to defend Golan, and the need to prevent Israeli troops in Lebanon from being flanked. But the biggest threat would be from Syrian chemical weapons, which could devastate Israel's civilian population. Of course, that would lead to an Israeli nuclear devastation of Syria, so hopefully Syria's leaders are sane enough not to go that far in aiding their Hizb'allah proxies.

The Iranians, other than the couple of hundred Pasdaran who are working with Hizb'allah in Lebanon, is too far away to intervene directly. (I count the Pasdaran as essentially Hizb'allah — or Hizb'allah as essentially Pasdaran, I suppose — and so include them above as integral to Hizb'allah's well-trained troops.) The one way the Iranians could become involved is by long-range missile strikes. Since this would, again, lead to an Israeli nuclear response, I don't think Iran is insane enough for that. They're happy to let Hizb'allah and Syria take the blows while Iran keeps working to get their nuclear program completed. Then, all bets are off, but that's not (hopefully) yet.

Terrain/Weather

Weather is not an issue this time of year.

The terrain is very favorable to the defender. The area north from the Israel-Lebanon border is extraordinarily hilly, rising to the Lebanon Mountains towards the Mediterranean coast, and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains on the border with Syria. Between these is the Beka'a Valley, the enemy's rear area in Lebanon (the enemy's strategic rear is in Syria).

The Litani River runs through the Beka'a, then turns West for the sea some 40km North of the Israel-Lebanon border. A number of smaller, generally seasonal rivers run East-West from the Lebanon Mountains down towards the Mediterranean.

The road net is somewhat underdeveloped except along the coast.

Troops

The Israeli military is large, with over 100,000 ground forces alone, plus perhaps half a million reserves. Israel began mobilizing its reserves several days ago, and recently called up significantly more (Fox said 5000 or more) troops. Israel cannot call up reserves for any length of time without hurting their economy, so they only do it in very limited conditions, when war is impending and will be big. The number of callups is still relatively small; my expectation is that they will grow as Israel commits to action, because Israel can operate for sufficient time on its regular forces to get the reserves into action.

Israel's troops are among the best trained and most competent in the world. They have never lost a war, and even when they lose battles, it is at high cost to their enemies. The Israeli army is stupendously well equipped, with natively built assault rifles and tanks, and significant imported arms of all kinds (mostly from the US).

Israel has probably the second-best air force in the world, trailing only the United States. Their equipment is numerous, capable and well-maintained. Their pilots are well trained and very, very good. (The last Israeli war saw an exchange rate of 80 enemy aircraft destroyed in the air for one Israeli aircraft, and that one was destroyed by ground fire.)

The Israeli navy is small, with 3 submarines, 3 corvettes, a dozen or so small missile boats, and a number of patrol craft. It is sufficient to blockade Lebanon and insert commandos, but insufficient for large-scale operations of any kind.

Time

The callup of reserves limits Israel's time horizon, and the more troops called up, the more this is true. Israeli reserves are otherwise known as civilians, and Israel only has about 5 million total civilians, including children and the elderly. Imagine the US economy if 30 million citizens were put under arms!

The second internal limit on Israe


	A strange loop.

January 29, 2007

Yes. Yes, it Was

January 7, 2007

Unsurprising to Me

December 19, 2006

Among the Reasons I am Unsuited for Diplomacy

November 20, 2006

There's a Word for This

October 20, 2006

Then What

October 9, 2006

Crossing the Rubicon

September 29, 2006

Target! Tank: 8600 meters. Sabot.

September 20, 2006

Chavez Who?

September 19, 2006

Full of Crap

September 13, 2006

Seventeen Words

September 12, 2006

Armies of Davids

How do you Achieve Something?

September 11, 2006

Five Years

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 11,

from Boston, Massachusetts, to Los Angeles, California, crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center with 92 people on board.

UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 175,

from Boston, Massachusetts, to Los Angeles, California, was the second hijacked plane to strike the World Trade Center, plowing into the south tower. Two pilots, seven flight attendants and 56 passengers were on board.

UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT 93,

from Newark, New Jersey, to San Francisco, California, crashed in rural southwest Pennsylvania, with 45 people on board.

PENTAGON

CREW

CREW

PASSENGERS

CREW

PASSENGERS

CREW

PASSENGERS

September 6, 2006

Establishing Ground Rules

Carpe Diem

September 4, 2006

It Was Only a Matter of Time

September 3, 2006

It's Worse than That, It's Physics, Jim

September 1, 2006

Anything at All

Is There a Better Way?

August 31, 2006

More Trouble with Maps

August 18, 2006

Evidence Mounts

August 17, 2006

What Works is Replicated

August 16, 2006

Standards of Victory

August 15, 2006

Exactly Backwards

August 12, 2006

No Such Luck

August 11, 2006

Flypaper

August 9, 2006

Israel's Grand-Strategic Dilemma

August 8, 2006

Conspiracy Theory

August 6, 2006

A Few Moral Questions

August 3, 2006

The Possibility of Peace; The Possibility of Unending War

July 28, 2006

A Matter of Time?

July 27, 2006

Ambulances or Troop Carriers?

July 26, 2006

Israel Might Just be Serious About Destroying Hizb'allah

July 25, 2006

Three Horns of a Trilemma

July 23, 2006