January 29, 2007
Yes. Yes, it Was
There are some things so stupid that only an academic could believe them. One would think that being an expert on French history would have taught him the dangers of appeasement. If he has deeper reading in European history that led up to France, he should understand the long-term danger posed by radical Muslims. Moreover, he very quickly gives away his fundamental misunderstanding of the threat and the "overreaction" he derides:
Certainly, if we look at nothing but our enemies' objectives, it is hard to see any indication of an overreaction. The people who attacked us in 2001 are indeed hate-filled fanatics who would like nothing better than to destroy this country. But desire is not the same thing as capacity, and although Islamist extremists can certainly do huge amounts of harm around the world, it is quite different to suggest that they can threaten the existence of the United States.
Well, the enemy (at least he calls them that!) demonstrated the ability to kill our civilians in large numbers, and their willingness to do so is not disputed even by Professor Bell. Is the Professor then suggesting that we wait until they have the ability to kill us in total before ending the threat is something other than "overreaction"? Is the Professor suggesting that waiting until the only possible way to end the threat is genocide is somehow measured and well-considered reaction?
Finally, and above all, this is exactly the reason we are fighting a slow war: to prevent the kind of genocide that would be necessary if we failed to act until the enemy has the capacity to annihilate us.
January 7, 2007
Unsurprising to Me
Wizbang notes that the Sunday Times is reporting Israeli plans for a nuclear strike on Iran to cripple the Iranian nuclear program. While this report may or may not be true, it's certain that the possibility is unsurprising to me, since I have been writing about it off and on for at least two years. But it's likely that the Sunday Times report is not any advanced warning of imminent attack; more likely it's a strategic leak designed to make Iran think seriously about the possible consequences of its intransigence.
December 19, 2006
Among the Reasons I am Unsuited for Diplomacy
Were I the US lead negotiator at a conference such as this, where the North Koreans basically demanded that we recognize N. Korea as our equal in standing, give them all kinds of money and goodies (including a nuclear reactor and energy help in the meantime), back off our strangling of their counterfeiting (of US money) operations, and accept N. Korean nuclear weapons before they would even agree to talk to us, I'd toss their lead negotiator a Sacagawea dollar, advise he use it to get a sandwich because he's looking a little thin, and walk out. But that's just me.
November 20, 2006
There's a Word for This
And that word is "insurrection," and it is cause enough for the Mexican military to go in and arrest every person involved in this phony government. Of course, given the situations in Oaxaca (about which see Mark in Mexico) and Chiapas and along the US border, it's doubtful the government will take the action necessary to prevent Mexico from sliding into a more serious revolution; the federales are slowly losing control of the country, bit by bit.
October 20, 2006
Then What
Fran Porretto has an interesting post on the decreasing supply of people supporting our war effort as a good policy. There is a question the war skeptics, and moreso the outright anti-war or (more usual) anti-Republican-as-President-and-whatever-he-might-do, have failed to answer: if we fail in Iraq, whether outright or by declaring victory and leaving the job unfinished, then what?
We cannot reasonably hope for the enemy to go (or stay) home; were that true, the 9/11 raids would not have happened. Nor can we sustain a policy of occupying the oil fields for the benefit of Western nations and fighting off all comers, because we are morally opposed to robbery in that sense (odd, given the income tax, but there it is). Nor can we sustain a policy of simply bombing to destruction any nation that sufficiently antagonizes us, as witness the situation in N. Korea in 1994 and in Iran today. Nor could we sustain a policy of sequestration, as Fran has advocated for in the past. Nor could we depend on others, either moderate Muslims or other first-world allies, to go into the Middle East and fight the jihadis on any terms.
Even ignoring the cascading failures that would inevitably follow in Afghanistan, Pakistan and around Israel; even ignoring the damage to our reputation which confirming the Vietnam precedent would do, after decades of trying to salvage our reputation, and the further threats, provocations and attacks that would invite; even ignoring how our military's morale would collapse — even ignoring all of this, what could we do to defend ourselves?
If we fail in Iraq with our current policies, which is certainly possible, and we can not change the situation by occupying the oil fields, or by killing the enemy and a lot of civilians from afar, then what? We could certainly surrender, which is exactly what we would we be doing if we cocoon ourselves and depend on defense. But the most likely course is that we will withdraw into a cocoon, periodically striking out ineffectually, as we tear ourselves apart internally for a while.
Meanwhile, the next real crisis will come not with a falling tower, but with fallout; not with war, but with genocide. I have yet to hear anyone who suggests leaving Iraq to its fate come up with any strategy to prevent this.
October 9, 2006
Crossing the Rubicon
In detonating a nuclear weapon in an underground test, North Korea has provided a clarifying event. While there seems to be a lot of discussion about who is to blame (focusing on Clinton v Bush or N. Korea v China v S. Korea v Japan), the reality is that it does not matter, in strategic terms, how North Korea came to this point, only that it has. While there is still some small room for denial (sure, they have nuclear weapons, but can they deliver them?), the nations of northeastern Asia must now add the certainty of North Korean nuclear weapons to their strategic calculations.
While this situation is useful for China if everything rolls their way, Japan and South Korea in particular (and to a lesser extent Taiwan and Russia) have to reconsider their interests rather dramatically. The North Korean regime bases its legitimacy on a religious worship of military force. (In a very real way for the North Korean leadership, this test is an act of worship, the programs developed only through starving the people are an act of sacrifice to their demonic and insane gods.) But the North Korean state is teetering on the brink of collapse, brought about largely by the famines induced by the leadership's constant brinksmanship and failure to allow any but the most pure Communist theory into such practical areas as agriculture and transportation.
Would the North Koreans, in the act of their eventual collapse strike out at South Korea and Japan, even at China? Does massive food aid, per South Korea and Japan for the last decade, stave off the crisis or merely prolong it? Does giving food aid make the North Korean military more capable, or make the population less likely to revolt in desperation, or both, or neither? What does North Korea plan on doing? What would they do if their plans were frustrated? And in all cases, the neighboring countries must be asking themselves two questions: how does this affect me, and what can I do to make the situation fall more in my favor.
My guess is that the "sunshine policy" is now dead letter; neither Japan nor South Korea can afford to give aid to North Korea hoping either to buy favor or to buy time: the favor is clearly not forthcoming and the time has clearly passed. China will likely not halt food and fuel shipments to North Korea, even though that is the one move that anyone other than the North Koreans could take that would be most likely to bring about an end to the North Korean nuclear and missile programs.
I would also assume that Japan will re-militarize. At least to the extent of building up their military, and particularly their air force and anti-missile systems (which they are developing in cooperation with the US). Japan might very well develop nuclear weapons themselves, or purchase them from the US or France (we'd probably not sell, but the French probably would). If Japan were to go down this route, they could have sophisticated and deliverable nuclear weapons within a very short time. They have the technical expertise, the sources of fuel and the industrial base necessary. I suppose we'll know in two years or less.
South Korea, in a similar position to Japan but complicated by land borders, might well be too paralyzed by fear of North Korean collapse to do anything at all productive. They would likely cut off aid to the North (see above), but would be far less likely to develop nuclear weapons. However, if China were to provide North Korea with sufficient political cover, and especially if the US were to withdraw from the Korean peninsula, South Korea might feel the need for nuclear weapons of its own. In that event, North Korea is much like Japan: it would have working, deliverable nuclear weapons within two to three years.
Taiwan is not directly threatened by North Korea's move. However, if China succeeds in brandishing North Korea as a deniable threat to keep others from interfering in the region, Taiwan could see this as prelude to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Whether Taiwan's internal resistance (provided by the former mainland Chinese who fled to Taiwan in 1948) to military procurement and self-defense would weaken is an open question. Whether Taiwan would acquire nuclear weapons is even more doubtful. It is likely that Taiwan's policies would not change over this, unless China becomes a much more looming threat than they are today.
For the US, the worst thing we could do would be to withdraw our troops from South Korea. While I generally favor doing so (the South Koreans can defend themselves), such a move at this point would encourage those seeking nuclear weapons (particularly Iran) as well as the North Koreans themselves, to think that the US will backdown from even a miniscule nuclear threat. That would result in much worse consequences down the line, because any minor crisis between the US and a nuclear or nuclear-seeking state would immediately be escalated into a serious risk of nuclear war. Just because it's the worst thing we could do does not mean that we won't do it. Sometimes we are that dumb.
The second worst thing that we could do would be to do more than make pro forma diplomatic noise. We don't want to hand North Korea a propaganda victory, and Dave's advice (linked above) to not panic is good advice. We should continue the policy of politically minimizing North Korea, making sure that no one is unaware of North Korea's fundamentally-evil regime, but not giving North Korea the legitimacy it seeks. In other words, we would be making a mistake if we change anything about our negotiations policy based on this; that would be escalating North Korea's position and stature, which largely derives from how much they get other nations to bend to their will. And even if their will is simply to get us talking again so that they can walk out on us again, we buy their regime life simply by taking them too seriously in the international arena.
I do think that we should pressure China to crack down on North Korea, and that we should (as part of that and independent of that) encourage Japan at least to obtain a nuclear counterweight to North Korea and China. It also seems to me to be a good idea to issue a declaration that any nuclear or radiological explosion in the United States, Europe, Japan, or the territory of any other US ally would be met with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear attack on North Korea, on the assumption that North Korea either undertook the attack or supplied the weapons, and that this policy will be extended to any other nations (such as Iran) that develop nuclear weapons and support terrorism. Pakistan can be left out of that list, or added in, as circumstances require it. (We'd be wiser to leave Pakistan off the list, I think, at least while Musharraf is in power.) The idea there is to replace NPT's failed attempt with a more brutal (but more likely workable) form of pressure.
Speaking of which, the NPT is dead and we should stop pretending it is alive. We should announce that given the obvious failure of the NPT, we will not rely on its mechanisms alone or even primarily to ensure that states like Iran remain non-nuclear. Rather, we will use all of the instruments of our power to that end, and will ignore the NPT mechanisms where they are not producing concrete results in meaningful time. Yes, this means that we should explicitly make clear that we would use force if necessary, without regards to the UN's positions or anyone's negotiations, to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
Posted by jeff at 10:00 AM | TrackBackSeptember 29, 2006
Target! Tank: 8600 meters. Sabot.
There are five basic classifications of weapons: melee weapons, missile weapons, mines, chemical weapons and nuclear weapons. A melee weapon is a sword, knife, club or similar instrument that does its damage by being bashed against the enemy, pushed into him, or some similar manner of employment. Missile weapons are weapons that throw some object away from the launcher, and do their damage when (if) that object hits its target. For the purposes of what I want to talk about the rest of the types are academic.
Missile weapons themselves can be operated in two distinct modes: direct fire and indirect fire. Direct fire means that you see your target, adjust for distance (a projectile falls due to gravity as it travels from its launcher) and other factors (some modern systems adjust for humidity and reported cross-winds half-way to the target!), and fire a projectile at that target. The principle is the same for bow and arrow, rifle and bullet, or cannon and shell. Today, of course, computers do much of the work for tank guns and artillery, such that a modern American tank can reliably hit targets with one shot at 4000 meters. (Which is why our invasions of Iraq and Kuwait were so seemingly easy: the enemy was destroyed before he could come within his own 2000 or so meter effective range.)
Indirect fire, on the other hand, is a mathematical game. Rather than taking an enemy and putting your gunsight on him, you determine where the enemy is in relation to you, do some math, and fire a shell along a parabolic arc which (hopefully) intersects that point. For that reason, you can shoot at targets 20-50 miles away with artillery (and anywhere in the world with large missiles) with a pretty good chance of hitting the enemy. Modern guided (usually GPS or laser) artillery shells have an excellent chance of hitting the target with one or two shots at 30 or more miles, if there is a person near enough to observe the target.
The primary difference between direct and indirect fire is simply that of seeing the enemy. Because a tanker or infantryman sees the enemy, he can choose his own targets. Because artillerymen cannot see the enemy, their fires have to be directed by observers who can see the target. But the US has just changed the equation in a fundamental way: the US has introduced a tank shell that has scored a kill at 8600 meters!
In other words, US tanks equipped with the MRM can now offer direct fire on targets that it cannot observe directly, giving the benefits of direct fire (pick an enemy and kill him without outside assistance) and indirect fire (range and difficulty, to the enemy, of returning fire or defending themselves) in one platform.
This is as much of an advance over WWII as WWII was over the US Civil War. In other words, once this is in full-scale use, there is not a conventional army in the world, regardless of size that can expect to win against the US Army. Which means we had better get very, very good at counter-guerilla work, because we're going to be seeing a lot more of it in the future, at least until we have an adversary rich enough and sophisticated enough to keep up, should that ever again happen.
September 20, 2006
Chavez Who?
Here's the thing about rants like Chavez' UN spew: it's just the squeaking of the impotent, inconsequential and unimportant looking for a little attention. He wants to feel big. It's kind of like my four year old when he's really tired and wants to get his way: he cannot get it by persuasion or moral force, so he lies on the floor kicking and screaming. But of course, Chavez is all grown up, on the outside. Which just takes us back to impotent, inconsequential and unimportant.
UPDATE: And I gotta love the idea of Noam Chomsky "loving" America like an abusive husband "loves" his wife. He had to beat her up: it's for her own good.
September 19, 2006
Full of Crap
Hossain Derakshan opines
that Iran should develop nuclear weapons:
[E]ven if Iran becomes the most peaceful, secular and progressive, yet still independent state on the planet, the U.S. would be unable to tolerate it. The U.S. would seek new excuses to topple Iran's government and install their favorite instead.
Quick: name the last secular democracy that the US invaded.
For this reason, I believe Iran needs to produce nuclear weapons as a defensive mechanism, to deter the U.S. today and the ever-expanding and equally energy-hungry China tomorrow.
Here's the thing: if Iran were a secular and progressive country, I would have no objection to them developing nuclear weapons. I don't mind Israel, India or (formerly) South Africa having nuclear weapons. I wouldn't mind Taiwan or Japan or South Korea or Australia or Brazil having nuclear weapons. I only mind Pakistan having nuclear weapons because they are so politically unstable, and I only mind China having nuclear weapons because I am unsure of their insularity. As long as China doesn't attack its neighbors, I have little problem with China having nuclear weapons at all. I only have problems with Russia having nuclear weapons because they don't have a very good nuclear safety record, and I worry that they will lose a few to terrorists who are more concerned with getting the weapons than the Russians are with keeping them from being taken.
I worry about North Korea having nuclear weapons, and would worry more if I were more confident that the North Korean weapons work, or if I didn't feel that we could engineer North Korea's fall (and are trying to) via financial and political pressure. I worry enough about that that I would be willing to declare an embargo against anything coming out of North Korea by land, sea, or air and would be willing to go to war to enforce it, because North Korea is not beyond selling a nuclear weapon to terrorists in the way that Kos is not beyond attacking President Bush for any failing, real or imagined.
But Iran is an expansionist theocracy which has been attacking the US, overtly and covertly, for 27 years, and which is fighting an undeclared low-level war against the US in Iraq as we speak, and which recently fought (undeclared) against Israel alongside Hizb'allah, and which is otherwise acting inimically to US interests immediately, and to my personal interests (to the extent they diverge from US interests) over the long term. So I don't just worry about Iran having nuclear weapons: I find the prospect unacceptable.
(hat tip: Glenn Reynolds)
September 13, 2006
Seventeen Words
In an offhand comment, in seventeen words, Wretchard managed to say what I've spend perhaps a few thouseand words in a dozen posts, as recently as yesterday, trying to say: "[T]he prospect of asymmetric warfare becoming symmetric that is the principal danger in the war on terror." At the point where we see Westerners adopting the enemy's organization, we will know our governments have failed to protect us. At the point where we see Westerners adopting the enemy's organization, we will know our civilization has failed to balance survival and liberalism.
September 12, 2006
Armies of Davids
If the Army of Davids thesis is true, and I believe it is, there are some things we should be seeing happen as a natural consequence. In particular, there are two types of NGOs we should be seeing form. The first type is organizations formed around the idea of nourishing Westernization and modernization in the Arab world, and the second type amounts to vigilante groups (operating internally in the West) and private armies (operating externally to the West).
Organizations intending to nourish Westernization and modernization in the Arab world (and probably in Africa and possibly elsewhere) would essentially be a private effort to "shrink the Gap." Such organizations would probably initially consist of providing security for Western firms or local people trying to do things like building a modern economy (banks, factories, and so on) or culture (schools, churches, and so on). They would almost certainly evolve into bringing in additional investments and programs. This would actually cause a huge amount of disruption, because it would bring massive cultural change to areas not noted for their tolerance to cultural change. On the other hand, governments like those of Iran, Iraq, and possibly Jordan would welcome the idea of having stronger economies, and would likely be at least somewhat willing to take the short-term rise in violence for the long-term rise in economic activity.
Organizations built around a more aggressive model of confronting Islam would likely take two forms, and might take a third. One form would essentially be vigilantes, working domestically to uncover jihadis and Islamists, with the intent being anything from pressuring authorities to arrest and charge such people, to trying to drive them out. This type of group would form if people felt endangered by the Muslims in their community, and didn't feel that the police could or would protect them. Something like this,
but with a different objective.
The second type would be private armies, operating abroad to kill or capture enemies where the government could not or would not. This could be something like the Abraham Lincoln Brigade of the Spanish Civil War, with people volunteering in nations at risk, or it could be something more like WWII's USFIP. Such an organization might adopt the structural organization of guerilla (and terrorist) groups: small cells operating independently. It might instead operate more like a brigade, operating as a large unit with detachable parts. Much about its structure would depend on whether it were operating under legal sanction (such as by obtaining a letter of reprisal) or were extra-legal.
The really scary form, that hopefully will not come about, is the organization that adopts the terrorists structure and methods to "terrorize the terrorists". There is some evidence that such a group might be forming in Britain.
I think that seeing organizations like the hospitallers, but non-religious, is a good thing, as it would lead in the long term to a more tolerant society, as well as making business and social changes safer in the interim (though likely with a lot of fighting, but now on both sides instead of only the enemies' side). If vigilante organizations form, it will be because of a lack of confidence in the government's ability or willingness to enforce the law, which would be a bad thing (though the groups themselves would not necessarily be a bad thing). If private armies form to operate in areas where the government can't or won't go, that would be a good thing, as long as they didn't turn into terrorists themselves, in that it would remove sanctuaries the enemy currently enjoys.
The question I have is, which of these groups are already forming, somewhere out of sight?
How do you Achieve Something?
When I read posts like this (also found here, with more intelligent comments), I wonder how people who could write such a thing ever achieve any goal they set. In my world, you set a goal, along with a cost you are willing to pay to attain that goal; formulate a strategy to attain the goal, complete with some set of observable metrics that tell you whether you are progressing towards attaining the goal; design a plan to implement the strategy, complete with alternatives and options that would be invoked based on the situation as it changes; and set about performing the tasks called for by the plan. Mike Reynolds' ('sideways') world does not appear to work that way, and some of the comments on the Donklephant post indicate that there are some whose worlds are even more divergent from mine.
Let's take the specific incident that Reynolds writes about: Pakistan's recent agreement to withdraw from tribal areas. Reynolds, like Roggio (the link in the last sentence), has a very pessimistic take on this, most prominently indicated by his title: "Did We Just Lose?" (I am cautiously hopeful.) Another indicator of deep pessimism is this:
Our goal was to deny Al Qaeda a safe haven in the near east. If this deal is what it looks like, we appear to have failed.If this deal is what it looks like, we aren’t even back at square one: we’re wishing we could get back to square one.
In fact, if this deal is what it looks like, we just lost a war.
Um, OK, let's take it from the top. The President set the national goal for the war on September 20, 2001:
Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. ... [T]he only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.
In the same speech, the President began to lay out the strategy he would follow:
We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat.
Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.
[snip]
We will come together to improve air safety, to dramatically expand the number of air marshals on domestic flights, and take new measures to prevent hijacking. We will come together to promote stability and keep our airlines flying, with direct assistance during this emergency.
We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home. We will come together to strengthen our intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they strike.
We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America's economy, and put our people back to work.
The strategy was made very explicit in 2002. Obviously, two parts of the plan were to eliminate the enemy's safe haven in Afghanistan, and to eliminate a major sponsor of terrorism in Iraq. Both of these have been done.
So if Reynolds' and Roggio's most profound fears are true, and the enemy acquires a new sanctuary, a more difficult sanctuary for us to attack than was Afghanistan (and now would be the time to remind everyone that most people who knew anything about Afghanistan thought that the enemy's Afghan sanctuary was more or less immune to serious attack), does this mean that we have lost the war, that our goals are unattainable? Hardly. Indeed, such an outcome, while a setback, would not even mean that our strategy was obviously wrong. It might merely indicate that Michael Ledeen's constant refrain, "faster please," should get more attention than it has heretofore. It might indicate that our strategy needs to be compressed in time, or that we need to modify or even completely rethink our strategy. It does not mean that we have lost.
But there is another side to this as well. What if this development opens the way for US troops to go into Waziristan and fight the enemy directly, with the enemy having no border as easy to hide behind as they do between Afghanistan and Pakistan? What if this development means that the tribal leaders are going to stop their cross-border raids and kick out the terrorists? What if this development is a way for Musharraf, knowing the agreement will be violated, to develop a domestic political consensus to commit real force to the area for the first time? Would this then even be a setback, in retrospect?
Unfortunately, we have developed a serious analysis problem. Our communications are so fast that we get almost instant news of what happens in even the remotest corners of the globe. But we only get that news, generally, if it is in the interest of mainstream journalists to provide it, and when they do, they often get the whole point so completely wrong that the information that is communicated is more false than true. This leads to bad, but rapid, analysis; to incorrect, but rapid, responses. We need to learn to sit back and let events unfold without feeling we have to respond immediately to each and every one. And we need to think through all the possible consequences, not just the most facile rationales or the most immediately horrifying or gratifying possibilities. First reports from the field, goes the military dictum, are generally wrong. We need to remember that.
But more importantly even than that, we need to remember that some goals are important to achieve. We need to remember that goals often have costs that need to be paid, and in this case, while the ashes were still settling over Manhattan, we put a very high price indeed on this particular goal. The world situation has not so changed as to make the goal unreasonable, or unnecessary to achieve. So we must attain our goal.
And we must remember that strategies sometimes are not quite right, but that it is better to do something that makes incremental gains than to do nothing, or worse still to pretend to be doing something while really just hoping the problem goes away. Worst of all is to pretend to be doing something useful while actually doing something guaranteed to make it harder, even impossible, to obtain our goals. If our strategies aren't quite right, we need to adjust them. We do not need to scrap them. If going to the store to get something turns out to be a bad idea, because that store doesn't carry that particular item, it doesn't mean you go to the park instead; it means you find the store that has the item you need.
Further we must remember that any plan we make will be flawed, and even if nearly perfect, will require many changes of direction as contingencies change the situation we are responding to. Worse, we could have to rethink the plan if it is not working. You don't throw up your hands if the store is sold out of the item you want; you get an alternate brand, or you go elsewhere, or you wait for the store to restock. Finally, the enemy gets a say in the situation, too. Imagine trying to get milk from the store while being shot at, and you are closer to the problem the military has.
It's possible, of course, to just throw up your hands at the slightest impediment and throw a screaming fit. Most two year olds do it. I've know forty year olds to do it. But those are people who don't get what they want, and who alienate everyone around them along the way. This war is important; this goal must be achieved, if we are to have a hope of leaving a peaceful, free, and prosperous life. And for that reason, we must not throw up our hands at every setback, must not throw a fit when things are imperfect (I'm picturing Andrew Sullivan right now). Instead, we must get the job done, and where we are making mistakes, we must fix them.
Reynolds' approach, though, to declare defeat when something happens that might be bad, or might not, is hardly a way to set about that process. At least, not if we care to win.
September 11, 2006
Five Years
I has been five years since the 9/11 raid changed the world. Five years since 2996 Americans and foreign guests were murdered in the most spectacular attack on America since 1941. Five years since the idea of the end of history died in all but the most deluded minds. Rather than talk about the day, adding meaningless chatter to meaningless chatter, I would simply like to remember the dead, in two ways. First, in the extended section of this post, is a list of the victims. Second, throughout the day, the events as they happened, taken from the 9/11 Timeline, will be posted at the corresponding times.
12:01 AM | TrackBackSeptember 6, 2006
Establishing Ground Rules
Brian Dunn is worried, as am I and as are many who want the experiment in Iraq to work, that the US will cut and run, as soon as the Democrats gain any measure of power. While this might or might not be good for Democrats' electoral prospects (depending on what follows after and how it's spun), it would be disastrous for our ability to fight against terrorism. Not fighting now, after such a commitment of national effort, would be tantamount to utter surrender, and both our friends and our enemies would know it. This is true even if you call it "redeployment" instead of "retreat", and it's as true of Afghanistan as of Iraq.
We would be abandoned by Muslim allies in droves, because they would make accurate judgments about their life and death chances with or without us. No Europeans would come forward to aid us any more, because they would make accurate cost/benefit choices, too. Iran would become massively emboldened, as would Syria. Iraq would devolve into a bloodbath, and probably suffer invasions from Iran and Syria and possibly even Turkey.
The problem is that President Bush can only control events, to the extent even he can control events, until the end of his term. After that, it's up in the air. But there is a way to powerfully influence events now and in the future, that is so easy of a call that I cannot believe we haven't done it. Why haven't we established 50 year leases on a couple of bases in Iraq, with the intention of basing an Army division and an Air Force squadron or two there more or less permanently? It would certainly make our intentions clear, and would make it much harder for future administrations to undo our commitment to changing the Middle East.
Carpe Diem
Bill Roggio analyzes Pakistan's apparent surrender to the jihadis in Pakistan's tribal territories. (hat tip: Instapundit) Roggio ends with deep pessimism:
The jihadi dreams of al-Qaeda's safe havens in western Pakistan have become a reality. And the gains made by the Coalition in Afghanistan have now officially been wiped away with the peace agreement in the newly established Islamic Emirate of Waziristan.
He might be right, but there is at least one circumstance under which Roggio may be dead wrong. If the government of Pakistan is washing its hands of Waziristan, and saying that it doesn't care what happens there — in effect, if the government of Pakistan is withdrawing its sovereignty from Waziristan — then the US has an opportunity to crush this troubling haven for jihadis, including apparently bin Laden and Zawahiri. Because you see, there is an open declaration of war against those responsible for 9/11, and these guys qualify.
The whole reason that we haven't taken out these sanctuaries before now, is that Pakistan has wanted to deal with the problem themselves, which would have the nice side benefit of keeping Pakistanis from rising up out of fury at an American invasion. But if this agreement opens the door for us, I say we grab the opportunity. It could be a chance we've never had before, and won't easily get again.
September 4, 2006
It Was Only a Matter of Time
It has come to this in Britain. The only surprise to me is that it took so long, and that it was in Britain rather than France or the Netherlands. Why are they adopting the tactics of the terrorists? Because they work.
The next step will be when they begin to carry out their threats. The authorities will crack down much harder on non-Muslim Britons attacking Muslims than they have on the Muslims for their attacks and incitement; such is the nature of the "white guilt" cult. But these crackdowns will lead to increased, not decreased, attacks on Muslims as more people become convinced that the government will not protect them against a thuggish Muslim subculture. Unfortunately, the non-thuggish Muslims will also be attacked. They will radicalize, in self defense. And this will drive the cycle downwards.
I have long maintained three things: 1) people will fight the war against the jihadis if their governments don't; 2) Europe will have a civil war (Muslims v everyone else) in our lifetime; 3) Europe's politics, at the next tipping point, will go radically right wing to the same degree that they have been radically left wing since before WWII. I believe that this is evidence that the first point is starting to come about, and that it will lead to the second.
September 3, 2006
It's Worse than That, It's Physics, Jim
So, why would Iran be pursuing nuclear fuel enrichment and a long-term reactor plan when the don't have the uranium domestically available to sustain it, but do have the oil and natural gas energy to sustain their energy usage far longer and at a lower price? I mean, if Iran's motivation were to break the dependence on imports of refined petroleum (they mostly just produce the raw materials), they could build refineries, yes? And if their concern were with maximizing revenue through oil sales abroad, they would still want to minimize costs to generate those revenues, because what they would really need to maximize is profit, yes? So if there's not a rational case to be made for Iran's nuclear program, then what could they possibly be using it for?
I mean, they've threatened to "wipe Israel off the map", and that was at the follow-on conference to the one where they were talking about how to have a "world without the Great Satan". They've blocked the IAEA from inspecting sites that Iran would have a perfect right, under the NPT, to operate, were they only for a peaceful nuclear program. They've stalled negotiations repeatedly, and rejected incentives that directly address the goals stated by their negotiators (such as having a domestic energy infrastructure not subject to foreign disruption) while bringing up terms and conditions unrelated to a peaceful energy program.
What could they possibly have in mind? And why does this remind me of something in recent history? Could it be that Iran, like North Korea, is seeking nuclear weapons? Could it be that since Iran is pursuing the same tactics as North Korea, in a similar strategic environment and with similar sources of expertise and materiel, that Iran is pursuing the same goal that North Korea was: a nuclear arsenal?
My guess is that, yes, Iran is doing exactly that. In fact, I think that the evidence is as strong or stronger than it was against Saddam. (And before you object that Saddam did not have an active nuclear program, I would ask you to go back to the time prior to the invasion and find people who consistently thought that. In the post-9/11 world, if you behave like a megalomaniac desperate to acquire nuclear weapons to use against America, we're likely to believe you. So why should we take the Iranians at their word, when if we are wrong, the inevitable outcome is nuclear genocide?) And the real question is, what do we do about it? There is a small window, maybe 2 years, maybe 5, maybe less than 1, in which we can definitely prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons and prevent a nuclear war. There is another window, perhaps 5 years, maybe even less, from when the first window closes, during which we can end the Iranian threat without the destruction of Israel or a US or European city, but this would likely entail a nuclear war. (For example, if Iran has a few nuclear weapons and threatens Israel, almost a certainty, would Israel hesitate before obliterating any chance of that arsenal being used? When the alternative is the utter destruction of Israel? How sure are you?)
After that ten years, I think that the odds rise steadily to a near certainty that Iran would, directly or through proxies, attempt to destroy Israel with nuclear weapons, possibly first decapitating US political leadership in order to disorganize and delay any American response, while pleading with the world to "prevent an unnecessary nuclear catastrophe" caused by US "aggression".
In other words, I think we are looking at several curves of probability: that Iran possesses nuclear weapons (near zero now, rising to near certainty within ten years, and likely much less), that America and/or Israel believe that Iran has nuclear weapons (probably trending slightly ahead of the Iranian possession curve), that Israel or the US would pre-empt the Iranian weapons program they believe to exist (well below the belief curve, but rising sharply as certainty rises, eventually surpassing the belief curve), and the probable casualties curve (the multiple of the US/Israel belief curve with the US/Israel action curve). The point of maximum danger is when the probability of Iran's possession of a nuclear weapon becomes high enough that the US/Israel belief curve equals or exceeds the probability of Iran having nuclear weapons and the probability of action curve equals or exceeds the belief curve. At that point, it is a certainty that the US or (more likely) Israel would act to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and given that the belief would be (at that point) that Iran does have nuclear weapons, the odds of a nuclear first strike on Iran would be staggeringly high. Ironically, the odds go up if the media succeeds in significantly delaying action against Iran, because that means that the probability of action curve would be sloping more steeply at the end, which would indicate that the attacker (Israel or the US) would feel in far more imminent danger than they would had there been a steady escalation towards a pre-emptive attack.
In other words, I believe that if we do not act to destroy the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapon well before that possibility can be actualized, then we drive the probability of nuclear warfare up dramatically. I am of the opinion that we would be better off to minimize the curve that indicates probability of a nuclear attack than to minimize the probability of the curve that indicates a war. The maximum likely casualties would be lower that way.
September 1, 2006
Anything at All
Today is the second anniversary of Beslan, which was the event that took me from "we must defeat terrorists" to "we must destroy the jihadis and probably the Islamists utterly". And Gerard's pieta, which I linked, is probably the saddest thing I have ever read. I have four sons, and yes, I would do anything, anything at all, to keep them out of that picture.
Is There a Better Way?
Dave at The Glittering Eye commented (in a post containing much more) that he would rather consolidate our intelligence functions back into the military. (Dave also makes a mistake: the military and State Department both had intelligence offices before the CIA was formed, though the military's OSS was used as the basis of the CIA.) Mark at ZenPundit defended civilian intelligence agencies.
What I really have a problem with, and what the 9/11 Commission recommendations that created the DNI did not solve, was that there is no separation between gathering and evaluating intelligence. Let me start over, because this is something that's been bothering me for a long time.
At its root, we say "intelligence" to mean a process with many distinct parts: gathering raw data of many kinds from many sources (open source like magazines, electronic signal interception, overhead imaging, human spying, documents captured in military raids and so on); deciding what data to gather; evaluating the value of sources and methods; aggregating raw data into summary chunks; analyzing those summaries to identify useful information; and using that information to derive conclusions about the state of the world, and in particular, our enemies. Moreover, we seldom distinguish between the reliability of intelligence on capability (usually high) and intent (usually very, very low).
I divide these functions up into a few small categories: gathering data, evaluating the dependability of the data, using the data to create information, and using the information to make decisions. The last category is necessarily distributed throughout the government by its very nature: we have different people making decisions on different things. Right now, every other category is largely under the control of the DNI, and largely (with the exception of much of the data gathering) in the CIA. I would organize the intelligence community somewhat differently, but first, we need to understand why our intelligence agencies are structured as they are: Pearl Harbor.
The entire structure of our intelligence agencies — military and civilian, agency- (CIA, FBI) or department- (State, Defense) based — is structured to prevent an enemy from acquiring the capability, and acting on the intent, of using their military to attack an unprepared United States. At that function, our intelligence agencies are supremely good, probably unmatched except by the British and possibly the Israelis.
But our intelligence agencies are unable, due to the very structure that makes them good at preventing a Pearl Harbor repeat (think 9/11 with bombers instead of terrorists), from institutionally understanding non-state actors the way they can understand states. And since that is structural, nothing short of structural reform will fix it: Dave is absolutely correct there. But I do agree with Mark, also: we don't want this to be a purely military function.
What I would suggest as an organizational model is a broadly-distributed network with minimal bottlenecks and control nodes. There should be small agencies geared to particular methods of intelligence gathering (electronic intercept, covert spying, reading the newspapers of the world, etc) or particular types of information (military construction, equipment design, agricultural output, talking points in negotiations, etc). These agencies should feed the information and the source of the information into a single agency whose job it is to evaluate the intelligence's credibility based on past experience with that source or method rather than on how "believable" the intelligence is, and to sanitize the information to include the evaluation of reliability, but remove any information that would identify the source or method used. This evaluated information could then be used by analysis cells attached to every policy decision maker, as well as feeding into certain field operations (most notably, the military). Organizations with particular needs (battlefield and theater intelligence for the military, political intelligence for an embassy) would retain the ability to gather intelligence themselves, and use it directly, while also feeding it into the evaluation agency for the rest of the government to use.
Covert warfare should either be a military mission, be directed by the Congress through letters of marque and reprisal, or abandoned.
This structure would have several benefits: it would be more adaptive and quicker to respond to critical information; it would be less politicized, because policy makers couldn't bury intelligence that didn't fit their world view; since each agency would be small, they would be able to individually take larger risks in gathering information or making a call on what intelligence means, because they bureaucratically have much less to lose; it would be harder for the enemy to track what we are doing; it would be easier for us to track what the enemy is doing, even a non-state enemy (perhaps especially a non-state enemy); we would be less likely, due to redundancy, to miss critical information. There would be downsides, too, particularly competition between agencies if more than one has access to the same kind of intelligence gathering abilities (like more than one human spying agency, or more than one agency operating satellites), so care would have to be taken in that regard.
But overall, I think we would be far better served by such a set of organizations than by the set we have now.
August 31, 2006
More Trouble with Maps
During the Iraq invasion, I posted The Trouble with Maps, which pointed out that if you looked at a map and listened to the Iraqi spokemen's explanations of what was going on, you noticed that the Iraqis appeared to be defeating Americans at locations invariably closer to the capitol than the previous day's "defeat". Now Lorie Byrd graphically illustrates the progress in having the Iraqi army take control of Iraq. It is the kind of demonstration that just blows the media narrative into its component lies. Which is why you won't see these maps on news programs.
August 18, 2006
Evidence Mounts
I realize that it is fashionable among many to believe that all the problems in the world are the fault of the Bush administration, or the Republicans, or the Americans, depending upon where those people come from and what their political leanings are. But you know, the evidence continues to mount that the Islamists really mean what they say, and that they really are at war against not Bush, or the Republicans, or even just the Americans (and Israelis), but against the entire non-Muslim world. Of course, if one can dismiss all the evidence of Islam's bloody borders and the large numbers and often massive scale of successful terrorist attacks carried out by Muslim jihadis, dismissing a failed bomb plot in Germany — failed because of incompetence, not police or military effort — should be child's play. And since the terrorists were not caught, they can learn from their experiences, and try again, giving the doubters yet another reason to say that there is not a war between the jihadis and the West. Well, unless they are on the wrong train...
August 17, 2006
What Works is Replicated
The obvious result of rewarding methods of terrorism is that you get more of them. The real question is, will it be Hizb'ullah or the new group that is fighting for the Sheba'a Farms area? (hat tip: Pajamas Media)
Posted by jeff at 8:26 PM | TrackBackAugust 16, 2006
Standards of Victory
Watching the political fallout of the war in Lebanon has been somewhat amusing. In particular, I note that the West and the Arabs have different standards for what constitutes a victory.
West
All enemy fighters are out of the field. A certain percentage, perhaps 5% may be killed or wounded. The others must be convinced to lay down their arms peacefully and go home.
No enemy civilians killed or wounded; no enemy infrastructure destroyed unless it is on a clearly marked military base; no civilian services in the enemy country interrupted.
The enemy's population comes to love us unreservedly, admits that we were fully justified, and joins future "peace" movements.
Arabs
We're not all dead.
August 15, 2006
Exactly Backwards
Nadim Shehadi, in an editorial in Ha'aretz (hat tip: Pajamas Media), is completely off-base:
What is the logic that will emerge from this war? If Israel can exist only by destroying the neighborhood, then it's time to declare it a failed state. The Zionist dream has turned into a nightmare and is not viable. If the future holds more of the same, then the time has come to reconsider the whole project. Every state has a duty to defend its citizens, but also it has a duty to provide them with security and the two are different. The prospects are for more destruction, fanaticism, violence and hatred. No unilateral separation can isolate Israel from this, nor can the region or the world live with the consequences. This seems to be the only choice, and Israel must do itself and others a favor and go away.
This is yet another example of twisting terms out of all meaning for political ends. The term "failed state" specifically is used to refer to a state (that is, the government of a country) which is unable to govern its nation (that is, the people and territory). This is clearly not the case with Israel. Indeed, if this were the standard to be applied, that conflict with neighbors invalidates a state, then almost every state must have been a failed state for most of its existence. That clearly makes no sense.
No, it is the rest of the paragraph that sets out Shehadi's true political agenda: Israel's only legitimate option, per Shehadi, is to cease to exist. Again, he turns language on its head: "Every state has a duty to defend its citizens, but also it has a duty to provide them with security and the two are different." And so, of course, per Shehadi, any state that has enemies determined to kill it has already failed — indeed cannot but fail, as any conflict invalidates the state. Having enemies is in and of itself, Shehadi implies, sufficient to make a state "failed", unless that state can unilaterally solve the problem of its enemies (without, apparently, fighting them, as that would clearly involve "more destruction, fanaticism, violence and hatred"). Of course, Shehadi only applies this standard to Israel, and ignores the obviously failed state (in real terms) of Lebanon, the pseudo-states of Hizb'allah and Palestine which have also obviously failed, and much of Africa and southern Asia. Indeed, Shehadi describes Lebanon as "resiliant". No, it is only Israel who must disband because of her enemies. Asking the Jews to politely lay down their arms and accept slaughter, slavery or another millennia of stateless wandering strikes me as somewhat unrealistic, as well as morally abominable.
How this is "do[ing] itself ... a favor" is unclear to me, and I suspect to most Israelis. The editorial continues to go downhill from there, such as by admitting that there was deliberate targeting of civilians, but that it was by Israel. On the matter of Hizb'allah, Hamas and so on targeting civilians deliberately, and on their hiding among civilians in order to ensure civilian casualties should Israel respond to the terrorists' increasingly violent attacks, Shehadi is silent. Near the end, Shehadi delivers his verdict: "If the fundamental moral logic is flawed, then it is time to give up, pack up and go."
He's right, of course, about the consequences of flawed moral logic. He's just utterly, irredeemably wrong about morality and logic. It is not Israel, but Israel's enemies, that should knock it off. And that includes, apparently, Shehadi.
August 12, 2006
No Such Luck
Tigerhawk asks what it would take to militarize the West. No such luck, I think, and here is why:
There are only three conceivable military acts the jihadis and their supporters could take that would spark war beyond where we are now: invasion of another country, another attack on the scale of 9/11 or greater, or a nuclear/biological/chemical attack on a Western city. Anything short of these would not be considered sufficient to react to other than as we are now, or as a police matter, in the Western public opinion.
Now, invasion of another country wouldn't be seen as a reason to militarize. Israel and India and Turkey, the pro-Western countries actually threatened by Iran or Syria or Pakistan, are all capable of defending themselves. Wars in Russia — how would they differ from Chechnya? Wars in Lebanon or other Arab countries — how would they differ from the war ending now in Lebanon? Invasion or Iraq or Afghanistan would get our ire up, but let's face it, there are no conceivable conventional military scenarios in either country that couldn't be handled by our military as it now is.
An attack on the scale of 9/11 or greater might provide further impetus to the West to fight as it has been; or it might induce the will to surrender amongst a large percentage of the Western public. Unless it was obvious that the only way to root out such an attack were to heavily militarize and attack multiple Arab/Muslim countries simultaneously (that is, unless there were a large number of these attacks in very close proximity in time), I don't see how that changes the current assumptions. If anything, it should just harden current positions.
A WMD attack on a Western city would also not lead to militarization; it would lead to genocide. Having not taken the war seriously in its breadth (including the multiple lines of domestic political attack against operations in Iraq), we would have no other options than to use nuclear weapons against our attacker, if we could figure out whom our attacker was. If we could not, would we hesitate to respond at all, or would we use nuclear weapons against the various terror-supporting states in a spasm of fear and hate? I suspect the latter.
Frankly, absent a large series of large terror attacks, or a dynamic leader on the lines of Reagan or Thatcher, I simply do see militarization as a likely route in the West. I think, instead, we will muddle along until genocide (ours or theirs) is unavoidable.
August 11, 2006
Flypaper
Soon after 9/11, I came to the conclusion that there were three simultaneous conflicts driving world events. The obvious conflict is between the jihadis and the West. Less obvious was the conflict for control of the West, being argued mostly peacefully (since the end of the Soviet Union and their sponsorship of Leftist terrorist groups) between the statists and the individualists. Even less obvious to Western eyes was the Muslim civil war, which at the time looked to be between jihadis and Pan-Arab nationalists.
Well, the Muslim conflict has decisively altered: the Pan-Arab nationalists have lost. The Palestinians have gone over to Islamism; the Syrians have become little more than Iranian sock-puppets; the Egyptians and Libyans have abandoned Pan-Arabism for simple dictatorship; and the Jordanians seem to be Westernizing as an eventual constitutional monarchy. The battle within Muslim countries now seems to be whether fundamental Sunni jihadis like al Qaeda or fundamental Shi'a jihadis like Hizb'allah will lead the Muslim world. However, the outcome is still the same: each group is fighting against the West to score points with uncommitted Muslims, because Muslims killing Muslims is not seen as a good thing by uncommitted Muslims.
McQ and QandO makes the point that Hizb'allah has gained the upper hand in this struggle, and I think McQ is correct. Hizb'allah is after all killing Jews, and al Qaeda is largely hiding in caves, dying in Iraq, or being penetrated and taken apart in Britain and Europe generally. This gives Hizb'allah major mojo among Islamists, because to them it looks like Hizb'allah is making progress. The strong horse, as it were.
But this has another implication as well. If al Qaeda's role was diminished by a combination of removing their unfettered sanctuary in Afghanistan (despite the failure to subdue Waziristan in the Pakistani tribal areas) combined with al Qaeda's mistakes in Iraq (fighting against the US military directly, combined with killing a lot of uninvolved Muslim civilians), this means that we are winning against the Sunni brand of jihad. It also suggests a path to winning against the Shi'a brand of jihad: first, remove any sanctuaries; second, provide a battlefield where the enemy must fight and cannot win.
So here's my take: to defeat the Shi'a jihadis, we will likely have to take down Iranian and Syrian governments, and one of those two countries (my guess would be Syria) will have to be done in such a way as to ensure that the Shi'a see it as fight here or die.
Now for the bad news: we simply do not have the forces to do this without a massive mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves, or a sustained build-up of forces to the level we had at the end of the Cold War, and we don't have the public will to do either right now. Almost worse, the actions in Afghanistan and Iraq that have been so successful in marginalizing al Qaeda are constantly propagandized by the Left as failures, to the point that most Americans and Europeans seem to take that view as a given (see the note about the struggle between statists and individualists for control of the West). This makes it unlikely that, absent another massive terror attack on the US, we will recover our public will any time soon, and that should we do so, we will have learned the lessons of what can and should be done. I think that is much of what is behind Bill Quick's rant (hat tip: Instapundit) in which he says, among other things:
The first administration of the first century of the American Third Millennium will, in my estimation, be remembered as one of the biggest failures of that century. Bush's great failure was, not invading Iraq, but not weathering the adversity that followed through acts of real leadership, and then pressing on with the necessary military destruction of the other regimes he, himself, named as most dangerous five years ago.
I've been feeling pretty depressed about our mid-term prospects lately. While Bill Quick's hope of a "fast war" would have been possible after 9/11, even as late as early 2003, I don't believe that it is possible now, without greater changes than a single election can bring. We're winning now tactically, and I believe we'll win in the end strategically, but I think we are going to have to go through some very painful episodes before we actually begin as a nation to focus on "victory" instead of "peace" as the marker for when the war is over.
Posted by jeff at 6:36 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
August 9, 2006
Israel's Grand-Strategic Dilemma
Israel has been put into a quandary of vast proportions, and most of its ways out have been foreclosed. When your strategic goal is to live in peace, as I believe is Israel's goal, and your enemies' strategic goal is for you to die, your options are to convince your enemy to abandon their goal, to make it impossible for your enemy to carry out their goal, to destroy the enemy, or to abandon your own goal.
Israel's initial strategy was to prevent Israel's enemy from following through on their goal of the destruction of Israel, by handing the enemy several military defeats of stunning magnitude. In 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973, Israel showed that Arab armies would not conquer Israel under any combination of circumstances. This finally led to Israel convincing both Egypt and Jordan to abandon their goal of destroying Israel. Israel discovered that, perhaps, under some circumstances, they could induce their enemies to abandon their goals.
Israel's earlier victories had two unfortunate outcomes for the long term: Israel had adopted a land-for-peace strategy after 1979, and Israel had taken charge of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, and the populations thereof. The first convinced the less sane of Israel's Arab enemies that they could get concessions from Israel until Israel succumbed, and the second convinced the Israelis that defense could be more trouble than it was worth. While laudable, land-for-peace failed. And the tar baby of the occupation reduced Israel's options dramatically, especially after Israel made a pair of strategic blunders.
In an attempt to pacify and abandon the occupied territories, Israel invited Arafat to take over territories under Israeli occupation. During the floundering peace process that followed this move, Israel abandoned their buffer zone in Lebanon. Those two blunders, which were really just attempts to get the Palestinians and Hizb'allah to abandon their goals, failed utterly, and came to their logical culmination when first the Palestinians, then the Hizb'allah, crossed into Israel from territory previously under Israeli control, but abandoned in the hope of peace, to kidnap and kill Israeli soldiers.
So Israel's options now are very, very limited: they cannot logically seek peace with the Palestinians and Hizb'allah; both have sworn to destroy Israel or die in the attempt, and have done everything in their power to follow through. Nor can Israel simply try to ignore the Palestinians and Hizb'allah: the kidnappings and rockets make that quite clear. So what can Israel do?
As I see it, Israel only has three options: ethnic cleansing, genocide, or a vastly risky war against Iran and Syria. Israel will morally (and correctly) shy away from genocide; the Israelis are not monsters, and know the meaning of genocide more than most. Israel could try ethnic cleansing, evicting the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, and taking southern Lebanon and evicting everyone from there. But even were Israelis not to settle those areas, modern rockets have sufficient range that such a strategy is impractical: Israel would have to continually expand their buffer zone, and Israel cannot reasonably defend such a large area as would be needed to guarantee their safety. This only leaves, in practical terms, a very risky option: war against Iran and Syria.
In real terms, Iran and Syria are the only true enemies that still have power to hurt Israel. By working through proxies (the Palestinians and Hizb'allah), these two countries are pursuing a strategy of bleeding Israel, while simultaneously demonizing Israel for daring to respond, which inevitably (and by the design of the terror groups) results in some civilian casualties. For Syria and Iran, this is a low-risk strategy. Basically, Syria and Iran are banking on Israel's, and the West's, moral sense to keep Israel from defeating them. They may have overplayed their hand, though.
If Israel were to strike Syria, Syria would be defeated in short order. This would make it very difficult for Hizb'allah and the Palestinians to continue to operate, and Iran's logistics would become much more difficult. But Iran would still be able to get supplies through, and if Syria were allowed to recover, it too would eventually be able to resume proxy operations against Israel. While Israel could keep Syria down by force, it cannot do so to Iran, because Iran is too far away for sustained Israeli force projection.
And this leads to Israel's only option against Iran: nuclear genocide.
For Israelis, there is no strategic solution that is a permanent win, except to abandon morality for survival. Absent an American take-down of the Iranian regime, Israelis are in for years more war, and many more threats to their existence, no matter what they do in the short term.
August 8, 2006
Conspiracy Theory
There has been a great deal of both smoke and fire lately about Reuters' use (and subsequent laudable retraction) of doctored photographs of fighting in Lebanon taken by Adnan Hajj, and of the possibility of much of the Qana photography (including photographs by Hajj) as probably being staged. I haven't really written about this much, other than to comment on others' blogs, but such lapses are of critical importance. The public's judgement is informed only to the extent that personal experience of the world or the testimony of others informs it. Since our personal ability to be wherever news is breaking is quite limited, and our capacity to directly connect to those who might be where news is breaking is also quite limited, the majority of the information we get about the world comes from the news media, either by watching/reading the news, or by talking to people who have. Indeed, in many cases, the news media barely reports the factual basis of the news at all these days, instead simply having on pundits who analyze the facts, complete with judging which facts are important and to what degree, for us and present us their digested and (theoretically) considered view of what those facts mean.
This is a dangerous situation for a free people, because we often think that we are being informed when we are actually being manipulated. Consider the infamous case of NBC's faked reporting on the "danger" of pickup trucks with side-mounted fuel tanks. This could easily have led to government-mandated safety standards which could have increased costs and decreased safety, because judgements would have been skewed by bad information. But this is only an example of news media being caught faking the news: how many times have they not been caught on issues where public policy was at stake? Or consider "Rathergate"; in an earlier age, without the blogs' fact-checking of the media, this kind of faked news could have changed the results of a presidential election, which no one can reasonably dismiss as small stakes. With that dynamic in mind, it is clear that faked news about the war in Lebanon could easily lead the public, because of its bad information, to pressure the government to make bad decisions about foreign policy. That is, in fact, almost certainly the goal of Hizb'allah.
After all, it's not as if Islamist groups have not been staging news for years. Staging news to create wrong impressions is the very basis of effective Islamist terrorism: create an outrage, manipulate public opinion, force the enemy (us) to retreat or withdraw from shame or fear, repeat. The goal is, eventually, to so weaken the West and Israel that we stop resisting the Islamists, at which point they can take over and establish the Caliphate (Muslim theocracy) and subject infidels (that's us again) to conversion, slavery or death. If this seems extreme, it is. But it's not me being extreme; it is the Islamists. Don't take my word for it: read their thoughts on the topic. (Hat tip and analysis: FrontPage Mag)
So Shane Richmond can make of The Telegraph insinuations or outright allegations of blogs succumbing to conspiracy theories akin to "the moon landing was fake" and "Bill Clinton was profiting from drug running, and had someone killed at the Mena airport to cover it up" or "the US government destroyed the World Trade Center on 9/11" (and sometimes, it does look that way), but that is missing the point. The whole basis of ridicule of such outlandish conspiracy theories is that they are so ludicrous: they rely on a massive cover-up by thousands of people, sometimes over decades, which only the intrepid conspiracy theorist has been able to unravel, due to the slight difference in shading in the bottom left corner of frame 184 of this film. No, really! Look closely! But conspiracy theories are not equally subject to ridicule when there really is a long-running, well-documented conspiracy afoot. And in this case, there is.
I do not believe the media is intentionally co-operating with terrorists. Amend that, I do not believe that most of the media is intentionally co-operating with terrorists. But I do believe that the terrorists have crafted a public relations campaign aimed at defanging Western resistance to the Islamist project to reestablish the Caliphate around the world; that that campaign is aimed at the needs, preferences and biases of Western media; and that Western media has, by and large, been unable or unwilling to see that they are being manipulated.
August 6, 2006
A Few Moral Questions
Let's say that a young person, Smith, were to get involved in gangs, and were to convince nine friends and acquaintances to agree to a scheme to defraud insurance companies. Let's say, further, that a tenth person didn't actually decide to go along, but was a room mate of one of the ten who did, and got caught up semi-unknowingly in the fraudulent scheme (that is, he knew that his room mate was a gang banger, and was involved in a insurance fraud, but did not do anything to stop it; however, he was not part of the origin of the scheme, nor did he benefit from it). Since this person is important to the questions, let's call him Jones. Let's further stipulate that Jones did not get involved to stop the scheme because he really needed a place to stay, and had no other options, and his room mate would have killed Jones if Jones had made any effective protest of the room mate's actions.
For one minor, fun addition, let us also suppose that Smith hates Jones' neighbor across the hall with all of his being, in part for thwarting some of Smith's previous schemes, and in part because the neighbor across the hall, Davis, is black, and Smith is a white supremacist who openly hates black people even when they weren't involved in thwarting his insurance scams. In fact, if Smith weren't a minor, he certainly would have done hard jail time. Worse still, though, there were some property disputes in the past between Smith and Davis, which resulted in fist fights and lawsuits, and while Davis eventually ceded the property to Smith, Davis was angry enough over the dispute that he (Davis) spent a great deal of time trying to figure out Smith's schemes and thwart them.
Now let's say that, after several different frauds, in which Smith profited handsomely, and Smith's nine acquaintances made tangible gains, that Smith, unbeknownst to his acquaintances, bought life insurance on them. Then let's say that Smith got all of the acquaintances together at Jones' apartment, and started throwing Molotov cocktails (incendiary devices) into the open door of the apartment across the hall (which Smith smashed down on the way in), in order to kill Davis. Now this is win-win for Smith, because he might kill Davis, and if he burns down the building and kills his (Smith's) acquaintances, he gets their insurance money as well. In fact, even if Davis escapes, Smith would still get the life insurance payoff on any of his acquaintances who were killed.
Now, as this is happening, let's say that Davis, instead of just trying to put out the fire in his apartment, first steps across the hall and shoots at Smith with a handgun he keeps. Now for the moral questions:
1. Has Smith done anything wrong? Have the acquaintances done anything wrong? Has Davis done anything wrong? Has Jones done anything wrong?
2. If Davis manages to kill Smith, without hurting anyone else, has Davis done wrong?
3. If Davis kills one of Smith's acquaintances, but misses Smith, has Davis done wrong?
4. If Davis kills one or more of Smith's acquaintances, wounds several others, but misses Smith, has Davis done wrong?
5. If Davis kills or wounds one or more of Smith's acquaintances, and wounds Smith, has Davis done wrong?
6. If Davis kills or wounds one or more of Smith's acquaintances, and kills Smith, has Davis done wrong?
7. Do the answers to any of these questions change is Jones, the semi-innocent room mate, is killed or injured?
8. Does the answer to any of the above questions change if Smith does not succeed in hurting any of Davis' family prior to Davis starting shooting?
Now, there is a ninth question, but it's important to write down the answers to the first eight before you answer the last question, so do that now.
OK, done?
Now, go back through the above questions and make these substitutions:
For Smith, substitute Hizb'allah.
For the acquaintances, substitute the Lebanese who support Hizb'allah.
For Jones, substitute the Lebanese who do not support Hizb'allah.
For Davis, substitute Israel.
9. If you answer the questions now, with the above substitutions, do your answers change? If so, why?
August 3, 2006
The Possibility of Peace; The Possibility of Unending War
The Middle East is convulsing, with pressure applied by the US and coalition on the one hand, democratizing (though not liberalizing, which is likely a mistake) Afghanistan and particularly Iraq, and Iran on the other hand, both stirring the pot in Iraq and using its Hizb'allah proxy to attack Israel. These convulsions are large enough that the Middle East will not return to its former shape afterwards. The question remains open, whether the region will change to a more or less peaceful area, in the mold of, say, South America, or instead will change into a region dominated by Iran, exporting jihadis throughout the world from a restored Caliphate.
For a long time, the idea of Middle East peace was tied to Israel, and resolving its problems with its neighbors. And for a long time, no one had a reasonable plan for peace, because Israel's minimum condition is unthreatened existence and its enemies' minimum condition was Israel's elimination as a state, and the slaughter of the Israeli people. But the land-for-peace formula emerged, under which the Israelis would trade captured territory in exchange for peaceful relations, and the US would foster such agreements with bales of cash. This was first tried out in 1979, with the treaty between Egypt and Israel, under which Israel gave back the Sinai (not the Gaza strip, though: Egypt wouldn't take it) in exchange for Egypt not deploying its army into the Sinai. To help this out, the US gave bundles of cash to Israel and Egypt, and stationed troops along the border, inside the Sinai, to keep the armies apart. The stunning thing is that this actually worked, and Israel and Egypt have not fought directly, by proxy, or even by exchanging artillery fire since the agreement. This may have been the one and only true foreign policy success of the Carter administration.
And suddenly, when land-for-peace worked, it became the accepted formula for peace, except perhaps in Israel, where it was only tentatively accepted. But then something happened: Israel's occupation of Lebanon, and Hizb'allah's long war against Israel, was resulting in a constant trickle of Israeli soldiers dying. This was coincident with a maturing Israeli society, which had seen no realistic threats from its main enemies for more than a decade, and had no threat on the horizon, either. Left-wing Israeli peace groups like the "Four Mothers" and Peace Now actually succeeded in convincing Israelis that the occupation of Lebanon was morally wrong, and that land-for-peace would work for Israel. Israel pulled out of Lebanon, and for six or seven years, had relative quiet on the northern border.
While no agreement could be reached with Syria, it looked for some time like a solution could be found for peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. Until Arafat renounced not only Israel's best possible offer — essentially everything Arafat wanted except the "right of return" — but in the process started a terrorist campaign against Israel from within the occupied territories. That was, really, such a heavy blow to the idea of negotiating land-for-peace that the land-for-peace formula seemed unlikely to recover. But Ariel Sharon, a hardheaded warrior and Israeli hero, came up with a new idea: if Israel could not negotiate land-for-peace, and could not bring itself to slaughter the Palestinians, perhaps it would work if Israel simply disengaged. That is, Sharon built walls and fences along the border with the Gaza strip, and began doing the same with the West Bank. Israel dismantled the Israeli settlements in Gaza, and withdrew from the area, leaving it entirely in Palestinian hands.
And then came the second body blow to land-for-peace: the Palestinians converted Gaza into a full-scale base for terror and rocket attacks against Israel, utterly rejecting any efforts to improve their economic or political situation and essentially declaring that to the extent Gaza was a Palestinian nation, it was a nation at perpetual war with Israel.
But it was the one-two punch of first Hamas, then Hizb'allah, crossing the border into Israel and killing/capturing Israeli soldiers that has destroyed the land-for-peace formula, probably forever. It is absolutely clear that the Palestinians and Hizb'allah will not rest until they or Israel are destroyed utterly. It is likely that Syria will continue to foment action by Hamas and Hizb'allah until they are held accountable, likely by the destruction of their military (again) and their economy (again) by an outside attack. While Israel may have a cold peace with Egypt and Jordan, and might be able to get the same with Lebanon if Hizb'allah is destroyed, there is simply no point in giving up land, particularly strategic land like the Shebaa farms (a part of the Golan Heights) in exchange for empty promises and agreements that will never be implemented on the Arab side.
How far gone is the idea? Far enough that members of the Four Mothers agree it doesn't work. (Hat tip: Wretchard) Far enough that the defense minister prosecuting the war against Hizb'allah and Hamas, a former leader of Peace Now, is finally turning up the level of violence and realizing that this is an existential struggle for Israel. Far enough that Ehud Olmert is backing off, at least for now and under strong public pressure, on unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank.
So now what are the possibilities of obtaining peace in the Middle East? The only alternatives to obtain peace are the destruction of Israel, or the destruction of the Islamists. The main obstacle in the way of destroying Israel is that Israel is powerful enough that it cannot be destroyed by its enemies, absent their acquisition of nuclear weapons or Israel's acceptance of a Muslim majority with full citizenship. Israel would use its own nuclear weapons to prevent their enemies from obtaining nuclear weapons. Israel will never grant the "right of return" and attendant demograhic suicide. So the obvious logical conclusion is that Israel is not going to be destroyed.
But how to destroy the jihadis? The first thing that must be recognized is that the jihadis are really just one manifestation of a broader ideology: Islamism. Essentially, Islamism is the ideology of restoration of the Caliphate (Muslim equivalent of the Holy Roman Empire) by creating a single Muslim empire, and then the expansion of that empire to cover the whole world, with the emphasis on killing or converting non-Muslims, and imposing Sharia law universally. The jihadis are the "fast war" expression of Islamism: essentially this is a continuation of the violent conquest techniques pioneered by Mohammed, and long neglected by Muslims, who after being thrown back in Europe, and stopped Asia and Africa, resorted to petty barbarism, piracy and the like instead. The jihadis are out to conquer their enemies (moderate or somewhat-secular Muslims, Jews, atheists, Christians, Pagans, and, well, everyone but the Islamists really) by force of arms. The "slow war" version consists of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and a lot of the European and American groups (like CAIR, for example, or the Muslim Association of Britain). These groups have decided that creating a unified mindset among Muslims (by intimidation and terrorism, generally), and taking control of new areas by immigration and constant demands for more and more rights for themselves, and more and more restrictions for others, would be a more sure and less resisted route to establishing global Islamic hegemony. The Islamists have the same goals as the jihadis and no objection to the jihadis' methods; they simply believe there is a less risky way to obtain those goals. This is critical because the threat will not be ended until the Islamist ideology is ended; simply killing the terrorists is insufficient, because the Islamist groups will create new jihadis wherever and whenever they are useful.
The key to the jihadi groups is that they cannot be successful without the sponsorship of states. Afghanistan and Iraq were both sponsors of jihadis, and we have removed those countries' sponsorship of the jihadis. But they were not the only sponsors of jihadis; there are three others. Iran is probably the biggest sponsor of jihadi groups, giving training, equipment, money, cover and sanctuary to many jihadi groups. The combination of Iran's quest for nuclear weapons and its support of the jihadis is the largest obstacle to peace at present, and the largest threat to the other nations of the world (including the Russians, who for some reason won't stop arming people who are sworn to destroy them).
Syria and Pakistan are both sponsors of jihadi groups as well, but in a more specialized way than Iran. Syria sponsors Hamas and Hizb'allah, among others, who are specifically dedicated (for now) to attacking Israel. Pakistan, similarly, sponsors groups largely dedicated (for now) to attacking India. In addition, Pakistan gives sanctuary to the Taliban and al Qaeda, and parts of the Pakistani government almost certainly directly aid those groups.
In the short term, ending the jihadi threat will require destroying the government of Iran and preventing another Islamist government from taking their place. If this can be done prior to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, simply bringing down the government and making a peace with conditions about the type of government that Iran can have should be sufficient. "Simply" sounds like the wrong word until you consider what happens if we wait for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. In that case, either the US will have to invade and occupy Iran, which is a very much tougher problem than Iraq, or the US or Israel will have to destroy Iran. Israel would have to use nuclear weapons to do this. The US might have to do so, although the US has the option to use conventional bombing and limited invasions (of Khuzistan and the area around the Straits of Hormuz) as long as Iran doesn't have any nuclear weapons actually in its posession. (Once Iran obtains nuclear weapons, they would use them to defend against any US attack, and that would lead to an overwhelming nuclear response by the US.)
It might be necessary, in order to end the immediate threat, to destroy the government of Syria, and to pressure Pakistan into allowing the US to operate with impunity in the provinces bordering Afghanistan, or to actually take on and defeat the jihadis inside of Pakistan. If Iran were taken out, it is possible that the Syrians would seek a Libyan solution: surrender in exchange for integration and aid. Similarly, absent Iran, Pakistan might be more inclined to take on their internal jihadis, whose resources would be much diminished by the overthrow of the Ayatollahs.
Over the long term, the problem is largely Saudi funding of Islamist groups, mosques and madrassas outside of Saudi Arabia. To end this longer-term threat, though, there are three methods that can be applied short of war, and because of this I frankly do not think that we will need to use military means to resolve the longer term problem. The first alternative is pressuring Saudi Arabia to end its support and founding of Islamist groups; this will probably not work, because the world needs Saudi oil, and that gives them a vast ability to resist such pressure, and the Sauds know that doing this will mean their overthrow (many of the Saudi people are very, very fundamentalist). The second method would be to develop either alternate energy sources to oil for most purposes (nuclear is the big option here, and of course would be bitterly resisted, ironically, by Western environmentalists), or cheaper methods of extracting oil from oil sands and oil shales. Either of those would essentially bankrupt the Sauds in short order. Finally, we can develop antibodies within the liberal democratic societies. For example, the Islamists would find little ground in the US and Europe if we were to deport Islamists who were not citizens, not allow further Muslim immigration, and in general make it socially taboo to be an Islamist. This is actually fairly unlikely, absent another attack or five on the scale of 9/11, because tolerance of others' beliefs (even of violent beliefs, as long as the violence is never carried out) is a major keystone of liberal democratic societies. In any case, some combination of these three methods in some degree should be sufficient to end, mitigate or at least contain the long-term Islamist threat, so long as they do not revert to force.
It is also possible, although I now think it unlikely, that George Bush's gamble of bringing democracy to Iraq as a seed for democratizing the Middle East will actually work, and these cultures over time could learn to compromise and live with others peacefully. I think that, had we set about liberalizing Iraq and Afghanistan, instead of democratizing them, we would have had better long-term chances for peaceful change. On the other hand, this would likely be regarded by most Muslims (even moderate Muslims) as intolerable: it would require changing long-standing cultural practices and, more importantly, reinterpreting key parts of the Koran. Maybe after democratization we can try for liberalization, but I think it far more likely that the nascent democracies will return to strong-man rule fairly soon for cultural and religious reasons.
So there it is. In a nutshell, the price of peace in the Middle East is the destruction of Iran's government by force of arms, and possibly the destruction of Syria's government by force of arms, combined with the destruction of the (by then weakened) jihadi groups, and any new state sponsors who might be feeling lucky. The price of long-term peace is ending or containing Islamism. And the consequence of not doing this will be wars for decades, perhaps centuries, to come.
It is going to be a very violent, bloody and unpleasant couple of decades.
July 28, 2006
A Matter of Time?
A few years ago, a Muslim man shot up an El Al (Israeli airline) counter at LAX. Authorities said it wasn't terrorism.
A few years ago, two Muslim men went on a sniping spree in the Washington, DC area, killing several. Authorities said it wasn't terrorism.
Now a Muslim man has shot several Jewish women in Seattle, killing at least one. Undoubtedly, authorities will say it wasn't terrorism. (They have already said that there is no indication the shooter was linked to a terrorist organization. Their powers of investigation must be superhuman.)
The problem with these kinds of denials by the authorities is that people have a sense of self-preservation, and they're not idiots. Why is that a problem? What is the smallest group that we can act against and still be safe from this kind of attack? The authorities seem to be letting it narrow down to "Muslim men", because they are not facing up to the reality of what kind of people are committing these attacks.
My bet: we'll soon learn that the shooter in Seattle was from a middle-class to wealthy family, and was entirely secular, but started attending a Saudi-funded mosque and became very religious and pious, and also quite judgmental. That has, after all, been pretty much the pattern of this kind of attack in the US and Europe to date.
But the thing is, these attacks will almost certainly continue, and intensify. And then when we decide to take preventive measures, because it's becoming crystal clear that the government doesn't have the stomach for it, against whom will we turn? Not against just the actual terrorists, because we don't have any information on who they are. Instead, we will turn against Muslims in general, because we can't get much closer than that, and the authorities won't get that close.
I hope I am wrong, but I fear that it is just a matter of time until there start to be actual attacks on Muslims in the US, rather than just in CAIR's fever dreams.
UPDATE: What I fear right now is this: "But this guy does belong to a "larger organization", the largest terror organization in the world called ISLAM."
And this: "If anyone practices Islam they are a terrorist, again pure and simple. Time to get all of them out of the country, voluntary or by force, including deadly force. This shows you can't trust any of the slime balls."
If these comments become widespread belief, there will be much more blood shed than is necessary. We have to take our PC blinkers off — that is to say, the government has to do so — and solve the problem of figuring out which are the dangerous fanatics in our midst. Otherwise, eventually, people will take matters into their own hands. And in the end, vigilantism is both effective at solving the original problems, and dangerous for any innocents in the wrong place, or wrong skin, at the wrong time. I'd rather avoid that, thanks.
July 27, 2006
Ambulances or Troop Carriers?
Here is footage of fighting in the Gaza strip. It's a little unclear to me exactly what is going on; it looks almost like the Red Crescent ambulance is being ambushed. Regardless, as the firing breaks out, a UN ambulance comes up, and the fighters climb in and are driven away.
Now there is more than one explanation possible here. Yes, the UN could be actively assisting the fighters. Or the ambulance could have been stolen, or the driver could have been forced by a gunman inside the vehicle to pick the fighters up. But here's the thing: Israel has to know that fighters are using ambulances to get around, in order to not be targeted by the Israelis. It doesn't really matter how the ambulance came to be in enemy hands; it is enough that the enemy uses ambulances as troop transports. Because Israel will target ambulances in the middle of a fight, and in fact there have been several news stories over the years where Israelis have fired on ambulances, and these are always presented to show the Isrealis as barbaric for firing on ambulances.
But who is the barbarian, really?
July 26, 2006
Israel Might Just be Serious About Destroying Hizb'allah
Transit Umbra posts an interesting take on where Israel's invasion of Lebanon is going.
I actually have been coming around to thinking that Israel intends to utterly smash Hizb'allah. It would be relatively simple for Isreal to race along the roads and take the whole South, but in doing so they would be operating with an enemy in their rear, because large number of Hizb'allah fighters and their weapons and ammunition would be bypassed in bunkers behind the advance.
Hizb'allah seems to have been counting on Israel fighting the same war as they did in 1982, and Hizb'allah was prepared for that. (Some commenters seem to be operating under the same assumption.) In fact, I would say that, had Israel fought this way, we would already be seeing signs of major disaster, as Israeli forces would be being cut off and defeated in detail by the "left behinds". For those who have been paying attention, this seems to have been part of Saddam's strategy as well, with the Saddam Fedayeen coming out to fight the supply units after the combat units passed by. It might have worked in Iraq had we not had a lot of flat terrain in which to maneuver, as well as unexpectedly-tough logistics units. (Despite the tragic wrong turn that led to the killing and capture of supply soldiers, most well-known being Jessica Lynch, there was also the battle at "Moe", "Larry" and "Curly", where supply troops fought hard to enable the breakthrough into Baghdad that collapsed the Saddam regime.)
The way to avoid this is to destroy the enemy stronghold by stronghold, tunnel by tunnel. It's not a style of war Israelis or Americans are used to seeing any more, but it is very, very effective. There is simply no way that Hizb'allah can fight from the areas that Israel has already captured. As a result, Israel has captured less territory, but has destroyed the enemy's capability entirely in the area it has captured. (The exception being where Israel has raided out from its salient and then withdrawn; those areas have gone right back to Hizb'allah control.)
The wild card is how long Israel is prepared to fight. Most people seem to be making the assumption either that Israel's will to fight will crumble over enemy civilians being killed, or that the US will force Israel into a cease fire. In either case, the assumption is that Israel has a week to finish this. That of course, has been the assumption for the last two weeks, and there is no evidence of either weakness in Israel's will or in the US's support for Israel's actions. Nor is there much evidence that Israel would succumb to US pressure in any case; Israel regards this conflict as existential for them, and I tend to think that they are right: if they fail, Hizb'allah becomes the government of Lebanon and Israel can expect more, and more brutal, attacks than heretorfore.
But Israel can destroy, not just degrade, Hizb'allah, critics' cries to the contrary notwithstanding. The reason for this is that Hizb'allah depends on public perception even more than Israel does. If Hizb'allah's opponents within Lebanon see Hizb'allah as defeated, they will fight Hizb'allah's attempts to gain hegemony over Lebanon. If Hizb'allah's supporters see Hizb'allah as weak, they'll look for stronger groups to defend them. If Iran and Syria see Hizb'allah as ineffective, they will withdraw support for Hizb'allah and put it to other uses. Israel can bring all of this about, but it will be costly and difficult.
To destroy Hizb'allah, Israel must occupy southern Lebanon, destroying all Hizb'allah infrastructure there. Israel must so weaken Hizb'allah elsewhere that Hizb'allah cannot rationally be seen as having beaten the Israelis. It will help if Hizb'allah's top leaders, particularly Nasrallah, are killed, and an "accidental" bombing of the Iranian embassy in Beirut — strike that, a fully public (but not pre-declared) bombing of the Iranian embassy in Beirut — could bring that about. Let Iran openly declare war, or back down and be seen as cowards. Either way is more advantageous to Israel than giving Hizb'allah an invulnerable base in Iran. Israel must only leave Lebanon when non-Hizb'allah troops capable of and willing to fight Hizb'allah's attempts to regain control, should that be necessary, are in place; Israel cannot allow Hizb'allah to declare victory as they did when Israel last pulled out of Lebanon.
If Israel does these things, Hizb'allah will be seen, in Osama bin Laden's memorable phrase, as a weak horse, and will lose its public support. That loss of support will destroy Hizb'allah much more completely than merely killing Hizb'allah's trained soldiers can do.
Regardless, I wish Israel well. They have been too battered for too long and for too little reason.
July 25, 2006
Three Horns of a Trilemma
The dilemma of a free people in wartime is generally shown as a continuum between Security and Liberty. To gain more Security, you have to sacrifice more Liberty, and any gain in Liberty likewise constitutes a loss of Security; at least, that is the general claim, and I'm willing to take it at face value for present purposes, even though it leaves out the messy reality of inefficient, ineffective, or incompetent governments. But that view is quite obsolete, now, for Western nations; there is another element of sacrifice that must be put into the pot: Humanitarianism.
To be quite blunt about it, there is no fundamental threat to the security of the United States that is not immediately solvable. Don't believe me? What's your example? Let's take the hard and intractable problem of terrorists who hide amongst civilians. There are a number of scenarios here, and none of them fundamentally threaten the United States, or pretty much any Western nation.
In Lebanon, Hizb'allah has so deeply embedded itself in the civilian infrastructure that troops (I'm being more generous to Hizb'allah's terrorists than is really merited) are barracked in civilian houses; armories are in civilian houses; observation posts are co-located with UN observation posts to make it difficult for Israel to strike without hitting the UN post; spokesmen and decision-makers are housed in the largest city in Lebanon, often amongst either civilians or government officials; many of Hizb'allah's capabilities are "owned" by the Lebanese army, rather than by Hizb'allah itself. How can the problem of Hizb'allah terrorism be solved? Surely, Israel cannot destroy Hizb'allah, because doing so would mean thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of dead Lebanese civilians.
Here is how Israel can solve the problem: it can kill, easily, thousands or tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of Lebanese civilians, if it must do so to solve the problem. If Hizb'allah retreats to Syria, Israel can do the same to Syria, if necessary, and so on. The only thing that stops Israel from doing this is its Humanitarian nature.
Like most Westerners, Israelis cannot imagine a condition where they would be willing to slaughter innocents, presumed innocents, possible innocents, even outright enemies in such numbers. This is a good thing, most assuredly, because if it were not so, those people would certainly have been slaughtered in every Arab country surrounding Israel, and in the occupied territories as well: no nation on Earth has resisted the number, severity and consistency of attacks on its civilians as has Israel. All to be called "evil" and worse, by people who would be far more barbaric in the same circumstances.
Similarly, with Iran's support of terrorists and pursuit of nuclear weaponry, the US could end the problem in about half an hour and with zero US casualties. It would take a bit longer if we wanted to avoid using nuclear weapons, and we would take a few casualties, but the result would be much the same. How much of an insurrection would have followed Saddam Hussein's fall had we simply leveled every city and killed everyone other than coalition troops? We could have done so; it is within our capacity.
Fortunately for the world, and for our conception of self, we have not had to resort to that level of barbarity. Anyone who thinks that we are not capable of it, though, should first read up on Dresden and the Pacific campaign in WWII, the last time we were called upon to exercise our barbarianism. I assure you, we were nearly as peaceful in 1938 as we are today, yet seven years later we leveled entire cities with our only second thought being whether we could get enough bombers and incendiary bombs in place to be thorough about it. Afterwards, we slept the sleep of the Just. We can do so again, and will do so if pushed to it.
If you think that maybe some Western nations, perhaps the sainted France, are actually beyond this, it only indicates that you haven't been reading about France's actions in the Ivory Coast over the last few years. As to Germany, no comment should be needed. Other Western nations are similar, though for many their tests have been so far back in time, or they have been so overmatched, that it's not readily apparent. The West is civilized not because we are above bloodshed, but because we have collectively crammed our arms in blood up to the shoulders for hundreds of years. The survivors have learned, mostly, how to live with each other.
For the Arab world, the ability to slaughter wholesale, as opposed to personal service, is a very recent development. That ability was developed in the West, as war after war drove our astoundingly creative and inventive forebears to develop astoundingly creative and inventive new ways to protect themselves from the old ways of being killed, followed by developing astoundingly creative and inventive new ways to kill each other. The Arabs simply bought the old leftovers the West no longer needed, as have the Africans. Suddenly, between the end of WWII and the middle of the 1960s, the Arabs went from resourceless barbarians in the trackless desert, killing each other with knives and small arms, to barbarians in a trackless desert over a sea of oil, killing each other with tanks and aircraft and chemical weapons.
But they were stopped cold by Israel, which had partaken of Westernism in fact, rather than by distant observation. In war after war, even when taken in the utterly worst possible military posture (1973), the Israelis mopped the floor with Arab nations outnumbering it something like 50 to 1 or more. Unlike the Arabs, Israel could build the weapons it used: Israel had the understanding of the Western way of war; the Arabs had only the tools. That is still true. But the Arabs have in consequence fallen back on their barbarian natures, updated with suicide bombs and rockets fired from the roofs of hospitals. They have not absorbed the Western way of war, so they have not absorbed the necessity of living without killing each other wholesale. They only have the tools of wholesale slaughter, not the morality to prevent themselves from engaging in it.
So the question John Podhoretz asks is, will we be capable of giving up, at least for a while, some of our Humanitarianism, to preserve our Security and our Liberty? My question is slightly different, because I assume that we can give up our Humanitarianism and still sleep the sleep of the Just; we've done it before. My question is, will we give up our Humanitarianism a little bit early, or altogether after the balance between Liberty and Security becomes moot, because we have neither?
July 23, 2006
If I Were in Israel's Place
I would wait until Nasrallah (leader of Hizb'allah) has a press conference — even if this is after the end of the current fighting — and then bomb it. These are, after all, announced in advance, and the criticism Israel would get for brutality (and even more, from the press, for killing reporters) would do less damage than leaving Nasrallah living, while at the same time making foreign enemies think twice about fighting Israel. As a further plus, any enemy of Israel would then have to carefully reconsider his press manipulation strategy.
Why Aren't we Going After Insert Enemy Here?
QandO has a post that notes: "Interestingly, one of the recent arguments from the left, as some of our liberal commenters here have echoed, is that we should've gone after Iran. they are the real bad guys, and all we're doing in Iraq is simply making the Iranians stronger."
I heard this meme tried out on (Fox, I think; I was listening on the radio, and it could have been one of several channels) today, with regards to Hizb'allah: of course we should have gone after Hizb'allah, because they are the real enemy. Going after Iraq just makes terrorists stronger&tm;.
I don't buy it. The reality is, we cannot go after every enemy, much less every unstable or failed regime, at once. I truly believe that we are at the beginning of a shakeup in international affairs unseen in its scope since the Treaty of Westphalia, and seldom ever seen in history. The whole World of Order Friedman was talking about (hat tip: QandO again) is nothing more than the Westphalian order: states have borders and sovereigns, and cannot be legitimately interfered with within the borders of their territory. The Westphalian order is collapsing. Pretending that borders are always meaningful because some set of people have agreed to them, that we know what a civilian and a combatant are (and that they are necessarily distinct), or that any given issue will have a point of consensus where everyone agrees what should be done and are willing to do it — these were the long-standing games of international order, but they cannot be meaningful any more. The terrorists and their supporters have so blurred the lines that the Westphalian order is fast falling into ruin.
What this means in practical terms is that there are going to be wars and battles and other forms of conflict for the next fifty or even hundred or more years, if we are fortunate enough not to first see a genocide along the way, to determine whether Islam really will be the world's single religion, and after that (and assuming the jihadis do not win), to determine how power can be legitimately exercised short of war, and what the valid reasons are for going to war. We will not likely see the end of this, and our children might not, either.
So to pretend that we have the unlimited resources to attack every enemy and solve every challenge immediately is simply fantasy. Well, more precisely, it is simply a rhetorical gimmick useful for beating on one's political opponents. It does nothing to help us get to a new world order (there is a phrase which the elder President Bush probably regrets, both for its prescience and for its difference from what he thought we were moving to). In fact, if anything, it makes it harder to solve these wicked problems.
This will get worse, far worse, before it gets better.
July 22, 2006
Detailed Map of Lebanon
Anyone interested in following the news and actually locating points in Lebanon may find this detailed map of Lebanon useful.
UPDATE: And Falling Rain can help to locate towns. (Hat tip: Belmont Club.)
Examining Israel's Gound Campaign
There has been a lot of punditry and analysis about the Israeli campaign in Lebanon, and with the likely imminent start of a major ground campaign, I was looking for an analysis of what form the attack might take. Finding none, I've decided to do it myself. The military uses an analysis framework known as METT-T: Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time. The analysis is from Israel's point of view, since Israel will have the initiative.
Mission
Israel has several major and minor goals. How they prioritize them is unclear, but the goals themselves are pretty obvious. These include: stopping the shelling of Israeli cities for the long term; removing Hizb'allah from the border and from rocket range of Israel; degrading or destroying Hizb'allah's fighters and leadership, as well as their arsenal; cutting off or weakening Iran's and especially Syria's influence in Lebanon; recapturing the two soldiers whose capture started the current conflict (more a morale and propaganda goal than a military goal); preventing the widening of the war to Syria and/or Iran. Some of these goals can simply not be obtained without troops on the ground for an extended period. For example, Hizb'allah has hidden significant weaponry in tunnels that are not visible except close up — you cannot find them from the air. Without destroying those tunnels, Israel will be back in the same position they are now within just a few months.
Enemy
There are two immediate enemies or potential enemies in Lebanon: Hizb'allah and the Lebanese army. In addition, Israel must be immediately concerned with how Hamas and the Syrian military. In an extreme case, Israel has to be concerned with what Iran might do.
Hizb'allah is the major enemy, of course, and it should not be underestimated. Hizb'allah has about 6000 full-time fighters, who are probably among the best Arab light forces in the world. A few days ago, they forced the Golani Brigade — well, a portion of it, actually — to withdraw under fire. That is no small feat, even if the Israeli intention at that time was reconnaissance, as it likely was. (On a reconnaissance mission, you don't want to engage decisively, because you want information, not a kinetic fight.) These are most likely concentrated on the Israeli border to engage the Israeli ground troops as they come across, then stage a fighting withdrawal.
In addition to this, Hizb'allah can probably call on up to 30000 additional fighters, of varying levels of training and with varying equipment. Hizb'allah's greatest weaknesses are lack of mobility and lack of air assets.
In addition to the rockets, anti-ship missiles and small arms that have been in evidence, Hizb'allah has mortars, artillery, RPGs and heavy anti-tank missiles. They are a formidable force.
The Lebanese army is basically a non-factor in operational terms. There are about 40000 troops, but they are lightly armed and badly trained. (This is also one reason why they have not taken on Hizb'allah for control of the South.) They have said that they would fight alongside Hizb'allah if the Israelis invade, but they would be quickly crushed if they did so.
A more pressing problem for Israel is that the Palestinians could cause trouble. In Gaza, that's not a problem, because the Israelis are already fighting there (though that fighting does tie down Israeli troops). In the West Bank, however, any fighting would mean more Israeli troops would be diverted and unavailable for the northern front. This would not be a serious threat to the Israeli plans, but it could be significant if the Syrians intervene.
The Syrians probably wouldn't intervene. While Syria has a large military, it is not terribly well-equipped and it has a long history of utter disaster when facing Israeli forces. Syria likely wants this to remain a proxy war. If Syria does get involved, it is a huge problem for Israel, because there is both the need to defend Golan, and the need to prevent Israeli troops in Lebanon from being flanked. But the biggest threat would be from Syrian chemical weapons, which could devastate Israel's civilian population. Of course, that would lead to an Israeli nuclear devastation of Syria, so hopefully Syria's leaders are sane enough not to go that far in aiding their Hizb'allah proxies.
The Iranians, other than the couple of hundred Pasdaran who are working with Hizb'allah in Lebanon, is too far away to intervene directly. (I count the Pasdaran as essentially Hizb'allah — or Hizb'allah as essentially Pasdaran, I suppose — and so include them above as integral to Hizb'allah's well-trained troops.) The one way the Iranians could become involved is by long-range missile strikes. Since this would, again, lead to an Israeli nuclear response, I don't think Iran is insane enough for that. They're happy to let Hizb'allah and Syria take the blows while Iran keeps working to get their nuclear program completed. Then, all bets are off, but that's not (hopefully) yet.
Terrain/Weather
Weather is not an issue this time of year.
The terrain is very favorable to the defender. The area north from the Israel-Lebanon border is extraordinarily hilly, rising to the Lebanon Mountains towards the Mediterranean coast, and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains on the border with Syria. Between these is the Beka'a Valley, the enemy's rear area in Lebanon (the enemy's strategic rear is in Syria).
The Litani River runs through the Beka'a, then turns West for the sea some 40km North of the Israel-Lebanon border. A number of smaller, generally seasonal rivers run East-West from the Lebanon Mountains down towards the Mediterranean.
The road net is somewhat underdeveloped except along the coast.
Troops
The Israeli military is large, with over 100,000 ground forces alone, plus perhaps half a million reserves. Israel began mobilizing its reserves several days ago, and recently called up significantly more (Fox said 5000 or more) troops. Israel cannot call up reserves for any length of time without hurting their economy, so they only do it in very limited conditions, when war is impending and will be big. The number of callups is still relatively small; my expectation is that they will grow as Israel commits to action, because Israel can operate for sufficient time on its regular forces to get the reserves into action.
Israel's troops are among the best trained and most competent in the world. They have never lost a war, and even when they lose battles, it is at high cost to their enemies. The Israeli army is stupendously well equipped, with natively built assault rifles and tanks, and significant imported arms of all kinds (mostly from the US).
Israel has probably the second-best air force in the world, trailing only the United States. Their equipment is numerous, capable and well-maintained. Their pilots are well trained and very, very good. (The last Israeli war saw an exchange rate of 80 enemy aircraft destroyed in the air for one Israeli aircraft, and that one was destroyed by ground fire.)
The Israeli navy is small, with 3 submarines, 3 corvettes, a dozen or so small missile boats, and a number of patrol craft. It is sufficient to blockade Lebanon and insert commandos, but insufficient for large-scale operations of any kind.
Time
The callup of reserves limits Israel's time horizon, and the more troops called up, the more this is true. Israeli reserves are otherwise known as civilians, and Israel only has about 5 million total civilians, including children and the elderly. Imagine the US economy if 30 million citizens were put under arms!
The second internal limit on Israel's time is munitions stockpiles. Israel has a limited number of smart bombs, for instance, and has to keep some in reserve should Syria get restless on being left out of the fight. This limits the way the Israeli's fight in a way that the US does not face, and means that Israel cannot trade bombs for their soldiers' lives as easily as we can. Israel will have to keep major combat operations within a span of perhaps 2 months to avoid running down their stockpiles, unless the US is flying in resupply (which we may well be doing). UPDATE: we are.)
The third internal limit on Israel's time is their public's aversion to even enemy civilian casualties. While the public is firmly behind the military actions for now, this won't last for more than a few months before the pictures of enemy dead begin to weigh on Israeli consciences.
The final limit on Israeli staying time is support from the US. As long as we support Israel, they can continue to operate in the face of everyone else's condemnation (they are used to it), but Israel depends on US support for a great deal, and will not jeopardize that. Right now, that limit looks to be in the far future, as President Bush appears glad that it's not us having to fight this fight.
So What Will Israel Do?
Who knows?
But if I were in charge, I would put six brigades (armor heavy) in the Bekaa, three on either side of the Litani, and drive North to cut off any possible Syrian assistance. Meanwhile, I would use another six or so brigades to take Lebanon up to the Litani in the West. I don't think Israel has the structure to cut off Hizb'allah's retreat, so they would instead be pushed towards Beirut (as the PLO was during the 1982 war), likely bringing down the Lebanese government, which Israel would not want. To prevent this, I would strongly consider landing troops south of Beirut by sea, in order to cut coastal movement and force Hizb'allah to stand and fight, at least in the West.
The idea would be to destroy Hizb'allah's military capability by killing their best fighters (who would likely stand and fight in the South), destroying their long-range rockets and missiles, and uncovering and destroying their bunkers. Then pull out: Israel is not ready for a long occupation.
Best case for this would be a 10 day operation. More likely would be a couple of weeks. Worst case (assuming no Syrian intervention, and Hizb'allah breaks within the first week) would be 3 months.
In my judgement, such as it is, Israel could sustain such a campaign with sufficient reserves to counter any other country (or the Palestinians) getting involved.
The key in the long term, though, is not military but political: someone has to control southern Lebanon to keep Hizb'allah out. While Israel could create a DMZ by fire, I don't think they want to have that on their shoulders. More likely would be a deal with Lebanon to come in and take over, backed by a threat to repeat if they let Hizb'allah infiltrate.
Will it work? No clue, but everything else short of annihilation or bringing in the US military has been tried.
July 21, 2006
Ouch!
The Edmonton Journal is pissed off at Canadians evacuated, whining, from Lebanon, calling them "swearing, muttering ingrates". Ouch.
(Via Pajamas Media, one of the best sites for information on the crisis.
The Limits of Intelligence
Throughout history, armies have been continually dismayed by how much of what they think they know is simply utterly wrong. Just in recent times, consider our intelligence on Iraq's weapons programs and force deployments, twice, North Korea's nuclear programs, and now, how well-armed and well dug-in Hizb'allah is. And yet, somehow, our policy makers and journalists keep acting as if we have (or anyone has) perfect, infallible intelligence. Now, keeping that in mind, how far is Iran really from developing nuclear weapons? The intelligence agencies all seem to agree, from politicians' statements and news reports based on leaked information, that the timeline is two years or more. Most lefty blogs that I've seen talk about it assume ten years or more. But what do we really know?
The answer could be critical when Israel goes into Lebanon.
July 20, 2006
Spot the Civilians
There has been a lot of discussion regarding the number of civilians killed in Lebanon by Israeli attacks. But what is interesting is the absolute clarity: X number of civilians killed. Many would call the death of even one civilian in a war, no matter how unintentional their death is, a crime committed by the party that fired on that civilian. While the demand for absolute perfection in targeting is clearly unrealistic, what is more baffling to me is the apparent expectation of perfect knowledge, as if the Israelis (or the US military in other circumstances) are omniscient gods.
How do we know, after all, how many civilians were killed in Lebanon? First of all, we have to accept the word of Hizb'allah, a group not noted for its truthfulness, as to who was killed and how many and under what circumstances. Is Israel responsible for civilians killed by Hizb'allah troops to prevent those civilians from fleeing the target areas? Were 8 children really killed, or just the two that Hizb'allah photographed? Second, and to me somewhat more insidious, Lebanon has the same issue that the Gaza, the West Bank, Iraq and Afghanistan have: how do you tell who the civilians are? Let's play a game I'll call "Spot the Civilians."
Is this person a civilian?
She is not wearing a uniform, after all. Or is she: does the headband count as a "fixed sign visible at a distance"? If she's not a civilian, does she become a civilian by putting down the anti-tank rocket? By taking off the headband? Does she become a soldier again by picking the weapon back up? If she's a civilian, how does one differentiate between her and this guy:
OK, he's wearing a pretty definite uniform, so maybe we can say that he is a soldier, but the lady above is not, because she's not wearing a uniform. Then how about this guy?
Not only is he not wearing a uniform, he's firing from the middle of a group of kids! How would we tell him apart from the woman at the top of this post? And if Israeli soldiers were to fire at this guy in self-defense, would he or they be responsible for the kids who got killed? But at least we can all agree that kids are not threats, right? I mean, all those photos of dead toddlers from bombed buildings in Lebanon (whether or not they are the children of Hizb'allah fighters, and whether or not Hizb'allah had stored weapons in the child's home) are truly heartbreaking. So surely we can agree, children are innocents in all of this. Right?
I don't know about anyone else, but I take the numbers of civilians reported killed with a huge block of salt. The truth is, we don't really know how many civilians have been killed, and how many have not.
And even more importantly, we have to realize that the civilized veneer stretched across war for the last couple of hundred years has been torn off, and we are back in a far more primitive world, where the moral issues are far less clear. When the enemy hides among non-combatants, fires from their midst, and forces them to stay in combat zones, it is inevitable that more non-combatants will be killed. I think that the only real way to approach this is to blame the barbarians who hide among civilians, or blur the line between combatants and civilians; and meanwhile harden our hearts against more pictures of dead children, placed for propaganda purposes by a barbaric enemy. The only other alternative is surrender, because if we hold fire for fear of killing civilians, that just gives the barbarians ready-made hostages and increases the death toll all around.
UPDATE: I don't know that I've agreed much with Alan Dershowitz before, but I do on this. Kevin Drum's dismissive tone notwithstanding, there really does need to be some redefinition of "civilians", because the all-purpose word doesn't capture the reality.
UPDATE: I am very interested in discussing how liberal democratic societies can fight terrorists who hide among civilians. I am very interested in discussing what is just and unjust in war. I am not the least bit interested in giving space to people whose main aim is to vent their frustrations, or just to call names. Nor am I at all interested in rehashing the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or getting bogged down in discussions of various technical points which "prove" the perfidy of Israel, or the US, or Christians or whomever. Fair warning: if you want to discuss serious issues, seriously, you are welcome; if you want to call names and hurl rhetorical bombs, go elsewhere: your comments are not going to get published here.
July 19, 2006
Santayana was a Bastard, but Right
Now, as then, we will moan that "if only we had known".
Now, as then, we know, deep down, we know.
Now, as then, we are too afraid of the practical consequences of inaction, and too ready to rationalize away our moral natures.
Soon, as then, will we say "never again"?
Soon, as now, will we decide that "never again" is too hard-line to be practical?
The Chicago Way
There's been a lot of noise lately about "proportional response" in Israel's counterattack against Hizb'allah, after Hizb'allah raided into Israel and captured two Israeli soldiers, then begin firing rockets at Israeli towns. I don't get the idea; I really don't. I suppose I just don't understand what a "proportional response" is? Let's explore.
A "proportional response" could mean "doing just what your enemy did". But if Israel were to go into Lebanon and capture enemy fighters, and then start bombing enemy civilians (even hospitals and mosques), they would be excoriated as being monsters and war criminals. Indeed, they are being charged exactly thus for the incidental damage from fighting Hizb'allah in response to such actions. (Example: Hizb'allah moves its rockets in trucks that Israel is bombing; to protect the rockets, Hizb'allah mixes those trucks in with convoys of civilian cars and buses; Israel attacks the trucks anyway, and the media reports this as Israel bombing a civilian convoy and everyone starts demanding Israel cease attacking civilians.)
A "proportional response" could mean "doing just what is needed to stop the enemy from doing what he was doing and no more". That has two big problems. The first is that this would likely imply a heavier assault than Israel is currently engaged in, and so is likely not what the worriers mean. The second is that such a formulation leads only to more casualties down the line. In fact, this has been the pattern in Israeli/Arab relations since Oslo: the Arabs attack Israeli civilians mercilessly; the Israelis respond by counter-battery fire against Arab rocket-launchers or artillery, or killing Arab leaders, or capturing Arab fighters, or some similar means; the Arabs scream "war crime" and beg the international community to force a cease-fire; the cease-fire comes; Arabs, having taken a drubbing, re-arm and recruit and train new fighters; go back to step one. In other words, the problem is never actually solved, only kicked down the road to come back again in a few weeks, months or (in rare cases) years. Is it really the moral position to insist that problems that lead to fighting never get solved? I cannot see how.
A "proportional response" could mean "just sitting there and taking it", because being more powerful than your enemy ipso facto removes any legitimacy you have to defend yourself. I suspect that this is what most Europeans, at least, mean by "proportional response." That is so against human nature as to beggar belief, but then Europe has spent a long time (as has the the US, really) in virtually complete peace and security, and maybe a lot of people have just forgotten what it means to be at the mercy of an implacable enemy.
A "proportional response" could mean "doing what other countries would do in a similar situation", but I suspect it doesn't. After all, look at what France did in the Ivory Coast (a few French "peace keepers" were killed, so France destroyed the government's air force and imposed de facto French control over the entire population and economy) or what Spain would do if the Basques were to start firing long-range rockets from France into Spain. (Yes, I know there are mountains in the way. It's a thought experiment.) If Israel's response were along those lines, it would really look more like the Chicago way, which is really the only way to settle a problem where one side's minimum condition is the extermination of the other:
You wanna know how you do it? Here's how, they pull a knife, you pull a gun. He sends one of yours to the hospital, you send one of his to the morgue. That's the Chicago way.
Posted by jeff at 5:58 PM | TrackBack
July 18, 2006
A New Sovereignty and Lebanon
Last August I wrote about how the old understanding of sovereignty is no longer useful. In brief, my point is that we should move from the current de jure definition of sovereignty to a de facto definition of sovereignty, and that within areas where no state is de facto sovereign (regardless of de jure sovereignty), any state should be able to act with impunity. This would certainly apply to southern Lebanon, where de jure sovereignty belongs to Lebanon, but where Lebanon's army cannot go without being fought (and likely defeated) by Hizb'allah, which holds de facto sovereignty over the area.
Under the old understanding of sovereignty, it is ambiguous whether any entity committed an act of war by attacking into Israel and capturing Israeli soldiers. While Hizb'allah holds seats in the Lebanese parliament and portfolios in the Lebanese executive, neither Lebanon's executive nor their parliament authorized any strike on Israel. Yet while Hizb'allah has no de jure sovereignty (and thus no ability to commit acts of war in the Westphalian understanding), treating Hizb'allah's act as a crime is clearly not the correct framework: for one thing, Lebanon cannot enforce any decree against Hizb'allah, and for another, this was an attack across an international border by an armed force. It is this ambiguity on which Hizb'allah, Hamas, Iran acting in Iraq and many other terrorist organizations and states rely for their protection. After all, if Hamas attacks Israel, what right does Israel have to attack a (presumedly-) sovereign Palestine that did not attack Israel?
Under a de facto understanding of sovereignty, the ambiguity is eliminated, and both sides' rights and responsibilties are clearly defined. Hizb'allah, as de facto sovereign of southern Lebanon, committed an act of war. Lebanon as a whole, to the extent it harbors Hizb'allah installations and forces, is a legitimate enemy of Israel (though Israel would be wise not to treat it as such, even rhetorically) because they are not acting as a neutral, but as a co-belligerent of Hizb'allah. Thus Israel has the right to fight in areas controlled by Hizb'allah, and Hizb'allah has the responsibility for negotiating and enforcing any agreements with Israel to stop the fighting.
Similarly in Gaza, Hamas is de facto sovereign (and arguably de jure sovereign). As such, the attack into Israel in which Gilad Shalit was captured was a clear act of war, because Hamas could have prevented, or should have been able to prevent, the attack, but did not. The position in Gaza is analagous to the position in Lebanon, except for the absence of any widely-accepted de jure sovereignty over Gaza.
Note that this understanding of sovereignty would also clarify the situations in Afghanistan/northwest Pakistan, Iran and Syria in respect to supporting transnational terrorists, and northern Mexico in respect to drug smugglers.
In general, clarity is good, and ambiguity is bad, in international affairs. Giving transnational groups the ability to act criminally or even to fight wars, while preventing sovereign states from engaging those groups because under international law the groups don't quite exist, simply leads to more wars and cross-border criminal acts. I can't think of anyone who would argue that that outcome is a good one.
June 29, 2006
Wait a Minute...
So let me get this straight: if an activity occurs entirely in one State, it is an "interstate" act, and if it occurs spanning multiple nations it is "not of an international character"? I think that the Supreme Court justices need to go back and study Latin long enough to determine the meaning of the prefix "inter-"; they seem to have reversed the meaning somewhat.
June 23, 2006
Obligations
I was going to write at some length about the latest attack by the New York Times on the American war effort, and thus on the people of the United States1, by disclosing yet another method the government uses to find terrorists. Fortunately, most of that ground was covered by Fran Porretto, so you can see much of the rest of what I would have written there.
But there is one thing that Fran didn't cover and that I would like to discuss: obligations. A member of a community — up to and including a citizen of a country — has obligations to that community. One of those obligations is to obey the constitutionally-valid laws duly passed to govern that community, and another is to not deliberately attack that community directly or by aiding those who attack the community. To do otherwise is to yourself be an enemy of that community. (If someone would like to propose a definition of "enemy" that doesn't include deliberate attempts to destroy or weaken an entity, I'd love to hear it.) For institutions that are part of a community, there is a double obligation: the obligation of the institution to support the system that governs and protects them, and the obligation of each and every member of that institution to do likewise. As such, the Times has multiple obligations to the US that should prevent the Times from deliberately attempting to weaken the US. "Serving the public interest" is not only the Times' duty, but that of every US citizen or institution — and most particularly of the government. The government has an absolute duty to protect the US from attack, and the Times' weakening of that ability is a moral and cultural failure.
The Times, though, has some other peculiar views about obligations that it seems to share with many other MSM outlets. For example, the Times seems to think that the government has an obligation to the Times (and other self-designated journalists with the proper accreditations, memberships and viewpoints) to grant access, disclose information and otherwise to assist the Times in its organizational (corporate, in this case) endeavors. The government has no such obligation. This lack of obligation on the government's part opens a road to dealing with the Times and its like-minded compatriots: banishment.
The President should immediately announce that the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times have, through their disclosure of this and other critically sensitive government programs, policies and procedures in the War passed beyond the point where they can be reasonably believed to be acting as responsible American journalists, particularly in refusing to withhold publication of sensitive information about vital government war measures. That, as a result, it is the policy of the government for one year from this date to hold those named institutions and their employees to be persona non grata in their role as journalists, with the following consequences: neither those organizations, nor any employee or associate of those organizations, nor any person whose material is published by those organizations during the year, will be granted press credentials at any government news conference or other event, including travel on Presidential and other government trips abroad; nor will any executive officer or employee grant interviews or otherwise disclose any information of any kind in their official capacity to those organizations or their employees, on pain of termination. The organizations' behavior over the sanction period would determine if the sanctions would continue in place past that year.
The MSM have for too long trampled over the people's true interests, and the people's representatives, in the MSM's own self-interest (while piously insisting they are merely our representatives, as if they were an elected, rather than self-appointed, agent of the public!). It is time for the government to reassert its own obligations to the citizens, by failing to cooperate with those who would harm our war efforts. True, there would be a firestorm over this. But then, what can the Times say that would be worse than what they've already said? What can they do that would be worse than what they've already done? It's time — it's past time — to reclaim government's role as our watchdog.
Certainly, there needs to be a free press covering the government, but there also need to be limits to how far that press goes. Exposing true malfeasance by government (yes, Abu Ghraib counts, though the coverage was one-sided and excessive) is one thing. A sustained attack on the country's ability to defend itself is quite another. And while censorship is not the answer, neither is ignoring the rot within.
1Yes, I realize that the Times would claim that they are "serving the public interest", or, in private, perhaps that they are attacking the Bush administration, but when you deliberately weaken a country's war effort, it is the people of that country who are put at risk. Do I question their patriotism? Unhesitatingly.
Smells Like ... Victory
It looks like we may be on the verge of a fairly complete victory in Iraq. The Iraqi government seems to be prepared to offer amnesty to insurgents in Iraq. Since November of 2004, and the river war that followed it, broke the back of the insurgency (organized operations by the enemy above the squad level have since been essentially non-existent), it has been clear that the insurgents could not drive out the US or Iraqi government militarily. The elections that have followed have shown that the insurgents cannot defeat the Iraqi government politically. The failure of terrorism to spark civil war, and the increasingly-evident revenge attacks by Sunni and Kurd groups embedded in Iraq's Interior Ministry, have made abundantly clear lately that the Sunni insurgents (2 or 3 distinct types, actually, including criminals, ex-Ba'athists and so on) have to settle, leave or die. And now we are in the end game: wars end either in the annihilation of the enemy, or their surrender on terms. This amnesty, however spun, amounts to nothing more than a surrender of the major Sunni groups on terms.
Certainly, there are some tenets of the proposal, assuming the media reports to be correct, that are questionable as stated, and I hope our government officials are on top of these. For example, including a halting of coalition anti-terror raids in insurgent strongholds only makes sense if we can resume those raids if there is any terrorist or insurgent activity in those strongholds, and if the Iraqi military and police are able to take control of those areas as a condition of stopping coalition operations. I'm content to give the administration the benefit of the doubt on this, given how well they've done in handling the war to date both militarily and politically.
June 21, 2006
The Danger of Letting Your Fangs Grow too Long...
is that someone will come along and cut them off. The rabidly anti-war "Bush lied" types let their fangs grow too long, and a couple of Congressmen appear to have pulled out the fang clippers.
I know that the first thing out of the antis' mouths will be to question the timing, and the second will be to question the administrations motives. But frankly, I'm glad that the administration has not been releasing this kind of information (or focusing, for example, on the captured documents being translated and what they show), because I really want them worrying about today and tomorrow and next year, not three years ago. Frankly, the President can't be re-elected, so let other people fight these battles and let the administration do the work of keeping us safe from all threats, foreign and domestic.
June 8, 2006
Celebrating a Death
It's not often that I celebrate a death, but Abu Musa'ab al-Zarqawi needed killin'. And apparently finally got it. With the cascade of top Zarqawi aides and regional leaders being killed, I figured it was only a matter of time until we got him, so long as he was in-country. Seems he was.
Ding Dong, The Witch is Dead!
ABC, Fox, and CNN are all reporting the death of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. In fact, as I type, Fox News is reporting that the announcement is now official. Zarqawi apparently was killed in a US airstrike.
May he roast in hell with 72 pigs.
Posted by Brian at 2:42 AM | TrackBackMay 23, 2006
Iran
Dave Schuler had an interesting post on Iran, in which he argues that our options are to get Russia and China on board with sanctions, or we have no options. I do not concur.
Well, let me be more clear. I concur that our best option is to get China and Russia on board (for real) with sanctions, and I hope that the government is focusing its will and bending its enormous resources to that task. My failure to concur arises from one likelihood and one fact: the likelihood is that Russia and China will not come on board with tough sanctions, and the fact is that we do have options past that point.
In my opinion, the US goals, in order, must be to (1) prevent genocide, (2) keep the oil flowing, (3) minimize attacks on the US and allied interests.
If Iran appears to be close to getting nuclear weapons, or if it is found to have done so, Israel will use its nuclear arsenal to destroy Iran utterly. Failure to do so implies that Israel will itself be destroyed, because 9/11 showed us pretty clearly to take our enemies at their words when they say they want to kill us. And the Iranians have been very clear about their goal to test their nuclear weapons in Tel Aviv and Haifa. So to accomplish goal #1, the US must prevent Iran from even getting close to a nuclear weapons capability.
Sanctions as a tool to accomplish that violate goal #2, but are more politically palatable than an outright attack on Iran. Assuming that diplomacy has failed to convince the Iranians to abandon seeking nuclear weapons (and I think that is nearly a given at this point, and will be assured when Iran rejects the latest EU proposal that would give Iran guaranteed access to commercial-grade nuclear fuel), sanctions will be our next attempt; indeed, we are already moving down that road.
But in order for sanctions to work, as you note, Russia and China must be on board. The history of N. Korea, and of the Oil For Food program, indicate that a tight sanctions regime is unworkable. I think we have to try, but I also think that we are unlikely to get what we want, and must keep in mind the timeline to achieve goal #1 is shrinking rapidly - particularly since it now appears that the Iranians (quelle surprise) have a parallel, secret military nuclear program in place.
So let's say that we can't get a tight sanctions regime. Do we go for a leaky sanctions regime? This is where, I believe, your "Without that we’ve got nothing" comment comes into play. No, we cannot accept a leaky sanctions regime that makes us the bad guy while letting Iran continue to develop their nuclear program essentially unhindered, in practical terms. Remember all the stories of starving Iraqi children? Think those won't come back in Iranian clothes? If so, think again.
So if leaky sanctions are not going to help us achieve goal #1, and would in the meantime lessen the oil flow (goal #2 violated) while giving excuses to the Iranians to attack us (goal #3 violated), we cannot do leaky sanctions.
What's next? Embargo. We could shut off Iran's access to the sea, and (if we were willing to attack oil pipelines and road nets, particularly in the North) could shut off any significant Iranian imports or exports. But that is an act of war: we have gone from "we all agree not to trade with you" to "we will compel everyone by force of arms not to trade with you." At that point, we have lost goal #2 and goal #3, and goal #1 is still very questionable because we will not be able to guarantee a stoppage of the Iranian nuclear program short of their utter surrender, more complete even than that of Serbia. Now, it's possible that Iran will surrender, and we'll be able to go in and eliminate their nuclear programs to a degree we (and the Israelis) consider sufficient, get the oil flowing again, and not take massive attacks in the process (surrender may just mean entrapment, in an age and land of terrorism). Possible, but then it's possible that the Cubs will win the Series. Possible, but unlikely.
So we are past sanctions as an option at this point in the logic, and Iran continues onwards. We've looked at the possibility of an embargo, and it's just not an attractive option for obtaining our goals. At this point, we've exhausted all possibilities of obtaining goal #1 short of war, and the question is what kind of war it will be. As I noted in my response to Dave's post, we've got the resources to do considerably more than a limited embargo, and in the process to acheive all three goals.
To do this, we must actively destroy Iran's civilian and military infrastructure and occupy the oil fields and the territory around the Straits of Hormuz. This would take considerably fewer ground troops than occupying all of Iran (which we do not have the strength to do, frankly, and might not have even were we not also engaged in Iraq). We would achieve goal #1 by simply making it impossible for Iran to function in any way until they surrender utterly, thus making it impossible (by tautology) for Iran to continue nuclear development. We would certainly take terror attacks for this, as would our allies, and some of them would be big.
On the other hand, of course, which is better: taking those terror attacks, or waiting until either Iran or Israel attacks the other with nuclear weapons? Politically, I suppose we could just let Israel go for it, and denounce them afterwards. Morally? Well, that's another story.
April 18, 2006
General Questions
While I think the six retired generals who came out publicly calling for SecDef Rumsfeld to retire were wrong on many counts, it is still good to keep in mind that these men have decades each of military experience, and not all of them are Title X guys (that is, political generals); these guys deserve to be listened to before being simply dismissed, and we all know the news tends to miss most of the important parts of any story in their quest for the right soundbite. So I have a few questions for them, and if there's any way I can get time to do this, I'll try to track down contact information for the generals and get answers to these particular questions:
1. One common criticism of SecDef Rumsfeld has been that he committed insufficient troops to the Iraq campaign. How many troops would you have suggested were required for this campaign? For how long would they be required and when would they be phased in and out? What missions would extra troops have been tasked with, and where deployed? How would these additional troops have been supplied, given the lack of both Turkey and Saudi Arabia as supply routes/sources and the political impossibility of using a route through Israel/Jordan? How would the additional supplies and supply routes have been protected both during the invasion and during the occupation?
2. Let us say that your advice from the first question had been taken, and the campaign had been fought with these forces, logistics plans and so forth. What additional risks would have been introduced, and what risks mitigated, by campaigning in this manner vice the manner in which the campaign was actually conducted?
3. Would the use of a larger footprint lessened the duration or severity of the terrorism, or given the terrorists more targets, or some mix of the two? Would the Sunni insurrection have been larger, smaller or the same? Would the Shi'a and/or Kurds have joined the insurrection? Would it have been possible, with this larger footprint, to build up Iraqi security forces who would have a will and interest in securing their country? How much time would this have taken in contrast to the way that it has turned out in reality? Was removing Saddam Hussein from power sufficient to end the war, or were other goals required to be achieved before the situation in Iraq could be declared
4. How does this plan align with the political goals outlined by the President? Would it have been possible to have stood up an Iraqi government in sovereign control of the country? How much time would that have taken, and how much buy-in from Iraqis - particularly Sunni Iraqis - would be expected? Would any such government, wholly owing its existence and form and security to American forces, ever be seen as anything other than a puppet government? Would it ever be anything other than a puppet government?
5. If you believe that engaging in the Iraq campaign was a mistake in the first place, and that the President's goals were not sufficient, were too audacious, or were simply not worth the cost to achieve, what goals do you believe would have been correct to pursue? Is it the place of the military or the civilian leadership to determine the goals to be pursued in undertaking a war? If it is the place of the civilian leadership to determine goals, and the military does not support those goals, should it be the military or the civilian leadership whose decision is final?
6. Should the Secretary of Defense be held accountable for the errors of his superiors? That is, should the Secretary of Defense be responsible for, say, the disastrous CPA results, even though those were largely at the hands of the State Department after the President's decision to implement the CPA in this manner? If the President should bear the blame for that, rather than the Secretary of Defense, then in what way did the Secretary of Defense mismanage the occupation (another common complaint)? What could have been done differently, knowing what we knew at the time and without benefit of hindsight? Where and how had such measures been tried in the past, and with what results?
7. Assuming that the larger levels of force had been used, a fairly large callup of the reserves and National Guard - much larger than was actually done - would have been needed. This would have been politically difficult, which is part of the Secretary of Defense's job to defend. What arguments could have been made to make such a large callup politically palatable?
8. Given such a large callup, national reserves would have been next to non-existent. If another crisis had come to a head in, say, mid-2004, with the vast bulk of the American military committed in Iraq, with what forces could we have influenced the crisis? Would any inability to influence the crisis, let alone meaningfully intervene, be politically defensible? Would it be morally defensible?
9. You spoke out after your normal retirement, rather than resigning during the run-up to the war, or in its immediate aftermath. While it would be extraordinary for a serving officer to speak publicly against the civilian leadership, did you consider any other measures while on active duty, such as resigning your commission or taking early retirement? In what other ways did you attempt to influence the Secretary of Defense and the CINCCENT to do things your way? Is there anything that, in hindsight, you wish you had done to bring attention to these deficiencies at an earlier time?
10. To what degree have you considered that you might be wrong?
As I said, these men deserve to be listened to. They might, after all, be right. But how can we know until they've been asked, and answered, tough questions? So far, all we've heard is unbecoming carping. I for one would like to know more.
April 15, 2006
Force Field Developed
Some stories just seem so amazing you can't help but wonder if they are just belated April Fool's jokes or propaganda.
Israel and the US have apparently developed an anti-RPG system called Trophy. I'm guessing it's a ECM system of some kind, based on this video.
If true, the best word to sum it up would be "Cool!'
(Jeff, I'd really love to know how Connor reacts)
April 14, 2006
Generally Wrong
Several retired American generals have recently criticized SecDef Rumsfeld's conduct in office, and called for his resignation. (Best takes here and here.) The generals are, for the most part, wrong; and because of the way in which they are wrong, they'll never see that they are.
But first to backtrack. One of my largest disagreements ever with my father — one that actually led to both of us raising our voice with some heat — was over an event that happened close to two decades before I was born: Truman's sacking of MacArthur. My father argues that MacArthur was correct in his determination that the war could only be won by advancing all the way to the border with China, and if necessary into China itself. While I agree, with an important caveat, that is only part of the story. MacArthur was correct that the war could only be won militarily as he suggested, but Truman was correct about two somewhat more important matters: first, that the point of the war for the US was not to utterly destroy the enemy, but to preserve South Korean freedom; and second, and most importantly, that the control of military policy is not in the hands of the generals, but the civilian leadership of the nation.
Both issues are coming into play today, too. The generals who are making these criticisms of Rumsfeld (really, of Bush, if you note what they are most often criticizing) have failed to note that the military issues are not the only ones on the table, and the civilians have picked a different grand strategy than the generals assume is operating. As a result, our actions (and force levels, and choices of enemy and target) are different than the generals believe would be best. This does not make the generals correct even though they may be right in a narrow military sense: they have simply failed to consider the broader context of the American use of force and other elements of national power in the long war.
We could easily break countries and leave them to rot, and that is precisely what those who argue for 4 times the troop levels we actually used in Iraq are actually arguing for. It would be possible to level cities, devastate populations and economies and infrastructures, and kill the enemy en masse with few casualties of our own. We could use overwhelming military might to force the enemy's head into the sand so hard he'd never pull it up again. But that would hardly contribute to democratizing the Middle East, which is the grand strategy that our leaders elected for that purpose have chosen, and in fact would be detrimental to that strategy. Further, such criticisms reflect a very isolated thought process: what force then would be available should, say, North Korea come south?
We have undoubtedly traded away margins of victory (the Shahikot Valley and Tora Bora both come to mind, as does the early occupation of Anbar Province in Iraq) in the short term in order to gain a strategic advantage in the long term. It's a type of sacrifice war gamers are very familiar with, and one would expect those whose entire career is tied up in war gaming and war fighting would recognize that. But these generals, for whatever reason, have failed to notice that policy is not their bag, and their opinion of what that policy should be (which is the root of their disagreements on such points as force levels and choices of pace and target and enemy) is no more relevant than mine: their job is to carry out orders, not make policy.
Even within the context of the President's mandate to control national strategy, it is obvious that the President, the SecDef, and the military have all made mistakes. What is remarkable, looking at events through a historical lens, is how few mistakes they have made, how minor they have been, and how easily they have been adapted to. Indeed, the only mistake that I cannot understand, the largest mistake and yet the easiest to avoid, has been the administration's mismanagement of public opinion. While the administration says that they realize they are fighting an ideological struggle, they apparently don't realize that this is a struggle not merely with the enemy, but also with elements within our own society, who would gladly see Americans die in large numbers (and our allies die in massive, massive numbers) if it would give Republicans a black eye. This oversight threatens to end the President's strategy with the President's second term, and that makes it a core error that the President and his administration must fix, or risk utter long-term failure (though it would not happen on their watch).
And by the way, those Bush critics who otherwise wouldn't give a general officer the time of day, but are now jumping to crow out the generals' statements for their (the critics') own political gain, aren't fooling anyone. It is transparently obvious that the generals will be discarded by the critics as soon as they are no longer politically useful.
March 30, 2006
Behavioral Changes
I've been so busy and distracted that I forgot to make a major point the other day with my post on how our assumptions underlie our foreign policy. Listening to Thomas Friedman on NPR this morning reminded me about it.
The two assumptions governing our policy in Iraq and the larger Middle East are that a certain class Muslims are dangerous and that Muslims can be democratized and reformed. The first assumption can, despite the efforts of the President and many on the Left, only really be changed for the better by Muslims themselves, and recent events are instead tending to solidify and expand the assumption, towards the assumption that all Muslims are warlike and dangerous and that they will give no quarter.
The second assumption, though, is under serious threat by the people increasingly calling for us to pull out of Iraq. But since they aren't thinking through the implications of their proposed policies, they've missed a big factor: if we decide that Iraq is a lost cause, it means that we've decided that democratization and thus presumably pacification of Muslim countries is a waste of time. And that means that when we go to war against Iran and other Muslim countries, which we will continue to do so long as we perceive them as threatening, it will not be to build their nations up but to destroy their nations and kill their people. Not the governments, but the people.
And I really don't think we want to go there.
March 29, 2006
Assumptions and Actions
We all tend to think about foreign policy in terms of immediate events. We look at a threat from Iran, or a report about North Korea, or a statement from France or Britain, or an election in Belarus, and we ponder what that event means. The problem is that the events are almost meaningless in and of themselves, and so we are often deeply misled about our own and others' foreign policies. Events themselves only have two possible effects, over the long term, on changing policy: either they change our assumptions, or they spark action. Most events, though — the vast majority, in fact — have neither of those effects: they are simply historical footnotes, confirming our assumptions or leading to no firm decisions. The events that are not footnotes are called inflection points or turning points, depending on how severe is the change they create.
Those particular events that spark action — the Pearl Harbor attack, the 9/11 raids, the attack on Fort Sumter — do so because they crystallize a change in assumptions and make clear that our former ways of acting are no longer appropriate. The Japanese would not be deterred from conquest by economic sanctions and slowly increasing pressure; the jihadis would continue to attack the US in ever more outrageous ways; the South would not peacefully remain in the Union. In each case, the crystallizing event served to validate assumptions that had been undergoing change for some time, or to show the necessity for reexamining flawed assumptions. And of course there are positive changes as well, such as the fall of the Berlin wall, that change our assumptions as well.
Still, what is seldom remarked upon, except perhaps by historians seeking explanations when all the principals are long dead, is the framework within which we make foreign policy decisions. Even the spark events are less meaningful in the long-term than the underlying assumptions that frame our foreign policy. The 9/11 raids sparked a war, and arguably two wars. The increasing assumption that we cannot deal peacefully with Muslim countries and possibly not with Muslims at all may lead to a dozen or more wars; and in retrospect the 9/11 raids would simply be seen as a crystallization of the increasing feeling that the Muslim world was broken that started with the first Intifadeh and grew with various terror attacks during the 1990s. And I'm not sure that that characterization is entirely wrong, either: certainly, those who were paying attention were disconcerted by the terrorism increasingly directed at the US, and with increasingly vast effect; our assumptions were changing, but had not yet reached a tipping point.
Spark events determine when we act, but our assumptions determine how we act. And our assumptions have been undergoing radical changes since the end of the Cold War, and need to be reexamined in depth. In particular, there are a few assumptions that have changed, and a few that may soon change, that will determine much about the world in the next decades.
One little-examined change in assumptions actually began under President Clinton. The US has always reserved the right to act preemptively to secure our defense. But during the 1990s, President Clinton first enunciated a doctrine of preemption against situations that we were unhappy about morally, but which did not impact our security needs. The interventions in the Balkans and Haiti were of this type. President Bush's policy of preemptive war is actually more limited than President Clinton's, in that President Bush is signalling that the US will act against a threat earlier than before, rather than that we will act against non-threats. But the underlying assumptions are that anything that happens anywhere in the world is our business, and that we must act in the early stages of a crisis to prevent a full-blown crisis, and that (in the absence of any other superpowers) only the US can act globally. Taken together, these changed assumptions virtually compel the US to intervene in the affairs of any unstable or ungoverned areas, which means that we need to staff and train appropriately for that. And to think that these assumptions will change under a Democratic administration is fantasy: the very idea of interference in such places to bring about a better situation for the people living there came from the Democrats in the first place.
Many of our changes in assumptions recently have had to do with Muslims. The first changes were from Islamic terrorism as an Israeli problem to Islamic terrorism as our problem. This began in the mid-1990s under President Clinton, but the change did not crystallize until 9/11. This change in assumptions is fairly monumental in and of itself, and undergirds the Bush Doctrine in its entirety. But this is not the largest change, nor the most likely to lead to future wars (excepting Iran, which results largely from this change). The largest changes are those that deal with the character of Muslims and of Islam itself.
Already, there is a fairly large movement in public assumptions from "Islam is a religion of peace" to "the Muslim world has bloody borders and massive internal injustices because of Islam", and from "most Muslims are moderates, even when they don't speak out" to "most Muslims either support or refuse to condemn Muslim violence, including terrorism, against non-Muslims". These alone will change the way we fight: as the wars drag on, we will become increasingly brutal as we increasingly demonize the enemy. This is not unusual; read up on the Battle of the Bulge to see some of the war crimes committed by both sides.
But I can see us going further than that. I can see assumptions on the horizon that include "Muslims are not capable of being civilized", "all Muslims are potentially terrorists", "Islam is not a religion but a totalitarian movement" and others more extreme still. The Rahman case certainly does not help the Muslims, nor do the cartoon riots, to fight against these assumptions and stereotypes. And as long as such incidents continue, the US (and indeed the West in general) will move increasingly to the view that the only solution is to wipe out Islam, or to decimate Muslims everywhere, or to subjugate the Islamic world entirely. If that happens, there will be a full-blown civilizational war on the scale of the Crusades, the Arab conquest of the Middle East, or the Second World War.
And since that is, apparently, what the jihadis want to happen, the only way that it will be prevented is for Muslims to first reform internally. And that is not very likely; external pressure is almost certainly going to be required. In the end, the most likely course of events for the next decades is an increasingly frequent and increasingly brutal series of wars between the West (the US in particular) and the Islamic world. And it will not matter whether it is Democrats or Republicans in charge, other than to change the rate of reaction, because the assumptions of Americans as a whole will drive both parties to the same ends.
Posted by jeff at 12:23 PM | TrackBackMarch 27, 2006
Not To Mention...
Brian Dunn argues that nuclear weapons would be a strategic negative for Iran. Perhaps, but what really interests me is this: where are the nuclear freeze protesters, and the protesters against Israeli and American nuclear weapons in general for that matter, with Iran on the brink of developing a nuclear capability? You'd think they'd be out in the streets trying to stop, or at least express displeasure at, the proliferation. Instead, they seem to be actively working to prevent the world from trying to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons into the hands of an unstable theocratic regime. What is it Glenn Reynolds says often? "They're not anti-war [or in this case, anti-nuclear]; they're just on the other side."
March 20, 2006
Warfighting and Defense Secretarying
Rusty Shackelford thinks it's time to fire Donald Rumsfeld. I think Shackelford is wrong, based primarily on not understanding the job of SecDef, as far as I can tell. It is not the job of the Secretary of Defense to fight wars, nor even to determine the strategy. It is the job of the SecDef to assist the President in setting goals and conditions (grand strategy, if you will), and to assist the warfighters in determining strategy. It is mostly, though, the SecDef's job to make sure that the warfighters have what they need to successfully prosecute wars to attain the goals set by the President. That's why he spends so much time with the Congress and the political generals.
Now it's truly the case that we've made errors in Iraq. Some are obvious now, and some are not. Many of the most controversial decisions (such as disbanding the Iraqi army we had just defeated) will not really be clear in their effect until some time has passed, and arguments can be made either that they were brilliant or terrible or somewhere in between with somewhat equal credibility. History will validate or condemn these decisions; they are too arguable to be used as justifications for immediate correctives now. But merely making errors is a bad reason to fire someone: were the errors demonstrably fatal to our cause, and are they things that few others would have done given the same information? Were they honest mistakes or incompetence? It's very difficult for us to judge from where we sit.
But the real problem is that the US does not know how to fight the wars we're in now, and will be in for the next several decades, any more than the military of 1949 knew how to fight the Cold War and the various proxy fights that would come up as ancillaries to the Cold War. Are we to modify or destroy the idea of Westphalian states, or to act as gatekeepers to which states can claim the associated rights? Are we going to use proxies to fight for us or to fight on our own or to form coalitions; to create empires as the British did (but without the colonialism) or to admit captured territories as US territories and possibly eventually as states or to destroy and withdraw; to rebuild the cultures of our defeated enemies or to only remove the leaders; to intervene wherever threatened or more broadly or more narrowly than that; to integrate war and nation-building or to unleash the full fury of our destructive power upon our enemies; to engage or to withdraw from the world, even to the point of giving up our will to project power short of direct attack against the US itself?
These are not small questions, and we don't yet have the answers. Until we do, until we have decided what we want to do to make the world more pleasant to live in from our point of view, it will be impossible to tell if Rumsfeld's approach was wrong or right. And thus it would be a mistake to fire Rumsfeld for the reasons Shackelford gives.
UPDATE: I should point out, by the way, that what these wars look like is actually what war always looked like before industrialization: little or no differentiation between combatant and non-combatant, fighting amongst the civilians being fought over, and no definable front lines/rear areas. The real question, then, is whether a modern, liberal state can fight a liberal war against a barbarian (literally) enemy: can we fight clean in this kind of war and have any expectation of victory. I think that we are learning in Iraq that we can, and that it is hard and takes a long time. It would be faster to kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out, and my fear is that if we don't maintain our patience and resolve, we'll start doing exactly that. Good for our warriors and our security; bad for our souls.
More Like Jenin
First, if this happened as reported, then the involved Marines must be prosecuted for murder and war crimes.
Second, it's unlikely that the events happened as described. Note, for example, the witnesses: the most quoted is "Khaled Ahmed Rsayef" ... "who didn't witness the events but whose 15-year-old niece says she did" (but note that she is not quoted); "Imad Jawad Hamza, who spoke with hospital officials and residents".
So we are confronted with the statements of two people, neither of whom claims to have witnessed the acts. Further, their statements are vastly at odds with observed behavior of the US military under these and worse conditions over the years, though that is hardly conclusive. Google wasn't helpful about Rsayef or Hamza. I found this on an enemy website: different both in quoted witnesses and in the details of what happened. Nothing else much of note, though since the story is new and would make the US look bad if true, there will undoubtedly be more stuff available quite quickly, most of it smarmy, screaming or stuffed with schadenfreude.
Given that the claims are extraordinarily unlikely, and the evidence quite thin, my evaluation is that this is not worth paying attention to until and unless more facts — well-sourced facts — come out. Sadly, I'm becoming quite proficient at picking apart news reports for indications of false reporting. Sad, because it is necessary to utterly distrust news sources due to their long history of outright lies, fabulous distortions and the like.
March 9, 2006
Critics and Their Foibles
When the Bush administration came into office, its policy on foreign affairs was quite Jeffersonian: we would largely withdraw from conflict areas like the Israeli/Palestinian situation and let them sort out their own affairs. Per the critics, disengagement was the wrong policy, and instead we should engage with conflicts in order to resolve them.
So when we engaged, largely alone (initially) in Afghanistan and then with Britain and others in supporting roles in Iraq, the same critics were quick to tell us that "unilateralism" was the wrong policy, and instead we should engage "multilaterally".
So when we engaged multilaterally in North Korea, the very same critics were again quick to tell us that we were being too multilateral and should be more unilaterally engaged or, better yet, should disengage completely and just leave North Korea alone.
And the latest is Iran, where we have left Iran largely alone until lately, letting the EU and Russia run with negotiations and such. And now the very same critics once again say that we are wrong to follow this policy.
The only consistency in the anti-Bush critics on foreign policy is that they are against whatever President Bush does, regardless of the outcome. I'm sure it makes the critics feel good, but all it's done for me is to convince me that the Democrats must never again, unless they reform, have control of foreign policy until the long war against the jihadis is over. When your only policy principle is "Republicans bad", you are not fit to lead the country — indeed you're not even worth listening to.
March 7, 2006
The World's Problems
The most important, and among the least understood, fact about the world today is this: there are no remaining sanctuaries for anyone.
Religious sites give no sanctuary.
Oceans give no sanctuary.
Appeasement gives no sanctuary.
Strength alone gives no sanctuary.
Weakness gives no sanctuary.
Isolation gives no sanctuary.
Local law and custom give no sanctuary.
Absence of war between nations gives no sanctuary.
There are no sanctuaries in the world today. Any place which is not democratic (in the modern Western sense), peaceful, modern and secular spills violence and death outwards and inwards. The most obvious and apparent source of this violence and death is jihadism, particularly when coupled with other forms of nihilism, but it is not the only source. A look at Zimbabwe, Venezuela or Myanmar will quickly dispel any such notion.
This raises questions whose possible answers are so frightening that many people refuse to ask them, or to countenance others asking them. Is it possible to have peace anywhere in the world, let alone everywhere, on an ongoing basis? Is it possible to have peace without genocide? Both peace and meaningful freedom? Both peace and prosperity? Is it possible for Western cultures, and Westernized cultures like Japan or Korea, to survive in the face of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, resentment both of Western success and Western attempts to spread that success? Is it possible for other cultures to survive the competition from Western cultures? The evidence is all over the place, but the overall picture is not encouraging. It is becoming apparent that Western cultures cannot tolerate disorder and violence anywhere, and that Islamist culture cannot tolerate anything but its own hegemony. It seems likely that either Western culture or Islamist culture will take over the world: each is maximal and each is proselytizing and each is convinced that it is the best way. Each also has those among its opposite who feel that their own culture is immoral, and willing to work against their own culture's ascendency.
It is very possible — perhaps even likely — that the world will soon come to a tipping point, when the liberal West collectively catches its breath and decides that this really is a culture war we are in, and we must fight tyranny or die, and our ideals with us. I believe that the jihadis, from their own statements, decided more than a decade ago that this is a culture war, and that they are doing their level best to convince other Muslims, and particularly Sunni Arabs, that this is the case, and that Muslims must fight the West or die, and their god with them. They might succeed.
I have been thinking a lot over the past few years about what happens if we pass that tipping point, and I hate all the answers I've had. But I've had a new idea recently, and idea that I don't hate and that might work, and I want to talk about that. But not just yet. I don't have a lot of time at the moment to flesh out the idea, and there is a lot of recent background reading that led me down this path. So instead of presenting my ideas at the moment, I would like to present their foundations:
The Pentagon's New Map by Thomas Barnett
From Way Up Here by Dave Schuler
Exit Zero on the Real War by Mary Madigan
The Breach by New Sysiphus
"Long War" is Breaking Down into Tedium by Mark Steyn
A Not Entirely Crazy Idea by Michael Reynolds [actually, it is a pretty crazy idea, but it did get me thinking]
Neo-Cons or Crusaders? by Callimachus
The World: Not Going Away by Michael Reynolds
February 21, 2006
Not Quite Treason, but Close
Rusty Shackleford asks whether anyone dares to call this treason? Not in the US, they shouldn't, at least not if they can read (from Article III):
Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
Unless they committed an overt act of waging war, and the article shows no evidence that they did, and were witnessed by two people, or committed such an act and admitted to it in open court, they cannot be convicted of treason. Planning to commit treason is not itself treason. It is conspiracy to commit treason. And that, too, has appropriate consequences. Oh, and one of the defendants, being a resident and not a citizen, could easily be declared a saboteur and shot.
Posted by jeff at 7:46 PM | TrackBack
February 17, 2006
Mark Kleiman on Iran
Mark Kleiman has an excellent summation on the implications of Iran's quest for nuclear powers. (hat tip: The Glittering Eye) I agree with almost all of it, but there are a few bits, all near the end, that I want to critique. I'm only going to quote those bits, but this should not be taken as a fisking even in a partial sense: Kleiman's points are well-considered and very worthy of attention.
13. We can't attack Iran while we have 150,000 troops in Iraq as virtual hostages to a Shi'a call for jihad against the infidels. But accepting a rotten result in Iraq might be a relatively small price to pay for avoiding a nuked-up Iran. Maintaining our freedom of action in Iran is one more excellent reason not to try to create a permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq.
I agree that preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons might be worth a bad, and certainly worth a less optimal, outcome in Iraq. But I don't agree with the premise, that the majority of Iraq's Shi'a support Iran because it is ruled by Shi'a. Sadr appears to be Iran's puppets, and would likely cause problems, but the real threat in Iran's response is not that, but the widespread terrorism around the world and the blocking of the straits of Hormuz combined with attacks on our allies and their oil facilities in particular using chemical weapons on intermediate ranged missiles. This would cause far more problems that finally killing off the Badr Brigades would. Particularly if Iran attacked Israel or US forces with chemical or biological agents, which could lead to nuclear escalation.
However, I don't think that Iran's possible response should stop us from acting, though it should be considered so that we can minimize it as much as possible.
None of this means that I favor military action against Iranian nuclear capacity. What it means is that military action might, in the future, become necessary to prevent Iran's transformation into a new nuclear power, and, if that were the case, I would be willing to support an attack (non-nuclear, of course) as the least bad option in a bad situation.
The real question, of course, is how to know where the dividing line is between when they just have potential capability and when they actually have nuclear weapons. The pessimist, or the cautious person, says attack early when we know they don't have weapons or the full ability to get them. The optimist, or the deluded, says don't strike until we know they do have weapons or the full ability to get them.
Footnote It goes without saying that reducing our oil imports is an even more urgent national-security issue than ever in the face of the fact that the support our imports provide for world oil prices helps enrich the Iranian regime. Anyone who says he's for national security and against an increase of at least a dollar per gallon in gasoline taxation is a bag of wind, and should be laughed at and ignored.
This I cannot agree with at all. If our goal is to deprive Iran of revenue, an embargo would be far more effective with potentially less impact on our domestic economy. Gas taxes simply do not work to reduce the revenue to an oil-producing state, because demand is relatively inelastic. To reduce the revenue by taxation, we would have to so tax gas and other oil products that other fuel sources would be more economical. That would be a crushing burden on the economy. Go ahead and laugh and ignore me if you feel so inclined.
Update Bruce Moomaw asks what we should do if a conventional attack on Iran wouldn't work and only a pre-emptive nuclear strike would do the job. My answer: drop back three yards and punt. The point is to maintain the taboo on the use of nuclear weapons. I think it's worth fighting a war to do so. But I'd rather risk losing that taboo than give it up for sure with a pre-emptive strike.This is unlike the situation with the U.S.S.R. back when Bertrand Russell called for pre-emptive war. (Which is not to say that I think he was right even in that circumstance; I don't.) Since Iranian nuclear capacity can't possibly threaten the existence of the U.S., I can't see how we could justify pre-emption either morally or on a pure calculation of national self-interest.
Are you willing to bet New York, DC, LA, San Francisco, Chicago, Dallas, Miami or any other major cities on this supposition? I agree that the taboo against using nuclear weapons is important, and that we'd be better off both militarily and morally (over the short as well as the long term) with a conventional attack. But I wonder if a conventional attack, with its attendant thousands of casualties, is possible in the current political environment, or if we will be unable to act for fear of casualties, until it becomes necessary to act with nuclear weapons or allow the Israelis to do so.
Posted by jeff at 2:36 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
What Color is the Sky in Your World?
The Arab Parallel Universe theory explains a great deal. And it's a nice counterpart to this, this and this.
Posted by jeff at 9:25 AM | TrackBackFebruary 15, 2006
Question for PNM Theorists
How does PNM handle the collapse or approaching collapse of rulesets in core nations? The flow of people from the gap to the core is inherently going to bring gap rulesets — those travel in people's heads, after all — and this is already apparent in Britain, France, Spain, Italy, the Low Countries, Denmark and Norway. I suspect we'll see the same in Germany, soon, because they have the same demography/immigrant problem as the rest of Western Europe.
Once the gap rulesets have been imported into the core, can the core rulesets remain established, or are the core rulesets inherently self-defeating? And if they are inherently self-defeating, at least when confronted with a lower-order ruleset from the gap, what changes to the core rulesets (and hopefully there are some short of mass deportation or genocide) can be made to avert the consequences of a core ruleset collapse (the main consequence being moving from the core to the gap)?
UPDATE: Mark Safranski responds.
UPDATE: Phatic Communion (what a great name!) comments. Actually, I was thinking of the intersection of the Western rulesets of "rule of law" and multiculturalism, and whether multiculturalism is compatible with rule of law. If not, if we allow those who are specially designated due to not being native to our rulesets to ignore the law, then can the rule of law stand, or would "natives" also begin to break the law, seeing that it is not enforced? And were that to happen, could the rest of our society stand with that pillar removed? It's not an idle question: in Europe it is already that case that Muslim immigrants are largely immune to the law in many places.
MSM Hypocrisy. How Unsurprising.
I have said before that the reason people get irritated at newspapers and TV news outlets not showing the Danish cartoons "to show respect for Muslims" and, more on point, "to avoid inflaming a tense situation" is that the media showed Abu Ghraib pictures wall to wall during that scandal. Well, they still are, with ABC rebroadcasting newly available photos of what happened at Abu Ghraib, despite not having shown the cartoons. So it's once again hypocrisy from the MSM. How unsurprising.
I'm sure that, when called on this, we will start hearing endlessly about the public's "right to know", while eliding the cartoons entirely.
February 11, 2006
What if the Enemy Really Is Islam?
I think that it is fair to say that, however one defines the enemy in the long war, it is not "all Muslims". Certainly, I've known many good and decent Muslims. And the cases of liberal Muslims (of which there are quite few, though they often end up leaving Islam, as Ayaan Hirsi Ali has done) certainly would tend to argue against identifying those people as enemies. For that matter, most truly moderate Muslims (including many that I've worked with or for or who have worked for me) — and by that I don't mean Islamists who haven't quite gone from incitement to violence into actual violence, or from rioting over cartoons to terrorism — can't be called enemies in any meaningful sense. Even if all Muslims were the enemy, for that matter, can anyone with any moral center advocate the necessary consequence, the killing or subjugation of 1.2 billion people?
But what if the enemy is Islam, the religion, in addition to its more deranged followers? Certainly, it is true that Islam has not produced the kind of prosperity we see in the West, and has not produced much even in the way of art (its supposed strong point) in centuries. What advances in science have come from the Arab world since the Middle Ages? What has Islam produced other than misery in the past decades? Even the oil the Arabs provide is largely from installations built, and often run, by foreigners and with foreign investment. So what if the enemy is Islam? How do you beat a religion?
(Note: I'm not really trying to discuss whether Islam is the enemy. You can take it up with Fran Porretto, who is an eloquent advocate of the point. What I am trying to discuss is what it would take to destroy Islam itself as a hostile ideology.)
There are, it turns out, examples of how to kill a religion. Ask the Pagans of pre-Christian Europe how it works. Essentially, what it takes is convincing the adherents of the religion that its doctrines are bankrupt (and possibly immoral) and that the religions promises cannot be delivered to its adherents. In the case of the pre-Christian European Pagans, their many religions basically offered protection from their enemies and prosperity. When faced with a prosperous Christianized Roman Empire, conversion was frequently both swift and relatively non-violent. But there were significant holdouts, particularly beyond the Empire's boundaries; yet they converted too. Why? Well, there is significant evidence of desecrated temples and violently killed priests to indicate that, in at least some cases, the Christians ended up proving that their religions did not offer protection. But more often than not, it seems to be the case that Christianity just offered a more compelling message to its new adherents than did their old tribal religions.
Applying something similar to Islam, it would take some or all of the following:
- A new faith could arise that promises to supersede Islam the way that Islam superseded Christianity: by offering a more compelling prophet of Abraham's god.
- UPDATE: As Dave points out in the comments, internal reinterpretation, where a new understanding of the existing texts and forms changes the religion's behavior, also works.
- Older faiths, particularly Christianity, could send forth missionaries to convert the Muslims. This would generate a large number of Christian martyrs, and in practical terms could only be done in combination with the next technique:
- proscription. Essentially, this means that we would have to compel Muslims to not practice their religion openly, the way that many Muslim nations currently punish or forbid the practice of Christianity. Or we could go all the way and simply kill Muslims who would not convert, which is a time-honored practice among Muslims, Christians and many other religions, though only in broad use now by the Muslims. Of course, this would require a conquest of the areas where the religion was proscribed, because there is no way that a Muslim nation would tolerate such activities. For areas already under non-Muslim control, such as Europe or the United States, this would be far more practical, not involving actual invasions.
- Destroying the ideological underpinnings of the religion is also an option. For example, Islam promises that any land once Muslim is always Muslim "until Judgement Day", that Muslims who believe sufficiently fervently and act in a certain way will have victory over their enemies, and that Islam will eventually conquer the world.
- While conquering Muslim nations would certainly daunt any such beliefs, there is another way that doesn't require actual conquest, though it does involve acts of war: destroy Islam's holy sites. Not just Mecca and Medina and the al Aqsa mosque, though of course those would have to be utterly levelled; but every single mosque of any branch of Islam. And while we're at it, it would probably be a good idea to kill every imam and ayatollah and mullah and any other spiritual leaders of Islam we can get to, whether that means judicial killings, or assassination, or simply dropping smart bombs on their houses. Any new places of worship, including houses where people gather, would also need to be destroyed. The idea here is to show that their god either doesn't exist or has no ability to protect them.
That's a pretty brutal list of options, and none of them are particularly appealing to me, personally. So how far would we go, as a society rather than as individuals, if Islam is truly the enemy, towards our own destruction before we undertook such measures? Would we be willing to give up free speech? That question is being tested now in Europe. What about free assembly? What about freedom of religion itself? Where is the line that says we can go no further without submission, and we are unwilling to submit? Is there such a line?
I don't know the answers to those questions, but Islamists and jihadis keep pushing at every boundary, weak point and doubt in the West, which makes me fear I might well know the answer before I die.
UPDATE: Speaking of Francis Porretto making the case of all Muslims as the enemy...
February 9, 2006
Shafting the Innocents?
I have been a strong supporter of the war. Indeed, I have given the administration every benefit of the doubt, and will likely continue to do so. I feel that we have to trust our elected leaders, and if we don't trust them, elect new ones. This seriously strains my trust. If this has indeed been the standard of evidence used at GTMO in the military tribunals for determination of status, and if no reform is forthcoming, then I would be forced to support Congressional reform attempts, even if that meant that holding real terrorists was harder, or voting out Republicans for a while. I don't have a problem with the administration doing whatever is necessary to defend the country, but laziness leading to unnecessary tyranny is not acceptable as a substitute.
February 7, 2006
How to Stop the Iranian Nuclear Program?
Posts at The Officers' Club, American Thinker and again American Thinker have me thinking about how the Iranian nuclear program could be militarily stopped.
The second American Thinker post explains why this is a necessary act:
To think clearly about the looming crisis with Iran, close your eyes and imagine that you’re standing outside your children’s school. It’s 2:55pm, and you’re chatting amiably with other parents while waiting for the 3pm bell to ring. Suddenly you see a man running toward the school, holding a hand grenade and shouting: “I hate kids. I welcome death.”Now, what do you propose to do?
Maybe Iran is just trying to appear strategically crazy to get what they want (a nuclear capability), but I think it's much safer to take them at appearances and think that they are actually crazy. Given that, how does one keep the Iranians from getting nuclear weapons? As the Officers' Club makes clear, a conventional Israeli raid on Iranian targets is a non-starter: the odds of success are low and the odds of losing much of the Israeli air force in the process are high. That's not going to happen. Nor can Israel field and sustain in Iran a ground force sufficient to the task.
Certainly the US could field and maintain a ground force in Iran, but a limited campaign is more likely. The first American Thinker article points to an Asia Times article postulating a similar campaign, with an Israeli conventional strike and the Iranian reaction as the precursors.
Given the impossibility of an Israeli conventional strike, the fact that no nation has ever negotiated away its most important weapons system in the face of threats it does not believe credible, and the uselessness of ignoring the problem, I see the following possible scenarios:
- The Israelis destroy the Iranian nuclear program using their nuclear arsenal. Targets would be, perhaps, the top 10 or so most critical sites, with 1-2 weapons each depending on the nature of the target. Israel has 50 or so Jericho 2 missiles capable of reaching Iranian nuclear targets.
- Israel could destroy the Iranian civilian population, rendering Iran essentially a dead nation. Again, Israel has sufficient missile capability to do this, without the requirement of using their air force, which would strain mightily at those ranges.
- Israel could use the threat of either of those options to force Iran to open up their program.
- Israel could use the threat of either of those options to force the US to act.
- The US could act for its own reasons, with or without European help.
In any case, the odds of a conventional Israeli attack or a non-military solution are slim, and getting slimmer all the time. The madman is running for the school with a grenade, but at least two of the parents have guns, and at least one is prepared to use it.
Posted by jeff at 7:16 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Indeed
Kudos to the Philiadelphia Inquirer for running one of the Jyllands-Posten cartoons of Mohammed. In their excellent explanation of why, the editors end with this statement, which should be read to the editors of newspapers like the NY Times, as a challenge:
This is what newspapers are in the business to do. We educate people, we inform them, we spark discussion. It is not only our profession, it is our obligation.
More of this kind of attitude, and I'll have to stop criticizing the media so broadly.
(hat tip: InstaPundit)
Posted by jeff at 1:26 PM | TrackBackThe NSA Kerfuffle, Declaring War, and the Limits of Constitutional Powers
This article and associated commentary on Centerfield is the best debate I've yet seen on the NSA surveillance kerfuffle. I was going to put this as a comment there, but it got too long to reasonably be considered a comment.
I'm not convinced that even if the surveillance was between two citizens of the US, both of whom were in the US, that the action would be illegal. Certainly, it would violate FISA, but it might be within the President's purview Constitutionally. Consider:
The power to act as Commander in Chief is fundamentally the power to order to military to undertake operations to take or destroy the enemy.
Operations to take or destroy the enemy necessarily involve surveilling the enemy (among other things: who would argue the President does not have the inherent authority to order the Navy to stop suspected enemy vessels at sea, or search them in a US port?), which is nothing more, really, than determining the enemy's position, capabilities and/or intentions.
Surveilling the enemy need not be by visual observation: it is also possible to determine the enemy's position, intent or capabilities by listening, electronic means, human intelligence (spying) and other means. There is no Constitutional limit to the means the President can use to surveil the enemy. There is no treaty limitation that I am aware of that would preclude the electronic gathering of intelligence.
The Constitution does not limit the President to fighting the enemy abroad, nor require a separate declaration of Congressional intent to fight the enemy in the United States. The President's power is to fight the enemy defined in the declaration of war, wherever that enemy is.
Thus the President has the power to surveil the enemy wherever that enemy is.
The question becomes, who is the enemy? That is answered by the AUMF: "those nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons".
The Congress explicitly gave the President to power to determine who the enemy is, within the limitation of being connected to 9/11. Since the President decided that this includes al Qaeda, any al Qaeda operative falls within the definition of the enemy even if that operative is a US citizen. The term we're searching for here is "treason", though for the life of me I cannot understand why we aren't charging people such as Padilla, Hamdi and Lindh with exactly that. Hamdi and Lindh, in particular, were captured on the battlefield and the case is a slam dunk (Padilla is a harder case, and a court is going to have to work that one out).
The only valid way to claim that the surveillance is illegal is to claim that the AUMF does not trigger the President's war powers because the AUMF is not a declaration of war. But nowhere in the Constitution is the President's power to make war divided between "real wars" and "so so wars": there is no way to grant the President the power to make war except to declare war. The Constitution does not require that such a declaration contain particular wording, such as "a state of war exists between the United States and [enemy]". So on what grounds, other than claiming that the Constitution is a "living document" and means whatever we want, can anyone claim that AUMF is not a declaration of war? If not, then what is it?
The Congress' powers are delineated in Article I, Section 8. They include:
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
Clearly, the provisions for creating and maintaining the militia, army and navy do not apply to the question. AUMF does not fall under "mak[ing] Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces". (Neither does FISA, by the way, because that is done via the Uniform Code of Military Justice and FISA is not part of the UCMJ.) AUMF does not activate the militia. AUMF does not deal with "Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations" per se, and was from the wording clearly not intended to apply this specific power. AUMF is not a Letter of Marque, nor is it a rule concerning captures. The only remaining power the Congress could be operating under is the power to declare war.
Now, it would be an interesting (and I think, losing) argument that the Congress' power "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof" allows the Congress to regulate the way in which the President can carry out his duties, and further that FISA constitutes such a regulation. I think this would fall down on whether or not the President is an Officer of the government of the United States. Since the Presidency has a Constitutional existence apart from any organization of government, and is head of state as well as head of government, I think that most people (except Whigs and congressmen of the party not occupying the White House) would agree that the President is not an officer of government as intended in this grant of authority.
It would be an interesting argument to have, though.
February 5, 2006
Angry Muslims Terrorize Those They Accuse of Caricaturing Muslims as Angry Terrorists
And this cartoon has a great take on the American media reaction.
South Korea Shills for Tyranny
Fifty years ago, my father was one of the American Marines fighting along with American soldiers and sailors and aviators to keep South Korea free, and turn it into a nation worthy of Europe. Oh, how they succeeded!
February 4, 2006
Cartoon Crisis
There is a certain cartoonish quality to the beginning of most of the great and terrible wars. The reason is simple, really: great and terrible wars erupt over great and terrible chasms of belief, understanding, and need, and it takes a long time for those chasms to grow; so in retrospect, the tiny incidents that are seen as the starting point of the great wars seem so trivial as to not merit mention.
World War II was an exception, because it was a calculated gamble by Hitler and another by Tojo: each believed that they could get what they wanted by war, without being meaningfully opposed. But WWI was started by the assassination of a middling royal in a nowhere place that no one had heard of or cared about. The American Civil War started because a minor and nearly forgotten garrison refused to abandon its post, as several other garrisons had already done in other places. The English Civil War started over the arrest of five members of Parliament. The Thirty Years' War started because 3 people were thrown out of a Prague window (they all survived). Some great wars start over insults, and others over misunderstandings, and still others over minor battles in out of the way places by peripheral players.
We may be at the point, now, where a great clash of civilizations begins over literal cartoons.
February 3, 2006
Not Quite So Different
Winston at The Spirit of Man, writing about Iran's secular resistance, says:
I am also hearing that the transit workers will stay home today (friday) and the families of the detained protestors will hold another demonstration in front of the Islamic revolutionary court of justice on Saturday to demand the release of their loved ones.There is no difference between the Iranian people today and the Polish people back in the 1980s but I guess the world has changed a lot and become unwilling to help other nations in their quest for greater freedoms.
The world has not changed so much. During the 1980s, when the Poles were desperate to free themselves from the Communist yoke, there was also the "nuclear freeze" movement and other, similar Causes trying to prevent bring down the concept of free societies. In fact, the roots of the "anti-war" movement today are in the "anti-war" movement then, which would happily have kept Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe and the USSR's unwilling "republics" Communist, rather than see the West intervene in any way, even by saying something like "all men deserve to be free".
No, the world has changed very little, really.
Any how, if any one wants to pick up the support for Iranians, it is the right time to do so.As Michael Ledeen has been saying over and over again: Faster Please!
Yes, no argument there at all.
Posted by jeff at 8:32 AM | TrackBack
January 31, 2006
Pressure on Iran
I have to admit that I'm shocked that the Administration has gotten Russia and China to agree to refer Iran to the Security Council over the Iranian nuclear weapons program, or more formally, over Iranian violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is, as Mark notes, a stunning feat of diplomacy. As Mark also notes, the odds of the President getting any credit for it are zero. In fact, that may overstate the odds, as doubtless some of the critics will bash the administration for being too multilateral (as they do about Korea). I suspect that the critics feel this balances their criticism of the administration for not being multilateral enough in other cases.
Nonetheless, it's a good step forwards towards resolving the crisis, although in the end I do not expect diplomacy to effectively end Iran's nuclear weapons program.
January 30, 2006
Future Carriers
Brian Dunn of The Dignified Rant has doubts about our next generation carriers, an extensive redesign of the current Nimitz class called CVN-21 (Nuclear-powered Attack Carrier for the 21st century). His major concern is that, in an networked warfare environment at sea, big platforms are very vulnerable, and their loss potentially devastating.
I do not think that there will be another generation of aircraft carrier past CVN-21 that will bear any resemblance to our current concept of carriers. The reason for this is simple: UAVs combined with excellent anti-air warfare equipment and sensors on modern ships.
Why, after all, do we need aircraft in our military? The main reasons are logistics (rapid delivery of small amounts of critical material or personnel), reconnaissance, support of ground forces, preserving our ability to carry out those tasks, and preventing the enemy from carrying out those tasks. But UAVs will soon be taking over — indeed, are currently in the process of taking over — a large part of the reconnaissance and ground support tasks, and that will grow in the future. If UAVs are capable of being adapted to fighter roles (protecting our other aviation assets and eliminating enemy aircraft), the only necessarily manned aircraft will be cargo planes, and perhaps specialty sensor platforms that for some reason need an on-board crew. A small number of manned aircraft in each category (for missions unforeseen by the software developers of the UAVs) will suffice to cover gaps, while most missions are carried out by unmanned aircraft. Combined with increasingly effective air defense systems — particularly at sea — it becomes possible that carrier-based manned aviation will become unneccessary.
In that event, the follow-on carriers to CVN-21 (sometime around 30 years from now, the way ships last these days) will likely be more like cruisers in size, with the ability to carry perhaps 50 or 60 UAVs of various types (mostly sensor platforms and attack craft). These ships can be smaller because UAVs will be smaller than manned aircraft, and (because they have fewer systems) need less maintenance, and there will be no aircrews and smaller maintenance crews required. Thus more vehicles and their support staff and equipment can fit in a smaller volume, which will reduce the size of the ships that carry them. These will, in particular as a component of a networked fleet, still be very, very capable ships, likely as capable as the CVN-21s they will replace in most or all ways, despite being dramatically smaller and cheaper. In some ways, they would be much more capable. (For example, it would make sense to equip such a ship with VLS, which current carriers do not have, along the lines of how the Soviet carriers were to be armed.)
In the meantime, the larger the carrier is, the more efficient it is (thus, the more aircraft it can carry). This comes from a simple cause: increasing the size of the ship does not increase the size of the engineering spaces, crew or many other factors by a similar amount, meaning that above a certain size, virtually all size increases translate directly into increased mission equipment. In the case of carriers, that means more aircraft. And as Brian notes, doubling the number of aircraft is worth a 50% bigger and more expensive target, because it means that there is less chance that the enemy will be able to target the carrier in the first place.
January 26, 2006
What if Everything you Know is Wrong?
What if Iraq did have WMDs, and they were smuggled into Syria just before the war? If this is true, we may soon know that in fact all the intelligence agencies were right and conventional wisdom is wrong. Not to mention the utter collapse of the whole "Bush lied, people died" meme, or what is left of it.
January 24, 2006
Target Rich Environment
When I hear about large groups of people shouting "Death to America!", my first thought is, "Targets!" I mean really, how can, say, Israel even resist dropping cluster bombs on Hamas funerals, for example? Yeah, it's kind of a war crime, but there's a certain element of satisfaction in hearing people chant your death, and responding, "You first."
January 20, 2006
If Only the MSM Would Help So Much
Congratulations due to "Rusty Shackelford" of the Jawa Report for his part in helping to get a wannabe terrorist convicted.
And note to the Democrats: my mind is now made up on the library provision beyond a doubt, so flogging that issue just makes it that much less likely that you'll win my vote.
January 19, 2006
Bin Laden's "Truce"
Jawa Report has both an excellent transcript of the latest bin Laden message and some good commentary on it, in particular comparing the positions of the American Left with the statements of bin Laden, who is basically repeating many of the Left's talking points, to their discredit.
The one thing that I want to see, but haven't, is the word bin Laden used, in Arabic, that is translated as "truce". If it was hudna, as I suspect, then you should be aware that this is a common mistranslation in both Western and in terrorist apologist media. The Arabic word hudna means not a "truce" in the Western sense, but a pause in fighting while they rebuild their forces to resume the fight later. The absence of conditions to the "truce" could be because al Jazeera didn't broadcast the whole tape, or it could be because bin Laden is actually announcing hudna. However, I think it is irrelevant, because I don't believe bin Laden is in operational command of al Qaeda — at least not in Iraq — and that therefore the fighting will not ramp down regardless.
January 15, 2006
Iran
Belmont Club, The Glittering Eye and The Dignified Rant have all recent written on our options regarding Iran. As Iraq's former rulers may attest, getting a lot of Americans talking about options in how to deal with your nutball regime is not a recipe for staying in power for long. Especially when your regime is as fragile as Iran's is.
Iran has a couple of problems: it has significant domestic opposition, though it is mostly dormant at present, to the theocracy; significant foreign enemies of its own making, mostly because of long support of very violent terrorist and extremist groups; a critical economic dependence on the export of a single commodity, oil; and the next-door presence of significant forces from the most powerful military in the world, which happens to be from the country that has overthrown more tyrants than any other, perhaps than all others combined.
And for all of these reasons, Iran has decided that it is critical that they have nuclear weapons to ensure their survival. Ironically, it is their quest for nuclear weapons that will ensure their destruction. Certain fires are too hot to grasp and live.
It is certain that neither the United States nor Israel is prepared to live with a nuclear-armed Iran so long as the Ayatollahs are in charge: the danger is too great; the threat too apparent. It is possible that the US, for domestic political reasons, might fail to act against Iran in reasonable time, accidentally letting Iran develop nuclear capability as we did with N. Korea (though the situation in Iran is not being deliberately kept quiet, as was the situation in N. Korea). The Israelis will not fail to act, because the alternative would be their almost-certain destruction. Because of geography and the characteristics of the Iranian nuclear program, the Israelis could not effectively act short of a nuclear attack. And as the old saying goes, if you strike at a king, be sure to kill him.
But the US would likely preempt Israeli action, should we know it to be imminent, by striking first. The reason for this is simple: the US would have to be complicit in the Israeli action, letting Israeli bombers through (the Israeli nuclear missile force appears too small to do the job by itself), and that means that we would take the consequences anyway. A conventional attack by the US would have less blowback against the US than a nuclear attack by the Israelis, which would be opening Pandora's jars in a most definitive manner, and would almost certainly push any near-nuclear states into crash programs to arm themselves with nuclear weapons.
There are many who say that the US cannot invade Iran and win. The reasoning usually includes the following elements: Iran is much larger than Iraq, too large to be occupied; US forces are committed deeply in Iraq and cannot be used elsewhere; the din raised by the anti's (anti-war, anti-Republican, or on the other side) for the last three years makes it politically impossible, and either the US population or US political leadership would not allow action; Iran's military is more powerful than Iraq's was, and we cannot sustain the casualties; attacking Iran would result in terrorist attacks against the US and Israel. There are more arguments of course. But as Dave Schuler noted in his piece, the real answer is not one of capability but of will: of course the US could effectively attack Iran, but would our political leaders be capable of mustering the will to do so.
I think the answer might be, surprisingly, yes, at least for the next few years. President Bush has certainly shown an inclination to act in what he believes to be the nation's best interests, almost regardless of political repercussions. There are still three years left in his term, and he will not serve another because of Constitutionally-mandated term limits. This gives the President amazing freedom of action, should he decide to attack Iran: let the critics yell; it won't change anything for the President, himself, politically. So the political will arguments might not be enough to restrain the President, anyway.
But what about Congress: would they pass another declaration of war (or authorization to use military force, really, since Congress is all about ducking responsibility these days)? Probably not, but they don't have to. You see, the Congress, in the wake of 9/11, passed S.J. Res 23, which was the authorization that the President used to go to war in Afghanistan and since then to pursue terrorists worldwide. In relevant part, this very short resolution states:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Now, it's been pretty widely discussed that Iran has been harboring several top al Qaeda leaders and sponsoring terrorism against the United States forces in Iraq. This alone is arguably sufficient to bring into force the President's powers under this declaration. In other words, the President could, without further recourse to Congress, attack Iran and claim sufficient justification. The Congress would not cut off funds for the warfighting effort while it was underway, at least presuming that the President notified key Congressional leaders prior to undertaking the attack. And the leaders of the opposition, loyal or otherwise, in Congress could simply claim that the President is wrong, but they can't undercut our troops by forcing a pullback via cutting off funding. Thus, the attacks on the President could continue with impunity, while the attack on Iran also could continue with impunity. And frankly, with a decent explanation to the American public of why the President feels the attack is necessary, the American public would probably countenance such an attack. The anti's are loud, but a distinct minority of the population. I don't think that there's a real political limitation against action in Iran, so long as President Bush is in office.
But what about what we can do? Can we overthrow the Iranian government as we did in Iraq? Probably not, at least, not with building up a replacement government afterwards: the force commitment would be too large to be sustainable, and we could not count on friendly nations to help us. But, who says that's what our objectives have to be? We have sufficient troops to occupy the southwestern oil fields and terminals, to ensure the oil keeps flowing, and to occupy Iranian territory at key points like the Straits of Hormuz. We have sufficient forces to strike Iranian nuclear, security, military, government, and key infrastructure sites (like power plants) effectively indefinitely, and can ruin Iran, both in their nuclear program and their military and their civilian infrastructure. If this does not bring about regime change by revolution, it at least moves the security threat several years, or more, down the road.
In other words, we can strike Iran if we have to, but it would be a very different war than we fought in Iraq. If I were Iran's leaders, I wouldn't count on bluster being enough to ensure their safety.
UPDATE: Marc Schulman of American Future has many more topical links. I'll go through them later and probably have more to say. Just from the summary, though, Duncan Black's (Eschaton) point of view once again leaves me furious. If it came to losing New York in a nuclear attack but winning the White House, or keeping New York and letting the Republicans keep the White House, I fear Black wouldn't think twice before consigning New York to the fires.
January 13, 2006
Good News, If True
I hope we got the bastard. Sadly, as Rumsfeld often says, "first reports from the field are often wrong."
Democracy, Republic, and Insurgency
Callimachus has an excellent post at Winds of Change about the difficulties democracies have in winning guerilla wars, insurgencies and against terrorist campaigns. There are four tracks that need to be explored in detail, and as I don't have the time at present, I'll sketch them out.
The first track is whether or not the historical evidence is on Callimachus' side. From what I know without looking up a lot of minor wars and conflicts, I would think it is. But there are a lot of minor wars and conflicts that might make his thesis weaker and would need to be addressed.
The second is whether it is only democracies that have this problem. In other words, would a republic have the same difficulty? The campaigns against the Indian tribes in America, when we were still constituted a republic, rather than a representative democracy, and against the Barbary Pirates indicate that there might be a difference worth looking into.
The third track that needs detailed consideration is whether the US strategy in Iraq is not, in light of Callimachus' observations, the best strategy we could have adopted. After all, the US never, apparently, intended to fight and win against the insurgency in Iraq. Once the insurgency and terrorist campaigns really got going, towards the end of 2003, the US switched from trying to stand up a conventional Iraqi army to trying to stand up Iraqi police and light infantry to fight the insurgency, while the US focused on buying the Iraqis time until they could successfully fight those battles. If that is indeed the best strategy, what are the implications for American warfighting doctrine, and for that matter for Barnett's grand strategic vision of having separate forces for conventional and insurgent wars?
The fourth track to be thought through is whether alternate governmental arrangements could overcome such a problem. For example, if we required an unambiguous declaration of war from Congress before committing troops to offensive actions overseas, and gave Congress an unambiguous power to similarly declare peace without the consent of the executive, but in exchange gave the President nearly unlimited authority to pursue war aims within the confines of geometry and time and funds set by the Congress — to the extent of abolishing Presidential elections until such time as the war was over, or the President died, resigned or was impeached for his conduct of the war — would give a democratic country (obviously, I based this on the current US model, but other models could be similarly reconstituted) the ability to win a bloody, ugly and protracted war. The other possibility here, too, is to have two separate executives, one for foreign policy and warmaking and one for domestic matters. The domestic executive would be more of a Prime Minister, answerable to Congress, while the President would be head of state rather than government, and would be far less constrained, but unable to act within the United States absent specific and limited Congressional action. Whether or not this is a good idea, and how to improve it, has to be part of that discussion.
January 4, 2006
Three Up, Three Down
This video is amazing. (hat tip: Mark in Mexico) It is night footage from an AC-130 Specter gunship in Iraq. After finding three insurgents apparently planning an attack (they took weapons out in the field, paced off distances, etc), and verifying that they were up to no good, the gunship (from about 2.5 miles away) hit and killed each person, individually, as well as their vehicles. Interestingly, the third guy probably would have lived if he hadn't crawled out from behind the truck: the engine's mass was protecting him. Of course, it's kind of hard to keep presence of mind when you are being shelled by an undetectable enemy and you've just watched your colleagues blown into tiny bits.
Why don't we broadcast stuff like this? Sure, some people would be offended, but I bet that a lot more would be cheering our guys on: these were definitely the bad guys getting waxed. And I suspect there would be a certain deterrent effect against aspiring jihadis.
Sensors
As a general rule, I tend to be very much in favor of having humans do things. While it is nice that a robot can go to Mars and find out all kinds of things for us, it is indisputable that there are things it cannot do. For example, a rover won't glance at the back side of a rock, see a strange color, and go investigate it; thus a rover might not find something important that a human would find, like water ice. Similarly, it is an open question whether a UAV capable of high-G turns could outfight a human pilot; the future will tell, when we have both available and can test them against each other. But there are some things that just don't require a human, and in fact where a human is a detriment to getting the job done.
Take, for example, aerial reconnaissance. Small UAVs are providing troops on the ground with information they would not otherwise get, because it's too expensive to use a manned aircraft for such missions, and this is costing the enemy dearly while saving the lives of our forces. Larger UAVs have basically gotten to the point, now, that they can do what the U2 can do, and without risking a pilot. So it makes sense that the Air Force will be retiring the U2 shortly. Why risk a manned platform where an unmanned platform will do the job with less cost and less risk? At the altitude that U2s fly, it's not like the pilots are making decisions on where to go and what to photograph: they can't see what they're surveilling.
I suspect that there'll be griping, but I really don't see a downside here.
Where the Fascists Went
A couple of years ago, Jim Bennett wrote an excellent article about European politics, Where Have the Fascists Gone. In the article, Bennett tied the long strands of anti-Enlightenment movements that sprung up in the late 1800s together, and noted how they survive in European politics today — not just the radical neo-fascists, but the superficially liberal statist politicians running the EU and the nations of "old Europe". But there are two other places that the fascists went, where a warm reception was to be had. One of these, of course, was Egypt, where Qutb grafted fascism to Islam to create the Islamist ideology (which, by the way, is why some call the enemy Islamofascists). The other, though, is not widely talked about other than as a joke.
Fascism went to South America, as fascists (notably many NAZI leaders) fled to Brazil, Argentina and elsewhere. Conveniently, the nations of South America have long had a self-destructive tendency, that flies from the Right to the Left with equal vigor, and similar results. These nations were very welcoming to the fascists, and undoubtedly were also influenced by them, leading to the rise of several right-wing fascist governments and several left-wing fascist governments. (Fascist, in both cases, in the sense of state control of industry, the destruction of personal responsibility while nominally maintaining personal property, blatant racism and violent nationalism.)
In the 1980s, most of these fascist states fell (or in some cases, were pushed by the US), along with Communist states like Nicaragua (sadly, not Cuba), and democracy finally looked to have a chance. Lately, though, the left-wing fascists are starting to stage a comeback in South America. I'm not talking about Brazil's Lula, though he could potentially fall into that mold if things go wildly awry in South America. Rather, I'm thinking of Evo Morales and the very, very up front Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. (He should learn to mouth liberal statist platitudes if he wants to be fêted by Western liberals, rather than ranting about the Jews, which will only get him.... Actually, never mind. Forget I said that.)
Now, it's every country's right to drive itself into economic stagnation, political corruption, genocide, international conflict and even totalitarianism. If that's what they want, they need merely be willing to accept the consequences. Sadly for us, though, we are unlikely to write off and ignore those countries in South America who choose the fascist route. Instead, we are likely to find ourselves intervening, again, to fix the broken nations that will be left when Chavez' madness has run its course.
December 21, 2005
Victory Conditions
Tigerhawk has posted a tour de force analysis of what victory will look like, and how to tell in the short term if we're moving in the right direction. What is most interesting about this is that it, like Steven Den Beste's justly famous analysis of our reasons for fighting Iraq, is not unique in its content, only in its drawing together of a lot of strains of thought into a coherent and unified vision. And this coherence and unity of vision is so rare it needs to be called out when it comes. Den Beste, Wretchard, Winds of Change, and many other commenters have said much the same (I've made several of the same points, such as the need to humiliate the jihadis), but no one has brought together the individual strands into a coherent whole like Tigerhawk has done. As a result, we now have a very useful foundation document and base for thinking about the long-term strategy in the war: we have a framework for building metrics. And that is no small thing.
One interesting thought that occurs to me, too, is that the President has also made many of these same points in speeches, also without much coherence or unity of vision. Indeed, one of Tigerhawk's commenters goes so far as to say:
I couldn't agree more, but it's not just the leftists for whom the Hawk's thinking would be too much effort. Would Bush, or Cheney, or Rumsfeld take the time and make the effort to profit from the work of people like DenBeste and Tigerhawk? Fat Chance.
Yet, as I noted, the President, and the Vice President, and the Secretary of Defense, and for that matter both of President Bush's Secretaries of State, have all made these points and others. It would be a lot of work to go back through administration officials' speeches over the last four years and fit them to this framework (as well as noting divergences). I don't have the time, sadly, but I would love to see if the administration's strategic vision lines up with Tigerhawk's analysis.
Posted by jeff at 7:27 AM | TrackBack
December 15, 2005
Crickets
Here's something fascinating:
For the third time in a year, the Iraqis have gone to vote in elections that were by and large peaceful, and featured a high turnout. In fact, in the current elections, the turnout was the highest yet since the Sunnis appear to have decided that their best bet for having any sort of power in Iraq is to join the democratic process (at least for now). In less than 3 years, the Iraqis have built, with our help, first an interim government, then a constitution, and now a permanent government. In the time frame that saw us still militarily governing Germany and Japan, the Iraqis have been sovereign for more than a year. Meanwhile, the Iraqis have been (again with our help) building up their security forces, to the point that those forces are now primarily responsible for security throughout Iraq, with the exception of a few areas in the West and Northwest of the country where the terrorists and few remaining Ba'athist fighters are more often fighting each other than the US.
So with this amazing story, what are the reactions of those who said that it couldn't be done? There appear to be three categories:
- It'll still go all to hell on you. Trust me on that.
- Nothing has changed and we are still in substantially the same position we were in during the first Falluja battle and the Sadr uprising.
- Story in Iraq? There's no story in Iraq.
Every time I start thinking that I am utterly cynical about human behavior, especially political behavior, I realize that I'm not nearly cynical enough.
Posted by jeff at 4:50 PM | TrackBack
December 6, 2005
The Next War
If Mohammed al Baradei is correct, and Iran is really less than a year away from even a rump nuclear weapons capability, the next war will be in Iran, and it will be soon. (via Officers' Club)
IAEA chairman Muhammad ElBaradei on Monday confirmed Israel's assessment that Iran is only a few months away from creating an atomic bomb.If Teheran indeed resumed its uranium enrichment in other plants, as threatened, it will take it only "a few months" to produce a nuclear bomb, El-Baradei told The Independent.
On the other hand, he warned, any attempt to resolve the crisis by non-diplomatic means would "open a Pandora's box. There would be efforts to isolate Iran; Iran would retaliate; and at the end of the day you have to go back to the negotiating table to find the solution."
(note: the full article does not repeat the summary)
If indeed Iran is months away from a nuclear capability, the pressure on Israel to strike at Iran will be immense. It is literally a matter of short-term national survival for Israel: Iran has pledged, recently, to "wipe Israel off the map" and, a while ago, that their first nuclear test would be in Israel. Israel is tiny; unlike the US, Israel could not absorb a nuclear blow and continue to exist more or less unchanged. And this means that Israel is likely to strike first. But how? As Officers' Club notes:
Will the Israelis use nuclear weapons preemptively or will they go conventional? Will America join them? Or will the U.S. act on its own accord? How would a joint U.S.-Israeli attack on an Arab state fare in the Middle East? Would it help or hurt democratic progress in that region?Unfortunately -due the Iranian refusal to play ball with negotiators- we may be hearing the answers to those questions more sooner than later.
It is unlikely that Israel could mount a sufficiently-destructive conventional strike on Iran's nuclear program, because of the distance from Israel and the characteristics of the critical nuclear sites (some of which are deeply buried). This means that either the US will strike with Israel or to keep Israel from striking, or the Israeli strike will be nuclear. And at that point, we will have lost the third conjecture's bet, and it's possible we'd be well down the road to losing the second.
Posted by jeff at 3:12 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack
December 2, 2005
Overblown Rhetoric
What is it about the Iraq war — or President Bush in general — that leads to overblown and unsupportable rhetoric? I used to have a lot of respect for Martin Van Creveld, a military historian who has written some really good analysis, but what is this? First, Van Creveld lays out a short surrender:
The number of American casualties in Iraq is now well more than 2,000, and there is no end in sight. Some two-thirds of Americans, according to the polls, believe the war to have been a mistake. And congressional elections are just around the corner.What had to come, has come. The question is no longer if American forces will be withdrawn, but how soon — and at what cost. In this respect, as in so many others, the obvious parallel to Iraq is Vietnam.
Confronted by a demoralized army on the battlefield and by growing opposition at home, in 1969 the Nixon administration started withdrawing most of its troops in order to facilitate what it called the "Vietnamization" of the country. The rest of America's forces were pulled out after Secretary of State Henry Kissinger negotiated a "peace settlement" with Hanoi. As the troops withdrew, they left most of their equipment to the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam — which just two years later, after the fall of Saigon, lost all of it to the communists.
Clearly this is not a pleasant model to follow, but no other alternative appears in sight.
Other than the facts that the military is not demoralized and no one is showing up at anti-war demonstrations, it's just like Viet Nam. Right, yeah, got it.
Then, having surrendered, Van Creveld notes that we cannot flee Iraq as we fled Viet Nam, leaving our equipment to the Iraqi government, because we can't afford to leave the equipment (at least the big pieces). This is followed by a huge narrative that I can only describe as a Leftist wet dream, with tales of confused routs towards Baghdad and then southwards, harried on all sides like the British fiasco in Afghanistan in 1841, taking massive casualties in their desperate flight. Behind the retreat, "Iraq almost certainly will sink into an all-out civil war" and [a]ll this is inevitable!
Then, Van Creveld says that we can't abandon the region. We will need an ongoing security presence to counter the nightmare resulting from our withdrawal:
Yet a complete American withdrawal is not an option; the region, with its vast oil reserves, is simply too important for that. A continued military presence, made up of air, sea and a moderate number of ground forces, will be needed.First and foremost, such a presence will be needed to counter Iran, which for two decades now has seen the United States as "the Great Satan." Tehran is certain to emerge as the biggest winner from the war — a winner that in the not too distant future is likely to add nuclear warheads to the missiles it already has. In the past, Tehran has often threatened the Gulf States. Now that Iraq is gone, it is hard to see how anybody except the United States can keep the Gulf States, and their oil, out of the mullahs' clutches.
A continued American military presence will be needed also, because a divided, chaotic, government-less Iraq is very likely to become a hornets' nest. From it, a hundred mini-Zarqawis will spread all over the Middle East, conducting acts of sabotage and seeking to overthrow governments in Allah's name.
No mention is made of how we might use any such stay-behind force — let alone where we would base it — given that we'd just run from Iraq, causing the problems he foresees. If we ran from Iraq because of 2000 casualties and bad public opinion, where would the will to take on a nuclear-armed Iran or armies of terrorists (who would not, after all, be attacking the US, but other Muslims) come from? Oh, except that if we leave a military presence there, the terrorists would be attacking Americans; it's just that we would have foreclosed any ability to respond to the attacks.
But the crowning achievement in foolishness is the conclusion:
For misleading the American people, and launching the most foolish war since Emperor Augustus in 9 B.C sent his legions into Germany and lost them, Bush deserves to be impeached and, once he has been removed from office, put on trial along with the rest of the president's men. If convicted, they'll have plenty of time to mull over their sins.
Really? The most foolish war in 2014 years? Worse than Germany's attack on Russia, or Japan's attack on the US in WWII? Worse than the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or the British invasion of Afghanistan? Worse than Agincourt? More foolish than the War of Jenkins' Ear?
This is not serious military analysis: it is blind, unthinking panic.
UPDATE: Wretchard has similar thoughts on Van Creveld, while taking a broader view about the difference between words and reality.
November 30, 2005
Staged Hostage Taking?
I could be wrong, but given that the four hostages taken in Iraq were anti-American activists, it is certainly possible that the hostage taking was staged with the cooperation of the hostages, or in that event "hostages". It will be interesting to see how this plays out.
UPDATE: Rusty Shackelford has more here, and seems to agree, speculatively, here.
That Looks Familiar
The White House has released a strategy document on Iraq that is well worth reading. But the most overlooked sentence is the first one:
The following document articulates the broad strategy the President set forth in 2003 and provides an update on our progress as well as the challenges remaining.
I have been saying for some time, and other bloggers (notably Steven Den Beste and Wretchard) have also noted, the strategy is apparent and has been talked about for years, but there are some things the President just can't say while there is a chance for the enemy to undermine the strategy. What is most important about this document is the fact that it has been released at all, which indicates that the administration now thinks that, without a tectonic shift in conditions, we have already passed the point where the enemy can defeat our strategy in Iraq.
InstaPundit links to some other bloggers writing on this.
UPDATE: Fixed the Belmont Club link.
November 28, 2005
Civilian Casualties in Iraq
I've long figured that Iraq Body Count, an anti-war site that chronicles civilian casualties in Iraq since Saddam Hussein was deposed, was very far off in its numbers, even though they are reasonable given the intensity of fighting and the fact that the enemy hides among civilians (and for that matter, frequently kills civilians to terrorize others). But it's interesting to see how far off they appear to be. Apparently, they count even police killed by the enemy as victims of the US occupation (and they don't distinguish between the period before handing sovereignty to the new Iraqi government and after, either.
November 26, 2005
Staying the Course, and Paying for It
Dave Schuler carries forward a discussion started by Dan Darling: whether you think we should stay in Iraq or leave, or something in between, what are the costs?
I personally feel that we should stay. In part, this is because of the downsides of withdrawing. More than that, though, are the benefits of staying, most importantly that our current apparent grand strategy has a chance of working. Sadly, neither the President nor the media has done a good chance of explaining our grand strategy, so let me start with that. (Note: I could easily be wrong here; the lack of communications on our grand strategy is understandable, but makes this kind of discussion hazardous.)
When you look at the enemy, it is clear that terrorism is not what we are at war with. While terrorism is abhorrent, it is a tactic that is neither unique to our enemy nor even the most abhorrent thing about our enemy. (In my book, their inability to coexist with anything or anyone that doesn't share their ideology is the worst thing about them.) Rather, it is militant fascist theocrats with an extremist Islamic flavor — the jihadis — that we are at war with. The jihadis have expansive goals: restoring or creating theocratic control (led, of course, by them) over all of the lands that have ever been governed by Muslims, and the spreading of that theocracy to every place where Muslims live or have lived. The jihadis are willing — indeed, eager — to kill every person in their way, and every person who doesn't believe the way that they do: women who "don't know their place", homosexuals, Jews, Christians, pagans, other non-Muslims, ex-Muslims, any Muslim who is not sufficiently extremist or sufficiently ideologically pure (note that the Shi'a in Iraq are bombed more than "collaborators" or Americans or other coalition troops), intellectuals, communists, atheists, and so forth. In other words, the jihadis are an implacable enemy: we cannot surrender to them except by becoming them, and joining them. We cannot run from them or hide from them: they will come until they are dead, or we are dead. They believe that god is on their side. They are not driven by poverty.
Considering these facts, and the actions of the Bush administration in fighting the enemy, I hypothesize that our grand strategy is as follows: remove the sanctuaries of the jihadis (in order of size) to disrupt their ability to carry out large-scale plans; remove the state sponsors of jihadi terror groups (in order of risk of transfer of WMD to the jihadis) to ensure that small terror cells cannot carry out raids with consequences disproportional to the size of the cell; eliminate the terror cells person by person and by disrupting the cohesion of the network, both by direct action and by, for example, cutting funding and transport links; and undercut future recruiting efforts by creating and expanding democracy within the Muslim world.
Now, if this is indeed the grand strategy, then how does Iraq play into it? First, Iraq was a potential sanctuary for the jihadis. The combination of Salman Pak and Iraq's tendency to give refuge to terrorists is sufficient to indicate that Iraq was at least potentially a sanctuary. But the combination of these with the payments made to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, the sanctuary given to Abu Nidal and other terrorists, and various other things makes it certain that Iraq was (was) a major state sponsor of jihadi terror. Since Iraq was also believed to possess chemical and biological weapons and to be developing nuclear weapons, this made the perceived risk of WMD transfer quite large. Further, Iraq had a largely secular population, with a minimum of overt jihadis and sympathizers. All of these factors made Iraq an ideal target after Afghanistan was neutralized.
All of that is, however, fairly irrelevant to what we do now, except to the extent that we might regress — or worse — by pulling out. So let's assume that I get my way and we stay in Iraq, building democracy and killing jihadis. What then, are the costs of that course, and what must we be prepared to do? What challenges do we face?
First, we have to realize that our reserves and in particular the National Guard are near the breaking point. We have deployed so many, so often and for so long that we are nearing the statutory end of our ability to deploy the Guard as units, though some individuals will be able to be deployed for some time to come. Second, we cut the military dramatically after the end of the Cold War; in essence we cut about half of our combat forces. This means that we are able to sustain deployments much smaller than we might like: perhaps 125000 ground troops indefinitely, 300000 for up to three years (after which training and morale issues would leave us unable to fight large campaigns for as much as 5 to 7 years). Our commitments in Kosovo, Korea and other areas make this even harder than it would otherwise be. Military transformation increases the number of deployable combat units, but not sufficiently to drastically change those numbers for some time to come. Third, we are nearing the point where large fractions of our equipment are getting worn out from use. This will require a replacement cycle, with the corresponding investments. Finally, we have to realize that we are not done with the war even when the Iraq campaign ends: at the least we will almost certainly have to deal with Iran by use of force, and we may have to deal forcefully with Syria, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as well.
In order to fix these problems, and be prepared for ongoing campaigns, we need to make many changes, and they are going to cost. We have to extend transformation to include changing the role of the Guard and reserves, so that we can fight extended wars without calling up Guard and reserve units and troops on a continual basis. We must increase the size of the military, particularly the Army. The Army, in fact, needs to be expanded by at least 50% in order to undertake continuous operations and occupations and still maintain our other commitments. This should have been done soon after 9/11, and not having done so is perhaps the largest mistake the Bush administration has made in the war. We must also be prepared to replace much of our military equipment (particularly trucks and personal equipment, but also including armored vehicles). All of this is going to cost. Worse, all of this is going to take significant expenditures of political effort, and cutting of non-military programs and pork in large swathes.
Two other questions that Dave raises are metrics (how do we know when we're done?) and usable subsets (what do we get along the way, even if we fail to reach our final goal?).
As far as metrics go, that is a very difficult question. Enemy casualties is useful as a side effect (it makes the future enemies we fight less well trained, less capable), but not as a metric, because the enemy does not need large numbers of people to stay in the fight. More useful is the amount of territory under enemy control in various degrees. When we get to the point where the enemy controls no territory at all, though, the enemy might still be able to fight, because he doesn't have to control territory to carry out attacks, though controlling territory makes carrying out attacks much easier. Another useful metric is the number of Iraqi government security forces capable of carrying out operations with US logistical and heavy weapons support, and the number capable of carrying out operations without such support. But again, this is not a complete metric, because the operations have to be effective. The number of Sunnis involved in the political process is also a useful metric. But the reality is that none of us are in a position to really know what metrics are useful; for that we actually have to trust those we've elected to run wars for us.
But I believe that Dave is wrong in saying that there are no usable subsets of our actions in Iraq. In fact, we have already accomplished several of these: we have ended the torture and killings that Saddam used to maintain control are ended; Iraq is no longer a state sponsor of terrorism; Iraq definitively no longer has WMDs nor the capability to make them; the United States has gained useful bases in the heart of the Middle East. Some or all of these might be undercut if we leave too soon, while others will not. If we do stick it out, as I hope, until the Iraqis effectively control all of Iraq, we will gain other benefits besides democratization of Iraq. These include, not least, dealing a body blow to the idea that the US will just cut and run when things get tough.
Are there costs? Yes. But as Dave points out, there are costs to cutting and running, too, and in my estimation those costs are much, much higher.
November 22, 2005
Confused and Off the Deep End
Kos is both confused and deranged (I know, little change) about white phosphorus. (Thanks to Rusty Shackleford for the heads up) So I wish to set him a little straighter, at the sad expense of actually giving him a link and a small increment of publicity (that he doesn't need).
White phosphorus is a chemical, as is salt or magnesium. In the case of WP, it burns quite brightly (useful as illumination when fired into the air) and smokily (useful both as a smoke generator and to drive people out of hiding places when fired on the ground) and in its most common weaponized form burn spontaneously on contact with air. WP is used, when fired at the ground, on a point target, and as such is not remotely a "weapon of mass destruction" as those are, by definition, area weapons. There is quite a bit about chemical weapons here, and you'll note that not only is WP not listed as a chemical weapon, it also doesn't share characteristics with chemical weapons.
Perhaps Kos is thinking of phosgene? Phosgene is a chemical weapon that disperses over a wide area and kills on inhalation, by destroying the respiratory system. (It reacts with water in the respiratory tract to form strong acids. Nasty, nasty stuff.)
As far as WP goes, one might as well accuse the US of using chemical weapons on the assumption that we kept the swimming pools at captured palaces chlorinated. Chlorine gas is, after all, the first chemical weapon used in warfare (phosgene came soon after).
Why the Pentagon document used the phrase "WHITE PHOSPHOROUS (WP) CHEMICAL WEAPONS " I do not know, unless it was simply another bad attempt at propaganda. It is classed by the military as an incendiary. Perhaps they were referring to a complex chemical munition, that mixed WP and carbon tetracholoride. I seem to recall human rights groups talking about Saddam using complex chemical munitions on Halabja, including some that had a cocktail of chemical agents, to make treating the injuries much more difficult. This was, of course, when Saddam was not an enemy of the United States, and the memory hole seems to eat those kinds of statements when circumstances change.
In any case, here is the summation Kos gives:
Saddam tortured, we torture. Saddam used WP chemical weapons against insurgents and civilians, we use WP chemical weapons against insurgents and civilians.
I have always found Kos to be annoying in the past, when I've noticed him at all. Now, I'm simply ashamed to think of him as an American at all. He is certainly an immoral ass, but then, we knew that already.
Two additional observations: to Kos, if your thesis is correct and WP is a chemical weapon, is it not then true that Saddam had massive stocks of chemical weapons and that therefore President Bush did not lie (by your own standards) about the justification for war? Can't have it both ways.
To Rusty: Kos' feelings towards America do not seem to me to be like an abusive husband towards his wife. Rather, I believe Kos and his ilk truly love America: an idealized, fictional America in which there are no actual people, just automatons carrying out roles preordained by the priestly progressive elite (which is to say, Kos himself; see Michael Totten on that one), towards an end that is as impossible as it is inhuman. It seems always to be the intellectual children of Rousseau, in search of the perfect "system", that slaughter by the millions in their efforts to remake men — and nations — into the perfect image, without ever considering that the nature of a man is mutable, but the nature of mankind is not. Yes, Kos loves America, but it is an America that does not and never can exist. And all us proles that get in the way, well, we'll learn the folly of our ways come the revolution. Oh yes, we will.
November 21, 2005
Why the "Cut and Run" Proponents are Morally Bankrupt. In Pictures.
If you want to understand the moral bankruptcy of the "cut and run" faction on Iraq, consider the people they would condemn to death and slavery, without any moral qualms at all.
November 20, 2005
Too Soon to Tell
... but Abu Musab al-Zarqawi may have been killed in Mosul. If so, it's good news for us, the Iraqis and in fact anyone who is not a jihadi, so I'm hoping it's true. Sadly, I first saw the report on CNN at the gym, so I have to assume that it's false until I hear it from more reputable news agencies.
UPDATE: This makes me wonder if the tip that led to the house didn't come from Jordan. After all, it is certainly the case that the Arabs have better intelligence in other Arab countries than, say, we do.
UPDATE: Bummer.
The Military and Political Implications of Disclosing Strategy
There is a critical point that needs to be made, that the media and the administration's opponents have been glossing over, and that the administration has characteristically not been making, or has made badly. The iron law of warfighting is this: the leaders of a country at war can publicly explain neither the underlying strategy being used nor the full extent of their successes and mistakes.
To see why this is so, consider two historical examples of grand strategy, and how knowing the actual strategy could have enabled the enemy to win: the American Civil War and WWII in the Pacific.
The Union strategy in the Civil War was known as the Anaconda Plan. This plan, developed by Winfield Scott (hero of the War of 1812 and commander of the Mexican War), essentially consisted of two elements: the first was to divide and isolate the Confederates by blockading the entire Southern coast and occupying the Mississippi river valley; the second was to then sit back and wait for pro-union sympathizers to rise up and force the rebel governments out of power. President Lincoln adopted the first principle, but the second was not enough when the Union public was clamoring for aggressive action to bring the South back into the Union. Instead, the Union adopted a plan to destroy Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and take Richmond.
The Confederates could have countered the second part of the Anaconda Plan. To do so, they would have had to conserve the Confederate armies, risking them as little as possible, while cutting Union communications along the periphery. While the Confederacy could not have overcome the blockade, they could have used their advantage of interior lines to frustrate Union attacks intended to either take Richmond or destroy the Confederate armies, while simultaneously inflicting great costs on the Union just to stay in the fight: it's hard to ship goods and people thousands of miles today; it was much, much more difficult in the 1860s. Eventually, the Union would have been exhausted if they had been unable to retake the Confederate states, and it's likely that the Confederate states would have been able to gain their independence.
Instead, the Confederates — Lee, at least — appear to have thought the key to victory was to take Washington. As a result, Lee was constantly fighting, and constantly pushing into Northern territory. And it was in doing so, at a small Pennsylvania town, that Lee's army was finally defeated so badly that it could never recover. There were still two years of war to go, but the South had passed the point where it could win without a massive Union blunder or failure of will. (General Longstreet recommended that the Confederacy instead use its railroads and interior lines to relieve the siege of Vicksburg, which would in fact, if successful, have both demolished General Grant's career and likely have led to a failure of the Anaconda Plan: the Confederacy could have kept the lower part of the Mississippi open.
But since the Confederacy did not know the strategy, they made fundamental errors that cost them the war.
The second example is WWII in the Pacific. The US intended to enter the war as soon as reasonable cause could be found. President Roosevelt knew that despite the anti-war (and in some cases actively pro-fascist) sentiment in the US, it would be necessary to defeat Germany; he was looking for a pretext, and the constant submarine warfare in the Atlantic had come close to supplying him one by late 1941. Apparently, Japan was seen as a considerably more minor problem — or at least one to be solved further in the future.
But Japan didn't know that. Japan saw the cutting off of raw materials shipments from the US as a clear provocation, and decided that it needed to act in order to maintain its ability to run a modern industrial economy. This required Japan to control a large part of the Pacific and SE Asia, where significant oil, rubber, mineral and other resources were located. This would inevitably bring Japan into conflict with Australia, which was actively defending New Guinea, in particular, which was a significant problem for the Japanese. The Japanese figured that the US would come to the defense of Australia (likely, but not certain), and that would pose a problem of major proportions: the US territory of the Philippines lay across the route of Japanese expansion southwards.
Looking at it from Japan's point of view, it was necessary both to keep the US from supporting Australia, and to keep the US from blocking Japanese expansion. This meant that the Philippines had to be captured, and the US Pacific Fleet destroyed, disabled, or kept away from the theater. And that is why Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Guam and other US installations in the Pacific on December 7, 1941, after which their defeat was as close to inevitable as war ever gets.
But had Japan understood that America saw Germany as the main enemy, Japan could have waited six months. By that time, the US would almost certainly have joined the war against Germany, and in the process would have transferred significant resources from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet. This would have given Japan the ability to advance southwards without worrying about the US. Already involved in a war taking all of its resources to fight, the US would not have been likely to intervene in Japan's expansion. By the time US attention could have been focused on Japan — probably 1944 at the earliest — Japan would have been much more powerful, perhaps too powerful for the US to see intervention as useful, absent a Japanese attack on Guam and the Philippines.
So as a practical matter, while a free society must always debate its goals in order to come to consensus (required for maintaining any policy over the long term), discussing strategy openly — at least on the part of those charged with developing or implementing it — is folly. Yet this is precisely what the opposition in the US demands. Absent this complete disclosure of the strategy well in advance, the opposition claims that there is no strategy, and that's why so much "needless" losses are happening in places that simply "have nothing to do" with the "real war". Why do they do this, knowing as they must that the administration cannot get involved in a deep discussion of strategy without possibly losing the war?
The iron law of political opposition in a representative country in wartime is this: the opposition can make use of the iron law of warfighting to undermine the government, if it is more concerned with its own power position than with the country's success or failure in the war. The way that the opposition does this is to challenge the administration to account for funds it cannot admit to spending without tipping off the enemy to our plans, to bring forth evidence of intelligence the government cannot disclose without allowing the enemy to stop that source of intelligence, to detail the strategy in ways the government cannot do without telling the enemy how to fight us more effectively, and to constantly beat the drum of incompetence and irrelevance of the leaders of the government.
If you think that the US is bad about this now, you should read up on the political infighting in England during the Napoleonic wars. The Democrats are amateurs compared to the Radicals, or even the Whigs.
It might be possible to publish milestones for our success in Iraq, at this point, since we've mostly won that fight in real terms (assuming, of course, that we don't just give up, as we did after militarily winning in Viet Nam). But it would be a grave mistake for the government to talk about the wider strategy in the war, and why Iraq is so important as a campaign in the war. Yet that is precisely what the Democrats want to debate, because they know it's a one-sided debate: the government cannot answer without giving vital information to the enemy. It's a cowardly and self-interested and treacherous. And yes, I am questioning their patriotism: patriotism consists in putting the interests of the country above your narrower self-interest, and the Democrats right now are (at least rhetorically) doing the opposite. I am glad the Republicans called them on it.
November 19, 2005
Comprehensive Foreign Policy Discussion
Mark Safranski notes Commentary's gathering of 36 of the most impressive thinkers on foreign policy, in order to ask them what they think about the Bush doctrine. More specifically:
1. Where have you stood, and where do you now stand, in relation to the Bush Doctrine? Do you agree with the President’s diagnosis of the threat we face and his prescription for dealing with it?2. How would you rate the progress of the Bush Doctrine so far in making the U.S. more secure and in working toward a safer world environment? What about the policy’s longer-range prospects?
3. Are there particular aspects of American policy, or of the administration’s handling or explanation of it, that you would change immediately?
4. Apart from your view of the way the Bush Doctrine has been defined or implemented, do you agree with its expansive vision of America’s world role and the moral responsibilities of American power?
It's going to take me a while to get through all of these, and I will probably comment on several of them as I go. However, I'd like to note up front that this is the kind of debate we need to be having in America.
Posted by jeff at 10:19 PM | TrackBack
Short History of a Long War
Greyhawk gives a timeline of the events in Iraq, primarily focusing on the war that began in 1990, simmered through the Clinton administration, and continues through today. (hat tip: InstaPundit)
November 18, 2005
Consequences
The change of heart today by Congessman Murtha (D-PA) on support for the war is very troubling, the more so because he did not change from supporting the war to suggesting we should eventually withdraw from Iraq: he changed from supporting the war to suggesting that we should run from with our tails between our legs, claiming victory of some sort:
The United States and coalition troops have done all they can in Iraq, but it is time for a change in direction. … We can not continue on the present course. It is evident that continued military action in Iraq is not in the best interest of the United States of America, the Iraqi people or the Persian Gulf Region.[snip]
The threat posed by terrorism is real, but we have other threats that cannot be ignored. We must be prepared to face all threats.
[snip]
I said over a year ago, and now the military and the Administration agrees, Iraq can not be won “militarily.” I said two years ago, the key to progress in Iraq is to Iraqitize, Internationalize and Energize. I believe the same today. But I have concluded that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is impeding this progress.
Our troops have become the primary target of the insurgency. They are united against U.S. forces and we have become a catalyst for violence. U.S. troops are the common enemy of the Sunnis, Saddamists and foreign jihadists. I believe with a U.S. troop redeployment, the Iraqi security forces will be incentivized to take control. A poll recently conducted shows that over 80% of Iraqis are strongly opposed to the presence of coalition troops, and about 45% of the Iraqi population believe attacks against American troops are justified. I believe we need to turn Iraq over to the Iraqis.
I believe before the Iraqi elections, scheduled for mid December, the Iraqi people and the emerging government must be put on notice that the United States will immediately redeploy. All of Iraq must know that Iraq is free. Free from United States occupation. I believe this will send a signal to the Sunnis to join the political process for the good of a “free” Iraq.[snip]
Our military has done everything that has been asked of them, the U.S. can not accomplish anything further in Iraq militarily.
While, as InstaPundit notes, and as the Congressman himself notes, the Congressman's change of heart is not new, the sentiment is certainly becoming more widespread. Ignoring for the moment that the Congressman's reasoning (that I largely did not reproduce, but encourage you to read) is largely specious (quick example: how does withdrawal improve our intelligence services?) and while his claimed facts are open to question, the call for total and immediate withdrawal is worrying, because it is part of a major offensive on the part of the Left to force the US to concede defeat, and thus needs to be addressed. I would like to address it in part, by looking at the consequences of US withdrawal.
To begin, it should be remembered that the best case and the worst case almost never happen. So it is unlikely that the terrorists would throw down their arms and stop attacking the US; our friends and allies would rally to our side with support and assistance in achieving our foreign policy aims without our using force against well-defined enemies; Iran would stop developing nuclear weapons; China would suddenly come around and see us not as a competitor but as a friend; and the world would march on in freedom and peaceful coexistence. It is equally unlikely that the terrorists would immediately take down the Iraqi government; the Israelis would use their nuclear weapons against Iran and (since they would face incredible isolation and political pressure after such an act) against nearer enemies and potential enemies as well; the US would be unable to act abroad unilaterally; Afghanistan would fall; and Musharraf would bow to the inevitable and start giving nuclear weapons to terrorists in order to avoid being assassinated. But what is likely?
First, let's look at what the Congressman apparently hopes will happen: the military will be able to fight elsewhere and sustain that fight; recruitment will increase, and the recruits will be of better quality; procurement will increase, both in replacing worn out equipment and in getting new gear; there will be less military spending, easing the deficit; fewer Americans will be killed and wounded; fewer Iraqis will be killed and wounded; the insurrection and terrorism in Iraq will stop; terrorism globally will decline; the Sunnis will join the political process. (All of these are inverse statements of what the Congressman declares to be wrong; presumably he believes that our withdrawal will put them right.)
And the Congressman has a plan:
To immediately redeploy U.S. troops consistent with the safety of U.S. forces.
To create a quick reaction force in the region.
To create an over- the- horizon presence of Marines.
To diplomatically pursue security and stability in Iraq
So let's look at his plan, and his hopes, and whether his hopes are likely to be fulfilled or his plan is likely to work to fulfill those hopes. Also, let's look at the things that he didn't mention that might happen on the other side of the ledger.
In the very short term, as we were withdrawing, attacks on Americans would dramatically increase. By attacking us in this way, the enemy could plausibly claim to have driven us out by force, not because we lost our will. Given the, um, interesting ideas that are widely believed in the fantasist Arab culture already, this idea would have wide currency. And how could we refute it? By saying not that we were defeated, but are cowards? This would not only lead to the revival of the jihadi movement, which has taken some major body blows in the region because (a) they can't drive us out and (b) they are killing lots of Muslims instead of lots of Americans and Jews, it would also lead to the essential collapse of reforms towards democracy or at least political concessions on the part of the other Arab states in the region. It would also destroy any chance of a peace in Israel, because it would confirm the thesis that a Western power, including Israel, could be driven out by persistent and violent terrorism. In Iraq itself, of course, the government would face a problem with the terrorists and insurgents already operating in Iraq.
What the US military presence in Iraq provides the Iraqi government currently, besides more people and weapons to conduct operations against the enemy, are two capabilities: the ability to relatively precisely target the enemy, and defense against foreign invasion. Without the US, Iraq could probably manage sufficient logistics and support to protect its oil infrastructure, keep the Shia and Kurd areas relatively peaceful, and ensure its continuation in power absent a foreign invasion. The Iraqi government can also defeat the enemy in country, but the methods will be different. Absent US air power, electronic assets, heavy weaponry like artillery and tanks, and exquisitely-trained soldiers, the only option for the Iraqi government is slaughter. Not only would more pro-government Iraqis die in the bloodbath that would follow American withdrawal, but more civilians — by far — would be killed, particularly Sunni civilians. Given their capabilities, it's the only way the Iraqi government could stay in power. And since the Iraqi government and other "collaborators" would be killed by the Sunnis and the terrorists if they were defeated, the government has a powerful incentive to kill first and thoroughly. The idea of "diplomatically pursu[ing] security and stability in Iraq is laughable: who in Iraq would listen to us after we abandoned them?
If Syria or, much more likely, Iran were to invade Iraq, the government would almost certainly collapse. The Iraqi military and police have been being tuned for counter-insurgency, with the US providing defense against foreign invasion. The Iraqi military simply doesn't have the capability to defend the country against an invader who has tanks and artillery and even a few aircraft. The government would fall, probably within months, and likely to be replaced by a Shia theocracy satellite to Iran. This could even kick off a regional war, because the Saudis, Syrians and even Jordanians would be unwilling to let Iran have the Iraqi oil fields.
But with Iran the regional power, and the US uninvolved, it's a certainty that the US would lose pretty much all of its regional bases except perhaps in Afghanistan. The Saudis have already kicked us out. The premise is that we would withdraw from Iraqi bases. The Gulf states would kick us out, probably all of them would, because they know we wouldn't defend them, but our presence would draw terrorists and Iranian ire. The latter, in particular, would be a problem, because again Iran would be the regional power, and could get its way pretty easily.
And the idea that our "quick reaction force" (which would not be "in the region" for the reasons noted above) or our "over-the-horizon presence of Marines" would deter anyone after we ran from Iraq is ridiculous. Why would we use the military where we would undoubtedly take more casualties for less gain, after we showed in Iraq that we weren't willing to take a trickle of casualties for a huge gain? And why would we intervene to save Iraq after we had abandoned it?
Domestically, of course, the Republicans would be turned out of power in a way that would rival the post-Watergate gains made by the Democrats. The Republicans have not been socially conservative enough to excite the social conservative part of the Party, while not being fiscally conservative enough to excite the libertarian part of the Party. The only thing that's kept the Republicans in the majority domestically has been support for the war. If the war is abandoned, the Republicans will be seen as uncommitted to principles domestically or economically, as feckless and ineffective, and they will be (rightly) turned out in droves. (And make no mistake, this is the end that the Democrats most hope for and cherish; in the process, they tend to not see or to discount all of the other things that would follow our defeat in the war.)
Beyond domestic and Iraqi issues, there would be a number of secondary effects. Our ability to get our way in international fora would be even more reduced than it is now: with what would we threaten or promise? Few people fear our economic retaliation, because WTO rules make that virtually impossible, at least on a large scale. And no one would consider our military, because we would have proved that we could be beaten. Would we collapse, as the USSR did, after it was beaten? Clearly not. On the other hand, our ability to conduct diplomacy would collapse, as the USSR's did, and for the same reasons.
Iran, of course, would get its nuclear weapons eventually. The US certainly would not have the political will to act in Iran when it had lost that will in Iraq. Iran would be a tougher fight altogether, and there would be less provocation (no string of UN resolutions or of firing at US warplanes enforcing those resolutions), while attempting to use intelligence of Iran nearing nuclear capability would be laughed out of the forum of public opinion, since that was part of the justification for intervening in Iraq, and is being painted as the entire justification for intervening in Iraq. What it would do with them is anyone's guess, but a very good guess is "destroy Israel". Whether Israel would attempt to keep Iran from getting them is not clear, though I suspect that they would, knowing what the Iranians have said about losing several Muslim cities being worth destroying Israel. If Israel did attempt to stop Iran from completing nuclear weapons development, their only real option is preemptive nuclear strikes. The Israeli aircraft don't have the range, and they do not have the refueling capacity, to keep up a sustained conventional strike against the Iranians.
So now let's go back to the Congressman's hopes, and pitilessly demolish them.
Would withdrawing from Iraq increase the military's ability to fight elsewhere and sustain the fight? In purely military terms, yes. Since we would no longer be involved in one fight, those resources would be available elsewhere. Of course, politically that would be a non-starter, unless the US or, say, Western Europe were directly attacked, which means that our ability to fight elsewhere would be irrelevant. For at least a decade, the US would be unable to intervene militarily virtually anywhere in the world. And would we then get our second Reagan, or our second Carter? Would we resurge or decline? It's impossible to tell.
Would recruitment increase, and recruits be of better quality? Um, no. First, the morale of the military would be shattered. Experienced troops and officers would flee the military at their first chance to do so, and the result would be more unfilled slots. Recruiting is a kind of economy, with the demand being unfilled slots, the supply being recruits, and the cost being the quality of the recruits. With a booming economy (which, despite the MSM's continual gloom seeking, we have), shattered military morale, the inevitable budget cutting (see below for more) and so on, means that the demand would far outrun the supply. This would be made up by raising the cost, that is, by lowering the standards. We would likely end up with the kind of recruiting situation we had in the late 1970s: extraordinarily low quality coupled with constant retraining because of high turnover rates. That was horrible in the late 1970s; with today's demands from both technology and doctrine, it would be unsustainable: the Army would lose the ability to effectively conduct low-casualty wars.
Would procurement increase? Would there be less military spending, easing the deficit? Of course, these two hopes of the Congressman are pretty much mutually exclusive: you cannot cut the budget and increase procurement at the same time. During the 1990s, we were burning through Cold War surplus (our military is about half the size, in fighting units, as it was in 1991) to replace equipment. That equipment will be burned through in the next few years, and so we will face using worn out equipment or raising military spending. We cannot do both. Well, we could, if we again dramatically cut the military, probably by half again. In the process, we would get rid of a lot of capabilities, likely including sufficient amounts of our capabilities that we would be unable to mount an Iraq-sized intervention without a couple of years of rebuilding first. We would be limited to small-scale missions, because we wouldn't have the troops, equipment and logistics to support a large-scale operation. Current weapons systems are expensive, and you cannot both cut the budget and keep current, especially when you have to replace a generation of the most expensive weapons (aircraft, ships and armored vehicles) all at the same time.
Would fewer Americans be killed and wounded? In the very short term, while we are withdrawing, no. More Americans would be killed because, as noted above, the enemy would attack more in order to claim they beat us, rather than our will collapsed. In the medium term, probably, because we wouldn't be fighting in Iraq and it would take the terrorists a little time to recover. But within two years or so, our casualties would increase. First, the terrorists would be intent on driving us completely out of the region, so they would be attacking our troops in Afghanistan, as well as our embassies, American universities, and corporate and military interests throughout the region. Even if the terrorists did not resume attacks in the US on the scale of 9/11, our casualties in civilians and non-military government agents in the Muslim world would likely exceed our current military casualties.
Would fewer Iraqis be killed and wounded? Clearly not, as explained above. But who would notice, since it wasn't Americans dying? While 30000 civilians in two years seems like a lot of dead people, it wouldn't surprise me to see the Sunnis put down with civilians dying at a rate of 30000 every few months. Again, the Iraqi government's options are limited. And like the killing in Cambodia and Viet Nam, I expect that the Left would not notice; and to the extent that it did notice, it would be to blame it on the US for not protecting the enemy after we abandoned our friends.
Would the insurrection and terrorism in Iraq stop? Probably. Absent a foreign invasion, I suspect that the Iraqi government could kill terrorists, insurgents, sympathetic civilians and uninvolved civilians at a high enough rate to end the terrorism and insurgency. Assuming, of course, that the army and police don't desert en masse out of fear after we leave. If they do, then the terrorism and insurgency would likely continue until either foreign invasion intervened, or the government of Iraq collapsed.
Will terrorism decline globally? Um, not hardly. Why would a tactic that had proven successful be scaled back or abandoned? In short order, there would be a sharply increased amount of terrorism in the Muslim world. Shortly thereafter, there would be increased terrorism on the periphery of the Muslim world, Islam's bloody borders. And if the terrorists were to succeed in pulling down some governments and establishing a caliphate (a possibility the Congressman is either unaware of or simply declines to mention), there would likely be serious attacks against Western and Jewish targets generally. For that matter, it's not even necessary to establish a rump caliphate to do this: the Syrians, Iranians, Saudis and Pakistanis would probably be willing to provide sufficient support to the terrorists to ensure that they could plan, train for and carry out attacks in Europe and the US.
Would the Sunnis join the political process in Iraq? No. The Sunnis are increasingly participating because it looks like we are going to win handily. If it begins to look like we are going to lose (or if we simply announce we've lost and run away), there would be no incentive to counter the strong disincentive of being killed for "collaborating". So the Sunnis would withdraw from the political process, and turn to violence. And they would have to do it quickly, to avoid the slaughter the Shia and Kurds would try to inflict on them, both for revenge and for the practical reason of not putting themselves back in the position they were in under the Sunnis last time.
There are two other significant downsides of withdrawal not addressed by the Congressman even in the negative: international cooperation and Korea. International cooperation, both on terror and on other matters, would become a much more rare commodity. First, the US would be seen as needing the cooperation more, and so (politics also being an economy) the price would go up. In many cases, the price would be out of our reach, because better deals could be found by cooperating with our enemies than with us. Ask the French, or George Galloway, about "oil for food" deals and how much you can profit, with essentially no risk, by adhering to US enemies.
As to Korea, China has been allowing North Korea to slowly starve. This would not continue. The South would know it could not count on the US for the harder task of fighting or occupying North Korea, since we were unwilling to take on the easier task of occupying Iraq, and so the South would likely build up its military significantly. China does not want a free North Korea to encourage the Chinese people towards freedom, so they would prop up the regime. With nothing to fear from the US, the Chinese would have every incentive to do so and would see little in the way of downsides. Japan and Taiwan and South Korea, realizing they have to fend for themselves, would likely develop nuclear weapons as fast as they could. There would almost certainly be a series of wars, probably including China invading Taiwan, over territory in SE Asia.
It has always been the case that most casualties are suffered not in the battle, but in the rout afterwards. If we allow ourselves to be routed, the likely consequences are severe. We should be aware of them, and ready to face them, before we incur them.
UPDATE: Instapundit has lots of concurring opinions. In particular, read Pejman Yousefzadeh.
UPDATE: Dave Schuler also has thoughts on this, and in particular on what responsibilities grown ups in a free society should have when their nation is at war.
My own preferences are that Congressional Democrats should alter their current trajectory from withdrawal to establishing a lasting peace in Iraq, the White House (and Congressional Republicans) should alter their stance from counter-confrontation to fixing whatever is wrong and speeding the pace of strengthening the Iraqi government’s position (even if doing that has political cost), and that bloggers would start confronting each others’ arguments rather than each other. Tain’t gonna happen.
Dave also points to Joe Gandelman's excellent roundup of opinion on this.
UPDATE: Kevin Aylward has also read Murtha's plan.
UPDATE: Ralph Peters has bitter words about the Democrats' electoral be-damned-to-the-consequences maneuvering.
November 16, 2005
Clinton Lied, People Died?
Let us look back to the day when President Bill Clinton launched Operation Desert Fox against Iraq's WMD capabilities, courtesy of CNN (emphasis mine):
Timing was important, said the president, because without a strong inspection system in place, Iraq could rebuild its chemical, biological and nuclear programs in a matter of months, not years.
"If Saddam can cripple the weapons inspections system and get away with it, he would conclude the international community, led by the United States, has simply lost its will," said Clinton. "He would surmise that he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction."
Clinton also called Hussein a threat to his people and to the security of the world.
"The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government -- a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people," Clinton said.
Such a change in Baghdad would take time and effort, Clinton said ...
I think the first two paragraphs above are interesting. After Desert Fox, inspections ended until President Bush went to the UN and got Resolution 1441. Assuming President Clinton wasn't trying to mislead the public to justify airstrikes, it would seem logical to conclude, by Clinton's own arguments, that Iraq would have been rebuilding its WMD arsenals between 1998 and 2003.
The final two paragraphs above are interesting for their prescience. We've accomplished paragraph one; we would do well to remember paragraph two.
(hat tip: Drudge)
Posted by Brian at 10:18 PM | TrackBackNovember 15, 2005
Media as Weapon, not Theatre
The Officers' Club addresses the idea of the media as an instrument of war, but Brian points out in the comments something that is vitally important to understand, and often lost on bloggers: the media is not a theatre, but a weapon. (hat tip: InstaPundit) This is a fact often lost on bloggers, who tend to view the media as a thinking enemy of the US.
To an extent, that view is correct: many in the media seem to be actively working against the US war effort. But that view is not complete: the media has motives, incentives and goals beyond simple anti-Americanism or transnationalism, and the media is not a unified body, either. It is precisely these different motives, incentives and goals that jihadis exploit: frequent bombings on the road to the Baghdad airport tweak reporters' incentives to show spectaculars, while the fact that the road has been safe for many months now has not been worthy of a single report, so far as I can tell. Similarly, by attaching the victim label to themselves, the jihadis get a free pass on atrocities, while by not being the victim, the US is blamed even for the acts of the jihadis. (This happens in domestic politics as well.)
To really understand how the press can be used as a weapon of the West, though, you have to understand one key fact: the only way to defeat an enemy (in the strategic sense) is to defeat his will to fight. The only way to defeat an enemy's capacity to fight is to kill him, if necessary to the last man. In practice this pretty much never happens, because human willpower is not infinite. As the Iraq campaign shows, even an enemy incapable of resisting on conventional ground can, if he is determined enough, continue fighting long after any rational analysis tells him he can prevail. Even at the very end of WWII in Europe, with all of Germany in flames, there were millions of Germans who could have taken up arms, and the arms were available. But the Germans had lost their will to resist. Indeed, the German people and even military would probably have been willing to surrender much sooner, but one of the drawbacks of totalitarianism is the inability of the people to bend the leaders' wills.
So to make the enemy stop fighting, or never fight in the first place, requires you to defeat the enemy's will to fight. For less rational enemies, like the Nazis or the jihadis, this is a task that requires the almost complete destruction of the enemy. For more rational groups, like the US or the Germans of WWI, once you demonstrate to them that winning is not possible, there is generally a point at which a negotiated settlement is preferable to continued fighting. Note that you don't have to convince a rational actor that he will lose a fight, only that he will not win it, to eventually force him to concede the field. This is, at its heart, the way that the jihadis use the press (and the way that anti-Americans, anti-capitalists and anti-Republicans in the press itself use the press): as an attempt to defeat our will to fight. Hence the boasting price; hence the videotaped beheadings; hence the endless accusations of the evil nature of all Americans and American institutions; hence the endless comparisons to Viet Nam. All of this makes using the media as an aid to war, or even neutralizing its effect, difficult for Americans in general and almost impossible for Republicans.
But we don't have to necessarily win the same way our enemies do. All we have to do is show ourselves to be strong enough to not lose our will because of excessively negative press coverage; that is, to convince the enemy that the press is not a sufficient weapon to defeat us. We don't have to use the media ourselves as a weapon, though it would be nice if we did, since it would shorten the war. That is why the 2004 election was so important: it denied a significant hope of the enemy. And the 2006 and 2008 elections will be important for the same reason. If the enemy comes to believe that he cannot defeat our will, then his own will will be weakened. In combination with the morale losses from field attrition, and the loss of supporters as media stunts staged for the West, like the attacks in Amman, result in a loss of respect among the semi-neutral Muslims the jihadis want to recruit, the enemy will have a very difficult time maintaining his will to fight, and many of the enemy's fighters will in fact stop fighting.
In the end, there are still jihadis who will only stop fighting when they die, but I suspect that that number is not sufficient to maintain an international campaign against us, and that the jihadis' will can be beaten sufficiently to not necessitate actually hunting down and killing each of the most fanatical of the enemy. Or if we do, it will be more like the Israeli hunt for Nazis than it will be like open warfare.
Important Reading on the War
Joe Katzman compiles some of the most important speculation and analysis on the war. The three highlighted posts are particularly good reads.
November 12, 2005
About 1:1
I had never thought to look at the ratio of young Muslims in France to young non-Muslims in France. Mark Steyn did. (hat tip: Wretchard) The article is behind a registration wall, but you can use BugMeNot. Here is the meat:
Now go back to that bland statistic you hear a lot these days: ‘about 10 per cent of France’s population is Muslim’. Give or take a million here, a million there, that’s broadly correct, as far as it goes. But the population spread isn’t even. And when it comes to those living in France aged 20 and under, about 30 per cent are said to be Muslim and in the major urban centres about 45 per cent. If it came down to street-by-street fighting, as Michel Gurfinkiel, the editor of Valeurs Actuelles, points out, ‘the combatant ratio in any ethnic war may thus be one to one’ — already, right now, in 2005.[snip]
So the question is: do you think M. de Villepin’s one last shot of failed French statism will do the trick?
The implications for that in terms of France's ongoing riots and the possibility of a civil war in Europe in the near term are staggering. Particularly when you consider that the Europeans don't seem to be very motivated, but the young Muslims do.
Posted by jeff at 8:19 PM | TrackBack
November 8, 2005
On the Uses of Torture
Should officers of the US government be allowed, under any circumstances, to torture people? Setting aside the definition of torture, I have to say "under some circumstances". Jon Henke disagrees on libertarian grounds, and I'd like to argue my case on libertarian grounds as well. (The comments thread at QandO is fantastic, as well.)
Should officers of the US government ever be allowed under any circumstances to torture American citizens, regardless of where and how captured? No. American citizens are covered by the 8th Amendment to the Constitution: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." In fact, they are also covered by the 5th and 6th Amendments, and we've probably already gone too far in a few cases of this sort.
Should officers of the US government ever be allowed under any circumstances to torture people of any nationality, captured in the service of a nation state with which we are at war and which is a signatory nation to the Geneva Accords? No, because our treaty obligations under the Geneva Accords prohibit that.
Should officers of the US government ever be allowed under any circumstances not covered above to torture people? Yes, in at least a couple of cases. There are two in particular, but they are special cases of a more general case. The two are non-citizen pirates and terrorists captured abroad, and the general case that covers both is unlawful combatants waging war against the United States and who themselves give no quarter. One who gives no quarter can ask no quarter. Whether or not the US should torture in such cases is a practical decision, best left to the executive, within the limits set down by the legislature. But to deny even the possibility of torture in such cases means that the enemy — in these cases one who would, as noted, give no quarter — will know in advance how far he has to resist in order to win, and that will mean that our lesser methods will be ineffective. Indeed, limitations already placed on US officers may have already made most of our lesser methods ineffective.
So there are, I think, limited cases in which torture might be justified. However, I have no problem with the legislature setting that bar lower than I would. I only ask that the executive act within the bounds set by law, and it seems that so far they have been doing so, with the caveat that the law is quite unclear on such questions in some cases.
Why do Men Join the Military
To go to war. The only people that this should surprise are those who ignore all evidence and common sense about the reality of gender roles, and how humans developed. Let's face it: men are genetically predisposed to protect and provide, and women are genetically predisposed to nurture children and provide a safe home environment. Not all the hand waving and cultural conditioning in the world will do more than make people angry and lonely when they deny their nature.
I came to this belief relatively late in my life, after I had children. Before that, I was perfectly happy with either traditional or culturally-approved gender roles (still am, really), but figured that child rearing and cultural conditioning was the chief determinant of behavior. Having had four boys, and seeing them turn a baby doll into a gun when they had never seen a gun or had a toy gun, I've been forced to change my mind on that one. Some of the effects of public schooling take a long time to be worn off by experience.
November 4, 2005
Baseless
Strategypage has some excellent observations on al Qaeda's current strategic problem: they have no secure territory from which to fight, and secure territory from which to fight is a requirement of jihad. But what I thought most notable was the conclusion:
In practical terms, al Qaeda is less an organization, and more of popular madness, dedicated to terrorism and mass murder. Al Qaeda is more dependent on mass media, than anything else. Whatever it does, if the message is spun the right way, then the contributions, volunteers and atrocities will keep coming.
The thought of al Qaeda as popular madness is really interesting, and given the loose nature of the terrorists' organizations since the destruction of al Qaeda's Afghan sanctuary, explains a great deal about the increasing lack of ability to conduct mass-casualty attacks in America and Europe.
But of course, as the author notes, as long as the atrocity's can get sufficiently wide play in the media without meaningful criticism, there will not be a definitive end to this war.
October 28, 2005
Generations of Warfare
With Morenuancedthanyou's question on this post, it is clear I used jargon I should have spelled out. The question: "What exactly is 4GW?"
4GW is an abbreviation for fourth generation warfare. It is also called "asymmetrical warfare". Modern warfare began in the late 1700s, roughly between the American Revolution and the rise of Napoleon in France. The first generation was characterized by mass conscription, fighting without regard to seasons, the use of formations such as rigid drills and fighting in a line to maximize the firepower of musketry, and a distinct lack of operational maneuver except among the best commanders (Napoleon was master of the art of operational maneuver).
Second generation (modern) warfare came about with the appearance of breech-loaded rifles, which made massed formations suicidal. The US Civil War was perhaps the last 1GW war, and showed elements of what was to come: reliance on indirect fire, dispersed lines in the advance, a reluctance to give ground in the defense and the development of operational art, particularly in the German army. WWI was a perfect example of this generation of warfighting at its peak.
3GW was also developed by the Germans, who saw a need to compete with numerically superior enemies and also an opportunity in new technologies. The result was the blitzkrieg: non-linear warfare, emphasis on logistics and maneuver, targeting enemy populations as a means to reduce future enemy supplies and on fighting in time (as well as space) and combined arms (aircraft acting as scouts, infantry supporting tanks in a breakthrough, tanks supporting infantry in defense and so on). WWII was the prime example of 3GW war, and its zenith in theory was the American AirLand doctrine developed after Viet Nam.
4GW is really almost a return to pre-industrial war, for at least one side. Realizing that America brings overwhelming strength to bear, and cannot be defeated on the battlefield by virtually anyone, leads non-American forces (and non-Allies) to develop suitable tactics to counter American strength: terrorism, attacking civilian populations exclusively, media-centric war, using criminal enterprises as instruments of covert war and the like. In effect, it is cheating, by the standards of "gentlemanly warfare" that more or less prevailed between the 1600s and today, at least in the West and most industrialized countries. The Iraq insurgency/terrorist campaign, 9/11, the second intifadeh terrorism against Israel, and the drug lords' war against the Mexican government. Viet Nam was, in effect, the first 4GW war by the end, being won by the Communists in the media, by attacking our will to resist or even to allow our allies to buy weapons and ammunition, rather than on the ground, where the enemy was pretty much slaughtered until the 1975 invasion, the second conventional invasion of South Viet Nam since American withdrawal.
It has been the case that each generation of modern warfare, by targeting the weakest points of the militaries of the prior generation, has been uniformly able to overcome the prior-generation army. 2GW weaponry made massed, linear attacks suicidal (ask both sides in WWI, and the Polish and Russians in WWII) and ineffective. 3GW tactics made 2GW weaponry ineffective because it couldn't reorient to the threat, and would be cut off and destroyed in detail. 4GW basically targets the enemy's will to fight, on moral grounds rather than practical grounds. A perfect 4GW war is one where the enemy chooses not to fight in the first place.
This has not yet been proven of 4GW vs. 3GW militaries. While the Americans were beaten in Viet Nam by 4GW tactics, the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Mexicans in Mexico, and so on, the second intifadeh was crushed by Israeli application of an immortal practice: building a wall and killing the enemy's leaders. Similarly, the US campaign in Iraq will be studied by future historians, barring a tremendous reversal of fortune, as a prime example of how to militarily defeat a 4GW force that is tied to a place, and how to tie them to a place initially. It's unclear as of yet, and will be for quite some time, whether the jihadi campaign globally will be beaten by American and allied force, by the adoption of 4GW tactics by America (as was done in Afghanistan with great success), by creeping democratization and liberalization of the Muslim world, or not at all.
It's pretty clear that a 3GW military with 4GW capabilities of its own can beat a 4GW force under some circumstances, and that a 4GW force can beat a badly-trained and badly-motivated 3GW force. It's pretty clear that 4GW won't work against authoritarian and particularly totalitarian regimes, because they can be as brutal and "unfair" as the 4GW forces and to much greater effect, since they have State resources behind them. It's pretty clear that 4GW forces cannot win without the support of States, particularly in weapons, financing, training and safe havens. Much else is still unclear, and will be resolved over time.
My personal view is that 4GW forces are more or less indistinguishable from pirates: no quarter given. If all nations begin to treat 4GW forces that are not the normal forces of a State (including but not limited to terrorists) as pirates and criminals, rather than as useful tools, 4GW forces will almost immediately lose their effectiveness. If the media would refuse to act as the propaganda agents of 4GW forces, the 4GW forces would almost immediately lose their effectiveness. If America becomes brutal (which may happen if we suffer a terrorist nuclear, chemical or biological attack), or the UN ceases to protect the "democratic rights" of States that are not in fact democratic, or Western citizens stop seeing themselves as their own enemies — in any of these cases, 4GW will collapse as an effective tool.
This leads me to conclude one other thing: it may turn out in the end that 4GW is nothing more than pre-modern warfare, ancient warfare even, fought with modern warfare before the unblinking gaze of the camera. If that is the case, 4GW will be seen in historical hindsight not as a generation of modern warfare, but as an attempt to win a gunfight with a knife.
October 27, 2005
Power and Control in a 4GW World
Mark Safranski has an interesting and pessimistic look at the ability of the State to defend itself in a 4GW world. Myke Cole, whom Mark quotes, sees the dissolution of the State in the face of a threat it cannot overcome. Mark sees the possibility of death squads as a State defense. I see a more optimistic scenario.
It seems to me that there is another option as well, and that it is not necessarily a bad one.
In the US, and in some other Western States, the government is not some god-installed authority against whom there is no power and over whom there is no control. Instead, the government is the agent of the people, and exists to serve the people's will. Indeed, the institutions of government are nothing more than a delegation of agency by the people to the State to do full-time what any given person can only do part-time, and not nearly as effectively.
The military is little more than the delegation of the power of self-defense against foreign foes to the State - the militia power, if you will. The police forces are nothing more than the citizens' delegation of authority to the State to enforce the law (which all citizens are duty-bound to do). And so forth.
The practical result of this is that, at least in the US, the State can fail utterly at some task without leading to dissolution — even at the task of defense against enemies, foreign or domestic. Let us say, for example, that the police make a total mess of fighting against a domestic 4GW threat. While it's possible the government could turn to death squads, it is unlikely (again, at least in the US). What is far more likely is that the armed citizens would organize themselves into a group and go solve the problem. There is a name for this: a Committee of Vigilance. Perhaps better known as vigilantes. While not the best solution — such groups tend to get out of hand — it is certainly better than giving up to death or at least chaos.
If you think that this will not happen in today's world, you should read up on the Minutemen.
October 23, 2005
Too Good Not to Repeat
Dale Franks at QandO said something too good not to repeat. In the context of discussing the recent action by a Spanish judge of bringing arrest warrants against three US soldiers, Franks noted:
Frankly, with all due respect for the hallowed traditions of Spanish law (among which are the Inquisition, the bastinado, and the auto da fé, I decline to be lectured on justice by representatives of a country that was a fascist dictatorship until 1975, and had its last attempted military coup d'etat in 1981. I hope I may be pardoned for suggesting that such a country may not yet have enough of a history of, or experience with, impartial judicial proceedings to offer us lectures on the administration of justice.Posted by jeff at 10:32 PM | TrackBackAnd that's my opinion on Spain, a country that has been part of—or, at least, an idiot stepsister to—Western Civilization for the last 700 years. If the dismissiveness of my opinion of them upsets you, then I assure you, you'd find my opinion of being dragged before a tribunal called by Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Indonesia, or Myanmar would be so harsh as to hardly be bearable.
October 18, 2005
Pattern of Operations
Bill Roggio offers another excellent flash presentation showing the pattern of allied operations in Iraq over the last year. It's a wonderful counter to the police blotter coverage that saturates the media, and shows both our plan of action and where it's likely headed.
The majority of operations in the last year have been to first disrupt enemy operations and strongholds, then to occupy those strongholds, along the major enemy logistics routes alongside the River Euphrates. There have been some operations as well along the Tigris River, and some operations to disrupt enemy communications between those rivers. These were aimed at pacifying Baghdad, a task which has actually been quite successful, reducing enemy activity there to periodic car bombings, generally against civilians.
Where, then, might we see operations in the future? With the Euphrates nearly locked down, except at its far western tip, I believe the center of gravity for American troops will shift to the Tigris logistics lines. The Iraqis will stay in force along the Euphrates, but the Americans will move to where the hardest remaining fight is, and that will be the line from Baghdad to Baqubah to Kirkuk to Mosul to the border. Once the rivers are both secured, operations will become more intense in far western Anbar province, particularly the routes from Jordan and Syria through ar Rutbah. But this latter extension, into the West, will not require a very large troop presence, and so it is possible that it will be undertaken entirely by the Iraqis, as they gain in competence and equipment.
Don't expect to watch on the news, though: the media doesn't tend to cover things that are going well, and that are not a point in time and place with an immediate emotional angle. Basically, expect the media to continue covering this war as if they had the understanding and attention spans of five year olds.
October 17, 2005
New to Me
I found a blog that I had never seen before: Sovereignty Blog. Orrin apparently has published as far back as 2000, but regularly since last August. Sovereignty blog is a wide-ranging set of quotations from other sources about topics related to sovereignty, usually followed by a Glenn Reynolds-length comment from Orrin. Worth checking out.
October 15, 2005
Assumptions, Victory in Iraq, and Strategy
The Iraqi referendum on their new Constitution has come off with high turnout. The assumption I am seeing on blogs that follow Iraq closely seems to be that this means that the referendum is going to pass. Not necessarily. The Constitution could well be voted down. But that is unimportant; there are only two important things: the election went off with such low violence — less than a typical American election in terms of number of incidents, though not their severity — and high rates of participation that it must be taken as the authentic opinion of the Iraqi people, and in failing utterly to prevent or disrupt the vote, the enemy's current strength has been revealed as lower than expected (and I expected it to be low). This indicates that the insurgency truly is over, and the terror campaign is fading faster than I had expected.
So even if the Constitution is voted down, this means that the political process will simply be re-engaged to negotiate a new attempt. And it is that political process that signifies victory for the US and for Iraq: by defeating the terrorists in Iraq, which appears to be happening more quickly than I had expected, and turning to the political process to allow free people to rule themselves as they choose, Iraq sets a magnificent example in the Arab and Muslim worlds of what Arabs can do. (It is, perhaps, too much to hope that the Western Left will take a similar example to heart.) In fact, in some ways, a defeat for the Constitution and a successful renegotiation would be an even better example, because in every other Arab state as it now stands, such a defeat would mean revolution and violence.
Given this, it is reasonable to expect the American presence to draw down within the next 18 months. Not all the way down, but down to the point that the Iraqis are basically in charge of the ground combat except in unusual circumstances, with the US providing air power, artillery, heavy weaponry, logistics and a deterrence against Iranian or Syrian invasion. Let's say 1/2 to 2/3, at a guess, of the US service members in Iraq and supporting Iraq can be retasked by the end of next year.
Now, this has some interesting implications. The US has learned much in the Iraqi fighting, and has kept those lessons because it's institutionalized the knowledge. (This is largely untrue for the enemy, who have not been able to learn as much because their people get killed too frequently, and their main source of intelligence is the media, rather than their own assets.) The Army is not, contrary to the puling of the critics, worn down, but rather has been sharpened. And that sharp point now begins to come available for follow-on operations. We can, after, say, next Spring, credibly threaten an invasion and occupation of Syria if that is necessary. As such, we can use that threat as leverage to pull down Syrian support of terrorists.
We could also credibly threaten Iran with attack and destruction (though not actually occupation). And if Iraq's oil reserves begin to come online in greater amounts, we could also credibly threaten to bankrupt Iran by cutting off their oil income. These threats can be used to hopefully get Iran to back off of their nuclear program, or to lessen their support of terrorists. If those don't happen, we can certainly attack Iran in much the same way that we attacked Serbia, using the destruction of their assets (less than total attack) to get them to back away from key policies (less than total defeat).
As a third option, we could use our available strength to undertake a lot of minor options, such as pressuring Chavez, Mugabe, the Sudan and some of the other third-rate problems around the world.
What will we do? The tea leaves don't reveal. But we will have a lot more options in six months than we now do, which will allow the US to take new steps towards advancing freedom and destroying terrorism. And that is a good thing.
Thanks to Glenn Reynolds and Bill Roggio for many of the links in this post.
UPDATE: Wretchard has similar thoughts, more eloquently put.
October 10, 2005
The Peace of the Grave
Glenn Reynolds rounds up some opinions on the so-called "peace movement". This leads to a thought I've had since the 1980's, when the "peace movement" was active in attempting to get the US to stop defending Europe and Latin America and pretty much even the US against the Soviets:
The "peace movement" always and only focuses on the actions of the US, our allies, or Israel [hereinafter "the good guys"]. They never condemn the side that opposes the good guys [hereinafter "the enemy"], even — in fact, especially — when the enemy is actually doing what the good guys are being falsely accused of1. Always and forever, the "peace movement" urges us to disarm, to back down, to forgive, to forget, to sleep, to sleeeeep....
The "peace movement" does not advocate peace: it advocates surrender. And to surrender against tyrants is to advocate the death of Liberty and its adherents — that is to say, they want us dead, or at least powerless and enslaved.
And interestingly enough, if we look at the "peace movement" from the 1960s onwards, the same people are always at its core: the hardcore Communists. Even today. Some people are simply evil right through; and let's face it, the only way to stop them is to kill them. Their minds are not changeable, and they will not give up until they win. Fortunately, that doesn't seem to be necessary, in that there aren't very many people who fall for it any more, as the picture in Glenn's post demonstrates. Perhaps time will take care of the problem for us.
1For example, war crimes in Viet Nam or torture in the current war.
October 9, 2005
Fighting Low
The interesting thing about how we are fighting the propaganda war against the enemy and his hangers on is that we don't seem to get their worldview at all. I can kind of understand that: we at least pay lip service to being logical and reasonable1, and in the main we2 tend to actually be at least somewhat logical and reasonable. But the Arab cultures are not logical and reasonable cultures; they are superstitious, tribal, honor/shame cultures. This shouldn't be hard for us to get a grip on — our ancestors were much the same — but for some reason it is. If we want to win the propaganda war in the Arab world, we need to fight the propaganda war in the Arab world symbolically.
To get an idea of this illogic, the jihadis claim that god is on their side — sorry, for them, it's GOD is on their side — and He will smite the invaders, and cause the very rocks and trees to call out against the infidels (that's you and me), in order to bring about the global Caliphate as has been ordained. Nothing shakes that kind of faith except alternate superstitions. It's like using methodone to wean addicts from heroine. On top of that superstitious base, the Arab world is conspiracy-oriented (I think that this is the true connection between Western extremists and the jihadis), rumor based, and deeply suspicious. So to argue against this kind of thing, we have to fight on the level of rumor, conspiracy, and superstition.
It so happens that the world offered a prime example this weekend of the kind of event we should be exploiting: the Pakistan earthquake that killed, apparently, over 18000 people — Katrina math: 2000 or so. We should be playing this up as proof that god hates the jihadis, and wants the US to win in the war, and was shaking the ground beneath the feet of the heretic jihadis who have been slaughtering Muslims3, including women and children, in Iraq and, of course, Kashmir (where the earthquake hit hardest). And so on. We should also deliberately target well-known terror-supporting imams and mosques (and governments), killing the imams and desecrating the mosques.
Fighting low? You bet, but then this is for keeps, and we'd better fight to win.
1This is the reason for the intelligent design argument: the supporters know, deep down, that they cannot win an argument on the emotional or faith arguments (which are powerful in and of themselves, at least to the Abrahamic religions), because those arguments are not given credit in society. Since it is the scientific — or at least seemingly-scientific — logical and rational arguments that society tends to give credit to, the intelligent design proponents are forced to try to win the argument by the nonsensical claim that what they are doing is science. It may be true, though they would have a long way to go to convince me, but it's not science.
2Excluding the mid- to far-Left and the far-Right, anyway.
3This is apparently somewhere in the Koran, because the terror-supporting imams quote it all the damned time in their sermons.
October 7, 2005
Not Like It's a Surprise, or Anything
Iran's "peaceful" nuclear program has been put firmly into the hands of the Iranian army. Like I said in the title: big surprise. But hey, I'm sure that the Europeans will be able to negotiate Iran away from nuclear weapons; it worked with North Korea, didn't it?
More, Please
President Bush gave a speech which was one of the best he's ever given. The President laid out the nature of the enemy and the elements of our strategy in the war. It's a shame that these points are not being continually made by the administration, or by the media. There's too much good stuff for excerpts to do justice, but I did want to address the strategy angle. The President noted five elements to our strategy:
- "First, we're determined to prevent the attacks of terrorist networks before they occur." The President divides this into two sub-areas: strengthening defenses here, and killing or capturing the enemy's current leadership and disrupting their organization.
- "Second, we're determined to deny weapons of mass destruction to outlaw regimes, and to their terrorist allies who would use them without hesitation."
- "Third, we're determined to deny radical groups the support and sanctuary of outlaw regimes." Here, the president puts Syria and Iran on notice by name.
- "Fourth, we're determined to deny the militants control of any nation, which they would use as a home base and a launching pad for terror."
- "The fifth element of our strategy in the war on terror is to deny the militants future recruits by replacing hatred and resentment with democracy and hope across the broader Middle East."
I guess the executive summary would be: defend locally, attack globally, deny unanswerable weapons to the enemy, deny sanctuary and bases of operations to the enemy, reduce the enemy's ability to replace their cadres. It's a useful strategy, because it simultaneously attacks the enemy at several pressure points: their current leadership and cadres, their capabilities, their sanctuaries and their ideology. In the long run, I suspect that the last will be the most important to ending the threat. Everything else is focused on containing the threat.
Like I said: good speech; give it more often and in prime time.
UPDATE: Juan Cole, not surprisingly, sees it differently. But calling names and shading the facts outrageously is not very convincing.
Mr. Bush, I don't recognize the world you paint. I find your speech a form of sheer propaganda, having almost no relationship to reality.
Likewise your post, Juan. But moreso, since I recognize the world the President paints, but not the one you paint. In particular, asserting that none of al Qaeda, Syria, Iran or anyone else in the region could possibly harm the US, and that it's all our fault anyway, followed by a tired repetition of Democrat talking points, just turns my stomach. Where the President offers a strategy for winning against the enemy we discovered on 9/11, Juan Cole offers nothing but handwaving and a denial that anyone except the US is the enemy. Pathetic.
Posted by jeff at 7:06 AM | TrackBackOctober 6, 2005
Naming Things, Logic, and Humanity
I'm a big believer in calling things by appropriate names. This is not mere sophistry: the naming of a thing tells us how to respond to that thing. To name a thing is to assign a moral role to that thing. The enemies of clear understanding, the Derridas and Chomskys and Zinns, use names to blur the moral nature of otherwise repugnant people or activities, as did Markos Zuniga when he called contractors working for the military in Iraq "mercenaries", and said "screw them" when they were killed and treated barbarously. It's why our external enemy are called "freedom fighters" by those who view us as their internal enemies: freedom fighters are morally legitimate, and thugs and terrorists are not.
Setting aside for the moment how this abuse of language leads words to become meaningless, and thus leads to the inability to clearly articulate moral choices, we come to another term that is meaningless and needs to be abandoned: "suicide bomber". A person who goes into the middle of the desert and kills himself by detonating explosives is not what we mean by "suicide bomber", even though he used a bomb to commit suicide. Similarly, a person who goes into the middle of a crowd, and sets of his bomb killing many, but who somehow survives (it has happened) is what we mean by "suicide bomber". But what to call such a person? The point of the act is not suicide, but homicide and "martyrdom" (a term that needs an essay or two to do justice to, particularly in the jihadi sense of the term) together — or frequently just homicide.
But "homicide bomber" doesn't work. Tim McVeigh, in destroying the Murrah Federal Building, certain committed homicide using a bomb, but that is not the same thing as what we mean, because McVeigh did not intend to die in the act. (This is why Fox News calling the Madrid train bombings the first homicide bombings in Western Europe was so ridiculous; clearly Fox missed the entire era of Communist terrorism in Western Europe, and for that matter the Irish bombings in England over several decades.) So what term does express the act itself: the intentional killing of others with a bomb, in order to attain a goal (terrorizing others into cultural and political surrender, these days), with the intent of killing one's self in the process? The only term I can come up with is "kamikaze". It expresses both the intended suicide and the intended homicide aspects of the act, and is morally neutral for the most part. It is understood to be a tactic, rather than a cause. And so it can be equally applied to attacks on military or government targets (morally legitimate) or attacks on civilians (morally illegitimate).
And now to some logic, and current events. Joe Hinrichs killed himself with a bomb at OU last Saturday. Was he or was he not a kamikaze? I tend to think not, for a few reasons.
- First, he doesn't fit the profile of today's kamikaze's. As Fran Porretto ably pointed out, the next one or ten or one hundred of these attacks are not going to be committed by middle class non-Muslim white guys. (Don't worry; we'll come back to this point.) As far as I can tell, Joe was a middle class non-Muslim white guy.
- There were several easy, spectacular targets nearby (including both the ongoing football game and a popular and crowded Irish pub) where, were Joe a kamikaze, he could have killed many, many people.
- In many ways most importantly to me, Joe was a member of the Oklahoma Chapter of Triangle Fraternity, an organization I am also privileged to be a member of. I know the kind of people involved in the fraternity in general, and the Oklahoma chapter in general. I know, as an initiate, the central mystery and ethics that are assumed as a part of becoming a Brother. Joe would have had to utterly renounce that creed — would have broken every part of it — to kill himself and others in this way.
Now that last point isn't logical. It is an intuitive feeling based on things that I know that are not amenable to logic. And as such, I'm perfectly ready to abandon (with accompanying grief and disappointment) that last point if it turns out that in fact Joe was intending a kamikaze attack. In fact, if it could be shown that Joe was a Muslim convert, I would have to acknowledge the likelihood that in fact this was a kamikaze attack, intended to kill numerous of my fellow citizens.
But let's pause there and look at the logic of many whose opinions I otherwise respect, who claim that Joe was a kamikaze. There are many examples, but I'm going to pick on The Jawa Report, because the format is easiest to deal with:
1) Hinrichs seems to have converted to Islam and attended a nearby Islamic center. (see map at Zombietime) However, the president of the University of Oklahoma Muslim Studeant Association denies that Hinrichs was a Muslim. Other witnesses, though, claim Hinrichs was a frequent visitor to the mosque.
2) It appears that the Islamic center is affiliated with the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), a group with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and which has been investigated for funding terrorism by Congress.
3) The ISNA linked mosque may have been the same one attended by Zacharias MOUSSAOUI. Much more on the Zacharias MOUSSAOUI link at Cao's blog.
4) Hinrichs' roomate, Fazal M. Cheema, was a Pakistani national and neighbors claim the apartment was a center of activity for Middle Easterners. He is described as a 'really nice guy' by his friends. Unfortunately, all terrorists are described this way by their friends. NEIN now reports that Cheema and his associates may have been on the FBI's terror watch list.
5) Hinrichs attempted to buy a large amount of ammonium nitrate, a key ingredient in large explosives such as the first World Trade Center bombings or the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing.
6) Hinrichs was later known to the FBI because of his attempted purchase.
7) Evidence at the scene of the bombing suggests that shrapenel was part of the bomb. This is a strong indication that Hinrichs planned to kill more than himself.
8) Witnesses now report Hinrich may have attempted to enter the OU football game, but that he fled when security attempted to check his backpack
9) Northeast Intelligence Network, who's earlier reports we had dismissed because of that website's long track record of alarmism but who are increasingly looking like they got this one right, claims a source is telling them:
It appears that HINRICHS was part of a larger plan that included members of an Islamic terrorist cell based in and around the Norman and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma area. As a Caucasian, it was much easier for him to obtain the materials needed to create a large bomb, act in concert with members of the local terrorist cell, and strike when relative calm was the word of the day.All of this evidence suggests that there may have been a wider plot by Islamic terrorists to use Joel Henry Hinrichs III as a suicide bomber in exactly the same way as terrorists use suicide bombers around the world: to kill civilians. Hinrichs, like so many other suicide bombers, failed in his attempt and killed only himself.
OK, so let's look at this. Point one might be convincing, if in fact it turns out that Joe was a convert to Islam. But was he? The only sources I've seen that say he was are either unreliable (I think NIN is as surprised as anyone any time they get something right; they're like the American Debka) or refer only to "anonymous sources", which I've learned not to trust. In contrast, named people will go on the record saying Joe was not a member of the mosque. Does anyone have a source that is not anonymous, and that is not NIN or WND or some equally untrustworthy site?
The most ridiculous evidence I keep seeing is the map showing the proximity of the local Islamic Center to Joe's apartment, the blast site, etc. Um, guys, the College Republicans, the office of the local Representative, and a lot of other things (including bars and bookstores) are equally close. That's not only unconvincing; it's blatantly illogical.
Points 2 and 3 are irrelevant if point 1 is unproven.
Point 4 is based on NIN "reporting", which I will not take without corroboration elsewhere (involving named sources).
Points 5 and 6 are essentially the same point (of course you're known to the FBI if you try to buy a large quantity of ammonium nitrate; they're not idiots, and learned to watch that after the OKC bombing), and certainly show that Joe might have intended to build a bomb. Of course, the fact that he killed himself with a homemade bomb showed that already, so I'm not sure how this is evidence of anything that isn't already proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Point 7 might be convincing, but there is no attribution and this is not something I've seen elsewhere. Is it from a reliable site, and a named source, or is it just rumor or third-hand reports?
Point 8 is a secondhand report, which is also known as "rumor", if you want to go back to the topic of naming things. The library security guard may be telling what he knows accurately, but given that he is telling about something he did not witness, it's not reliable testimony of what actually happened at the stadium, nor whether the student mentioned as running from the stadium guards was even male, never mind whether the student was Joe.
Point 9 is more rumors and unnamed sources from NIN.
So it comes to this: my prejudices lead me to believe that Joe was not a kamikaze, and a lot of people's prejudices lead them to conclude that he was. But the "evidence" being bandied about is not very convincing on either side, and perhaps it would be better to remember that no matter what else, Joe has a family and friends who are very badly affected by Joe's death. In the absence of good evidence, isn't it a bit better to wait to pronounce from on high, so as not to unfairly smear a possible innocent and his family? Otherwise, just how are conservatives any better morally, any less conspiracy-addled freaks, than the DU moonbats?
To Rusty's credit, he does at least have a disclaimer: "A word of caution is necessary here. It is definitely possible that Hinrichs did act alone and was just a sad nut with a death wish. Some of the facts presented above could turn out to be untrue, and even if true could be interpreted in a number of ways. We'll just have to wait and see. But, as of this writing I am inclined to believe that Hinrichs was part of a larger plot." I wish others were at least as responsible.
UPDATE: Lewy14 notes in the comments: "I recall reading something last year to the effect that _real_ kamikaze pilots (there were a few who went through the training and survived the war) were indignant at being compared to terrorist suicide bombers. Calling the latter "kamikaze" elevates them to the dignity of soldiers. It effectively claims that their civilian victims are legitimate combatants. Whatever else the Japanese kamikazes were, they were not murderers or terrorists."
I actually considered that. The problem is that our enemy doesn't think like we do, while the Japanese basically did. Our enemy does not have an idea that separates soldiers from civilians; they are tribal. But when a "suicide bomber" attacks a military or government target that we would regard as legitimate, then they are doing exactly what the kamikazes did. The only difference is that our enemy doesn't regard civilians as non-combatants.
UPDATE: Classical Values has great coverage of this story, by the way. I have gone through the last few days of posts, and it's exactly the tone I was trying to hit (except without the emotional involvement I have): skeptical of unsourced claims from any site.
UPDATE: Cathy Young has an interesting post today, 10/18, where she takes apart Michelle Malkin, Powerline, and Jawa Report for basically the same reasons I did. Here is the graf that had me saying, "yep":
Malkin, Powerline, and The Jawa Report claim that the blogs have not made any assertions, merely asked questions. First of all, that's a common, and rather poor, excuse for irresponsible speculation. If a prominent left-wing blog ran an item titled, "Did George W. Bush know in advance about the 9/11 attacks?", I doubt that Malkin & Co. would consider the question mark to be much of an attenuating circumstance.
I do have to say one thing in Powerline's favor: they didn't consistently refer to Joe as "Joel Henry Hinrichs III", as the other blogs did. That full legal name thing just screams "suspect", and I'm happy that not everyone jumped onto it.
UPDATE: Turning off comments, because I'm getting really weird ones now, that are complete junk (just a few words) rather than real comments.
October 1, 2005
Here Endeth the Lesson
Well, not quite. The end of the lesson is when it turns out that the terrorists behind the latest Bali bombings are likely the same ones behind the last Bali bombing; you know, the terrorists the Indonesians let go with a slap on the wrist.
Winning
Strategypage has an important article on winning the Terror Wars. The article points out the number of Islamist/jihadi insurgencies defeated recently, and notes that another jihadi campaign is about to join those earlier defeats:
The war in Iraq and Afghanistan has taken the battle to the heart of those regions that supply the leaders, and foot soldiers, for Islamic terrorism. In Iraq, this revived a civil war that had been flaring up periodically for decades. This time, the Sunni Arab minority were not able to crush the Kurds and Shia Arabs who comprise 80 percent of the population. Aided by Islamic radicals who want to establish a religious dictatorship, the Sunni Arabs have been losing rather visibly. The towns and neighborhoods where the Sunni Arabs could operate openly have been shrinking over the last year. Over the last few months, the number of terror attacks has gone down as well.
Finally, though, and most importantly, the article cuts straight to the heart of why I believe invading and democratizing Iraq was necessary, and why it may be necessary to invade any or all of Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia as well over the next decade or so:
On a wider scale, the Islamic terrorism is a response to tyranny and self-delusion in the Arab world. Islamic terrorists fight the former, and embrace the latter. But both the acceptance of tyranny, and fondness for self-delusion, are still problems in the Moslem, especially the Arab, world. Until those two self-defeating habits are overcome, unrest in the Moslem world will continue. The invasion of Iraq kick started the process, removing the local tyrant, and forcing all Iraqis to confront the delusions that have led them to defeat after defeat over the last half century. The Islamic terrorists can be beaten down in the short term. That’s been done a lot of late. But unless the bad habits are changed, the terrorists will keep coming back. [Emphasis mine - JKM]
It is this argument that the "anti-war" folks tend to avoid, and that the anti-tyranny forces need to make more often and more forcefully in public fora.
Posted by jeff at 2:20 PM | TrackBack
September 28, 2005
FCS and Elementary Logic
Well, I probably should not call it elementary logic, since our elementary schools don't teach it, but...
Defensetech has an article on how the FCS (Future Combat Systems, intended to develop a smaller, lighter, faster-deploying Army force) are getting more expensive and heavier. Lots of cynicism, little common sense. (On the other hand, the planners at the Pentagon seem to have lots of optimism, and little common sense.)
There are two ways to evolve anything, including combat systems: evolutionary and revolutionary. An evolutionary change improves what exists. A revolutionary change starts from scratch to create something new. In military generations, the M-60 was an evolution of the earlier M-48 tank design, and the M-1 was a revolutionary tank design (using a gas turbine engine, blow-out panels over the ammunition storage, layered ceramic armor, advanced fire control, a new track design and lots of other innovations).
The M-1 was part of a wave of modernization that brought a host of revolutionary changes to the Army, including its first real IFV (the Bradley) and a new light utility truck (the HMMWV, or Hummer). This was possible because, while fighting in Viet Nam, we had skipped a generation of procurement. We have not done that since the 1980's upgrade (the Reagan defense build-up) to the Army; we have been procuring steadily and improving upon existing systems. We have not let technology advance to the point that FCS made sense for most systems. The Air Force upgrades (the "smart bombs" and GPS) and the computerization of the Army combat units together constitute a pretty hefty shift in capabilities, but the underlying vehicles the Army is depending on for FCS simply aren't ready for a big jump yet.
Consider: an IFV, like the Bradley, has two key characteristics; it carries troops and it mounts weapons sufficient to give those troops firepower support against anything except a heavy armored force. This requires an IFV to have sufficient armor to stand up to enemy infantry, IFVs and mines (including the IEDs used in Iraq, and earlier Chechnya, to such great effect). It requires sufficient mobility to keep up with tanks. And it requires sufficient space to carry infantry and their supplies. The size necessary for both holding, say, six armed and armored troopers and mounting a turreted weapons system including mid-sized guns and possibly anti-tank missiles, means that only a lightly-armored system can fit into the FCS vehicle weight limit of 19 tons. Or, we can develop an entire new generation of armor that does in 19 tons what now takes 25-30 tons. Since that's not likely in the near future, we either sacrifice armor, or we create two different vehicles (a troop carrier and an assault vehicle mounting infantry support weapons) that both have to be transported to make up an efficient team. Or, final choice, we scrap the weight limit.
But having scrapped the weight limit, there are still two choices: continue to deploy the Army by sea (slow but effective) or build a large number of larger transport aircraft (fast but expensive). It appears that the Army has, pragmatically, taken the sea-deployment approach.
So it's not likely that many of the big FCS systems will see service: we really aren't ready for that kind of leap yet. But it is likely that evolutionary changes will continue, and we will eventually see a big leap that takes ideas from FCS (as M-1 took ideas from MBT-70) wedded to new technology to create a truly revolutionary system.
In the meantime, people should stop getting hysterical about theoretical costs that will never materialize, and the Army should consider buying the Navy a round of drinks and about a dozen fast transports.
September 27, 2005
Dead Men Train no Terrorists
The problem with the theory that the enemy is gaining experience in Iraq and that is why it's bad that we fight there, is that dead men take their experience with them, and lots of high-level enemy have been dying in Iraq lately. And as long as that keeps up, the net experience the enemy gains from Iraq continues to be much lower than our net experience (since our guys tend to survive their tours). Long term, that's not a way for the enemy to win. I give the enemy 12 months or less in Iraq — they appear to me to be on the verge of collapse, with the insurgency nearly non-existent and only the terrorists still fighting — and if they don't win the media war in that time, they are defeated.
September 26, 2005
The Perils of Not Reading History
Mark Safranski of ZenPundit notes a RAND analyst's testimony before Congress on Chinese asymmetrical warfare doctrine. Since I lived in Taiwan for four years, and remember it fondly, I've always taken an interest in the Chinese approach to Taiwan. (This is also an area that, it would be remiss to neglect, Brian J. Dunn covers extensively.)
China's current thinking is somewhat disturbing, in the same sense that watching an approaching trainwreck is somewhat disturbing. It's apparent that the Chinese have neglected some basic history:
If China waits for a militarily superior adversary to commence hostilities, it will be difficult for China to seize the initiative and the adversary will likely have the preponderance of forces as well. If, by contrast, China initiates a conflict before an adversary attacks, China can seize the initiative and may also enjoy an initial advantage in the local balance of forces. Finally, preemption greatly increases the chances of successfully achieving surprise. In the context of a conflict between the United States and China, the value accorded to preemption in Chinese military doctrinal writings suggests that, on the presumption that the United States will inevitability intervene in a conflict with Taiwan, China might initiate hostilities by first attacking U.S. forces in the region, even before it has attacked Taiwan.
Moreover:
At least some Chinese military analysts believe that the United States is sensitive to casualties and economic costs and that the sudden destruction of a significant portion of our forces would result in a severe psychological shock and a loss of will to continue the conflict. [This] suggests a belief that a preemptive surprise attack on U.S. forces in the Pacific theater could cause the United States to avoid further combat with China.
I was going to say something snarky here about remembering the past or being doomed to repeat it, but I'll let Roger Cliff (the RAND analyst) have the say on that:
It does not need to be pointed out to this panel that the last time such a strategy was attempted in the Pacific the ultimate results were not altogether favorable for the country that tried it, but the Chinese military doctrinal writings we examined in this study did not acknowledge the existence of such historical counterexamples.
But that's not the only counterexample. Consider, for example, the attack of 9/11. That attack was compared immediately to the Pearl Harbor attack, both in its destructiveness and in its effect upon the nation. Even in our current cultural daze, with the ex-hippies (and sometimes not so ex-) largely in charge of society, the 9/11 attack was enough to get the United States to overthrow not only the government most responsible for the 9/11 attack, but also another that was strategically convenient. It would be, um, unwise for the Chinese to think that a preemptive attack on the United States would be met with a collapse of American will. Indeed, I can think of nothing China could do that would more enrage the US than, say, sinking a carrier off of Japan; or destroying the airbase at Guam; or using submarines to block the entrances to Pearl Harbor, Yokosuka, and the Panama Canal; or attacking those bases outright to eliminate their logistical and communications utility. China would get less reaction from the US by just attacking Taiwan directly, which is something the US will not stand for. But if China attacked Taiwan directly, we would be likely to stop with throwing back the invasion/attack and bottling up China until it stops fighting. Were China to preemptively attack the Pacific Fleet, I believe that the United States would not stop until the rightful Chinese government was restored to rule over all of its rebellious mainland provinces. Or until the Chinese mainland was a smoking heap of largely-depopulated ash, should China wish to be particularly stupid and destructive.
Yet that appears to be what China is considering:
[A RAND] analysis of Chinese military doctrinal writings identified a number of specific tactics that could affect the ability of the United States to deploy and maintain forces in the Western Pacific in the event of a conflict with China. These tactics include attacks on air bases; aircraft carriers; command, communications, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and facilities; and logistics, transportation, and support facilities.
I really hope that the Chinese strategists read up on the history of American reaction to surprise attacks before attempting such a strategy. China has an old and often beautiful culture, and it would be a shame to have it survive only in American Chinatowns.
Posted by jeff at 12:48 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
September 23, 2005
"Nuance!!! I need nuance!!!"
Brian Dunn notices a contradiction: if driving the terrorists from Afghanistan is bad because they're harder to find, then why is drawing them to Iraq where they are concentrated bad, and vice versa?
September 22, 2005
Breaking Things
Jack Kelly at Irish Pennants thinks it's time for Rumsfeld to go:
Rummy must go chiefly because of his management style. He tends to treat subordinates -- including general officers -- as if they were small children. Some of Rumsfeld's "snowflakes" and dressings down were necessary in the beginning, to shock the military out of complacent old ways. But it is disrespectful.Rumsfeld is smarter than almost anyone he encounters. The problem is he is too well aware of this. He is more interested in giving orders than in listening to advice. In this way he reminds me of Douglas MacArthur, a brilliant general so awed by his own brilliance he accomplished less than more modest generals Marshall and Eisenhower.
Rumsfeld shares another failing with MacArthur. MacArthur preferred a staff of sycophantish mediocrities. To the very limited extent he relies on anyone for advice, Rumsfeld relies on a coterie of intellectuals who military experience is zero, and whose management experience isn't much greater.
Rumsfeld manages from crisis to crisis. Subordinates are to drop what they're doing and respond immediately to whatever is his "snowflake" for the day. This is exhausting, bad for morale, and a poor way to develop long range plans.
Mark Safranski at ZenPundit notes something important about the senior military command structure:
Powell's generation of officers also became exceptionally risk-averse to expeditionary missions that smacked of nation-building or counterinsurgency, preferring to be prepared to fight only " Big wars" against Warsaw Pact opponents. Where the previous generation of general officers had presented a can-do face to presidential requests from JFK and LBJ, the new rising corps of generals and admirals struck the pose of Cassandra, warning of impending doom and searching to find the magic number of troops to request to kill any desire of the White House or Congress to intervene anywhere.[snip]
Beyond the brass where the critical decisions are made by men whose formative experiences on the battlefield were almost two generations earlier are the civilian appointees at the DoD, in the White House and on Congressional staffs. Quick to micromanage but loathe to accept responsibility for the actions of field commanders following instructions from Washington, civilians need to accept their role of providing leadership by making( and standing behind) the tough political decisions, setting broad strategic goals and granting sufficient discretion to carry out the policy objectives.
Finally, most of all, civilian leadership must accept the responsibility when things sometimes go wrong, as they inevitably do in battle, instead of leaving low-ranking soldiers and officers twisting in the wind. Properly directed and supported, given realistic and specific objectives, the U.S. military will move heaven and earth to accomplish their mission.
I think Mark points out why it is that Rumsfeld has been — and continues to be — so important. The generals and staff officers that Franks called, in his autobiography, "Title X Motherfuckers" are the ones who are bitterly opposed to Rumsfeld. It is they who argue and complain when changes come, and determinedly resist any attempts to take a fresh look at the system as it is working now.
And it is that part of the system that Rumsfeld most needs to break apart. It is that part of the system that is fundamentally broken. In the long term, the reorganization of the Army into Brigade Units of Action, with divisions acting like corps used to, is less important than the efforts to change the procurement process so that decisions take less than two years to reach the field. This means, actually, cutting out whole layers and columns of bureaucrats — mostly bureaucrats in uniform — and that means that a lot of long-established ways of doing things need to be swept away. That the reasons for those ways of doing things are no longer applicable is not the kind of thinking that bureaucrats are known for doing well.
So I have to disagree with Jack, and say that Rumsfeld should stay. It's precisely because he is making people uncomfortable and shaking things up that he is so necessary. Rumsfeld would not be a good SecDef in an environment where things are working well. But things are not working well in several parts of the Pentagon that do not directly deal with combat in the field, because they are still stuck in a Cold War and static slogging mentality, and Rumsfeld is doing the right things to fix that.
Understanding Iraq
While Time Magazine asks if we've already lost in Iraq, Bill Roggio shows the intricate series of attacks we are mounting on the enemy in his centers of strength. Note where we are fighting now: not in the South-central part of Iraq, but deep in the terrorist and insurgent rear areas. And note the kind of fighting we are doing: no longer simple sweeps, but targeted strikes on leaders and key infrastructure, combined with clear and hold operations (that is to say, denial of territory to the enemy) in enemy strongholds.
Chester, meanwhile, demonstrates the disconnect between real events and the reporting of the events, and Belmont Club explains the disconnect more succinctly:
The news coverage of Iraq frequently fails to convey the cumulative linkage of military events in that country. Operations are often reported in a disconnected fashion, as if some operations officer got up in the morning and asked 'what are we going to attack today?', and then troops rush out to do whatever just occurred to them. Worse, definite types of military operations on both sides, whether car bombing, cordon and search, precision strike, etc. are often described according to some political theme -- 'standing up for freedom', 'deepening quagmire', 'the body bags mount', 'reduced to high altitude bombing' -- and the reader gets no sense of the logic behind the events. Both the US Armed Forces and the enemy are led by experienced professionals schooled in the operational art; and if we can be sure of nothing else, we can be certain that their acts have a specific military intent which often does not correspond to the themes articulated by some talking heads. Whether one is on the Left or the Right, it should be abundantly clear that we are watching the battle for the Syrian border and for the control of the Euphrates and Tigris river lines. No matter whose side you're on, you should know what game you are in.
I don't understand, really, why it is that the MSM is not learning from its mistakes. They should have realized after Afghanistan that the narrative being conveyed (aggressive and incompetent US bogged down in hopeless mountain war against hardened native defenders) did not match the reality. Instead, they found flaws and imperfections to nitpick. They should have realized after the Iraq invasion was completed that the narrative being conveyed (aggressive and incompetent US bogged down in hopeless desert war against hardened defending troops) did not match the reality. Instead, they found flaws and imperfections to nitpick. They should have realized by now that the battle to defeat the terrorists and Ba'athist remanants in Iraq does not match the narrative (aggressive and incompetent US bogged down in hopeless desert war against hardened insurgents fighting to defend their freedom [to kill the rest of the Iraqis, but that's never stated] aided by heroic foreign fighters [terrorists who slaughter women and children in houses of worship, but that's never stated]) does not match the reality. Instead, they focus on police blotter coverage and disconnected incidents while avoiding any systematic look at the big picture.
Eventually, reality overwhelms narrative, and the media has some huge narrative failures to account for.
September 20, 2005
Why the Optimism?
Anyone believing a word of what North Korea says about anything is, as Scrappleface points out, deluded. So I cannot understand all the congratulations in conservative circles about the agreement signed by the North Koreans, which after all only promises the same things the North Koreans promised in 1994, the breaking of which promises got us into the current situation. Is it just the desire to proclaim a triumph for President Bush, at a time when his domestic political support is perceived to be weak? Bat One, writing at Pennywit, gets it exactly right.
September 13, 2005
Interesting Idea
It seems that the South Koreans are going to dramatically shrink their military, on the theory that North Korea will collapse, and in the time between now and the collapse will be unable to attack the South:
The politicians, and most of the voters, believe it is inevitable that the communist government in North Korea will eventually collapse, and no longer be a threat. The reform plan, which has been in the works for years, will take fifteen years to complete. But by 2020 the army would have six corps instead of 13, twenty divisions instead of 47 and 26 percent fewer troops (500,000 instead of 680,000). The reserves would be reduced even more, from 3 million to 1.5 million. Conscription would not be eliminated, but it would be used less. The army would provide higher pay for the Special Forces (sort of like the U.S. Rangers), to encourage volunteers. Conscripts who wanted to make the army a career, would immediately receive much higher pay once they agreed to stay in, when their conscription service was over. Ultimately, an all-volunteer forces would be preferred.
At first blush, this looks a lot like what the US did in the aftermath of the Cold War (to our later regret, as we now have far fewer troops with which to take on our enemies, leaving us able to handle only one occupation at a time). But there is a significant difference: our main enemy was gone at the end of the Cold War, and North Korea still exists. It's an interesting idea to significantly reduce your forces in the face of a determined and nuclear armed enemy, and it may work, since North Korea is undeniably teetering on the brink of collapse, and their armed forces, though large, are increasingly incapable of normal operations, and increasingly outclassed in training and equipment.
There is one very good thing about this, though: clearly, we don't need to keep our troops in Korea, if the Koreans themselves think that there are too many troops there.
September 11, 2005
9/11
Four years later, Joe Katzman provides a remembrance full of links and thoughts.
September 1, 2005
Self-Destructive Behavior From Hugo Chavez
(But what's new about that, you may well ask.)
Brian Dunn notes some provocative behavior by Venezuela's tin-pot Leftist dictator: provoking the Dutch over their Caribbean islands close to Venezuela. Perhaps Chavez thinks that the Dutch are too weak to respond if he does decide to invade, as Argentina thought (wrongly) about the British.
In actual fact, he right: the Dutch have no expeditionary capability. But they do have a different asset: the Dutch are in fact a part of NATO, and those islands are not just nominal, but actual, Dutch territory, to the extent that the Dutch citizens of islands like Aruba have full representation in the Dutch parliament. One of the interesting parts of the NATO treaty is that an attack on one NATO member is, under Article V, an attack on all NATO members. The US is also a NATO member, with significant expeditionary military capability stationed within a few days of Venezuela. The US also has some grudges of its own against Chavez, who is one of the most destabilizing and anti-democratic leaders in the world, interfering throughout Central and South America with his buddy, Fidel Castro.
If I were Chavez, I'd think very, very carefully before picking on the Dutch.
August 28, 2005
Gates of Fire
Were there any justice in the world, Michael Yon's Gates of Fire would win the Pulitzer Prize. The piece is about a recent combat action in Mosul, where the 1-24th Infantry became involved in close quarters combat. How close? At one point a SGT and a terrorist (who had been recently released from prison after having been captured months ago!) were wrestling on the ground. This is the best combat photojournalism and writing I have seen since pieces published during WWII.
If the rest of the media were reporting the war this well, I would have zero complaints about the reporting of the war. (And I suspect that public support would be much higher, since Michael Yon shows the good we do, along with the bad and the ugly that is done to us.) Sadly, this piece about a related action, or this piece about the same action are both far more representative of most mainstream war reporting, and far more likely to be recognized for journalism awards. In fact that latter piece was a report about Michael Yon's reporting, omitting basically all of the useful information, but at least linking to Yon's blog.
(LT Col Kurilla is recovering in the US.)
August 18, 2005
Spain's French Government
Posted by jeff at 3:31 PM | TrackBackThe de Menezes Killing and Police Responsibility
The Times of London has a timeline of events in the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in late July. This was the case where the victim was being tailed by police as a terror suspect, and was reported as wearing a heavy coat (in summer), vaulting a barrier to enter the Tube station, running from pursuing police onto a train car, and then being hauled to the ground and shot in the head. At the time, I defended the police because, while the shooting was of an innocent, the police had no way of knowing that at the time, and his behavior did not appear innocent. Given the reported circumstances, the police acted correctly.
The key word is "reported". Apparently, those reports were wildly inaccurate. Mr. de Menezes apparently was wearing a light jacket, not a heavy coat. He apparently entered the Tube station normally, and walked casually towards the train. After entering the train, Mr. de Menezes apparently sat down. Police then entered the car and identified themselves, whereupon Mr. de Menezes got up and walked towards them. He was grabbed by an officer and pulled down, and was then killed.
If this sequence of events proves accurate, the event becomes much more troubling. In a case where there are clear signs of threatening intent, or of flight, the police would have been correct in their actions. Their killing of Mr. de Menezes would have been a tragic accident, but an unavoidable one if larger losses from terrorist bombings are to be prevented. But where there are no signs of flight, and the only signs of trouble are a vague match of body type and coloration plus leaving from a building under vague suspicion of housing terrorists, as seems to be the case here, it appears now that the Metropolitan Police acted irresponsibly. I don't have a problem with the shoot to kill policy, where there are strong suspicions that an attack is underway. But where the suspicions are vague and no threatening behavior is evident, the police have a positive obligation to act with caution, even if that means that their own lives are in danger.
If the police expect to be defended when they make a mistake, they need to only make such mistakes when there is clear evidence to guide them. Otherwise, public support for strong action to prevent terrorism will rapidly evaporate, and the police will have a much harder time preventing attacks in future.
As it is, it appears that the officer who shot first might well have committed murder (the officers shooting after that had reason to believe, by the mere fact that shooting was happening) that something untoward was going on that required a rapid intervention. I won't prejudge that - the investigation into the incident is not yet complete - but if that is the case, the police have acted unacceptably and should be accordingly punished. If events are other than the Times has reported them, whomever leaked the timeline has acted unacceptably and should be accordingly punished.
UPDATE: What he said.
August 17, 2005
The Problem of Iran
Wretchard has an interesting post, containing a translation of an Iranian nuclear official's take on their negotiations with the EU. Short form: it bought them time. In other words, just as the center-right has been arguing, Iran is using the negotiations to further their nuclear program, in much the same way that North Korea did. OK, fair enough, but what do we do about it? The Bush administration has utterly failed to prepare the US for a large-scale war, both domestically and (critically) militarily. We simply don't have an army large enough to occupy both Iraq and Iran without breaking the army completely within 2-3 years. And since that's not acceptable - it's not like the terrorists are going to give us a holiday - and since we are running out of time to deal with Iran before they obtain nuclear capability, we are left with quite the conundrum. Wretchard ends with this:
[V]irtually no Western politician can ever use force again to prevent a regime, even one openly dedicated to terrorism, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The subject is verboten because the Left has declared it so.
Not so. We have repeatedly seen that the voices telling us this or that is impossible or cannot be done politically are constant, and appear around every problem. The voices whisper despair, while shouting courage; they whisper failure, while shouting progress. But their only power comes from being listened to. When a politician does not listen to the voices, and George Bush has repeatedly demonstrated his deafness to the counsels of despair and failure, he is free to take action, and is generally supported by the public.
Wretchard's commenter wildmonk said:
[A] preemptive invasion of Iran to deny it nuclear weapons is fraught with great philosophical peril. It can be justified in one and only one way: America would have to overtly arrogate unto itself the right to be the final arbiter of other nations' actions. This would represent an unprecedented seizure of the international agenda and discard any remaining pretenses that we live in the age of Liberal Internationalism. Indeed, our entire postwar order - including the moral authority of the UN - would have to be discarded.
I don't think an invasion is possible, because we would need an army the size of the one we had in 1991 to pull it off while still occupying Iraq. But that does not mean action is impossible. While regime change in Iran is an eventual requirement, it is not an immediate requirement. We could bomb the Iranian nuclear program into oblivion - or near oblivion - despite the buried facilities, and in the process destroy much of Iran's military and shared-purpose infrastructure. The Navy and Air Force could do this with some difficulty and time required - and losses almost certain.
Iran would react, most likely by attacking Arab states (particularly the Gulf states) that support the US with missile bombardment, but this reaction would be dwarfed by the American force that could be applied to Iran. On top of that, Iran is constrained from using its ground forces to attack us overtly in Iraq because that would bring a US invasion (sadly, requiring a complete mobilization of the Guard and Reserves, but we'd do it under those circumstances). So whether we would simply neuter Iran, or whether the regime's opponents would rise up in reaction to the attack and take down the Mullahs, either way we can push the problem down the road, until we have the capacity to solve it permanently.
UPDATES: See also Time Magazine and IMRA. Hat tips for both to Colt at Winds of Change.
August 16, 2005
Victory or Exit
Joe Katzman found a gem: an opinion piece by CPO Jeff Edwards (ret) on exit strategies as opposed to victory. It's so good I could not even quote it without simply including the whole article.
August 13, 2005
Governors and Immigration
OK, here's what I don't get: why are our governors such weenies? They see the problems caused by our Federal government's utter failure to fix our immigration mess, yet they do nothing. The governors are executives. They are military commanders, and have actual armed forces reporting to them, and the authority to mobilize those forces. Why are the governors waiting for Washington?
Looking at the states bordering Mexico, you see the following:
Texas: 36th Infantry Division (of which CPT4ever is a member); Texas State Guard including six brigades (all MP) and an air wing (that currently seems to be strictly ground support for the National Guard's aviation units)
New Mexico: seems to be just about nothing - an MP company and an ADA (anti-aircraft) unit
Arizona: engineering, signals and logistics units; significant air assets including an attack helicopter BN and an attack helicopter RGT; artillery
California: 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), plus an assortment of units, including engineers, signals, intelligence, aviation and logistics units
For Texas and California, there is significant strength on the ground. In addition, each of these states' governors could organize additional militia units at will (within budget constraints, of course). So if the governors see a real problem with immigration, why are they not doing their duty to fix the problem within their areas of responsibility?
August 12, 2005
Two Thousand Tragedies
Stalin famously said that single death is a tragedy, while a million deaths is a statistic. To my mind, there is no more clear and unambiguous measure of how well we are fighting the war than that every story of every death, and every life story of that person, and even the internal family tragedies and political leanings of a few of the dead soldiers' families are known to us. Within a year after Pearl Harbor, US forces were losing so many men that discussion was only possible about statistics, unless it was your relative who died - that had been true for many years, by that point, in Europe and Asia and the western part of the Pacific Rim. We lost more men in three days on Iwo Jima than we have in the last three years fighting this war.
It's a manifestation of two factors that are different now from WWII: the first is that we are so overwhelmingly dominant against any conceivable enemy that our major limitations in combat are not enemy actions, but our own rules designed to keep enemy civilians (and sometimes even enemy soldiers) from getting killed; and the second is that we have chosen not to defeat the enemy per se, but to co-opt the enemy's society away from them. We have chosen to fight a slow war, giving time for representative governance and rule of law to develop, rather than a fast war, leaving behind us only a smoking ruin.
In a way, I'm very glad that we are still able to see our combat dead in tragic terms, rather than as part of a panorama. I'm very glad that it's still possible for Nightline to read off the names of all of the US combat dead in years of fighting in Iraq, that it's still possible to care about Cindy Sheehan's political views, and that it's still possible to know the names of every brave soldier, sailor, airman and marine we have lost. The alternative, while seemingly less painful, is not better.
A Dreadful Magic
Grim at the Fourth Rail has a very perceptive essay on beating insurgencies:
Can we defeat state sponsors of terrorism, if we cannot sustain the long-term, low-level losses of a guerrilla war? If that proves politically impossible for a democracy -- just as the Medieval state could not raise an army large or strong enough to sustain the losses needed to take a castle -- we will find that we are at last in the opposite position. Defense will again be stronger than attack. We will not dare...(That's a fragment from the middle; the whole thing needs to be read to get the full idea set.)...what, precisely?
Why, we will not dare to be drawn into a guerrilla war. And that is what our enemies hope, and it is what many critics of America hope: that America will thereby be restrained, that American power will thereby evaporate.
Yet if it proves that technology is not up to the task, there remains strategy, and grand strategy. We are not so easily defeated. One trick will not do it. There remains, as Clausewitz warned, escalation.
If artillery will not batter down the walls of the castle, burn the countryside until the knights ride out to their doom.
We have another option of that type ourselves. It is fully developed; it has advocates in the Pentagon, particularly among the Air Force. It is called "Network Centric Warfare," and it is built to avoid the problems of Fourth Generation fighting.
It cannot escape the realities of such a war. In the Fourth Generation, lines between military and civilian are blurred even to the point of vanishing. The terrorist hides among the civilian; teh guerrilla can blend so fully that there really is no clear line at all. Consider Yon's bomber's mother, who praises her son to the skies even in the face of American fighters. The bomber is a combatant. The mother is... not? Is she?
If 4G war fails to find a way to win by transformation of such a society, we will not therefore choose to lose all future conflicts. America will not choose to simply yield on every point, to any enemy, regardless of how deadly the consequences or how vital the interest. We will choose to fight according to another strategy: we will attack the problem in another way.
Network centric war seeks to identify the webs that support a system of warfare, and collapse them. Against a traditional army, it destroys their logistics, their communications, it renders them blind and finally starving, and then their fighting capability withers like leaves in a sandstorm. It was used against a conventional military target, to great effect, during the fighting against dug-in Iraqi military units outside of urban centers. The few survivors of the Republican Guard, which suffered casualty levels approaching fifty and seventy-five percent before they even made contact with the Marines, know all too well how terrible this method of war can be.
It can be deployed against terrorists, too. It can apply to 4G conflicts as well as conventional ones.
But the network one seeks to take down, when the battlespace is an entire society, is the whole society.
Either we will raise Arab/Muslim societies into free nations, or we will raze them to the ground. A failure to defeat the terrorists by fighting gently and discriminately, as we now are, does not mean loss, it means fighting fiercely and indiscriminately. It means a return to the urban fighting of WWII: level the city, block by block, and bounce the rubble into dust. Or it means ignoring conventional fighting altogether and simply annihilating every major population center in the Arab/Muslim world. The US will not accept nuclear terrorism, and nuclear terrorism is an inevitable outcome if the terrorists and their state sponsors are not defeated, because we will not surrender to the jihadis, which is the only end they will seemingly accept.
Grim is correct: we either defeat the terrorists now, or we annihilate their entire societies later.
August 11, 2005
Nice IED. Wouldn't Want There to be an ... Accident
Wretchard writes about the IED war/counterwar in Iraq. One thing that really interested me was a new countermeasure he described:
The JIN neutralizer, now being test fielded to Iraq is an interesting application of directed energy weaponry. It works by using lasers to create a momentary pathway through which an electrical charge can travel and sending a literal bolt of lightning along the channel. A link to a Fox News video report on the manufacturer's website shows a vehicle equipped with a strange-looking rod detonating hidden charges at varying distances, some out to quite a ways.The first thing to occur to me after reading the description and watching the video is what a fine preemptive weapon this would be. At some point in the construction of a bomb, and before it is placed, it has to be hooked up to the triggering mechanism. I assume that the LIPC countermeasure wouldn't set off explosives that were not hooked up to a detonator and probably some kind of wire circuit for the triggering mechanism (that is, I assume that the device works by inducing a current in that circuit, as if the triggering mechanism had fired).
But what if we were to mount this on helicopters or surplus M113s, then drive down the street (or fly over) in insurgent-friendly areas, simply pointing it at each building in turn? I suspect that there would be a sudden large increase in "work accidents" until the enemy figured out to not wire the detonators until they were emplaced. Of course, car bombs would be utterly useless anywhere these were around, since you could just point it at each approaching vehicle and see which ones blow up. (That would reduce accidental shootings of civilians as well.) And the enemy would have to take a longer time emplacing IEDs, which increases the chances of being detected.
Sounds like a good idea to me, if it works.
August 9, 2005
Winning the Propaganda War
Rusty Shackleford has some intriguing thoughts on the propaganda war and how to win it.
I would add to his suggestions that actively enlisting Western media and entertainment figures, as we did in WWII, would be a good idea. This means two things: we would have to trust them enough to bring them into the process, so that they know they are not being lied to, and we would have to make it worth their while economically and philosophically.
August 6, 2005
The Greatest Scientific Gamble in History
Zenpundit has posted President Truman's announcement of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, along with a number of links on the 60th anniversary of the event. One of the most interesting things about the Little Boy bomb that destroyed Hiroshima is that it was never tested before it was used: it was considered so simple that testing was redundant. (The Trinity test was of Fat Man, the bomb used to destroy Nagasaki three days later.) Those three weapons, the two bombs used on Japan and the one for the Trinity test, were the entire US stockpile, and it is my understanding that it would have been six months before another weapon was ready to be used. Had Japan not surrendered, Operation Olympic - the invasion of mainland Japan - would have been necessary, and very probably more people would have died than were killed in the two atomic bombings.
August 4, 2005
The Next to Last Way to Win the War
The last, and very final, way to win the war is to simply destroy every Arab/Muslim city with a population greater than a few thousand people, then kill any remaining Arab/Muslim people who are still fighting, if any. Not the way we want to go, and not the way that we are likely to go, unless the terrorists manage to get nuclear or chemical or biological weapons and use them against a Western target.
I was thinking: what would be the next to last way to win? How could we absolutely win, without genocide. It occurs to me that the next most drastic scenario would be to take over all of the oil fields in the Arab/Muslim world, and to expel all non-citizen Muslims from the West into the remaining areas. Then seal all the borders, by land, sea and air, of where the Muslims are confined. This would condemn more than a billion people to poverty, disease and isolation from the rest of the world, but it would be better than genocide (though more time-consuming and more expensive).
But it occurred to me that we Westerners could probably countenance the quick genocide better than the long-term destruction of impoverishment. Odd, that. But true, I think: where would we get the will to sustain something far worse than the sanctions against Iraq, for a far longer time? I just don't think we could do it.
I'm not sure what's third from the worst way to win.
August 2, 2005
The Scope of Jihadi Terrorism
Michael Totten has a memory aid for those who might tend to underestimate the enemy.
August 1, 2005
Of Course You Know, This Means War
Apparently the drug cartels operating out of Mexico have turned to using Mexican deserters (trained as counter-narcotics special forces, ironically) to safeguard their wares in the US. This involves, among other things, placing high prices on the heads of US law enforcement officers, such as, say, my father in law or one of my best friends (CPT4ever is, in addition to being an officer in the National Guard, a law enforcement officer).
Let me be very clear, here: the US is not currently fighting a drug war, despite all of the rhetoric. We are in fact trying to put on the appearance to the public of fighting a drug war, but the resources we are committing to such a struggle are miniscule. Making it take me 30 minutes to buy sudafed (can be used to make meth) pisses me off, but barely impacts the meth makers at all, who can always add a couple of extra steps (like growing their own ephedra) to get around the problem, and enjoy the higher prices. If we want to fight a drug war, we have to go after it much more thoroughly than we are.
And I don't think that we should: drug criminalization is unconstitutional by any reasonable reading of the Constitution (that is to say, not using the reading that activity undertaken entirely in one state and without any value exchange constitutes interstate commerce!), is counterproductive (in that it encourages drug use by making drugs "forbidden" but easy to obtain) and is unnecessary (in the same way that prohibition of alcohol was unnecessary, and for the same reasons).
But - and this is a big but - even though I think that the "drug war" is wrong, that does not mean that I or most Americans would tolerate the drug cartels attempting to undermine our law enforcement. Mexico is essentially a failed state in the southern and northern extremities, and we will not go that way. We have gone to great lengths to help Mexico, but eventually we will help ourselves. If the Mexican government does not take over the border area effectively, it will eventually become necessary for the US to intervene militarily in the area to stop the escalating attacks on American law enforcement personnel (and inevitably, eventually civilians). This might be 5-10 years out, but it is inevitable if the violence keeps escalating and the Mexican government cannot regain control. And the anti-immigration lobby in the US would be right on board with such actions.
So it would be a really, really good idea for the Mexican government to regain sovereignty before there is a second Mexican war.
(hat tip: QandO)
UPDATE: Mark in Mexico is thinking along the same lines.
Critical Success Factors and Terrorism
Dave Schuler asks:
So here's what I propose: let's see if we can come up with the critical success factors for a terrorist attack on the United States. The level of abstraction we're seeking is something between the level that Vanderleun went after (quantities of explosives, maps of the subway, etc.) and the level that the root causes discussions have taken (poverty, human nature, the will of God). We're only looking for real critical success factors—factors that are really necessary.Why bother? If you consider the notion of a critical success factor there are two reasons. First, in order to eliminate the threat of terrorism (or at least substantially reduce the threat), we must interfere with or intercept one or more of the critical success factors. Second, no plan that does not interfere with or intercept one or more of the critical success factors can really succeed.
The first thing that has to be said is that "attack" is a very broad term, especially in the context of 5GW warfare. Attacking a subway is much easier, for example, than flying airliners into office buildings. That said, there are commonalities between the two acts. In either case, the enemy must:
- determine to attack
- plan the attack
- carry out reconnaissance of the targets, both to aid in the planning and to check its feasibility
- train for and practice, to the extent practicable, the attacks
- obtain any necessary materials, such as explosives
- construct any needed devices
- convey themselves to the point of attack
- evade security
- carry out the attack
- have the resources (physical, human and financial) for all of the above
- friendly media exposure to achieve the intended political effect (in general, weakening our will to resist)
There are some things we can do to make this process harder, like better control of explosives or increasing point security, but in the end these are limited. (That doesn't make them not worthwhile; I just mean that there are better things we can do.) The key to disrupting attacks is to look at that next to last point: resources. What a terrorist attack requires in the way of resources is:
- money, and the associated financiers
- leadership
- specialists (like bomb makers)
- willing attackers, recon and other intelligence gatherers, etc. - foot soldiers
- a safe haven
- time
- secrecy
- access to matériel
Money is first because it is the biggest enabler: money allows you to get what you need and keep your people fed and housed. Money is fungible, and therefore hard to track: what goes to an Islamic charity to help Darfur can (and often does) end up instead in the hands of HAMAS or other jihadist organizations, financing terror. Indeed, many terror groups (including HAMAS) directly operate charities for this purpose. (They also do charitable work. The personal is political, indeed.)
Leadership and specialists are critical: they are the core that survives even suicide attacks, learns from them, and creates the next attack plan. As the Israelis learned, killing the terror leaders and the bomb makers dramatically reduces future terrorism, both in amount and quality. We have applied the same lessons in Iraq with much success: the vast majority of attacks on defended targets in Iraq are failures. That's why the terrorists in Iraq go after the civilians, people waiting in line to join the Iraqi military and police, and so on: it's the only place they have a good chance of success. The failures seldom get reported in the Western media, so they don't effect our will to fight; only the successes (from the terrorist point of view) generally get reported.
The foot soldiers are easy to come by - there are always people looking for work or who hate the West, America and/or Israel. The key for the enemy is to get foot soldiers willing to carry out dangerous assignments, up to and including killing themselves in the act of the attack. This requires ideology and motivation, and it is very difficult to do. But it is also very difficult to prevent, and there is a wide enough pool of would-be jihadis that some can be indoctrinated to the proper point necessary for any given attack. It should be noted that the need for people capable of penetrating security and successfully carrying out the attack generally means that you need intelligent, determined, and resourceful people. It should be noted that such traits tend to be helpful in ordinary life as well, and tend to raise one's standard of living. As a result, it's far more likely that attackers will continue to be from the middle and upper classes than from the poor and oppressed that form the vast population of most Arab countries. That also means that capable attackers, where indoctrination succeeds, are more available in the West than in Arab nations (although the indoctrination process is much harder here).
Safe havens can be anything from large training camps in failed states to an apartment in Leeds that the government doesn't know about. A place to plan, train and indoctrinate can be gained physically, through controlling areas of failed states or buying a large place in the country; morally, through psychological intimidation of the target population (us) not to look at who the attackers are or what they are doing (hence all the work of CAIR, etc); by corruption, bribing officials to look the other way (see the Beslan attack for a good example); or by deception, simply remaining invisible in the vast population of innocents that resemble the attackers. Each of these methods can and should be attacked, but it is very hard for a free country to do so, because of the moral component: we don't want to limit our own rights, nor to infringe the liberties of innocents, in order to get to the attackers. "I have rights", yelled the London bomber as he was pulled from his safe haven.
Time is an interesting resource. It, like money, can be fungible. You can spend your time doing recon, planning, constructing bombs or what have you. You could also spend it going to the movies or having a picnic by the lake. But time is fleeting for terrorists, because the longer their OODA cycle, the more likely that they will be discovered and interdicted. So it is necessary for the terrorists to act quickly, at least for what needs to be done in the target country. From the moment that the attack switches from indoctrination of the foot soldiers to active planning, the cell is in danger: in that period, if they are discovered they will not be released (while they would be if they were just out on the corner preaching hatred, for example, or just in their homes being quite, quite religious). The attacks are easier to disrupt than to carry out, because anything that raises a threat to the cell or to the possible success of the attack needs to be avoided. Simply raising the terror threat level on a target can deter the attack, if the attackers feel that this jeopardizes the operation.
Secrecy is useful to extend the time the cell has to operate, to help in obtaining safe havens in the target area, and so forth. If secrecy is breached, not only is the attack thwarted, but the entire cell is often destroyed by our security forces.
Access to matériel is obvious, but not always simple. Explosives have to be made from commonly available ingredients, or they have to be purchased. A car that cannot be tracked back to the cell is preferable, but not necessarily easy to obtain. And so on. Again, we can make this more difficult, but the reality is that all that we are doing thereby is lengthening the time that the cell is exposed for. This is generally a positive good in itself, but it's probably not possible to completely take away enemy access to what they need to carry out an attack.
It should be noted that these are all tactical considerations, really: what does it take to carry out an attack. It doesn't address the strategic issue.
UPDATE: fixed link on The Glittering Eye, as technical difficulties have intervened.
Posted by jeff at 8:46 AM | Comments (2) | TrackBackJuly 25, 2005
Denial - It's not Just a River in Egypt
Marc at American Future excerpts a Guardian commentary by Osama Saeed, spokesman of the Muslim Association of Britain. The core of Mr. Saeed's argument is that fighting terrorism is Britain is Tony Blair's job, not the job of the Muslim community.
The position of Muslim organisations and mosques has been consistent for years. Killing civilians is murder, and a crime in Islam. We have consistently said that Muslims must help the police to track down those responsible.This is why I've found it strange that many Muslim leaders have offered to look deep within our community now. It's a tacit admission of negligence that I simply do not accept. The prime minister has of course welcomed this attitude. Indeed he has led from the front, ratcheting up the rhetoric against Muslims, laying the responsibility solely on us. "In the end, this can only be taken on and defeated by the community itself," he said last week.
[snip]
By putting the onus on Muslims to defeat terror, the prime minister absolves himself of responsibility. Muslims are not in denial of our duties, but who are we meant to be combating? The security services had no idea about all that has gone on in London, so how are we as ordinary citizens to do better?
[snip]
Unfortunately, a handful of individuals have eschewed this to carry out the attacks in London. You can regard these acts as part of Islam, or as an irrational reaction to injustice taking place in the world. If it's the former you have to explain why this started only 12 years ago and not 1,400. To us it is evident that it is the latter, so we're batting the ball back in your court, Mr Blair.
The commentary is full of denial, finger pointing, tu quoque and so forth. It's not so much an apologia (though there's some of that) but a complete and utter deflection of blame away from Islam and Muslims. And that's OK, in one sense: Saeed is correct that it is in part Tony Blair's job to fight terrorism in Britain. It is also every Briton's job, because every person in a society - at least a free society - has a stake in defending that society.
Now, Saeed may simply be saying that Blair's responsibility is greater, as the society's elected leader, than that of any particular subject of the Crown. That's fine. The alternative, of course, is that Saeed is saying that Muslims are not inherently British nationals, even if they've acquired the status in a legal sense, and therefore not bound to defend the society.
But Saeed should be careful what he wishes for, because there are three options open to the British government: surrender, accommodation of the terrorists, and elimination of the terrorists. But given that the jihadis' goal is elimination of the society, there is a certain point at which accommodation is simply no longer possible, and only surrender or fighting are possible. Assuming that the government does not go very far in accommodation of terrorists before fighting, a safe assumption in Blair's case, then the only two real alternatives are surrender or fighting.
Britain is not going to surrender: there'll always be an England. But how will the British government fight against terrorists hiding in Britain's Muslim community? Most likely, the British will make a determined effort to tackle the problem as criminal, by finding and arresting known jihadis and their enablers. But that will always be a reactive strategy, because it is always possible to hide some, not all, small cells, particularly if the local Muslim population is sheltering those cells. This implies that attacks will continue as long as the treatment of the attacks is as reactive law enforcement.
It's possible, of course, that the jihadis could run out of agents in Britain. But that is unlikely: Marc has an analysis of a survey of Muslims in Britain that suggests that as many as 100,000 of them at least tacitly support the attacks. If even 1% of these tacit supporters - 0.25% of Muslims in Britain - are willing to actively aid or carry out attacks, that still leaves 1000 potential terrorists. Given an average of 4 attackers and, say, 10 supporters (bomb makers, safe house operators, financiers, etc) per attack, and a death/capture rate of, say, 8 terrorists per attack, somewhere around 125 attacks could be made before the jihadis exhausted their pool, and that assumes no one coming in from outside or being recruited given the inevitably greater interference from police. At an average of 20 Britons killed per attack, that's some 2500 dead Britons over a period of a few years. And those are all pretty conservative numbers: odds are you could multiply those final numbers by a factor of 5, given the results in Iraq and Israel, and be nearer the mark.
But treating the attacks as law enforcement is not a stable state with casualty rates like that: no free government can stay in office with its subjects being regularly killed. And the pattern of jihadi activity everywhere it's taken hold is to grow for a while, making statements that are ignored; then to begin small attacks; then to escalate those attacks. At some point, British tolerance with attacks will be surpassed; then what?
Then, it becomes a military fight, and the British will go after not just those who have committed or attempted or helped commit attacks, but those who are likely to commit or attempt attacks. At that point, a very easy method to justify is deportation of the population thought to be most risky. That would be an early step: the English have a backbone of steel, and an immense national pride, and will do anything necessary to defend England, when it comes right down to it. And the community that will be affected by those actions is Mr. Saeed's community, the one he says bears no responsibility to help. (If he's lucky, it will be the British government coming after him: the Brits after all invented football hooliganism, and I would take the British young men over the Muslim community, if it came to a fight.)
Well, I suppose it's up to Britain's Muslims: responsibility now or suffering later.
One paragraph in the article deserves to be fisked point by point:
Mr Blair has attacked the idea of the caliphate - the equivalent of criticising the Pope.
You know, if people were killing innocent civilians in the name of the Pope, I'd be criticizing them pretty strongly. The caliphate is an idea, though, not a person: people are killing to bring about the caliphate. A more reasonable comparison would be terrorists trying to turn Britain into a Catholic nation. Ask the IRA how that went.
He has also remained silent in the face of a rightwing smear campaign against such eminent scholars as Sheikh al-Qaradawi - a man who has worked hard to reconcile Islam with modern democracy.
You mean this guy? Yeah, he's a moderate all right, working to reconcile us to acceptance of unequal rights for women (including ritual female genital mutilation), the establishment of a theocracy, and the killing of homosexuals. He's against democracy, and thinks that terrorism is just fine, as long as it's against non-Islamic states. Big moderate, yeah. Now why would PM Blair defend such a person? Why would any person who loves freedom and self-determination defend such a person? Why do you, Mr. Saeed, defend him?
Such actions and omissions fuel the suspicion that we are witnessing a war on Islam itself.
No, but it's certainly the case that there's a danger of that. If, for example, organizations like the Muslim Association of Britain keep telling us to trust that Islam is a peaceful religion, so Muslims of course wouldn't attack innocent civilians, and so we should ignore the evidence of our lying eyes, there will come a point where this will become a war against Islam. And at that point, I would not give Islam a snowball's chance in Hell: have you read anything about how the West fights when it feels its survival is at stake? Or, heck, when it just thinks it would be nice to live in Oklahoma (ask the American aboriginals about that one).
If there is any thought that Muslims are fine but their religion can take a hike then Mr Blair should know that we will never be in the corner, in the spotlight, losing our religion.
If Islam does not reform, and work actively to eliminate the terrorists who kill in the name of its god, then it is only a question of time until Islam is destroyed. Your call, Mr. Saeed, no matter what you think. If you and your fellow "moderates" are unwilling to accommodate us, to worry about our street opinion, to control your worst elements, then it is a matter of time before we will do what is necessary.
I'm sure that some future Prime Minister would issue an appropriate apology.
UPDATE: And via Mark in Mexico, read this editorial from Youssef Ibrahim. That is what we need to here from Saeed and his ilk.
July 23, 2005
The Mechanics of Madness
Well, Representative Tancredo has certainly set off quite the firestorm, by suggesting that it would be a good idea to bomb Mecca and Medina in the case of a nuclear, biological or chemical attack on the US. Those commenting notably include: Rusty Shackleford, Baldilocks, Zenpundit, riting on the wall, Francis Porretto, The Glittering Eye, Donald Sensing, Hugh Hewitt, and James Lileks. Good: it's a debate we need to have now, rather than in the immediate aftermath of our response to a nuclear, biological or chemical attack on the United States.
My take on it starts with my moral center: "Do what thou wilt, an harm none." This is the Wiccan Rede, the center of Wiccan morality. Essentially, what it means is that it is your right to do what you will, so long as you, in the process, cause the least harm. (Thermodynamics makes pretty clear that entropy increases, so doing no harm is simply not possible; the idea instead is to balance and minimize the harm done.)
So from this we take away a few questions about when it is possible or even necessary to take another's life. And this requires that we put values on lives. (Note: not a value on life, because all life is most definitely not equally valuable.) It is clear that the life of an innocent outweighs the life of a murderer: the murderer is actively causing harm, and so his life has a lower value than one who is not actively causing harm. It is clear that the life of a person advancing human happiness outweighs the life of a person advancing human misery. So, say, Jerry Springer's life would be valued above that of Osama bin Laden, and below that of Hernando de Soto. But such calculations are not easily made clear when the lives being worked with number in the millions: we have to simplify.
If the United States is attacked with nuclear weapons, or to a lesser extent chemical or biological weapons, the deaths and grievous injuries will be legion. Taking revenge by obliterating Mecca and Medina, or Tehran and Damascus, or anywhere else would be morally vile: murder does not pay for murder. The question has to be on how to minimize the number of deaths and injuries, and that puts the question in a very different light, because it brings up a very serious question: are the jihadis deterrable?
If they are, then threatening to obliterate Mecca and Medina in such a case, provided we were to follow through on it, would be useful. The same goes with threatening to obliterate Tehran and Damascus. If such a threat, credibly issued, prevents a nuclear attack on the United States, it is useful. However, the problem is that once a nuclear attack is initiated on the United States, we must then follow up with the nuclear attacks we pledged as collateral, or we invite further attacks. The enemy will not back down when faced with an empty threat, only a credible threat will be meaningful.
But this assumes the enemy to be deterrable. If the jihadis cannot be deterred, then even a massive response will be meaningless in preventing future attacks (unless we happen to hit all of the enemy's supply of nuclear material). If the enemy cannot be deterred, the only way to prevent the deaths of millions (assuming the enemy gets nuclear weapons) is to kill or capture the enemy first. The problem is that this is very difficult: the enemy hides easily in the midst of non-combatant Muslims (a better formulation than "moderate" Muslims, since many of the Muslims sheltering the terrorists are anything but moderate), and separating out the immediately dangerous jihadis from the less dangerous collaborators and the not at all dangerous Muslims is terribly, terribly difficult.
Any response, any strategy, has to take into account how to minimize both the number of people the enemy kills or injures, and the number of innocents we kill or injure in attempting to prevent the enemy from acting. Multiple approaches will be needed, and multiple approaches are being taken, to prevent a nuclear attack from occurring in the first place. But what if they fail?
Well, if the American people perceive the enemy as deterrable, we will likely engage in measured escalation, isolating radical Muslims (hope to catch all the jihadis in the process), overthrowing jihadi-friendly governments (Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc), ignoring the sovereignty of countries like Pakistan that are unable to deal with the jihadis in their midst, and so on. A strong President could make a case for something less than genocide, even in response to a nuclear attack on America, and make it stick.
But a weak President, or a public perception that the enemy cannot be deterred and so will strike repeatedly, means a three conjectures world, and that inevitably means genocide.
Me? I hope the enemy is deterrable, or that we are lucky enough and good enough to keep the enemy from acquiring nuclear weapons. Because if we are not, the results will be appalling.
UPDATE: Francis Porretto said it better, of course:
As your Curmudgeon has already written, the secret to deterrence is discovering what the enemy values more than the damage he plans to inflict upon you, and holding that hostage to his good behavior. It's chancy, prone to miscalculation of several sorts. More, when "the enemy" is not a decision-making monolith, there's always the possibility that your threat will deter some but not all -- and that the undeterred segment will act against you despite all your disincentives. But these observations fall far short of proof that Islamic terrorists cannot be deterred, particularly since history says the opposite.
Posted by jeff at 1:59 PM | Comments (4) | TrackBack
July 18, 2005
The Enemy's Strategic Problem
The enemy has a very serious problem strategically: they attacked too late, and they picked the wrong form of attack. From the beginnings of widespread access to network television to the mid-1990s, when talk radio became powerful enough to get disputes with the mainstream media into people's heads, opinion was by and large shaped by about a dozen people at two newspapers and three television networks. It is common perception that the news networks drove (and largely still do) their coverage based on what the New York Times was covering. There was no effective alternate voice, and since these dozen or so über-editors were from similar backgrounds, there was basically one narrative in American opinion.
The talk radio shows, Fox News Channel, and later the blogs have changed that: there is once more a competing set of narratives in the US, as it was when we depended upon newspapers and magazines for our news. This onset of choice has led to, gasp, a better-informed public (scary though that can be) and a fragmentation of opinion. This has, in turn, led to a reduced ability to scare the US (and to a lesser extent, Europe) into a stampede, which in turn has made us stronger.
The reason we are stronger for this is that our military is unbeatable in any practical exercise. Even the Chinese admit they would lose a conventional war with us, which is why they recently declared their willingness to use nuclear first strikes to prevent US intervention in any Chinese attempt to take Taiwan. The only way to beat the US is for the US to give up from lack of will. And compelling the American will now requires more than stampeding the dozen or so mandarins that used to push the rest of us along. There is still an American herd, but it is increasingly smaller than the American pack.
So into this comes the enemy, attempting to shape our will. Why? Because the enemy's intermediate goal is a caliphate - a theocracy claiming authority over all Muslims - in the entire Middle East. To get that caliphate, local governments have to be overthrown or co-opted. To overthrow the local governments, the West must not have troops in the Middle East, nor the will to use force to support local governments (particularly Israel, which is not subject to the slow process of jihadi conversion, nor to being driven out, and so must be destroyed in place). And since the only forces with any decisive and intransitive power were the Soviet Union and the US, those two had to be driven out.
The Soviets broke on a combination of Afghanistan and poor leadership (Brezhnev took two years to die after he became incapable of rule, and his two successors served short and uninspired terms). The Soviet will broke, and soon thereafter the USSR literally disintegrated. It should be noted that the Soviets were unable to win militarily, but they were not beaten militarily, either: the Soviets only committed about 90-100,000 troops to Afghanistan at any one time, a small fraction of their force. (And appallingly, some 484000 of the 642000 or so Soviet troops that served in Afghanistan were casualties, mostly to diseases like typhoid and hepatitis!)
That leaves the US, which is similarly unbeatable militarily, and due to the increasing fragmentation of opinion, unlikely to be scared into submission. There were (and remain) two means of altering US will to support the regimes in the Middle East: direct attack and co-option.
The enemy could try to break our will to support the regimes - pretty much all some flavor of appalling totalitarianism - through attacking us in the Middle East and elsewhere abroad and, eventually, at home. The idea was that by terrorizing the population, we would force the government to withdraw into a shell and leave them alone. An attempt to co-opt, on the other hand, would look like South Africa or India: resistance that is, or can be portrayed as, the non-violent struggle of people for equality and decent treatment.
It's an interesting question whether a strategy of co-opting our will could have worked: as it is, a shockingly large percentage of the Western Left is ready to be co-opted even in the face of massive violence against the West and anyone in the Middle East seen as "not Muslim enough". It's telling that the Left is not scared away from arguing the jihadis' case by attacks - real, physical, brutal killings - of women and homosexuals and children, shutting down schools by bombing them, and so on, sacred objects of the Left at home. Given that, and a prominent realist strain in US policy, it's possible that a co-opting strategy could have driven the US out of the Middle East utterly. The sticking point would have been Iraq, but I can think of a few ways that could have been worked around, including by enlisting the US to help jihadis overthow Saddam Hussein, as the mujahideen overthrew the Soviets in Afghanistan.
But the enemy was impatient, or felt it had a better chance with violent attack, or maybe just didn't understand the power of ANC appeals in the West. Whatever the reason, the enemy chose violent attacks. And that presents them with a paradox: since the Western will is, by and large, stronger than it used to be (particularly in the US), attacks more often strengthen Western will than weaken it (London, 9/11, Bali, as opposed to Madrid). So to break the West's will, it is necessary to attack targets more and more sensitive or innocent. I believe that Beslan presages attacks in the West, and it would surprise me not at all to see hospitals, day care centers and so on attacked with suicide bombers. The point is, to break our will, the enemy has to get our attention. Short of nuclear or chemical weapons (and the resulting genocide of the Arabs), this means more spectacular attacks. But those attacks, as I noted, are actually driving people away from the enemy.
It's probably too late for the enemy to switch to a full-on attempt to co-opt our will: who would believe them who is not already effectively arguing for surrender? But the enemy cannot continue to attack us without eventually building our will to a point that, if the Western governments do not crack down brutally on Muslims in the West, the mobs will. That is not a best-case scenario for us, but it's pretty much a worst-case scenario for the innocent Muslims among us.
I'm sure some President would apologize for our behavior, in a couple of decades.
But the enemy cannot retreat, either, because an obvious systemic defeat (as opposed to defeats in specific campaigns, like Afghanistan or Iraq) would undermine the central tenet of the jihadis: God sent them. And if their god didn't send them, or won't help them, then who would follow them?
So the enemy has only one real option: ratchet up the violence in the West. And they have to do it before we pull the rug out from under them by co-opting to democracy or imposing democracy by force of arms. And they have to create a sufficient level of fear and panic to cause us to run, but not a sufficient level of fear and panic to cause us to rise up and destroy them in the West, along with the innocents they hide among.
Our options are not great, but I wouldn't trade strategic situations with the enemy: their options are dismal.
July 15, 2005
...and That's a Good Thing!
Our enemies are complete wimps. Cowards we knew - who else would strike primarily at unarmed civilians? Bastards we knew - who else would slaughter children? But wimps? That is new.
It's pathetic, really.
Taiwan
QandO (especially see the comments), The Glittering Eye, and ZenPundit are all discussing the recent statements of Chinese General Zhu regarding Chinese strategic posture towards the US over Taiwan:
“If the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition on to the target zone on China's territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons,” said General Zhu Chenghu.Gen Zhu was speaking at a function for foreign journalists organised, in part, by the Chinese government. He added that China's definition of its territory included warships and aircraft.
“If the Americans are determined to interfere [then] we will be determined to respond,” said Gen Zhu, who is also a professor at China's National Defence University.
“We . . . will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all of the cities east of Xian. Of course the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds . . . of cities will be destroyed by the Chinese.”
Having lived in Taiwan for 4 years, it is a particular interest of mine. (I do not claim particular expertise, merely interest.) General Zhu's comments, clearly, are primarily a statement to the US of how seriously China takes the Taiwan issue, since China seems to perceive the US as supportive of Taiwanese independence, at least as long as President Bush is in office; and to Taiwan that China is prepared to sacrifice greatly to prevent Taiwanese independence. It is, in other words, part of China's deterrent effort to ensure that the situation remains static.
Brian Dunn is convinced that China will attack Taiwan on the eve of the 2008 Olympics, while the world is not willing to upset the Olympics over the issue. I am not. It has been the position of the American defense establishment - more particularly, the position of the title X guys - since the end of the Cold War that China was the next emerging threat. In large part, this is "fighting the last war", particularly now that the war we are in is against 4GW threats like al Qaeda.
China would put up with a lot, even economic collapse, to take Taiwan if it felt it could. And China probably could take Taiwan with its current amphibious, army and air capabilities (though at great cost). But the US could retake Taiwan - even prevent the attack from succeeding with enough forewarning.
Put simply: the US has sufficient conventional capability to beat China in China's backyard in a major war, and China knows it; hence, China has to have some way of credibly threatening the US in order to maintain the status quo, and thus this threat.
But "China" in this case is the government, not the people. China has, recently, been really opening up internal markets, and private property and private enterprise are growing rapidly in importance - it's one of the reasons China is even a contender. And the Chinese entrepreneurial classes would simply not stand for the inevitable result of war: blockade. The US would shut off all sea routes into China, and the land routes out are sufficiently poor and through sufficiently hostile territory that China's economy, which depends upon exports, would collapse in short order. The Chinese government maintains its rule by the people's belief that the government has the mandate of Heaven, and that belief would collapse with the economy.
In other words, even without a direct US counterattack to retake Taiwan, or just to punish China, our naval blockade would force the Chinese government out of power in short order, to everyone's benefit except the CCP.
I see this warning as deterrence, not a serious threat.
UPDATE: Brian Dunn weighs in.
The Shortest Path to Heaven
When you hear someone say that suicide attacks have nothing to do with religion, that terrorism has nothing to do with Islam, it would be well to remember that some who attempt suicide bombings fail and survive the attack. Here is one who was interviewed:
"How did you feel when you heard that you'd been selected for martyrdom?" I asked."It's as if a very high, impenetrable wall separated you from Paradise or Hell," he said. "Allah has promised one or the other to his creatures. So, by pressing the detonator, you can immediately open the door to Paradise — it is the shortest path to Heaven."
[snip]
I asked S to describe his preparations for the suicide mission. "We were in a constant state of worship," he said. "We told each other that if the Israelis only knew how joyful we were they would whip us to death! Those were the happiest days of my life."
"What is the attraction of martyrdom?" I asked.
"The power of the spirit pulls us upward, while the power of material things pulls us downward," he said. "Someone bent on martyrdom becomes immune to the material pull. Our planner asked, 'What if the operation fails?' We told him, 'In any case, we get to meet the Prophet and his companions, inshallah.'
"We were floating, swimming, in the feeling that we were about to enter eternity. We had no doubts. We made an oath on the Koran, in the presence of Allah — a pledge not to waver. This jihad pledge is called bayt al-ridwan, after the garden in Paradise that is reserved for the prophets and the martyrs. I know that there are other ways to do jihad. But this one is sweet -- the sweetest. All martyrdom operations, if done for Allah's sake, hurt less than a gnat’s bite!"
[snip]
None of the suicide bombers -- they ranged in age from 18 to 38 -- conformed to the typical profile of the suicidal personality. None of them was uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed. Many were middle-class and held paying jobs. Two were the sons of millionaires. They all seemed entirely normal members of their families. They were polite and serious, and in their communities were considered to be model youths. Most were bearded. All were deeply religious.
I was told that to be accepted for a suicide mission the volunteers had to be convinced of the religious legitimacy of the acts they were contemplating, as sanctioned by the divinely revealed religion of Islam. Many of these young men had memorised large sections of the Koran and were well versed in the finer points of Islamic law and practice. But their knowledge of Christianity was rooted in the medieval crusades, and they regarded Judaism and Zionism as synonymous.
Nope. Nothing at all to do with Islam.
Posted by jeff at 2:55 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Let's Play a Game
Democrat or French?
The insurgency cannot be overcome easily by either United States military forces or immature Iraqi security forces. Nor would the situation be eased even if, improbably, the United Nations, NATO, our European allies and Japan choose to become seriously involved.
In other words, no victory is possible over this unbeatable enemy; we must surrender. The quote is from John Deutch, Undersecretary of Defense and Directory of Central Intelligence in the Clinton administration.
I got this from Rusty Shackleford, and this gist of his post is that al Qaeda fights the way it does because it's worked for them in the past:
Terrorism, as a tactic, is chosen because terrorists believe those tactics will work.Goal: U.S. Marines out of Beirut.
Tactic: Suicide car-bombing.
Result: U.S. Marines out of Beirut.
Lesson learned: Terrorism works.[snip]
Why would they think they can defeat us in Iraq using geurilla warfare?
Goal: Soviet military out of Afghanistan/imposition of Islamic law.
Tactic: Guerilla warfare.
Result: Soviet military out of Afghanistan/imposition of Islamic law.
Lesson learned: Geurilla warfare works against super-powers.But Afghanistan was not the only place where this lesson was learned.
Goal: U.S. military out of Somalia.
Tactic: Guerilla warfare.
Result: U.S. military out of Somalia.
Lesson learned: Geurilla warfare works against super-powers.So, what will happen if we pull-out of Iraq? Can our long-term national interests be met using this tactic?
Goal: U.S. military out of Iraq/imposition of Islamic law.
Tactic: Guerilla warfare.
Result: U.S. military out of Iraq/civil war possibly leading to Islamic law.
Lesson learned: Geurilla warfare works against super-powers.If we truly wish to win the second war in Iraq, we cannot abandon her to our enemies. If we do then the lesson they will learn is that the U.S. can be beaten. And if the U.S. is beaten in Iraq, then the U.S. can be beaten elsewhere.
That is a lesson we cannot afford our enemies to learn.
Posted by jeff at 2:08 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
July 14, 2005
An Insightful Point from QandO
QandO makes a fantastic comparison of London to Oklahoma City.
July 13, 2005
The Fire Brigade and the Fire
A suicide bomber today in Iraq detonated his car bomb in the midst of children who had come to talk and get candy from US soldiers. The media are shocked. Apparently, this is only because they do not want to remember that this has happened before. This is not a time for neutrality between the fire brigade and the fire; this is a time to name our enemy, to call them out for what they are. The difference in this war is that the Japanese and German soldiers were by and large innocent; it was their political leadership and a particular few soldiers that were responsible for the inhuman parts of their behavior. In contrast, our enemy today are monsters.
For a normal person not to realize that is problematic but understandable; a large number of people in the US can't even name the Vice President. But for the media to not understand this is inexcusable: it is willful blindness, or taking the side of the enemy. It cannot be claimed to be ignorance.
UPDATE: Joe Katzman is thinking along similar lines.
Ending Jihadi Terrorism
Background has begun to come out on the terrorists who committed the 7/7 London attack. Wretchard, of course, is all over it, with his usual insightful analysis. Wizbang, Danny Carlton, Captain's Quarters, and My Pet Jawa all have more. There's one aspect of this story that I haven't seen much addressed, though: the tradeoff between freedom and safety.
If you wanted maximum safety, to make sure that no suicide bombings were ever carried out by domestic terrorists, you would have to be able to do a few things: identify the terrorists before they could commit a terrorist act; ensure that you didn't miss any terrorists; take the identified "proto-terrorists" out of circulation before they committed a terrorist act; vigorously follow up any terrorist act netting anyone who was likely involved. This is a non-trivial set of tasks.
To begin, how do you identify the potential terrorists? If you look at the known information on the London terrorists, and the 9/11 terrorists, and the numerous other terrorists that have operated outside of predominantly-Muslim countries, you find that they are by and large middle-class, educated, not particularly rigidly observant, young Muslim men, entranced by the ideology of particularly rigidly observant and intolerant old Muslim men. There happen to be a large fraction of the immigrants to Western nations (particularly Europe) who are middle-class, educated, not particularly rigidly observant young Muslim men who are not entranced by the ideology of particularly rigidly observant and intolerant old Muslim men. So how do you separate out people whose only distinguishing characteristic is what they believe and whom they follow?
Cast the net too narrowly, and terrorist attacks will be carried out by native or immigrant terrorists living freely in society. Cast the net too broadly, and you sweep up a great number of innocents along with the guilty - a much greater number, in fact, than of the would-be guilty, let alone the actually guilty. But in order to distinguish the would-be terrorists, you would have to be terribly, terribly invasive of your citizens' rights: shadowing them as they attend religious events, planting agents in domestic religous places to observe the worshippers, secretly invading their homes to search for evidence while they weren't there (lest you accidentally arrest a not-guilty person). This would not be tolerated by the public at large, and for good reason. And even were it tolerated, you would still miss some.
So you have to cast the net more broadly, to avoid being overly invasive or missing potential terrorists. But this means that you will, as noted above, be netting more innocents than terrorists. After a very few incidents of this come out, casting the net broadly is right out, and for very good reasons.
But let's say that you somehow managed to figure out a way to get more or less all of the proto-terrorists without getting so many non-proto-terrorists that the backlash ended all of your efforts. How, then, do you keep these men out of circulation? You cannot charge them with crimes they have not committed, nor (particularly if they are citizens) can you hold them without charge. And if they are citizens, you cannot expel them. Would the courts revoke a person's citizenship on suspicion that they might, at some point, commit terrorist acts domestically? I certainly hope not! Because if they did, we'd already be at the point of no longer being a free society.
I suppose you could wait until you could catch the terrorists red-handed, but that runs into a problem as well: you will often be too late to catch them. Look at the furor over the ill-named PATRIOT Act, which does little to prevent terrorism, but does make it easier to investigate terror attacks and round up the cell mates who weren't killed or captured in the attack: this mild measure allowing for some domestic surveillance has raised intense (and often ill-informed) anger. Would any system actually capable of detecting preparations of a terror attack be allowed at all? And if so, could you catch every terrorist after they had incriminated themselves enough to be convicted in court, but before they had carried out their attack? Not likely.
So it's inevitable that even the most vigorous possible attempts to detect terrorists and prevent terrorism will fail, and some terror attacks will be committed by native or immigrant terrorists. At least you can clean up afterwards. Big help to the victims and their families, but maybe you can prevent future attacks. I suppose, but the problem there is that you still have to convict the conspirators, and that has proven remarkably difficult. Terrorism is designed to fit into the holes in our system: it frequently leaves too little evidence to overcome reasonable doubts, particularly amongst the planners and agitators, as opposed to the attackers and bomb makers.
And I haven't yet covered the "useful idiots" of the terrorists, who do everything possible to help the terrorists win, for noble or (mostly) ignoble reasons, including simply that the wrong political party is in power. (And there are enough buchananites that it's likely a Democrat administration would face the same kind of opposition.)
So in the end, it is simply impossible to prevent domestic terrorism. How, then, we deal with terrorism? There are a few options: surrender, retreat and accomodation, engagement and accomodation, and genocide. Which we choose depends on the enemy's goals and his means, as well as our will.
The enemy's strategy and goals are clear enough: the jihadis intend to establish a unified theocratic Muslim state (Caliphate) in all Muslim majority countries, then all Muslim minority countries, then all countries. His means are currently limited to small arms, infantry weapons and crude artillery (mortars and rockets), improvised bombs and suicide attacks. The enemy can move more or less freely in democratic countries, and fundraising is only somewhat impaired, due to the Western unwillingness to see Islamic charities for what they are. Similarly, conversion is unimpaired, due to Western unwillingness to interfere in religions or to target jihadi ideologues, planners and sponsors who are also religious figures. State sponsorship is somewhat available at present, but at the point that the enemy gains control of a Sunni state (as opposed to Shia Iran, which distrusts the Sunni jihadis who are after all always preaching that the Shia are apostate, though they allow the Shia are probably not infidels as such), the enemy's means will expand exponentially. The jihadis already seek chemical, biological and nuclear weapons; once they have a state under their control, they will almost certainly get those weapons in short order.
Given those characteristics, surrender is unthinkable. Surrender would mean converting to Sunni Islam, and adopting its most stringent tribal or philosophical forms (Wahabbi or Pushtun or Silafist); overthrowing our entire cultural and religious heritages; adopting strict Shari'a law (including such fun characteristics as stoning adulterers and homosexuals, treating women as chattel, accepting total theocratic regulation of every aspect of life and beheading those who don't go along with all of this); ending most representational art, music and non-religious literature; giving up on science because it might discover things that contradict the Koran (I've seen one Saudi science teacher explain that oxygen and hydrogen come together to make water if god wills it!); and totally submitting to the most reactionary, extremist, and illiberal ideology extant in the world today.
But surrender is not only unthinkable: it will not bring peace. Ignoring the casual violence of the Muslim world, such as killing your daughter for dishonoring the family by getting raped by her uncle, there is still the problem that even the most extremist Islam - the jihadi sects - is not unified. There are differences between the different groups, as there are differences between Sunni and Shi'a. And if there's one thing that the jihadis don't do, it's tolerate differences. Even after we surrender, those differences would lead to the kind of blood feuds and raiding that is common in tribal Muslim societies. Give a bit of credit to the Communist pan-Arabists: they did at least dampen these tendencies in countries where they took hold, though it was at the cost of, well, becoming Iraq and Libya and Syria and Egypt and the Arab areas of Palestine as we know them today.
If even surrender will not bring security, what about retreat and accomodation? This is what people are recommending we do when they say that we should pull our troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan, stop supporting Israel, stop supporting Arab dictatorships and the like. This amounts to geographically-defined surrender: we will give up on all Muslim-majority countries, and let the locals fight it out, while we deal with the spillover attacks in Western countries (whether London-scale or 9/11 scale or really anything short of nuclear attacks - and maybe even then for people like George Galloway). The problem with this is that it's how we got here: we tried in the 1980s and 1990s to take a very even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; we defeated the Serbs who were killing Bosnian and Albanian Muslims; we tried to help the starving in Ethiopia (really Eritrea) and Somalia; we stopped the Israelis from completing their conquest of the PLO in Lebanon; we kept Saddam Hussein from holding Kuwait. All of these led to more and more brutal attacks, which we promptly ignored. Which led us to 9/11, when we finally decided that was enough. There is no evidence that retreating now will do anything other than embolden the jihadis to attack us even more strongly in the future.
Worse than that, it is very likely that a policy of retreat would lead to genocide as the Israelis defended themselves in a world where all their neighbors were once again literally gunning for them and where they had no assurance at all of outside support.
So we come to the position of the Coalition: engagement and accomodation. The idea here is to overthrow the governments most supportive of terrorism, replacing them with representative governments. Since the jihadis are, so we are continually assured, a "small minority" of Islam, that should theoretically lead to countries that are basically free and considerably more prosperous. And basically free and prosperous countries don't tend to be very hospitable to creating jihadis, theoretically. In other words, provide an alternative means of political expression to jihadi ideology, and combine this with productive ways to use time, and over time the threat will diminish radically. In the meantime, we accept that there will be some terrorist attacks on us in our home countries, that we will deal with as best we can.
This strategy has some obvious problems, the most important of which is that there is evidence, most recently in London and Madrid, but also from California and elsewhere in the US, that Muslims can be radicalized and converted to jihadis even in prosperous, free nations like England, Spain and the US. Still, if we can remove the possibility of the jihadis gaining control of a state, and can end support from existing states (particularly Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia and potentially Pakistan, China and N. Korea), we may be able to reduce the enemy to the point that law enforcement methods, keeping pressure on finances, and denying lawless territory to the enemy would be sufficient to reduce attacks to a level where we could accomodate them, as we did with Leftist terrorism in the 1970s.
If this fails, though, eventually we are once again led down the road to genocide, ours or theirs. If we won't surrender, and they won't stop, and we cannot reduce the attacks to the point where they don't threaten our existence as free and prosperous societies, it is virtually inevitable that genocide will occur. And given the imbalance of power, which itself is the reason that a stalemate will never happen as long as the West is threatened, the likelihood is on the side of the Arabs/Muslims being the targets of the genocide. Short of surrender or us being the targets of genocide, that's the worst outcome I can imagine.
All of this is why I deeply, sincerely hope that the President's strategy is correct, and that we can stay with the strategy long enough for it to have determinative effect. The alternatives range from aweful to unthinkable to unconscionable.
July 10, 2005
Pretty
This is such a beautiful picture of the Eurofighter Typhoon that I had to steal it from Strategy Page.
What's in a Name?
So it seems that news organizations have a problem figuring out what to call the forces fighting against the US and Iraqi governments in Iraq, as well as against the government of Israel in Israel. The media frequently calls these loathsome individuals insurgents (generally correct for the Ba'athist remnant in Iraq, but not for the other forces fighting us there) or militants, and sometimes even activists (I kid you not). It seems that, at least for US and British media, the choice would be simple: the enemy.
Nah, I suppose it's not "nuanced" or "balanced" enough. But then, that's why it's so easy to slip into thinking that the media is on the other side.
What to Do
Dan Darling has an article at Winds of Change that summarizes, among other things, what to do to win the war on terror. The summary he presents of how to win the Terror Wars is from Gunaratna's Inside Al-Qaeda:
- Military and non-military responses to al-Qaeda on a region and issue-specific basis, with military responses providing the necessary security and political conditions to facilitate far reaching socio-economic, welfare, and political programs that will have a lasting impact.
- The destruction of al-Qaeda and allied infrastructure, denying them rear bases, killing their leaders, exhausting their supplies, and disrupting their recruitment.
- Ending Pakistani covert and overt military, political, and diplomatic support to the Kashmiri jihadis while mediating to provide diplomatic solution to the Kashmir issue.
- Strangling terrorist financing, tightening control over the manufacturing and supply of weapons, exchanging personnel and expertise with allies, and building common terrorist databases in the Third World.
- Developing new vaccines, medicines, and diagnostic tests, enhancing medical communication and disease surveillance capabilities, and improving controls on the storage and transfer of pathogens and their equipment so as to address the threat of a catastrophic terrorist attack.
- Enhancing the protection of nuclear facilities while monitoring rogue suspected scientists and technicians.
- Killing Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Mullah Mohammed Omar in order to diffuse the momentum of the terrorist campaign [to which we can probably add Zarqawi].
- Relying on black ops operations to assassinate terrorist leaders and ideologues.
- Recruiting intelligence agents and agent-handlers within Muslim immigrant communities and sharing existing intelligence with the wider decision and policy-making community.
- Engaging al-Qaeda as an organization militarily while working non-militarily to erode its active and potential supporters by discrediting its ideology through broader action in areas where international neglect has legitimized the use of violence among many Muslims.
- Replacing unilateralism with multilateralism wherever possible and developing far-reaching policies designed to grapple with protracted conflicts and contentious issues currently fueling anti-Western sentiments by answering the real and perceived grievances of many Muslims and frustrating the current wave of open and clandestine support for al-Qaeda.
- The Islamic world as a whole must answer whether al-Qaeda and its actions are Koranic or heretical and credible Muslim communities and religious leaders must stand up and denounce bin Laden and his acolytes as power-hungry murderers rather than men of God.
- Muslim rulers and regimes must compete with Islamism and Wahhabi NGOs, building schools and community centers that both impart a modern education and instill humane, non-sectarian values.
The international community should prioritize reform Islamic education, fostering an independent media, and establishing criminal justice and prison systems that truly reflect the rule of law rather than the whims of the current ruler.
- Terrorism as a tactic must be rejected and a societal norm built against its deployment similar to that which now exist to varying degrees against slavery, colonialism, fascism, Nazism, sexism, and racism irrespective of the legitimacy of the struggle.
The thing that strikes me about this list is how much of it is being done, and how much of it is not. By and large, the things that are not getting done are those that are traditionally the province of intellectuals and NGOs, that is, the Leftist establishment. The Left wonders why so many question (or in my case deny) their patriotism, and it is this: their patriotism seems too often contingent on who wields power domestically. They were all patriotic when a Democrat was in office, but seditious the moment a Republican was in office.
It's ironic, really, because the very things that would allow voters to take the Democrats seriously are the ones that their far-Left colleagues are denying them: actively participating in the Terror Wars on our side.
July 8, 2005
Conclusions
Frances Porretto has two posts, one quoting John Derbyshire on what kind of attitude it will take to win the Terror Wars, and another discussing why it is necessary to win the war fast - even if brutally - rather than drag it out to a more-destructive conclusion.
Our enemy, the jihadis, has goals (including our death or enslavement), on which he is unwilling to compromise and which are utterly unacceptable to most Americans, Britons, Australians, Israelis, Indians, Japanese and frankly most everybody else if it comes down to it. Our enemy craves death, and glories in slaughter of the innocent. Our enemy has a vast area and large population in which he can hide and from which he is not generally distinguishable when he chooses to hide, and that population is, even when not actually sympathetic to the enemy's goals or methods, generally willing to conceal and materially support the enemy. Our enemy can move freely within our own societies, with very little inconvenience or chance of detection, because a part of the enemy's concealing population lives in our societies, and we are unwilling to tolerate the massive police powers necessary to find and eliminate the enemy in our own territory. Because of our unwillingness to slaughter innocents, and our unwillingness to kill those preaching the ideology of jihadism, our enemy can replenish his numbers indefinitely (though replenishing those numbers with trained and effective cadres is somewhat difficult for him).
In addition, the existence of supportive states gives the enemy shelter, sustenance, transportation, armament, training and funds. Furthermore, the technology required to develop nuclear weapons is such that a growing number of states are capable or becoming capable of doing so, including a few who also fall into the category of harboring and supporting the enemy. This axis of evil, though the term is much derided rhetorically, includes N. Korea and Iran most prominently, and also includes Syria and Saudi Arabia (though they do not appear to be developing nuclear weapons at present), and is a quite real threat. It is not inconceivable that an enemy cell could obtain from one of these states a nuclear weapon, nor is it unlikely that the enemy would use such a weapon (most likely in Israel, somewhat likely in the United States, and not inconceivably in Europe) once having obtained it. As time goes on, the probability of our enemy obtaining nuclear arms grows to an almost certainty, though this might take decades.
As time goes on, too, and casualties mount - particularly as enemy attacks continue to target our countries directly, and the casualties are civilian - the American character is such that we will become less and less tolerant of those who might be the enemy, and more willing to kill innocents amongst whom the enemy is sheltering. The enemy likely doubts this. The French, having never seriously warred with us, likely doubt this. The Japanese, the British and the Americans have no questions at all on this score. After all, we are a country that fought a four year civil war - in which something like 20% of the military-age men were killed - over a matter of principle: whether or not all men were truly created equal, as we claimed in our Declaration of Independence. Our capacity to wage war - even unmobilized - is unequalled and indeed unprecedented; our ferocity in war, once inevitably committed, is virtually unlimited; and our ability to adapt to changing circumstances as needed to defeat any threat has been repeatedly proven. We only get out of a conflict if we force the enemy to surrender unconditionally, destroy the enemy, or where we went in as good samaritans. This is a subtlety the enemy (and many of our own people) miss: the only exception to this rule was Vietnam, where our interests, but not our existence, was at stake, and our leaders were uniquely incompetent. In Somalia and Beirut, we simply went in to do a good deed, but we weren't willing to die to feed the hungry or protect the endangered.
Certainly, any provocation along the lines of, say, detonating a nuclear weapon in an American or allied city, would result in a nearly-instantaneous and nearly-complete genocide of Muslim countries not absolutely on our side.
The most threatened country in the Terror Wars is not America, but Israel. Israel has the most competent armed forces in the world, excepting only our own and possibly Britain's; is fighting on home ground; is fighting for its very survival; and has a literally living memory of the Holocaust. For the Israelis, "never again" is not just a slogan. Israel is also a nuclear power, in range of all of the terror-supporting Muslim states.
Given all of these facts, there are only a few possible conclusions to the Terror Wars: the enemy will give up, either through an ideological transformation or because a democratizing populace stops providing them with concealment and support; the enemy's supporting states will all be overthrown or will democratize, depriving the enemy of sufficient resources to continue an effective campaign, and will recede to nuisance level attacks; the enemy will attempt to destroy us, and will instead be destroyed; the enemy will attempt to destroy Israel, or will appear to seriously threaten Israel's existence, and will be destroyed. The remaining alternatives, involving the enemy defeating us, simply will not happen. While it is possible that we would attempt, in the short run, to walk away from the fight, our enemy will not stop at that, and will eventually attack again in our territory, which will put us right back to the options we have now. And utterly destroying us is beyond the enemy's capacity.
In short, the options over the long term boil down to two: the enemy is defeated or gives up; or the enemy and his supporting population is slaughtered en masse.
As Fran said, "Winning this war quickly will save a greater number of innocent lives in the long run, even if the methods used seem brutal and callous."
UPDATE: Dave Schuler of the excellent Glittering Eye has expanded his comments with a discussion of the various positions staked out in the blogosphere - and for that matter in society in general - vis a vis the Terror Wars. It's well worth reading.
I'd like to make two additional points. The first is that while the mainstream Lefty blogs tend to positions 3 (Denial), 4 (Fortress America) and 5 (Focus on the Real WoT), their commenters tend to have a large number of proponents of position 2 (anti-American/anti-Western) and 3, and somewhat less of 4 and 5 (although those arguments often show up in point scoring comments).
Similarly, mainstream Rightest and Libertarian blogs tend to position 6 (Neocon), but the Rightest blogs that allow comments, such as Little Green Footballs, tend to have a significant section of their comments in position 8 (Kill 'em all).
In other words, the commenters tend to be more extreme than the bloggers themselves. The reason LGF sometimes gets called a hate site tends to be more because of the comments than because of Charles Johnson's posts per se.
The second point is that while I certainly support position 7 (faster, please), I don't think that fighting a more vigorous war on terror-supporting states is itself sufficient for meeting our long-term objective of ending jihadism. In fact, I'd say that doing so requires a stronger neocon position (rebuild the conquered states as democracies) than simply trying to democratize the states requires. The reason for this is that the pure neocon position allows a lot of changes to be made in place, essentially fixing the societies as best we can from where they are now; the faster, please position requires first breaking some societies that are already dysfunctional, so that the rebuilt societies will be stronger. But because there's more breakage to start the rebuilding with, the rebuilding effort is harder and more expensive.
Not All the Way
Michael Totten has an interesting column where he posits that the US will withdraw completely from Iraq while there is still fighting:
So we aren't going to stay and finish off the terrorists and insurgents. Iraqis will do it. That means that whenever we stop fighting and leave...people in Iraq will still be firing at us.Withdrawing under fire emboldens our enemies. It gives them a tremendous propaganda victory. "The Americans can be beaten," they'll say, just as they said the same thing when we withdrew under fire from Lebanon in the 80s and Somalia in the 90s. "We sapped their will to fight. They ran just like the Soviets did in Afghanistan...and look at what happened to them." The US will be called a cowardly "paper tiger" and all the rest of it.
This would be, as Rumsfeld himself likes to put it, not helpful.
Totten goes on to explain that this would not actually be an eventual victory, though, for the enemy:
The propaganda victory for both the Sunni Arab insurgents and the terrorists from outside the country could turn into a pyrrhic one. There is such a thing, after all, as a tactical retreat. It could work to our advantage if we don't do it prematurely, if the Iraqi government really is strong enough to mop this up on its own.[snip]
We may be able to pull a similar and more effective coup of sorts inside Iraq even if we leave under fire -- if, that is, Iraqis really can finish the job on their own. (Otherwise a retreat would clear the way for a catastrophic world-historical victory for the most vicious gangs of terrorists on the planet.) Those who still want to fight -- the Sunni rejectionists and the foreign Islamists -- will be emboldened, no doubt. But the number of people who want to fight in the first place will drop, and it may drop precipitously.
I think that Michael is incorrect, somewhat. In particular, I do not think that the US will completely withdraw while the active fighting is still going on; we learned from Viet Nam. Instead, I suspect that we will begin (maybe as early as 2006) drawing down our forces until only about 35000 or 40000 remain, in perhaps two bases. This will provide a credible presence to deter Iran and Syria from full-scale intervention (as well as providing a convenient launch pad for later operations in the region, which Iraq will, as Kuwait has done since 1991, likely facilitate).
But with our forces essentially in their bases and training areas, working with Iraqi forces in training but not in the field except in emergencies, the feeling of US presence as an occupation will be gone, and the Iraqis will know that they have to be self-reliant in their own defense. It may then be several years before the terrorists are beaten, though I'm coming to the conclusion that the insurgency (that is, the Ba'athist remnants) is indeed in its last year of effective existence.
I do think we'll tone down our forces in Iraq, but I don't think that either President Bush or Secretary Rumsfeld was trying to imply that we would draw down to zero there. It's more likely that we would draw down to zero in Germany or Korea, than that we would do so where we have troops stationed in the midst of our enemies.
In the Beginning...
Wizbang asks when the War on Terror began, and gives some suggestions. Some of the suggestions, though, and others made in the comments, are way off track, because they fail to distinguish between the beginning of an event and the precursors of an event, and tend to see named events as distinct from the history within which they occur. Let's take WWII as an example: when did it start?
WWII started in 1941, when the US declared war on Japan and Germany within a few days. Prior to that point, what would come to be known as WWII was actually several different wars: the Japanese wars in SE Asia, which led to the Pearl Harbor attack (the Philippines were in Japan's way, and if we took up with the Australians, as we showed signs of doing, Japan's southwards expansion would fail unless the Philippines were reduced and the US Navy kept in the eastern Pacific); the German war in Europe, beginning with the invasion of Poland, which later subsumed the Russian wars in Europe, including the joint campaign with Germany in Poland and the attacks on Finland; the Italian war in N. Africa (beginning with the attack on Ethiopia). It was when the US joined into the major wars already ongoing that it became WWII in any real sense. Without US involvement in the Pacific, we would likely today talk about WWII (meaning the war in Europe) and the largely-forgotten (by the US, anyway) Sino-Japanese War. WWII didn't start with the Treaty of Versailles, the Beer Hall Putsch or the failure of the League of Nations to oppose Italy in Africa; those were all precursors.
I prefer to call the War on Terror the Terror Wars. There are a series of wars and almost-wars going on around the world, that all tie together because one side in each of them is the jihadis attempting to restore the Caliphate and put first the Arab world, then the Muslim world, then the rest of the world under its rule. These separate conflicts include:
- The terror campaigns against Israel that began after 1967's Six Day War and continue to this day, and subsume the war in Lebanon in the 1980s and the two Intafadehs.
- The wars in Chechnya, lately spreading into the whole region, that began with the breakup of the USSR.
- The Muslim insurrections in the Philippines and Indonesia and other areas of SE Asia.
- The cold war between Iran and the US since 1979.
- The invasions of Islamists throughout northern Africa, including Somalia, the Sudan and others.
- The Muslim insurrection in Kashmir.
- The Algerian civil war.
- The GWOT as Americans usually define it, beginning with the attacks of 9/11 and including the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The point is, there are a lot of different wars going on that are tied into the Terror Wars, because of US involvement after 9/11. Without that, there would be a series of disconnected (to our eyes) events: Chechnya has nothing to do with Israel, right? Well, no, it's not right: there is an enemy that has started a series of wars on its borders, and those wars are becoming tied together because of US involvement in all of them.
And the start of the wars won't be truly determinable until the wars are much further along, because we don't yet know what will happen to change our perception of today when we look back on it. Israel may get tied much more closely into the Terror Wars more broadly (for example, the US and Israel could theoretically jointly invade Lebanon (going after Hizb'allah) and Syria). Russia might realize that Chechnya is not isolated, and might tie into the US campaigns in the Middle East. India could invade Pakistan to root out jihadi training camps. Iran could become actively belligerent against the US, attacking our shipping in the Persian Gulf. And so on.
If you have to pick a date now, the logical date to my mind would be 9/11, because that's what tied all of these disparate wars together, and defined the enemy.
July 7, 2005
Condolences
My condolences to our British cousins on this terrible day.
Rule Britannia
When Britain first at Heaven's command,
Arose from out the azure main,
This was the charter, the charter of the land,
And guardian Angels sung this strain,
Chorus
Rule, Britannia, Britannia rule the waves,
Britons never will be slaves!
The Nations (not so blest as thee)
Must in their turns to Tyrants fall,
While thou shalt flourish great and free,
The dread and envy of them all.
Chorus
Still more majestick shalt thou rise,
More dreadful from each foreign stroke;
As the loud blast that tears the skies,
Serves but to root thy native oak.
Chorus
Thee, haughty Tyrants ne'er shall tame:
All their attempts to bend thee down,
Will but arouze thy gen'rous flame,
But work their woe, and thy renown.
Chorus
To thee belongs the rural reign,
Thy cities shall with commerce shine;
All thine shall be the subject Main,
And ev'ry shore it circles thine.
Chorus
The Muses still with Freedom found,
Shall to thy happy coasts repair; Blest Isle!
With matchless beauty crown'd,
And manly hearts to guide the Fair.
Chorus
UPDATE: Steph, who has more of a connection to London itself than do I, has thoughts.
July 6, 2005
Treason - the Real Kind of Treason
Apparently, five Americans have been captured in Iraq over the last few months, possibly insurgents or terrorists. These people are Americans, and deserve to be brought to America and tried in our civilian courts or courts martial (depending on the bill of particulars). If guilty of treason, that is, fighting against America, then they deserve to be killed.
It seems to me that we are going too soft in this war. It's one thing for John Walker Lindh, who went to fight with the Taliban against other Muslims and ended up fighting against the US when we invaded; there's a case to be made there that there was not treasonous intent. On the other hand, if you are in Iraq fighting against Americans now, there can be no doubt of treasonous intent. Nor in the two known fragging cases.
If a person is guilty of treason, as Hassan Aqbar most certainly is, and these guys may be, upon conviction they should simply be killed.
July 5, 2005
Is Zarqawi Getting Desperate?
Maybe there's something to those "last throes" after all.
The reputed leader of al-Qaida in Iraq said the Iraqi army is as great an enemy as the Americans and announced the formation of a new terror command to fight Iraq's biggest Shiite militia, in an audiotape found Wednesday on the Internet.
The comments, purportedly from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, appeared aimed at discouraging armed Iraqi groups from entering talks with the Iraqi government. The tape challenged critics who maintain that fighting U.S. troops is legitimate, but who oppose attacks on Iraqi forces.
"Some say that the resistance is divided into two groups — an honorable resistance that fights the nonbeliever-occupier and a dishonorable resistance that fights Iraqis," the speaker said. "We announce that the Iraqi army is an army of apostates and mercenaries that has allied itself with the Crusaders and came to destroy Islam and fight Muslims. We will fight it."
Let's see, a terrorist from Jordan looks to win support from Iraqis by advocating the killing of Iraqis. Doesn't seem like the best way to gain support for the cause to me.
The fact that Zarqawi has the need to issue this statement shows that he is facing criticism about the killing of Iraqi soldiers. It appears many insurgents consider it dishonorable. It would seem that a number of Iraqis, while having no love for the U.S., may be tiring of killing their fellow countrymen and may be considering entering the political process. Heck, he even acknowledges the resistance is divided!
Surely many insurgents must be noting that their current strategy is not working. America is not leaving any time soon. The move toward democracy is continuing pretty much unabated. They are losing this war. If they want any power, any say in Iraq's future, their only recourse may be through politics.
Zarqawi doesn't care about that; he's a cold-blooded killer, plain and simple. He is waging jihad against the Great Satan and the Zionists. But I would bet many insurgents care far more about their place in society than killing for killing's sake. They didn't want to give up their stranglehold on power, and that's why they have been fighting. But their days as Iraq's overlords, the favored of Saddam, are over and they aren't coming back. Better something than nothing, which is what they are faced with. The longer they remain separate from the political process, the more leverage they lose in any future Iraqi democracy.
The speaker tacitly acknowledged pressure to abandon the struggle against the Americans and their Iraqi allies, saying he was "saddened and burdened" by people "advising me not to persist in fighting in Iraq."
Well, what more can you say about this? If this is Zarqawi, this is stunning! There is no clearer evidence that the insurgency is losing steam and victory is close at hand. He's losing support.
He also said the Americans began speaking of negotiations to end the conflict after al-Qaida had "humiliated" U.S. forces on the battlefield.
Sure doesn't seem that he really believes that by the tenor of his comments. Wishful thinking, propaganda, and it sounds utterly unconvincing, even to the insurgents I bet.
Folks, Dick Cheney may very well have been right!
Posted by Brian at 10:30 PM | TrackBackJuly 2, 2005
A Friendly Reminder
There are four dominant strains of thought in American foreign policy. The Jeffersonians, at best warning against hubris and focusing on making ourselves better as an example to others, at worst the Michael Moore school of fiddling while Rome burns and self-loathing (isolationists); the Hamiltonians, who would as soon buy the loyalty of the world as anything, and don't really have guiding principles beyond a rigid adherence to our interests of the moment (realists); the Wilsonians, who believe in bringing representative self-governance and economic prosperity to the world by evangelizing American philosophy (Truman Democrats); and the Jacksonians, who act like Jeffersonians and Wilsonians as much as possible, but will are the vengeance of the Old Testament God made manifest when we're attacked (the neocons). The President is a mix of Wilsonian and Jacksonian, as are, I think, most Americans.
Now, the Jeffersonians are loud but powerless, and we're not going to disengage from the Middle East no longer how loud they whine. The Hamiltonians just want to preserve the flow of oil, and don't care about much else. The Wilsonians are giving a try in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere to convert the Arab nations to benign, self-governing, representative liberal democracies. The Jacksonians are quiescent, waiting to see how Afghanistan and Iraq shape up as long as we seem safe at home.
So with that as background, I'd like to make a couple of points to the jihadis, and to those Muslims unwilling or unable to stand up to the jihadis. The selection by the Iranian mullahs of a terrorist, murderer and kidnapper as president makes this particular Jacksonian pretty nervous, particularly combined with Iran's push to develop nuclear weapons. The pyramids and Karnak are pretty in pictures, but I've never been there. The oil is useful, and we'll do our best to preserve it no matter what happens, because we need it.
Outside of that, the Muslim world offers nothing to the rest of us, and if every Arab/Muslim between Algeria and Pakistan were to die in a day, we'd be shocked and appalled for a few weeks, then go on with our lives as if we never existed. Hence this warning: you live at our sufferance, and die at our will. That will will be galvanized, and almost instantly acted on, if there is ever another 9/11-scale attack on the US mainland, or a nuclear or chemical attack on American or European or other first world countries, or a series of suicide bombings in the US.
Think before you act, jihadis and apologists. America is benevolent, but not infinitely so.
July 1, 2005
The Legacy of Colonialism in Iraq
Dan Darling has a three-part summary/review of Anthony Cordesman's analysis of the Iraqi insurgency. Part I, Part II, Part III
Cordesman's analysis is a must-read for understanding the Iraqi insurgency and how events in Iraq might play out. Cordesman, as is typical and necessary in this kind of review, is very harsh on the mistakes made - and Bush critics will love it for that - while also being fair in recognizing the things done right. This kind of analysis is critical to correcting problems, and it's a shame that it will most likely be used as a simple rhetorical club for bashing the Bush administration. That would in fact be not just shameful, but tragic, because it's likely that we'll have other occupations and reconstructions to work through in the years ahead, and this document contributes to the body of knowledge necessary to make fewer mistakes the next time.
UDPATE (7/5): Dan has posted part four of his review of Cordesman's paper.
UPDATE (7/6): and part 5
Posted by jeff at 9:29 AM | TrackBackJune 30, 2005
And the US is Deaf on Foreign Policy?
So what are the odds that having the new president of Iran being one of the lead hostage takers at the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 will be good for American-Iranian relations? RandomPrecise, targeted bombing has moved up on my list of ways to deal with Iran, personally.
The Duty of the Living
Tigerhawk has a letter from a surgeon in Balad, Iraq, that must be read:
The first rule of war is that young men and women die. The second rule of war is that surgeons cannot change the first rule. I think the third rule of war should be that those who have given their all for our freedom are never forgotten, and they are always honored.I wish there was not a war, and I wish our young people did not have to fight and die. But I cannot wish away evil men like Bin Laden and al-Zarqawi. These men are not wayward children who have gone astray; they are not great men who are simply misunderstood.
These are cold-blooded killers and they will kill you, me, and everyone we love and hold dear if we do not kill them first. You cannot reason with these people, you cannot negotiate with these people, and this war will not be over until they are dead. That is the ugly, awful, and brutal truth.
I wish the situation was different, but it is not. Americans have two choices. They can run from the threat, deny it exists, candy-coat it, debate it, and hope it goes away. And then, Americans will be fair game around the world and slaughtered by the thousands for the sheep they have become.
Our second choice is to crush these evil men where they live and for us to have the political will and courage to finish what we came over here to do.
It is the duty of the living to make meaningful the sacrifices of the dead.
Posted by jeff at 9:17 AM | TrackBack
June 29, 2005
Baby Steps
Captain Ed points to a NY Times article with some very good news about Iraq:
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani [] outlined a proposal that would scrap the system used in the January election....Under the proposal, voters in national elections would select leaders from each of the 19 provinces instead of choosing from a single country-wide list, as they did in January. The new system would essentially set aside a number of seats for Sunnis roughly proportionate to their numbers in the population, ensuring that no matter how low the Sunni turnout, they would be guaranteed seats.
This is an excellent development, for a couple of reasons. The most important thing that this would do is to ensure that the central government could not simply weld its power base to one faction, and use that to dominate the rest of the country. Almost as important, it means that those who would boycott elections would diminish their influence with the politicians elected in their area, meaning that the insurgents and Ba'athist holdouts would not have the propaganda weapon of having no one really represent the Sunni, and at the same time would have little or no influence with the Sunni elected officials. Since the Ayatollah Sistani is the most powerful religious figure among the Iraqi Shi'a Muslim majority in Iraq, his proposal carries great weight, and is very likely to be adopted in some form.
This is a good sign that Iraq is moving to a Federal system of some sort, which is the only type of democratic governance yet shown to be capable of running a democratic country without trampling the rights of minorities into the dust. Perhaps some day, we'll move back in that direction ourselves.
On an unrelated note, though apparently not to the Times, why is it that there can be no story with any good news about Iraq that does not also include every bit of bad news that can be dredged up?
The violence has cut deeply into Iraqi society, with about 1,200 Iraqis and more than 75 American soldiers killed in the past two months. The attacks have taken on increasingly sectarian overtones, raising fears that Iraq could be headed toward civil war.At least 10 Iraqis were killed and more than 36 wounded in attacks across Iraq in the past 24 hours.
A car bomb exploded late Sunday outside a barbershop in the New Baghdad district of the capital, killing the shop owner, a customer and a 4-year-old boy, an Interior Ministry official said. Barbershops have been singled out by Islamic attackers because they offer Western-style shaves and haircuts. On Monday, at least 4 Iraqis were killed and 29 wounded when a car bomb exploded outside a restaurant in the same neighborhood.
Also on Monday, two American soldiers were killed when their Apache helicopter crashed about 11 a.m. near Taiji, a large air base northwest of Baghdad, said Master Sgt. Greg Kaufman, a military spokesman. It was the third loss of an American helicopter in about a month.
The military did not say what caused the crash. The Associated Press quoted an Iraqi witness as saying a rocket had hit it, and other witnesses heard heavy gunfire. Sergeant Kaufman could not confirm any of the details.
OK, certainly it's news about Iraq, but it is unrelated (or only incredibly tenuously related) to the lede of the story. It's as if stories about Chicago were written like this:
The City of Chicago let a new contract to firm X to polish the giant new mirrored bean in Millennium Park.The Mayor, in speaking about the new contract, did not mention the murder of two homeless men on the South side of Chicago, the ongoing trucking scandal, police corruption, or the seemingly invincible hold on power by the Daley family which, our lawyers advise us, is completely and totally unrelated to any corruption you may or may not have heard about.
I mean, it's silly. Why is it that only in events where some good news might be afoot in the war - or in some other thing where the good news might benefit non-progressive Americans - that all sorts of unrelated bad news must be featured in every single story about the event? Second off-topic bit: did the decline of journalism begin when journalists stopped writing reports and began writing stories?
Because of the tendency of mainstream media articles to disappear, here is the entire text of the article:
BAGHDAD, Iraq, June 27 - Iraq's most powerful Shiite cleric appeared to offer a major concession to the Sunni Arab minority on Monday when he indicated that he would support changes in the voting system that would probably give Sunnis more seats in the future parliament.In a meeting with a group of Sunni and Shiite leaders, the cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, outlined a proposal that would scrap the system used in the January election, according to a secular Shiite political leader, Abdul Aziz al-Yasiri, who was at the meeting. The election had a huge turnout by Shiites and Kurds but was mostly boycotted by Sunni Arabs.
Such a change would need to be written into Iraq's new constitution, which parliamentarians are drafting for an Aug. 15 deadline. Although there has been little public talk about what form elections might take under the constitution, Ayatollah Sistani has been highly influential in Iraq's nascent political system.
Under the proposal, voters in national elections would select leaders from each of the 19 provinces instead of choosing from a single country-wide list, as they did in January. The new system would essentially set aside a number of seats for Sunnis roughly proportionate to their numbers in the population, ensuring that no matter how low the Sunni turnout, they would be guaranteed seats.
Sunni Arabs welcomed news of the suggestion. "This should have been done from the beginning," said Saleh Mutlak, a member of the National Dialogue Council, a Sunni Arab political group that has pressed for a more active role in politics. "That election was wrong."
The January elections ended in a decisive victory for Shiite Arabs and Kurds, leaving just 17 seats for Sunni Arabs in the 275-seat National Assembly. Voting in largely Sunni areas was extremely low, depressed by threats from insurgent groups who opposed the election.
Iraqi and American officials say feelings of disenfranchisement among the Sunni Arabs, who ruled Iraq for decades, may be fueling the insurgency. The violence has cut deeply into Iraqi society, with about 1,200 Iraqis and more than 75 American soldiers killed in the past two months. The attacks have taken on increasingly sectarian overtones, raising fears that Iraq could be headed toward civil war.
At least 10 Iraqis were killed and more than 36 wounded in attacks across Iraq in the past 24 hours.
A car bomb exploded late Sunday outside a barbershop in the New Baghdad district of the capital, killing the shop owner, a customer and a 4-year-old boy, an Interior Ministry official said. Barbershops have been singled out by Islamic attackers because they offer Western-style shaves and haircuts. On Monday, at least 4 Iraqis were killed and 29 wounded when a car bomb exploded outside a restaurant in the same neighborhood.
Also on Monday, two American soldiers were killed when their Apache helicopter crashed about 11 a.m. near Taiji, a large air base northwest of Baghdad, said Master Sgt. Greg Kaufman, a military spokesman. It was the third loss of an American helicopter in about a month.
The military did not say what caused the crash. The Associated Press quoted an Iraqi witness as saying a rocket had hit it, and other witnesses heard heavy gunfire. Sergeant Kaufman could not confirm any of the details.
Another American was killed Monday in central Baghdad while he helped Iraqi policemen investigate a burning car, the military said.
In a Pentagon briefing on Monday, the top American commander in Iraq, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., confirmed that American and Iraqi officials had been meeting with Sunni leaders in Iraq in hopes of defusing the insurgency and drawing their followers into the political process. General Casey denied that the meetings constituted negotiations, and said he was unaware of any direct contacts with insurgent fighters.
"They're discussions primarily aimed at bringing these Sunni leaders and the people they represent into the political process," he said at a briefing with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. "But to characterize them as negotiations with insurgents about stopping the insurgency, we're not quite there yet."
Both General Casey and Mr. Rumsfeld have said there have not been any contacts with foreign fighters like the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who is believed to be responsible for some of the most deadly suicide attacks in Iraq.
The statements by Ayatollah Sistani are the latest foray into Iraqi politics by the Shiite leader. Pressure from him was a major factor in establishing an accelerated timetable for the elections in January. That pace, however, largely dictated the election's countrywide system, because United Nations organizers considered it the simplest and quickest way to organize the vote.
When United Nations officials met with the ayatollah in March, he chastised them for choosing the system, and said he favored setting assembly seats aside district by district, a preference he reiterated Monday. Mr. Yasiri, the Shiite politician, said Ayatollah Sistani had characterized the January election as flawed.
In the past, the ayatollah has reserved his efforts to pushing for measures, like nationwide elections, that were likely to enhance the power of Iraq's Shiite majority. His endorsement of a new voting system seemed to be made out of concern for the delicacy of the current political situation here.
"He said there were a lot of mistakes," Mr. Yasiri said. "He said this election must be different than the old one. He said we prefer that all the people share in it."
In other news, Iraq's foreign minister under Saddam Hussein, Tariq Aziz, in a videotape of his interrogation that was released Monday and described by Agence France-Presse, said Mr. Hussein had personally ordered the crackdown on a Shiite uprising in 1991 without consulting top aides. The testimony could help prosecutors build a case against Mr. Hussein for his trial.
Posted by jeff at 1:45 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
June 27, 2005
Last Plane Out
Jay Tea has a post on an exit strategy for Iraq, and how the best exit strategy is none at all.
[L]et's presume we do set a deadline for our withdrawal from Iraq. Immediately we give a HUGE boost to the terrorists' morale -- "all we have to do is hang on until December 2006 (for example), and we win by default!" The immediate result of a timetable for withdrawal will most likely be an immediate decrease in deaths, but that will be merely the calm before the storm, as they will be saving up and resting and re-grouping and re-arming for the civil war that will break out the instant the last American leaves Iraq.But there's a far more compelling reason why setting an "exit strategy" or a "timetable for withdrawal" is such a bad idea: they don't work.
Yep, that's about the size of it. The thing is, the debate on whether or not we should have an exit strategy is meaningful only in its domestic political implications. The entire debate is merely a device the Democrats are using to attempt to undermine the Republicans in advance of 2006: they're setting up debating points for the mid-term elections. (Of course, they'd be quite happy to hit the jackpot and get us to withdraw, as the shame, malaise, resulting Iraqi civil war, lack of US ability to influence international events, and eventual massive attacks on the US could all be easily laid at Republican feet - which could be an electoral godsend for the Democrats for years to come. And they are already thinking about the domestic political implications, though Kevin Drum seems to think that they would be quite negative for the Democrats, and he is probably correct in the longer term.)
In practical terms, it doesn't matter unless the Democrats retake both the House and Senate in the mid-terms. Even if the Democrats won the next Presidential election, and assuming that the insurgency wasn't utterly defeated by then, a Democratic administration would not withdraw from Iraq, nor would it face much pressure to do so. The Democrats are not stupid, and the administration would recognize the disaster that withdrawal prior to victory would be. And since the advocates of withdrawal would trust a Democratic administration and would be deprived of Bush hatred as a motivator, they would not have to face large scale domestic political opposition based on being in Iraq (where problems could be blamed on Republicans, and successes claimed for Democrats).
The problem with the Democrats in Congress using withdrawal from Iraq as a political issue in this manner is that the message is not left in the United States. The enemy sees the debate, and the enemy sees weakness. This causes him to escalate his efforts, in an attempt to push the US into a panicked withdrawal, as we made from Viet Nam, Lebanon and Somalia. (The enemy's analysis of our character may be wildly off, but bin Laden did have a point about recent history.) Given that the enemy's only hope is to redo what Hizb'allah did with Israel - outlast us, followed by claiming that they drove us out when we do leave - it serves the enemy's purposes for American politicians to be calling for withdrawal before victory.
The Bush administration will not pull out prior to victory, and that victory is likely to be manifest prior to the next presidential election. No matter who wins in 2008, the US will be in Iraq until victory is assured. And for that reason, the only practical outcome of the debate is to get more Americans - and far more Iraqis - killed as the enemy escalates the violence to get the press coverage they pray (literally) will weaken our resolve enough for us to withdraw.
Withdrawal won't happen, but that doesn't bring back the dead.
June 24, 2005
Hate is Stronger Than Love in Some People
Big surprise: the European fringes - the hardcore Marxists, Maoists, fascists and the other assorted types you see driving the anti-globalization/anti-capitalist/anti-freedom movements - are funding the terrorists in Iraq.
June 22, 2005
That's About the Size of It
Bill Roggio lays out the likely consequences of withdrawing from Iraq without first beating the enemy. And note that, unlike the Left, he's not looking at domestic political consequences. And yet the Left anxiously wants us to pull out, primarily for domestic political reasons. Somehow, they never address what happens after. Talk about not planning for the aftermath...
Tick, Tick, Tick
Since we have decided that we are not fighting a war against Islam per se (a good decision), we are also being very careful to not go after jihadis who are not actively fighting us at the moment (a bad decision).
Let's just be very clear before I go on: I am not advocating civil violence; I'm making a prediction.
Given the tendencies of Americans, and given the actions of jihadis in America to misunderstand how Americans behave, and given that our government is not actively going after jihadis until they commit, or attempt to commit, acts of terrorism - given all of this, how long until vigilantes attempt to solve the problem? My guess is that the next major terrorist attack in the US will see outbreaks of real anti-Muslim violence in the US, and my other guess is that it won't be confined to the anti-American Muslims, but will target anyone who is Muslim - or Indian subcontinental for that matter. If the people don't see their government fixing a problem, they will fix it themselves, and mobs are not known for their restraint or their powers of discrimination.
Can I Question Their Patriotism Now?
And if not now, when?
UPDATE: How about now?
A Struggle for Power and Money
Winds of Change has a fine addition to their ongoing AAR/LL post.
Most immediately interesting to me is the bit about the media: this indicates to me that the military sees the non-embedded media as hostile-neutral at best, which fits with the behavior of the non-embedded media in Iraq in particular. This is a dangerous development, because the perception that the media embeds with the enemy will lead to us tracking the media to find the enemy, which will lead to a lot of journalists being caught in crossfire, or killed by enemy who think the journalists are leading the military to them.
Second most interesting to me is the involvement of non-Muslim terror groups in training. This is not entirely unexpected - criminals and terrorists and rogue regimes of all types work together all the time - but is the first time I've seen it explicitly reported. Also, note that some of the camps are over the border. As in Viet Nam, we are making the mistake of giving our enemy safe havens: this must end.
Third most interesting to me is the inefficiency of IEDs at killing American troops - 12000 attacks in one year did not net a large number of dead soldiers. An IED is a pretty safe attack to make, and has been a jihadi tool for a long time. (So has taping every attack. Before 9/11, I had seen some interesting footage of dozens of attacks in Chechnya using IEDs, sometimes followed up with small-unit assaults, on Russian troops.) Figuring out how to turn the tables on the enemy - that is, not just to avoid the IEDs or seal the area afterwards to prevent a full-scale ambush from developing, but to actually preempt the IED attacks by taking out the camera crews and trigger-pullers - would be a big win against the jihadis.
UPDATE: And Winds is on a roll today. Armed Liberal's The Cowboy War is a must-read. He nails exactly what's been bugging me about those who say they support the troops and the war while simultaneously denigrating everything done by the troops or in pursuit of the war as not good enough: compared to what. It's only in fantasy land that perfection is attainable, and yet for these guys, perfection is the norm, and any deviation from perfection is sufficient to make us as bad as the Nazis, Pol Pot, Stalin.
But the really sad part is that they think this way for purely partisan reasons. Look at Dick Durbin's words with President Bush in office:
I cannot and will not support President Bush's unilateralist, aggressive foreign policy of preemption. It is wrong. It was wrong when we voted on it in October of last year. It is wrong in November of this year.
as opposed to when Bill Clinton was President:
I call on those who question the motives of the president and his national security advisors to join with the rest of America in presenting a united front to our enemies abroad.The men and women who are risking their lives in defense of our national and global security deserve nothing less.
UPDATE: Callimachus notices the same thing, this time comparing praktike with Molly Ivins. And here is the killer question that I think should be posed to the anti-war types, and with slight modification to the pro-war types as well:
Let's say the devil popped up from a burning Texas sagebrush and made Molly Ivins an offer: not a single American dies in Iraq from this day forth, and democracy takes root there, and Condoleezza Rice wins the presidency in 2008 and the Democratic Party sinks further into irrelevance. "Or," Old Nick smiles, with a twinkle in his eye, "the butcher's bill continues to mount, the American public reaches its tipping point, and your chicken-fried prose pushes them over it. Bush, Rummy and Cheney go to the Hague in the 'war criminals' docket. And you never see another Republican in the White House or a GOP majority in either branch of Congress for the rest of your life."
Answer carefully. (hat tip: The Glittering Eye) Posted by jeff at 9:08 AM | TrackBack
June 21, 2005
More Evidence that we are Winning in Iraq
When Kofi Annan tries to claim credit for success in Iraq, it's a pretty good sign of two things: success is unmistakeable, and the UN had nothing to do with it. Interestingly, Annan is starting to sound like the military and the more hawkish bloggers who follow war events closely: "In a media-hungry age, visibility is often regarded as proof of success. But this does not necessarily hold true in Iraq. Even when, as with last week's agreement [bringing Sunnis into the process of writing the new Iraqi constitution], the results of our efforts are easily seen by all, the efforts themselves must be undertaken quietly and away from the cameras."
Of course, for the military, it's often the opposite: actions are taken in full view of the cameras, but the results are off-camera and largely not understood by a public and punditry that does not, by and large, understand the military or the nature of guerilla warfare.
June 20, 2005
Tell me you didn't see This Coming
The chickens released by Sen. Durbin, Amnesty International, and so on, and so on are coming home to roost. Big surprise.
Objectives
Those who do not study history, or omit the military parts of it1, and who are not trained in warfare, generally miss a lot of the big characteristics, strategies, and determinants of war. It's not just the "little" things, like what particular equipment can and can't do, and how units are organized for different tasks, but big things, like the importance of morale, the inevitability of escalation, and the fact that the opponents aren't fighting the same war.
Aren't fighting the same war? Well, let me put it another way: aren't fighting for the same end state. It is, in fact, more uncommon for two belligerents to have the same conditions for victory than it is for them to have different conditions. For example, in the US Civil War, the North's objective was to reunify the nation, while the South's objective was to successfully separate from the North. So the condition for victory for the North was the defeat of the South; the South did not have to beat the North, just get the North to stop trying to beat it. Yet this is a case where the objectives are relatively similar - they flowed from the same choices of outcome. This is not always the case: sometimes the goals diverge markedly, such as the War of 1812, where our goal was to prevent British predation on our merchants, and the British goal was to defeat the French (for which aim the British needed seamen, which it got in part by preying on American merchants).
In the Terror Wars, our objectives started out markedly different from the enemy's: we sought to punish the terrorists for 9/11, and to destroy the terrorist organizations so that they wouldn't threaten us again; the enemy sought to kick us out of Saudi Arabia as part of their plan to restore the Caliphate. To them, we were a sideline, interesting mostly because of our support of the regimes they intended to bring down.
But while the enemy objectives have not changed, except that we are now in Iraq instead of in Saudi Arabia, our objectives have changed dramatically. As we came to realize that defeating the terrorists now would be meaningless, because the totalitarian fascist ideology that drives them would simply create new terror groups, our objective shifted to democratizing and modernizing the Middle East, so as to remove the ideology of jihad as a threat. This change in goals took place between the beginning of the build-up to war in Iraq and the replacement of General Garner - in fact I think that it was the replacement of General Garner that marked the acceptance within the administration that our long-term strategy must include democratizing the Middle East.
In other words, our goals have converged with our enemy's goals, and as a consequence, our objectives have become symmetrical: they seek to restore the Caliphate, and we seek to ensure conditions that would prevent the Caliphate from being established: representative government, economic prosperity, and a more realistic world-view. In order for the enemy to win, they must continue fighting - not necessarily effectively, just noticeably - until we withdraw. At that point, they claim victory and, greatly strengthened, proceed to attack the Arab governments in order to restore the Caliphate. In order for us to win, we must establish representative governments strong enough to resist the jihadis or we must destroy the jihadis and the funding and ideology-generation systems that create them (which effectively means destroying every Wahabi and Salafist mosque and imam, as well as the jihadis, so thoroughly that no one will be tempted to try preaching jihad out of fear for their lives). Since we aren't prepared to do the latter (yet), we must attempt the former.
What's very interesting is that this means that the primary determinants of the war are time and public will: so long as we are able to sustain the public will to simply not withdraw, we will eventually succeed in establishing representative governments in Iraq and throughout the Middle East. And it is here that we come to the third force in this war: the Western Left (and to a much lesser extent, the extreme right).
For these groups, their goal is to gain political power. At the moment, the balance of power in the US is highly in favor of the Republicans, which is not helpful to the Left. So how does the Left gain power? Well, certainly, the last time that there was a significant Leftward lurch electorally was after Viet Nam, where the Republicans - humiliated by a combination of Watergate and losing the war after a politically-forced withdrawal - lost heavily. And thus, from the Left's goals and history, we get their objectives: embarrass the Republicans, and force us to withdraw from Iraq. The combination of the two will (at least in the mind of the Left) return the Left to power.
Thus, the left's objectives have become congruent to the enemy's objectives: forcing the US to withdraw from Iraq, and in general to lose the Terror Wars, serves both the enemy's and the Left's purposes. This is why it seems that the Left is on the side of the enemy: they are working to the same midpoint. The Left seems to believe that it stops there, that the enemy will simply work on restoring the Caliphate, behead a bunch of other Muslims and who cares? and will happily mind their own business. How they can think this after 9/11 escapes me totally. There are a few other things they are missing as well about the probable consequences.
1No kidding: my college American history professor made very clear up front that we would not study any wars, because they weren't relevant to how people live, which is what's important about history. Ever since then, I've understood how we get people waving paper and declaring "Peace in our Time" - fantasy is so much less upsetting than reality.
June 19, 2005
More Analysis of the War in Iraq
Grim provides a fine essay on the situation in Iraq, and the difference the choice of battlefield makes strategically.
June 18, 2005
The Avoidable Genocide
We are coming to a dangerous crossroads. In America in particular, increasing numbers of people have tired of being at war. The steady dribble of casualties - small in historical terms - has been blown all out of proportion by the domestic forces of defeatism - particularly odious are those who would be fine with America winning, so long as the Republicans didn't get credit. The normal, slow course of counter-insurgency, the whining of the domestic Left, the self-seeking politicians, and the receding sense of direct threat to America combine to weary those who simply don't focus much on anything except direct threats to them. Much of the American public is being lulled. This QandO analysis of a Victor Davis Hansen essay makes the essential dichotomy clear.
Ironically, this is a byproduct not of failure, but of success: we have done such a good job of disrupting the large terrorist organizations and eating alive the core of the jihadi movement, who come to Iraq to fight our soldiers rather than to America to attack our civilians, that the immediacy of the threat has been reduced. So long as we continue to aggressively pursue the fight. Because when we stop, give up, go home and once more doze in contemplation of the end of history.
The ability of the United States to make war depends on our willingness to make war. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the only way for any country at present to actually defeat the United States in war is to make us weary of the fight, give up and go home. And our desire to minimize the destructiveness of war, on both our own people and enemy civilians (and increasingly, even on enemy combatants), mitigates against our fighting the kind of war we can win swiftly. We could end the insurgency in Iraq in 3 months, were we willing to destroy the Sunni Arab population of Iraq in order to do so; we are not.
But there is a serious, often unstated problem with giving up. Once we leave the field, we see ourselves as our enemy sees us: defeated. And as the aftermath of Viet Nam showed, such a defeat makes further action politically impossible. In the 1970s, we could not have defended any place but Europe and maybe Japan from attack, because politically we would have prevented our government from doing so. Even in the 1980s, there was a serious, strong, determined and sustained movement to prevent the United States from protecting Europe! Younger readers may not remember, but there was in fact a serious effort to convince the United States to disarm unilaterally even up to the point that the Soviet Union dissolved.
And in the Middle East, today, such a mistake - giving up our ability to fight against a threat - would be fatal. Not to us - well, not to us collectively, anyway - but to the Arab world. Consider the consequences:
If the United States pulls the threat of military engagement from the Middle East, Iraq would pretty much immediately fall into chaos. Conventional invasions from Syria and Iran are possible, but more likely would be a full-scale civil war, culminating in either a dictatorship of the Sunnis or a Shia theocracy similar to neighboring Iran. In the process, we would have lost every single base that the United States has in the region: as an untrustworthy ally, those that were not conquered would be closed by our former friends, now eager to distance themselves from us as far and fast as possible. (Read up on what happened after the fall of the Shah in the late 1970s.) This would further complicate any American attempts to use force in the region.
With the US not engaged, and with the world focused on Iraq's slide into chaos, the likelihood of Iran developing weapons within five years approaches certainty. Pakistan might even decide, in order to prevent Musharraf's fall, to open sell nuclear weapons to Muslim states. This means that with every year that passes, with democracies and Western leaning tyrannies in the Middle East falling in succession to the Islamists, the realization of a caliphate becomes progressively more likely. Even without that, there is still the problem of two or more nuclear armed states with a history of supporting terrorism.
We probably wouldn't be the first target of nuclear terrorism; that would more likely be Israel. After all, with the United States removed from the region, paralyzed with self-doubt and recriminations, Israel is both a bigger threat and a bigger opportunity.
Funny thing about Israel: Israel has nuclear weapons, too. A lot of them. Enough to destroy every Arab population center of any reasonable size. And if Tel Aviv were destroyed, what possible reason could Israel have to restrain from destroying every Arab population center of any reasonable size? After all, Israel's very existence would be in doubt. They take "never again" more seriously than does the rest of the world.
But let's say that the Arabs manage to destroy Israel so completely that only a few Arab cities can be obliterated. This would throw the West into further anguish, as after all Israel is an American ally, and we should have done "something" (never actually specified) to prevent this outcome. (Those who suggest, at that point, that withdrawing from Iraq was the cause of this situation will be shouted down, vilified.) And now the Arabs would have a real claim on victimhood - because after all, it wasn't those innocent civilians that destroyed the Israeli cities, and it wasn't they who marched in and slaughtered the Jews wherever they found them. So again the West would likely not act.
Having barely dodged utter destruction would not make nearly the impression on the Muslim world that their victory would: yes, they lost a few million people, but the state of Israel was destroyed; the hated Jews were slaughtered. Surely Allah had brought this blessing. Surely Allah would allow the Muslims to retake Andalusia (Spain), the Balkans, and how about the rest of Europe while we're at it?
Now maybe the French or the British would react, and maybe they wouldn't. How far they would go is anyone's guess. Let's just assume that the French allow themselves to fall under Muslim rule, along with the rest of continental Europe, and the British kicked out the more troublesome Muslim immigrants and formed a closer alliance with the United States. This is pretty much a best-case outcome for the jihadis, by the way. Now, they have a larger and more sophisticated nuclear arsenal (France's), and a larger population and resource base.
Would they be satisfied? Well, their doctrine, endlessly restated, is that the Muslim caliphate must extend over the entire world. But the US would still stand, and in fact we'd be the only enemy of note besides China and India that the Muslims would have to worry about. The order isn't important: neither China nor the US nor India would suffer a nuclear attack without responding, and neither country would give up its identity. As such, whichever major enemy was the next target of jihadism (my guess would be India) would be quite likely to utterly destroy the Arab world.
And fundamentally, that is the problem with withdrawal: the enemy doesn't recognize an end to the war short of their complete control of the entire planet. But there are forces in the world that will withdraw and withdraw - until they reach a certain point. And one of those forces - likely Israel, potentially France (not very likely), and certainly India, China or the US - would eventually be pushed against the wall where it is very clearly "us or them". None of these civilizations, except possibly France, would choose "them."
The only way to be sure that there will be a Muslim world in 50 years is to defeat, now, the elements within Islam that are incapable of compromise or coexistence. And in the end, it will less likely be us, than our children, who will be around to face that end, if we fail now.
June 17, 2005
The Fruits of Defeat
Here is the reason I read Kevin Drum, despite disagreeing with him on basic principles: he can reason himself through to a correct conclusion. I don't care about the consequences of war outcomes on electoral outcomes in the US, but I care deeply about the consequences of war outcomes on the country's safety and freedom. And in this case, withdrawal would be a disaster. Drum sees that, and while his focus is on what that would do to elections here (rather than, say, the destruction of military and civilian morale and the then-inevitable rise of nuclear terrorism), he at least has the clarity to acknowledge it.
One more nudge towards the edge, and Kevin will be able to see that deliberately undermining the war effort, as so many on the left and a few on the right do, brings many kinds of disaster in its wake, and should therefore as a matter of national interest not be done.
UPDATE: Chris asks in the comments:
Ok... so what, in your view, constitutes "deliberately undermining the war effort?" Is any kind of critique of the way the war has been carried out allowed? Who decides what those boundaries are?
Those are excellent questions. First, who decides? For the obvious cases (treason, sedition, espionage, etc.), the legislatures must make those decisions, and the courts must enforce them. For other cases I mention below, it should be up to each individual's conscience, both as to whether to undermine the war effort, and how to deal with those who do. Here's a list of some things that I consider to be "deliberately undermining the war effort", and what to do about them.
Treason
This is defined by the Constitution: "Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court." This is a very limited definition in comparison to most countries prior to the US (and for that matter, in the more rabid fever swamps of the right wing - I'm looking at you, Ann Coulter). Note the requirement for an "overt Act". With that, there is no possibility of criticism, incitement or other verbal or printed words being treason. This does not mean that the United States has not faced treason in this war: we have, more than once.
What to do about treason? Make charges and put them in court. Any American citizen arrested anywhere in the world, and any non-citizen arrested in the United States while not committing an overt act of war, needs to be put before a judge. For traitors, the guidelines are pretty clear on what should happen. For non-citizens, the court should determine if the defendant could or could not be reasonably construed as an enemy combatant, and after that only executive authority (keeping in mind laws and treaties) has any bearing on such a person's treatment.
Sedition
Sedition is "Conduct or language inciting rebellion against the authority of a state." Sedition is a step down from treason, and involves not conducting war against the government, but attempting to undermine the government (in particular, in the US, the Constitution and the institutions it creates). I don't believe that there is currently a sedition act in US law. There needs to be. Specifically, incitement to war against the United States, interference with military officers or troops in the lawful performance of their duties, invasion and occupation of military facilities, incitement to desertion and similar acts should be punishable by law. Short of that, though, they certainly fall under the category of "bad ideas", below.
Espionage
Espionage is the unlawful giving of national security secrets to the enemy. In actual fact, we generally consider espionage to be the giving of any national security secrets to any foreign person or organization. This includes, but is not limited to, detailing the methods by which enemy prisoners are interrogated, which allows the enemy to come up with methods to resist such techniques; detailing the way in which captured enemy fighters are transported around the world, which helps the enemy to target those flights; and so forth. Even when it is journalists doing this, they should most assuredly be prosecuted (as should the leakers). Note that I did not include revealing the Abu Ghraib abuses in that list in any form; distasteful though the media frenzy over that was, that is not espionage but a bad idea (not the reporting; the frenzy).
Bad Ideas
In addition to the above, there are a number of things that are not crimes, but which help the enemy in major or minor ways. These are all matters of conscience, but people who want the US to actually, you know, win the war on terror, should refrain from these behaviors, and punish those who do not refrain (with professional censure, criticism, shunning, firing in certain cases, and so on).
These activities include trying to weaken border security, distributing enemy propaganda, execrable comparisons of US facilities to the worst labor and death camps; advocating cutting the pay of the troops (bad for morale); and so forth.
Bill Roggio has some more things to be avoided or embraced. While Bill's post focuses on the Democrats, I want to be clear that I don't give a damn about political identity, and there are people on the Right who are undermining the war effort as well.
And I should add that playing gotcha games on particular words, in an effort to embarrass political or military leaders, is maybe a bit unhelpful as well.
There's a War On
I was thinking a few weeks ago that the United States is not really at war - not in the sense of an active engagement with a named enemy. We're not just not in a total war, as WWII or the Civil War, but also not in a war in which the majority of the people seem to realize, on a daily basis, that there are high stakes for which we (in the sense of our military, in any case) fighting and dying. But before I could put this in any coherent essay form in my head, Gerard Vanderleun beat me to it:
Over the decades since Vietnam, our media has evolved into a self-sustaining series of institutions that literally cannot see anything other than their internal elite reality. This would be benign if they did not also have the power to inflict it on others. The destruction of this power is the real pivot on which the political fights of the next decade will turn.Unless we run out of time in which to entertain this cute little internal cultural and political squabbles. Unless, of course, many of us wake up one morning to find that there is, after all, a real war on -- one that can reach out and kill us at will.
In this manner, it is both tragic and yet hopeful, that our current war, in order to be really on, waits upon another September 11. For, it is clear now as it has been for sometime, that nothing absent another significant attack on the homeland will wake us from our media induced stupor.
[snip]
So, in the final analysis, what will it take for America to wake up and to stay awake, and to finally and at last, "know there is a war on?"
Quite obviously and without a doubt, it will take thousands of dead American civilians, men, women and our children. They will die here on our soil. They will be your family and your friends and your neighbors.
That is precisely what it will take. Not one body more. Not one body less. And although our enemy will be at fault, we will have nobody but our own weak and fat souls to blame. After all, we won't be able to say we didn't see it coming this time.
I agree with Vanderleun that the Bush administration squandered the American will to fight that 9/11 awoke. This requires stoking; Americans are not naturally belligerent as a people (though our elected officials often are), and this has been President Bush's one massive failing. And, like Vanderleun, I fear that the only way to change the image of the war is to suffer another attack on the magnitude of 9/11, or worse. But I hope that, rather than being a "losing police action[]", we can win the war abroad before our will gives out and before we suffer another catastrophic attack on America.
Posted by jeff at 1:51 PM | TrackBack
June 16, 2005
Let Gays Serve, And While We're at It...
I agree, categorically and unconditionally, with Joe Katzman and Pejman Yousefzadeh:
[P]olitical leaders should ... show that they are serious about tackling whatever personnel problems may exist in the United States military. And the best way to do that is to finally and completely reverse the ban on gays, lesbians and bisexuals in the United States military. Not only would the reversal of the ban go a long way towards remedying any recruiting problems that may exist, it is the right thing to do to let gays, lesbians and bisexuals serve their country in the armed forces should they wish to do so.
Pejman addresses what I consider to be the one reason I've seen that is a reasonable justification for not allowing homosexuals into the military:
Some are inevitably concerned that the inclusion of gays, lesbians and bisexuals in the military will cause morale problems that will result from soldiers living in close quarters with one another. ... [T]o the extent that fraternization needs to be prevented, it can be prevented through the amendment and application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In order to prevent the depletion of unit morale that may result from fraternization, fraternization of all types must be prevented, not just same-sex fraternization.
Indeed. If there is a bias in the ranks, that can be overcome with discipline, as was the bias against blacks when the military was integrated under Truman.
While we're at it, let's make two other changes: remove the rules against women in combat and abolish Selective Service. As Joe notes, women have served well and admirably in combat already, due to the nature of fighting a counter-insurgency. There is no reason to exclude women from combat and combat support arms just because they are women. Most women will, certainly, be unable to meet the physical standards of such units, but then so are many men. If an individual woman wants to serve in a combat MOS, and can serve in a combat MOS, then she should be allowed to do so.
Selective Service is the kind of odd compromise that government excels at: useless after a few years, but nonetheless seemingly immortal. When the draft was abolished, there were serious fears that an all-volunteer military of the size needed in the Cold War could not be maintained without deeply compromising on standards as to who would be accepted. My father was in the Air Force in the late 1970s, and it really looked like the doubters might have been right for a while: standards (particularly in the Army) dropped shockingly low in many cases. Read General Franks' autobiography, American Soldier, for his experiences as a young officer in Europe during this time; it's doubtful that such troops could have defeated the Soviets had they come at us full bore.
So there was a certain point to having draft registration continue at that point, in case a draft needed to be restarted. By the middle of the 1980's, it was becoming quite clear that this would not be the case. At this point, there is no doubt: except in the most extreme possible circumstances, perhaps a war with China, a draft will simply not happen. As such, let's abolish Selective Service altogether. If we do at some point need a draft, we can use tax and other records to find people, presuming that we need to. These are likely to be more accurate than old Selective Service records in any case, because they are more up to date. The insignificant time lost in such a case would be more than made up for by the current benefits: removing draft fears from the table of American discourse (scare politics annoy me greatly, particularly scare politics about the military in time of war), raising the morale of the military (see, we really trust you) and saving a small amount of unneeded government spending.
So, let's do all three: allow homosexuals to serve openly in the military, allow women in combat, and abolish Selective Service. In the process, we would increase our military's pool of available troops, and remove a bogus issue from the table.
June 15, 2005
The River War
Mack Owens has a great editorial in the NY Post (use BugMeNot to get past the registration) analyzing the US/Iraqi theater offensive that started with the reduction of the enemy's Fallujah sanctuary last November. (hat tip: Irish Pennants) Like myself, Owens seems to think that this was the point at which the jihadis began to be seriously engaged in depth, and where the Sunnis began to turn to the Iraqi government in real terms, and away from the Ba'athist insurgency.
Owen's post hoc analysis validates Wretchard's excellent predictive analysis in The River War. If you want to understand the campaign, Owen's and Wretchard's analyses are a great place to start, and as always Michael Yon peerlessly provides the details of how this plays out tactically.
June 13, 2005
Faster, Please
I've been thinking quite a bit about how we are faring in the war, and this has led to two thoughts. The first is depressing, in a way, and encouraging in another way: the United States is not at war in the total war sense (that is to say, a committed society whose every effort strives to victory), but in a Cold War sense (that is, we have an ideological foe that we intend to defeat ideologically over time). That is a long subject for another post. The second thought is what this post is about.
It is clear that the enemy in Iraq started losing late last year. I think Fallujah was probably the turning point; since then the enemy has been shifting tactics to less and less strategically-significant attacks (from attacking US troops and overrunning Iraqi police stations, to attacking Iraqi police and National Guard units, to attacking civilians), while we have been shifting more and more to the offensive in Iraq. While the elections accelerated the political change in Iraq, it is the battle for Fallujah that appears to have ended the enemy's capability to undertake offensive actions at above the platoon scale with any coordination or apparent effect.
Wretchard writes about the balance point we are at right now, between the theater defense we were playing while setting up the Iraqi government, and the choice between setting up a strategic defense and going on the offense to achieve a faster, but more expensive (in soldiers' lives) victory. Wretchard talks about the enemy's strategic game as well. I'd like to talk about where I think we need to go strategically, and how to upset the enemy's strategic game.
I should note that this is moot, if our goal is to hold in place in the hopes that we can outlast our enemy in a war of wills, betting that we can democratize the Middle East (by osmosis, except for Iraq and Afghanistan) faster than the enemy can Islamicize it. I should also note that, given the partisan politicization of the war, and absent a Democrat leader able to move his party into support for the war, we cannot win such a war of wills. Eventually a Democrat will be elected to the Presidency, and if he is not behind the war effort, or is willing to sacrifice that for domestic political points (ahem, LBJ, ahem), then we will lose the battle of wills at that point. Our only winning strategy is a steady offensive strategy.
Our center of gravity is the will of the public to continue to fight. And the enemy's most powerful weapon for striking at that center of gravity is our press, ever willing to accommodate the enemy's need for spectacular headlines because of its own need for spectacular headlines. So in considering our strategic posture, we need to consider both how to effect the enemy's center of gravity (which is most likely, in the strategic sense, their confidence in their literally God-given right to victory) and how to draw attention away from our own center of gravity.
In other words, we need to fight the war primarily in terms of humiliating the enemy and making him lose confidence, while at the same time drawing attention away from media fights we cannot win with a press that is determined to see the US government in general, and the military in particular, as somehow being simultaneously bumbling liars and diabolical, secretive schemers of the highest order.
There are some other factors that need to be considered, of course, such as our means and our long-term goals. Our army is about as committed as it can be for the long term. Since we have not raised active-duty troop levels (in fact, we are a corps short of where we were at the end of the 1991 Gulf War, which is about the same number of troops as we actually have in Iraq currently!) since 9/11, and have not declared war in order to maintain the National Guard and Reserves indefinitely on active duty (and could not now declare a war absent a huge new provocation, on the scale of 9/11, for political reasons), we are at the extent of our possible sustainable ground forces deployment. We can use troops other than those in Iraq for short-term missions, but cannot keep the normal rotation of 1/3 in combat, 1/3 training up, and 1/3 refitting while taking on another long-term, high-force level mission. This means that we need to extend our ground forces commitment in the Middle East, rather than starting a disconnected engagement elsewhere. We have ample air and naval assets - these are barely involved in Iraq - for anything we could contemplate, although a significant uncommitted air and naval force has to be maintained in the event of a crisis in Korea or the Taiwan Straits.
In addition to the force issues, we also have no effective allies to count on. While we have many allies actively contributing to existing missions, and the British have some reserve force that could be deployed into, say, Africa, there is no effective deployable ground combat capability among our allies that is not already being used. So whatever we do will be our show.
It seems to me that we can accommodate all of these concerns, while at the same time helping the theater situation in Iraq. The next move for us, if we have seriously learned the lessons of Viet Nam and if we care about winning, is to make tactical strikes into Syria and Iran. In actual fact, simply threatening this in a credible way might be enough to get serious concessions from Syria in particular. But if not, we should bomb known Syrian safe houses, raid training camps, destroy infrastructure near the border, bomb known terrorist organization offices in Damascus and in Iranian cities, and stage spoiling and punitive raids across the borders.
We should make clear that since Iran and Syria are ignoring the border and interfering in Iraq, we reserve the right to ignore the border and destroy the terrorists in Iran and Syria. As long as we kept to stealth bombers and smart bombs over the major population centers, and minimal engagement except in the border areas, we should be able to avoid pushing either Iran or Syria into starting a naval war in the Gulf, or attacking Israel, or doing something else to widen the war dramatically. I am not suggesting we take on both at once. For both political and military reasons, it would be better to pick one fight at a time.
Me, I'd start with Syria. Not only are they already teetering internally, but they are more involved, apparently, with actually supporting the insurgency. Capturing a few Iraqis running the insurgency from inside Syria, or some major terrorists there, would be a big win that would give us a lot of freedom of action to continue. There is also a good case for Iran first, if we coupled the border raids with strong and unequivocal statements that we consider Iran a natural ally of the US, and perfectly acceptable as a nuclear state, once the people removed the mullahs and returned control to the people, where it belongs. This would disarm the mullah's biggest rhetorical weapon against us, and strengthen the Iranian democrats considerably.
Both options are full of risks, of course, but the payoffs are large if we are successful. And in war, winning requires risks; the timid side always loses.
UPDATE: It was late, and I forgot to add my second point. We need to demystify Islam. Stop treating the Koran as anything other than a book. We shouldn't go out of our way to mistreat it, but we should stop apologizing for handling it without gloves, dropping it on the floor, etc. Same thing with how we used to not let female soldiers drive in Saudi Arabia (and still wouldn't if they were stationed there). Screw that: our troops are our troops, and they are of our culture, and we shouldn't be bending over to the minor nits of other cultures when they will not acknowledge the most basic tenets of our culture. There is no reason to treat Islam or the Koran any better or any worse than we would treat Christianity or the Bible.
And that includes entering mosques to search them as necessary. We must remove these as safe places to store munitions, plan attacks and hide fighters. In the midst of battle, we have largely been willing to do this. We need to do it when we're not in battle, as well. If a mosque in Iraq has an imam preaching jihadi ideology, it needs to be searched regularly.
UPDATE: Praktike has a good post on where to go, as well. I think that Iran is our natural ally, if we can get rid of the mullahs. Since the Iranian people apparently hate the mullahs, too, we may be able to help them in this regard, without any kind of military action. Simply standing up and saying that if the mullahs were out of government, we would consider Iran our natural allies and would not object to their nuclear program - this alone would go a long way.
Secrets in a Time of War
There is a very, very frightening report in Time. It details the interrogation methods used on a particularly valuable detainee at Guantanamo. What is fightening is not the methods - which are mild by the standards of civil police work, never mind fighting terrorists - but that they were reported. (hat tip: Captain's Quarters for the link; I also heard this, in somewhat different terms, on NPR this morning)
One of the least recognized aspects of war among non-warriors is the role of chance and of accumulations of small events. We tend to focus, as do most histories, on big events, like the battle for Midway. But how many people realize that the reason we had our carriers off Midway, instead of Southwest of Pearl Harbor, was because someone had the bright idea of sending a fake message about a routine mechanical problem on Midway, to see if their hunch was right about a code-group's meaning in intercepted Japanese military signals? When the message was repeated along the Japanese military networks, the code group (AF) appeared in reference to where this supposed mechanical problem had occurred, and since we already knew from decyphered enemy messages that there were carriers heading to "AF", we sent our carriers to Midway to meet the enemy.
The protection of military secrets is vital to winning a war. If the enemy knows everything you have, where it is, what it can do, and what you plan to do with it, he can counter your force with his own, and knowledge multiplies his power tenfold. Let's say that the military is planning a raid in a particular neighborhood. If the terrorists holed up in that neighborhood know it, they can simply not be there when the troops come.
But what about this Time report? Well, every enemy combatant we capture from here on out will know about the tactics that we use, and will therefore be prepared to resist them. (The fact that even these mild interrogation techniques are already being decried as against American values is another post all of its own.) That means that we will no longer be able to get as much information out of newly-captured combatants. And since we cannot (for political reasons) ratchet up the stress of the techniques we use, the odds are that the well of information will dry up for those enemy we don't decide to send to countries that are less, um, sensitive in how they handle enemies.
So why does it matter, in the long run, if we don't get bits of information from the enemy, even though he's getting serious amounts and quality of information about what we have and how we operate? Well, it matters because of the second factor I mentioned above: the accumulation of small incidents.
There is an old story, of whose provenance I am unsure. A messenger had vital information about the enemy's movements, but because a blacksmith had failed to put the last nail in one of the messenger's horse's shoes, the shoe was thrown and the horse lamed. The messenger was unable to get to the King with the message, and thus the King was ignorant of the enemiy's movements, and was surrounded and defeated. Or consider Shakespeare's Richard III: "A horse! A horse! My kingdom for a horse!"
As in Viet Nam, the US will not lose large battles in this war. (This is pretty amazing in general: the US is expected not only not to lose wars, but not to lose battles, and to do this under the most restrictive conditions ever imposed upon men in battle. And we do it.) We will have setbacks, yes, and these will be equated by the enemy and by the media with great defeats, and will be rhetorically amplified until many people believe that they are defeats. We hear every day a constant drumbeat of DOOM! DOOM! even while we are crushing the enemy abroad, blocking (so far) his attacks on us here in the US, and democratizing several countries in the process.
So if we will lose battles, we could still lose the war. As in Viet Nam, we can at any time snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. The real battlefield in this war is the morale of the American people. The government's ability to impact this morale is limited: if the government were to start a service of optimistic press releases, what kind of coverage would it get in the rest of the media? So with the press daily beating down the US will to fight, it is up to non-traditional media like bloggers, and ultimately up to each individual American, to maintain this will.
But will is a fickle thing; it is subject to constant questioning. And it is the daily accumulation of car bombs deliberately planned to obtain the most coverage in the West; the deliberate, brutal filmed beheadings of innocents to demoralize the civilian population; the constant stories on all of our faults, no matter how trivial, combined with the utter indifference to and lack of reporting on our enemy's brutalities, no matter how outrageous - it is these events which batter at our will to fight.
Churchhill said that in war, the truth is surrounded by a bodyguard of lies. That is still true. The media seem to be intent on us losing this war. This seems to be more from ignorance of the consequences of their actions than from actual malice (in most cases), combined with a preference for attention and advertising to victory. This is not an excuse: people will still end up dead because of Time's actions, like Newsweek's actions before them, and sadly and undoubtedly like others to follow.
UPDATE: Wretchard covers the same Michael Yon post that I did, and ends with this observation:
In summary the situation can be described as follows. The Coalition is on the strategic offensive, probably inflicting a multiple kill-ratio on the enemy, capturing its leadership, improving its intelligence capacity and generating ever larger numbers of indigenous combat forces. It is basically ascendant in every measurable military category. On the other hand, the insurgents are counting on making America tire of of serial combat victories without apparent end in the belief that if they simply do not admit to loss they will eventually win -- not on the battlefield as Fester and Kos would have us believe -- but on the political front, as they always aimed to do.
Posted by jeff at 10:27 AM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Mosul
Michael Yon is embedded with the troops in Mosul. His reporting from the war zone is detailed, balanced, complete and very well written. It is everything that the media should be working on constantly in reporting the war, yet somehow never get around to. Here is May, in summary. It's a long post, but after reading it, you will have learned more about how the war is really playing out than you will have from reading the newspapers for the last two years.
June 12, 2005
Bolivia Falling into Ruin
Bolivia is falling into ruin. Sadly, it seems as though this will end up in a civil war, and it seems from other things I've pieced together over time that this crisis is largely being instigated by Hugo Chavez, Venezuela's "one man, one vote, one time" dictator. I doubt that the US or the UN will get involved, and Brazil is apparently going to stay out of it, so it looks like the situation will come down to who controls the Army and Police. If those institutions answer to the political leadership, then there will be a (likely long) civil war against Morales' insurgents with Venezuelan backing. If not, then there will likely be a very short and bloody overthrow of the government, followed by a long and bloody communization effort.
UPDATE: Man, some days. I originally had this as Ecuador, and indeed meant Bolivia. While I was typing this, I was thinking about a fraternity brother from Ecuador, and my brain was handily mistyping what I was thinking about instead of what I was saying. Sorry about that.
June 11, 2005
Rant On, Brother
Brian Dunn has a great rant about some stupid foreign policy articles on N. Korea. My favorite bit:
This is serious rock-pounding stupidity. I'm honestly not sure if it exceeds the previous article or not since they cover different subjects (though in both the common fault lies with President Bush). Comparing stupid apples with stupid oranges isn't easy.In the end, I think I have to give the edge to Selig for turning the "stupid dial" to eleven. He shows why I sometimes get so frustrated with area experts. They go native. They learn so much about the local thugs that they can divine differences between the 90% psychos and the 95% psychos. And they seriously think this difference is significant. In the end, the experts such as Selig use their insights in order to identify who we should surrender to.
Posted by jeff at 1:41 PM | TrackBack
June 10, 2005
Never Again
In 1946, the world looked over the wreckage of humanity that the Holocaust caused, and said "Never again." Subsequent decades have shown that the full statement should have been: "Never again will fascists commit genocide against the Jews in Europe unless it's convenient." I'm with Joe: Give them guns to defend themselves.
Posted by jeff at 6:55 AM | TrackBackJune 9, 2005
Amnesty International Very Far Gone
Captain Ed points out that in addition to equating Guantanamo Bay's prison camp for terrorists to the Soviet Gulag camps, Amnesty International apparently has called for US officials to be kidnapped abroad, and tried for war crimes. My first thought is to wonder whether anyone really wants to commit that act of war against the US? Frankly, I cannot think anyone would be that ballsy, since we'd be prepared to destroy a country that kidnapped, say, the President.
My second thought is that we should allow Amnesty the chance to put their money where their mouth is. We should offer to Amnesty, the ICRC, etc. the opportunity to set up camps, on land we provide, around which we will place a guarded perimeter to ensure that no prisoner can escape. Within that will be a prison built to the specifications the NGO's desire, and staffed by the NGO's people. They can ensure that everyone inside is treated as they wish, and we will ensure that no one escapes. The prisoners inside would be those we've decided are too dangerous to release, but which we are done interrogating for information that might save lives in the war.
Think they'd go for it?
Think they'd survive?
June 8, 2005
Taking the Battle to the Enemy
Austin Bay pulls together a lot of threads around a
The first problem we face is defining the enemy. "Knowing him when we see him" is not good enough, particularly in a society where dupes and outright seditionists in our own society are willing to use our open system of justice in attempts to keep the enemy free and free to operate. Here is how I see the major enemy: the enemy comprises people motivated by the violent jihadi ideology that arises out of Salafist/Wahabbi Islam to attack those they see as unislamic.
The major enemy breaks down into several categories:
- The actual jihadis, who take up arms or become suicide bombers, or train and arm the fighters: These are the actual fighters, and are analogous to the enemy military in a conventional state-on-state war.
- The terror masterminds, who guide and fund the jihadi fighters. These include such obvious characters as Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership, and are the analog of the enemy government.
- The producers of terrorists, which include the madrassas and their Saudi (and other) backers; the despotic, terror-supporting Arab governments (Syria, Iran, "Palestine", Saudi Arabia and a few others); and the imams and mullahs and what have you who preach the jihadi ideology. These are the analog of the enemy economy.
- Those who are sympathetic to the jihadi cause for religious, ethnic, nationalistic or ideological reasons, and are willing to donate money, time, shelter, and other aids and comforts ot the other enemy groups. These are the analog of the enemy population.
In addition to this, we have minor enemies and opponents to deal with. These include the loyalists of current or deposed regimes, who will fight us only in their own country and to protect or restore the regime they are loyal to; anti-Enlightenment Westerners (and some who are just anti-American and anti-Israeli) who don't particularly care whether the jihadis win, but are determined to see free-market, representatively-governed, Enlightenment-derived, classically liberal societies lose (this, by the way, is sedition, not treason; it's only treason if they cross over into actively helping the enemy), and who are willing to see the jihadis win to accomplish that goal (think Ward Churchill); and the "useful idiots" who for multiculturalist or internationalist idealistic reasons actually believe that there is no moral difference between us and the enemy or are simply unable to form clear judgements about consequences (think Jimmy Carter).
Right now, we are fighting actively against the jihadi fighters, the terror masterminds, and the remnant Ba'athist loyalists in Iraq. We are doing little to nothing against the other groups.
The enemy's advantages include our reluctance to fight every aspect of the enemy's power base (a far cry from WWII and even Viet Nam), and to argue forcefully against Western and Arab/Muslim opponents of our conduct of the Terror Wars. The attempt seems to be to trade taking our time in dismantling the enemy so as to be able to provoke less outrage amongst our non-enemy opponents. Our restraint is not provoking less outrage, butmore, as our enemies and opponents take our restraint to be weakness.
Defeating Iraq's Ba'athist loyalists (the only force in Iraq legitimately entitled to be called insurgents or a resistance) has proven much easier than I would have expected a year ago. How long has it been since platoon-sized attacks on our troops or overrunning Iraqi police stations and driving police from the cities has happened? Those were the work of insurgents. The car bombings and beheadings and such are the work of the jihadis, and the insurgents are largely either giving up, or are joining the jihadis and switching to terrorism. I don't think that the jihadis will be crushed in Iraq for some time, given our current strategy, but I think that the insurgency is all but over.
We have a major advantage in this war, beyond our unprecedented military might and unprecedented economic strength: we have the ability to sustain operations at a much higher pace than the enemy, who is limited to slow and fragile communications links, has little central control authority, cannot react as quickly as we can act, and can only see concentrated threats centrally (distributed threats look smaller, and are only seen locally, because the enemy's intelligence is limited to what he can see and what he can read in the news). Our ability to sustain a faster optempo distributed over a wide area can break the enemy.
This would require continuing what we are doing now, and adding some other things, such as attacking the jihadi infrastructure in places like Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. This could include everything from killing terror-supporting imams to occupying Saudi oilfields. Given our military's current loads, and the need to be ready to move into Iran if they get close to a nuclear capability, most of the action would have to come at the smaller-scale end. By killing the imams, smugglers, government officials providing training and weapons and so on, we could seriously dent the appeal of supporting terrorism.
Much of this could be accomplished by simply paying off the local enemies these guys have already made to kill them, and if we leave some of the most vitriolic alone while killing others, and letting it be quietly whispered that it's us, the ones we leave alone may be tagged as collaborators. In any case, these attacks would reduce the inflow of recruits, and have a major impact on the jihadi ideology. After all, if God is on their side, why do they keep ending up being found dead in alleys? Leaving raw pork on the dead might help drive that message home.
Before you raise the objection that doing this in countries like Syria is an act of war, go read the Austin Bay article above: we're already at war with these people; we're just fighting on their terms. And before you raise the cultural sensitivity of pork to Muslims, consider that that is precisely why I suggested it: this is a war largely of ideas, and that means that the idea of violent jihad to restore the Caliphate has to be discredited. I'm all for other methods, as long as whatever we do has the desired effect of making adherence to the ideology of jihad less attractive. Winding up dead and damned has a way of doing that.
We're taking the battle to the enemy in Iraq, which is far better than having them bring the battle to us like they did on and before 9/11, but we need to take it elsewhere at the same time. We need to so overpressure the enemy (both the jihadis and the producers of terrorists) that they cannot keep up, and collapse utterly. And we need to do this before the seditionists in the West either succeed in convincing a majority that dishonorable defeat is better than "unfair" victory or become targets of vigilantism.
War is unpleasant, but losing a war is more unpleasant than winning it using ruthless means. This is a war of national survival: we won't have another chance to prevent the intersection of terrorism, anti-Americanism and nuclear weapons. I'll be prepared to apologize for what we do today to win, a couple of generations after we've won.
June 6, 2005
Welcome to the Real World
Sometimes I get really bugged by little things, like when someone, referring to the Marines' discovery of a large underground bunker complex near Fallujah, asks:
[I]s it a good thing that such a well-developed bunker system was being actively used over the past two years without being found by the coalition forces
Of course not; the answer is obvious, self-evident: no one wants enemy bunkers to exist undetected for any length of time. But is it a useful question?
If you decide to go to the store to get something, there are a number of things that could happen. You could get there, get what you went for, get home, and all could be well. You could get there, get what you went for, get home, and find your house burnt to the ground. You could get there, get what you want, and be killed in a freak accident on the way home. You could get there, and the store could be closed, or they could be out of stock. You could fail to get there in the first place.
In these cases, there are things that can be done to ensure the right outcome, and things that could not. Certainly, if you came home and your house had burnt down because you left the oven running, it's your fault and you are just out of luck. But what if an arsonist burned down your house while you were gone? Were you then responsible for not being there to prevent the arson?
Because that's the supposition behind the question: the Marines are to be faulted for not finding the bunker sooner. (To be frank, I'm half convinced that that chain continues with, "and therefore their commanders are to be faulted, and therefore George Bush is to be faulted". And I'm certain that, if that is the case, the chain of supposition started with "George Bush is to be faulted".) But is it a fair supposition? Going to the store, there aren't people trying to kill you (hopefully), and it is not uncommon for things to go wrong. Murphy rules, nowhere so completely as on the battlefield.
This kind of nitpicking is unhelpful in the extreme. The better question is, how can we find these complexes faster? Do we have the resources we need in Iraq to accomplish the mission? Can we accomplish it better with more, fewer or different resources? Does our doctrine or our equipment need improvement to make it easier to find these bunkers? How can we gather better intelligence in enemy-held areas (and especially in areas we hold) to ensure that such complexes are quickly discovered? Are there other bunkers out there holding WMDs or other things nastier than explosives?
When one begins with the expectation that perfection is possible, one fails more often than not. The [unobtainable] perfect is the enemy of the [obtainable] good.
June 3, 2005
The Goddess of Democracy
Tomorrow is the anniversary of the violent crushing of a democratic movement in China's Tienanmen Square. My prediction about the future: one day this statue will again stand in this spot - but made of marble - and the portrait of Mao will not.
June 2, 2005
Gulag? Not Quite
Rusty Shackleford notes:
[If you assume that everything reported about prisoner abuse at Guantanamo by the detainees themselves, and their defenders] is true then Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is a blemish on America's good name and a national shame which needs correcting.
He goes on to detail some of what happened at the gulag camps, and I'll spare you the nightmares: it can be compared only to the labor-death camps of the NAZIs and the North Koreans (and maybe the Chinese) for depravity and horror.
It is, in fact, not necessary to read any detail on what happened in real death and slave labor camps to realize that anyone making a comparison of Guantanamo's conditions to the conditions of the gulag has to be:
- rabidly anti-American,
- explicitly pro-terrorist,
- trying to excuse the Soviets' behavior,
- trying to convince people that Americans are utterly immoral and hypocritical,
- pandering to people who believe the above and could in some way aid the ones making the comparison
- vapid and ignorant
- woefully misinformed,
- or some combination of the above
I wonder which choice Amnesty International would pick? Posted by jeff at 10:16 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Road Map and Wall Blueprint
Scott at Powerline notes an interview by outgoing Israeli Defense Forces head Ya'alon with Ha'aretz. Ya'alon is convinced that the Palestinians intend to restart the terror war against Israel as soon as Israel stops withdrawing, whether that's after the Israeli pullout from Gaza, or at some later time. Scott ends with "In any event, it seems fair to ask where precisely this road map is leading."
Well, here is where it seems to be leading: the Israelis will pull completely out of Gaza, even turning over border security between Egypt and Gaza. At this point, it is quite likely that freedom of movement will be ended - not just remain restricted - between Gaza and Israel. Israel will pull out (perhaps in another year) from the West Bank as well, presumably abandoning the Jordan/West Bank border to Jordan. Freedom of movement will be ended across that wall as well. The walls around Gaza and the West Bank will become de facto borders of Israel.
This will drive the Palestinians nuts, thinking they are on the verge of victory and simultaneously angry about not being able to work in Israel, and they will launch attacks over the walls with rockets and mortar bombs and artillery (if they can get it). The Israelis will respond.
Meanwhile, the Europeans will be going nuts - how dare Israel impose the unilateral solution of ending freedom of movement between the poor Palestinian families divided by the wall? - and the war will continue. But it will look more like the artillery war that preceded the Six Day War than like the terror wars of the last 15 years.
If the Palestinians are too aggressive or very unlucky, the response to the coming artillery war may be the same as the response to the last one, and I suspect that the Israelis, if they had to reinvade the West Bank and Gaza, would drive the Palestinians out completely, into Jordan and Egypt. Israel is not prepared to countenance a resumption of occupation - and occupation is always about the people, not the land.
Sadly, I don't think that the Palestinians are prepared to stop short of the line that will cause just that outcome. They almost seem to be begging for destruction or being forced out.
May 28, 2005
Hanchongryon
Brian Dunn has a question:
[T]his makes no sense at all:As a matter of fact, yes, they do.
Earlier this month a few thousand members of Hanchongryon — South Korea's largest student group — staged a demonstration and tore down wire fences at an air force base in Gwangju, demanding the United States remove its Patriot missiles and withdraw from South Korea altogether.What kind of person do you have to be to protest against weapons designed to protect your country and people from a psychopathic gulag-master who regularly vows to turn your largest city and capital into a sea of fire? Seriously, do they get their marching orders from the Pillsbury Nuke Boy himself? This makes no sense at all.
Posted by jeff at 1:33 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack
May 26, 2005
Good News on Iraq
Given that Juan Cole, professor of history at the University of Michigan, has a history (no pun intended) of being about 150 degrees off on his predictions and analysis (at least, so far as anything concerning the Bush administration goes), this is very good news:
Therefore, I conclude that the United States is stuck in Iraq for the medium term, and perhaps for the long term. The guerrilla war is likely to go on a decade to 15 years. Given the basic facts, of capable, trained and numerous guerrillas, public support for them from Sunnis, access to funding and munitions, increasing civil turmoil, and a relatively small and culturally poorly equipped US military force opposing them, led by a poorly informed and strategically clueless commander-in-chief who has made himself internationally unpopular, there is no near-term solution.
We may not be there (at least, in an active combat role) nearly as long as I'd thought.
(hat tip: The Glittering Eye)
May 25, 2005
A Poor Legacy
Is it just my imagination, or are most of the really messed up places in the world either former French colonies or francophone? I'm just, you know, asking.
Indian Country
Bill Roggio talks about the US/Iraqi approach to pacifying western Iraq. This reminds me of another pacification effort the US fought more than 100 years ago. Then, as now, our advantages included numbers, technology, Western military doctrine, a recent history of success and fighting far from our homeland (thus protecting our civilian population). Then, as now, the enemy's advantages included fighting for their home ground (motivation, in other words), the ability to hide, knowledge of the area, and fanatical devotion to their cause.
Then, as apparently now, our strategy was to build forts, and operate mobile forces from those forts to destroy the enemy in the field. Later, we would move in with government civil institutions to push the enemy further outwards and hold the territory the enemy was forced to abandon. How did this previous effort turn out?
Posted by jeff at 8:50 AM | TrackBackMay 24, 2005
The News from Iraq
Michael Yon, embedded with the troops in Iraq, has a really interesting report on how newsgathering works outside of the embedding program, and why the news we see is so tilted towards mayhem. The problem seems to be structural: too much of an attempt at serving reporters on the military's part, combined with cheapness and risk-aversion on the media's part. But it's a critical problem, because the effect is to not tell the stories of our troops helping people in ordinary ways under extraordinary conditions, to not tell about finding homes for puppies after arresting a suspected terrorist.
And that skewed perspective eats at the heart of America's one weakness, our one demonstrated way of losing wars: public resolve. If all we see are the body counts, the lies, and the abuses (which are rare enough that two major incidents have been the touchstones for anti-military sentiment for two and over one years, respectively) - if that's all we see, then it's easy for those of us who are only barely convinced that the war is worth it, to become convinced on balance-of-harm or utilitarian grounds that the war is not worth the effort and the side effects.
Once that happens, we have lost. Even when, as in Viet Nam, we had already won militarily. And if that happens in this war, the next 9/11, the next 3/11, will not be a van loaded with explosives, or an airliner, or a series of suicide bombings. Those would happen, yes, for some time and with increasing severity. But if we stop prosecuting the war by ceasing to aggressively work to eliminate tyranny, then the next attack that shocks us will be nuclear, and it will be New York, or Chicago, or Seattle or Paris burning in ruin.
So to win this war, should we play down atrocities committed by Americans? No, but we shouldn't play them up, either - or in the case of Newsweek, make them up. Should we lie about how great the military is? No, we should tell the truth about how great our military is. Right now, our media is primarily telling only one side of this war: the enemy's side. And that has to stop.
Squeeze Play
Bill Roggio at Winds of Change has an excellent roundup on the results of Operation Squeeze Play, which was a primarily-Iraqi series of raids over the past few days on enemy personnel and sites in the vicinity of Baghdad.
The most important information (in terms of indicating the direction the war is going) is that the enemy had been infiltrated, and was completely surprised by the operation (indicating that the Iraqi forces weren't infiltrated). This means that the Iraqis are winning the intelligence/counter-intelligence battle, which is the key of defeating the mixed insurgency/guerilla/terrorist campaign we see in Iraq.
Combined with the increased freedom of action coalition troops have, which has allowed them recently to start going into known insurgent areas like Fallujah and along the Syrian border, indications are that Iraq is nearing a tipping point, after which the insurgency will lose cohesion rapidly. I would expect to see this, barring any unforeseen changes in the world situation, within the next year.
UPDATE: Michael Ubaldi comes to a similar conclusion.
May 20, 2005
Police Involvement in 3/11 Bombings?
It is often the case that things that appear suspicious are really coincidental. It's a big world, and a lot of things are going on, and especially in small societies, there is a multitude of connections between people and organizations. But possible involvement of Spanish police in the 3/11 train bombings in Madrid is a scary thought. It will be interesting to see where this goes. The most worrisome thing to me is that the bombings might have been a sophisticated, rather than a crude, plot to bring down the Spanish government. (More here - link from Adventures of Chester's post)
Posted by jeff at 11:16 AM | TrackBackTwo Possibilities
There are two possibilities: this NY Times report on prisoner abuse in Afghanistan is substantially correct, or it is substantially incorrect.
If the former, there are some of our guys who need to be put in prison, at least, for a very long time. If the latter, there are some NY Times reporters who need the same.
Unfortunately, given what was already previously known, I'm betting it's the former. What a damned shame. Inexecusable.
UPDATE: Blackavar says everything I would care to fairly well.
Ongoing Discussion
There's a great discussion going on in the comments to this post about peace, war, and so forth, between myself and kj.
September 15, 2003
How to Look at the War on Terror
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David Horowitz has a magnificent essay in FrontPageMag (hat tip: Mrs. du Toit), dealing with perceptions of the war on terror, the importance of being on the offense, and where help can be found. Apropos that last point:
The way to think about the war on terror is to ask yourself who is supporting President Bush and the American military in this life and death engagement, and who is not?Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBack
Help is certainly not coming from the European nations who armed and then appeased Saddam Hussein and opposed the liberation of Iraq and who now refuse to aid America in securing the peace.Far worse, with exception of fading candidates like Joe Lieberman and John Edwards, it is certainly not coming from the leaders of the Democratic Party who from the moment Baghdad was liberated have with ferocious intensity attacked the credibility of America's commander-in-chief, the justification for our mission in Iraq, and the ability of our forces to prevail.
September 13, 2003
Threshhold
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Required reading: Belmont Club on the nuclear threshhold in the age of terrorism. I've long felt, like James Lileks, that it is inevitable that we will lose a city to nuclear terrorist attack some time in the next 20 years. Wretchard follows the chain of logic to demonstrate why, once the Islamists demonstrate the capability, the rational response is the immediate and total destruction of the Muslim world.
Actually, I think that there is a more measured response that might avoid this. If you look at the Muslim countries, there are four basic tiers in which they fall: nations with intent against the West and with WMD capability in place or close (Iran, Syria, Pakistan?); nations with intent against the West but no WMD capability (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia); nations with no pronounced intent towards the West, but with WMD capability (Pakistan?); and nations with neither pronounced intent against the West, nor WMD capability, though often with insurgent anti-Western forces within the country (Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait). The question about Pakistan's intent is whether they will be able to resist the Islamists, or will give them help to keep them away from Pakistan itself, or will fall to the Islamists.
If a nuclear terrorist attack were launched within the US or Europe, every city in a first tier nation with more than 10000 people could be obliterated, along with their entire military and major economic targets (occupying those critical to us and destroying the rest). This would almost certainly remove their ability to strike at us again. Then we could watch the second tier countries, and let them know that any attempt to acquire WMDs would cause them to meet the same fate. At that point, it could either go towards an outright race to acquire WMDs to use against the West, or the moderates could take over and the Muslims could roll over. If the former, we could obliterate the second tier countries, and mop up anything left over in the first tier countries. If, at that point, there was still a valid attempt to acquire the means to act against the West, we could push to the extremity of the analysis and eliminate every Muslim nation - a nuclear genocide.
This would, needless to say, be very bad politically, economically and socially. However, it would still be better than being destroyed ourselves. By putting in detents in the escalation scheme, we could potentially avoid the worst-case scenario, though I don't hold great faith in the ability of extremists to see reason.
UPDATE (9/21): Belmont Club offers a postscript and some reader response. As clarification of my comments, I agree with Belmont Club's statement that "If Islam desires the secret of the stars it must embrace the kuffar as its brother -- or die." I am simply positing that it is not necessarily the case that, once nuclear exchanges start, they can only end with the destruction of every Muslim state. I believe that cutting the heart out of the Muslim states - the destruction of the radicalised Arab states in particular - would do it. If not, we would eventually get to Belmont Club's end state: Islam - and much else - would be gone.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackSeptember 11, 2003
Class Act
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This is the difference between the Germans and the French: the Germans have class. Even though the US and Germany currently disagree over some things, we still fundamentally remain friends. I'm not certain that the US and France have ever been of like mind, really.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackAugust 22, 2003
The Real Reason for the Iraq Campaign
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Tom Friedman is generally either really wacko, or dead on, depending on the day. Today, he's dead on. Today's article is about why we really went to war in Iraq, why we didn't use our real reasons as jusitification, and what it means.
As Mr. Stothard recalled the scene outside Mr. Blair's office: "the prime minister takes a walk out into the hall and stands, shaking out his limbs, between [his political adviser] Sally Morgan's door and a dark oil painting of Pitt the Younger. . . . Morgan is away from her desk. [Mr. Blair] looks into the empty interior as if the answer to the latest state of the vote count will emerge from her filing cabinets nonetheless. He comes back out, disappointed, and looks around him. `What amazes me,' [Mr. Blair says,] `is how many people are happy for Saddam to stay. They ask why we don't get rid of [the Zimbabwean leader Robert] Mugabe, why not the Burmese lot. Yes, let's get rid of them all. I don't because I can't, but when you can you should.' "Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackAlas, Mr. Blair never really made this case to his public. Why not? Because the British public never would have gone to war for the good reasons alone. Why not? Because the British public had not gone through 9/11 and did not really feel threatened, because it demanded a U.N. legal cover for any war and because it didn't like or trust George Bush.
Yes, what takes me aback here is the degree of European-style anti-Americanism and anti-Bushism in Britain — which Mr. Blair's personal and overt pro-Americanism has disguised. "Blair had a real George Bush problem," says John Chipman, director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. "George Bush is disliked by a large segment of the British public. He offends the European sense of nuance. The favorite European color is gray and the only colors President Bush recognizes are black and white. So in supporting the war, Blair was not just going against European public opinion, he was going against his own."
...
Unless real W.M.D.'s are found in Iraq, Gulf War II will for now and for years to come be known as "the controversial Gulf War II" — and the hyped reasons for the war will obscure the still good ones. Only future historians will be able to sort out this war's ultimate validity. It is too late or too early for the rest of us.
It's too late, because no one will ever know what Saddam would've done had Messrs Blair and Bush not acted. And it's too early, because the good reasons for this war — to unleash a process of reform in the Arab-Muslim region that will help it embrace modernity and make it less angry and more at ease with the world — will take years to play out.
August 20, 2003
I'm Actually Not Surprised
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Mrs. Du Toit and Dean Esmay are agog at this Samizdata post.
Communist leaders plan to amend China's constitution to formally enshrine the ideology of Jiang Zemin, the recently retired leader who invited capitalists to join the Communist Party. Despite sweeping economic and social changes, the political status of China's entrepreneurs is still ambiguous.There have been no details of the possible changes although foreign analysts say they include the communist era's first guarantee of property rights. Certain amendments are still needed to promote economic and social development [emphasis in original], said the party newspaper People's Daily. It said the changes were meant to cope with accelerating globalization and advances in science and technology.
Jiang's theory, the awkwardly named "Three Represents," calls for the 67 million-member party to embrace capitalists, updating its traditional role as a "vanguard of the working class" and for the constitution to formally uphold property rights and the rights of entrepreneurs.
Actually, it doesn't surprise me one bit. I've been arguing for years that China is likely on the road to becoming a free capitalist country, which is why I said this in March: "those nations which adopted Western values (including Israel, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan - and possibly including China)".
Before I get into why and when I came to this conclusion, I should disclose that I lived in Taiwan for 4 years, though I was young enough that I mostly remember the NCO club, where I won a prize for the best joke ("Why did the elephant sit on the fence? So he wouldn't fall into the hot chocolate." -- I told you I was young!), the one-handed monkey in the cage outside the ground-floor garage of the Hai Shan guest house, the pigs in the alley behind it, picking up tile pieces with my Dad near where they were building the apartments, our dog, the nuns at the Catholic kindergarten, breaking my arm - in other words, no hint of politics. Even the language is fairly completely gone now. I don't claim special understanding of China from this.
When the Tiananmen Square disaster happened, I was horrified, believing that China's actions were totally without merit or redemption. While I still believe that the killing of students in cold blood - using the PLA against the people for the first time - was immoral and reprehensible, I do understand its one merit, now: China is not Russia. Could you imagine the disaster that would have befallen Asia had China liberalized a la perestroika? China is far more backwards even now than Russia was in the late 1980s, and has less coping mechanisms against disaster. The fault in Russia and much of the rest of the former USSR (and to a much lesser extent the Eastern European countries) was that they went from near-total state control to near anarchy without any intervening cushion or even education. As a result, Russia was effectively taken over by gangsters, and almost fell into civil war and utter disaster. The ongoing fighting in Chechnya shows how close Russia can still be to that abyss.
Had that happened in China, with its 1 billion population, and a still mostly-agrarian and rural economy, the dead would have numbered in the tens of millions - possibly in the hundreds of millions if the society dissolved into another civil war. If nothing else, Tienanmen gave the Chinese leadership - at that time already beginning liberalization - the ability to ease into the process.
The Chinese have never been free. Even in Taiwan, under US tutelege, freedom only really came in the last 15 to 20 years. Hong Kong, under the British, and Macao, under the Portugese?, were too small to provide examples to a country the size of China. In the West, before the idea of freedom became established, there were about 700 years of increasing freedom and the building of institutions to allow a country to stably exist with political and economic freedom. Increasing property rights, rights of trade, limitations of the rights of the nobility, the rise of banking and the middle class, the standardization of rates of exchange and all of the the other myriad items that make it possible to have a free nation, were built up slowly in the West.
The USSR had tried to build up parallel institutions, with similar names but dissimilar attitudes, rights, powers and behaviors. As a result, suddently set free, the system imploded. The same or worse would have happened in China - particularly in the aftermath of the "Great Leap Forward." If you look at China's actions - gradual implementation of a limited free market in a limited area, then expanding both the area and the freedom of the market, putting Western banking structures (including lending, interest and contract enforcement rights) further into effect and the like - well, to me anyway it looks like China is on a 50-year program to become a capitalist, multiparty, probably-federal republic. I believe that the next steps we will see, as the economy grows and the population begins to urbanize, is an expansion of the local voting for councils, followed by the establishment of semi-autonomous provinces (still under the Communist Party) with their own governments and powers. Greater industrialization, driven from the ground up by the opening market and from the top down by divestiture of industries over time, will bring greater wealth, and with it a true middle class. The growth of the middle class and the decreasing control of the central government will bring calls for greater and greater degrees of representation by the people. In particular, it will bring calls for a loosening of the very controls that keep the government in power: control over the press, the religions and so on.
At this point, China will face a crisis, and the Communist Party will have two choices: allow multi-party elections or fall to internal revolution. And because China has not yet faced that crisis, and we don't know what sort of leader will be in power when they do, it's too soon to tell whether or not China will eventually be a free nation.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackAugust 14, 2003
Aftermath
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We are in the aftermath of the Cold War, and it is time for us to recalculate how global security is to be maintained. The institutions of the Cold War - the UN, NATO and other standing multinational alliances, proxy warfare, and the spectre of Mutually Assured Destruction - were sufficient to the task of keeping the world from descending into a third world war, by providing the incentives and methods to step down before a hot war could start between major powers.
Those institutions, though, are simply not up to the task of dealing with today's challenges:
- The UN - in the guise of the IAEA and the NPT - are incapable of stopping states from developing nuclear weapons - even near-absolute pariahs like North Korea. The spread of chemical and biological weapons is even broader, and these are very dangerous against cities or in confined areas (for example, Israel is very threatened by these weapons, because it is so small, and so close to enemies which have at least chemical weapons).
- NATO has proven to be unable to cope with security problems in their own backyard, unless the US decides to be the prime mover. As a result, the crises in the Balkans in the 1990s spiralled out of control until the US decided to intervene. This is not surprising, since NATO was really designed as a defensive alliance against invasion, rather than as a European guarantor of peace.
- No organizations or mechanisms exist to try to solve the problem of terrorism. Indeed, member states of the UN have used this as a tactic against other member states in order to keep just this side of overtly attacking their neighbors (think Syria and Israel, for one example).
- The UN has proven incapable of restraining agression between states. In the few cases where inter-state aggression has been challenged, the challenge has come from the US, using the UN, and would have happened without UN sanction. (Indeed, in the cases of the recent Iraq campaign and Kosovo, there was no UN sanction.) I cannot think of any examples of successful UN-sanctioned interventions which did not involve the US, unless the British action in Sierra Leone was conducted under UN mandate.
- The UN has proven incapable of preventing genocide and massacres, even when their troops were ostensibly protecting the victims. (Search google for 'un peacekeepers massacre "failed to prevent"' and look at the shameful roster.)
What is needed is a new framework for securing the world. The outline of such a framework is beginning to emerge.
One pillar of a new security regime would be local intervention by regional powers. The US would provide the backing force to ensure that the interventions didn't fail. The Australian interventions throughout Oceania are an example of how this can be done. The US is also really pushing the West African states (via ECOMIL), particularly Nigeria, to take up regional security in West Africa. This is how the Liberian operation is being handled, with a relatively-small US force on the ground, and a much larger force offshore, supporting the ECOMIL intervention.
It is up in the air whether Britain would be a power in its own right or part of the EU. If Britain elects to remain independent, they most likely would retain some global role. I don't see the EU, though, engaging in any activities outside of Europe and maybe North Africa. At least it can be hoped that the EU can be convinced not to sponsor and aid terrorists and dictators.
South Africa, Brazil, India, Iran (after its regime is changed), Turkey, the EU, and Japan all need to be brought on board to this philosophy, and helped in its implementation. Together with Australia and the US, this would allow for a spread of free-market, representative, and secular government to bring long-term stability, on the backs of the regional powers to create the short-term (5-10 years) conditions for that stability to arise.
The regional powers, acting in concert with the United States and with each other, would be able to create and enforce the peace, spread good government and good economics, and in general lift the prospects of much of the world's population. In the circumstances where this is not enough, the US could intervene decisively, and undertake the 20-year plus projects (as it did with Germany, Japan and South Korea, and is now doing in Iraq).
For those states which are in-between, neither failed nor free - including Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, Vietnam, some of the African countries, and so on - the US and regional powers could apply economic and military leverage (both cooperative and coercive, as needed) to push them in the right direction. In particular, these states are likely capable of doing a great deal in the fight against terrorism and WMD proliferation, and many of them could liberalize without falling into anarchy, though their lives may literally have to depend on it first.
I believe that this kind of arrangement could result in a generally-stable world in the long-term, with the threat of international terrorism and WMD proliferation decreasing over time and the threat of international wars declining even faster, although Africa would remain a basket case for quite a while, I suspect. Of course, in the shorter term, the world would have to be made deliberately unstable, and that will be strongly resisted. The old arrangements of the UN and NATO and similar alliances would dissolve, with coalitions of the willing - generally the regional powers and the US, with maybe a few other states along - coming together as needed instead.
I think that this is the outline that the British, US and Australians are pushing towards, and I hope for success. The alternative - nuclear terrorism - is too horrible to contemplate.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackThe Significance of Iraq
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Belmont Club has a great article on the significance of Iraq in the war on terror, Europe's role in Iraq in the wake of the UN bombing, and how the war on terror differs from past conflicts.
The engagement between US forces and a coalition of Ba'ath and Islamist elements has thrown up a bundle of ratlines -- the threads of cells, clandestine routes and support structures which are the basic tactical units in this war. But unlike wars of the past, tactical units are not engaged linearly. The prosecution of a ratline discovered in Mosul is not geographically confined to Iraq but may immediately translate to action in Amman, the West Bank, Thailand, the High Seas or Buffalo, New York. In this deadly game, cells are not always destroyed but sometimes turned. The "sting" operation aimed at corralling arms dealers selling surface to air missiles is one example. And the overall aim of the War is not the physical death of Islamic militants per se so much as the corruption and weakening of their organization and parent regimes. Nor is this effect imaginary. The seismic effect of the War on Terror can be gauged from the upheavals in Riyadh and Teheran.Thomas Friedman has accidentally hit upon the key strategic value of Iraq in the War on Terror. It is a rich recruiting ground of Arab intelligence assets. It is bursting with ratlines. Iraq is valuable to America because it is full of Kurds and Arabs -- the raw material of the American sword. America is in Iraq for the very same reason that Al-Qaeda set up shop in London, Berlin and Paris: to seize human beachheads in the heart of enemy territory. As such Iraq is both flypaper and springboard and has the potential to be a decisive battleground in and of itself. The War on Terror is a struggle for the hearts of hundreds of millions. Its task is not to turn Arabs into imitation Americans so much as to create the conditions under which Muslims can reconsider and remodel their whole culture. In the process, every regime in the Middle East will be shaken to its very core. Ruling houses will fall. Boundaries will be redrawn. America herself will be transformed in ways that no one understands.
(Hat tip: One Hand Clapping)
And if you're not yet convinced that you should be reading Belmont Club, let me offer this quote from another post, on the capture of Hambali:
The one thing which plastic surgery could not hide were the strange men who Hambali's neighbors noticed visiting his apartment. Men who stood out in that carefree Thai tourist town with an aura of earnestness; whose backgrounds, once examined by the alerted police didn't quite add up. Every clandestine operator should know the danger: the unmistakable signature of a coven of true believers caught like deer in the headlights by accidental intrusion of neighbors from the workaday world. But Hambali did not.As he returned to his apartment on his last night of freedom, other men forged in equally strange but different ways foregathered in the dark. They, too, had walked the hills of Afghanistan; they too had found a brotherhood. They too were prophets from another place. Hard-muscled and in mufti, they were joined by trusted members of the Thai police. Hambali's neighbors recalled the urgent knocks on the door answered only by silence. After an interval a crash and the sounds of a struggle before silence returned anew.
And then there's this, from a post on al Qaeda's recent attempts at reconstitution and counter-attack, and the Left's reaction to al Qaeda:
At no point since 1940 has the Left been forced to into such an absurd position. Just as Hitler and Stalin had to be portrayed as beneficent when they were patently predators soley to satisfy ideological requirements, the Left must project the simultaneous image of an omnipotent and helpless America; of a War on Terror at once unwinnable and yet too easily won by a bullying United States. The Islamic "militants" must be portrayed as both supermen and victims, and the Left the soul of reason. But absurdities are familiar friends to true believers; and the Left are the neediest of all the faithful.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBack
August 12, 2003
The Saudi Civil War
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It has been said by many that the war on terror is really just an Arab civil war (between socialist Pan-Arab nationalists and fascist Islamist militants), exported to the world to keep the Muslims from killing each other. Saudi Arabia is the microcosm of this - and in fact its source. The Wahabbi sect provides the house of Sa'ud with legitimacy, and the house of Sa'ud in return exports Wahabbism around the world.
Adam Sullivan at the Karmic Inquisition has some thoughts on how we can turn this to our advantage, inciting the civil war within Saudi Arabia, and using that to cut off the financing of the Islamists.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackA Lesson the French Could Learn
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My friend Nathan is a wargamer. He particularly enjoys large and complex games, with a good range of strategic thinking necessary to win. A story he tells has to do with such a game, World in Flames. World in Flames represents the time leading up to WWII, and all of WWII, all over the world. Nathan, playing France, had been very careful in setting up his power in the Mediterranean in the mid-1930s, and when Italy started to get a little too adventurous, he moved. Positioning a large force off of Italy just South of Rome, Nathan told the Italian player - who knew his capital was going to be taken, his army cut in half, and his navy eliminated if he fought under the prevailing balance of forces - to remove his army from the border with France, and by the way give up Sicily and Naples, too. The Italian player asked what Nathan would give him for these concessions, and Nathan's answer was, "Nothing." When the Italian player - incredulous - asked, "Why not?", Nathan's answer was classic: "I don't have to."
And that is the first story I think about when I read things like Steven Den Beste's post on maneuvering at the UN. The real France could learn a lesson from Nathan's game, I think.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackDistributed Defense
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Terrorism is not an enemy. Terrorism is a tactic. Terrorists are enemies, and we are tracking them down and killing them, depriving them of finances and bases of support, and generally making their life miserable as best we can. We are, as far as I can tell from what I'm able to find in the press and in conversations with people who are involved, doing a pretty good job of that.
We appear to be failing, though, to get homeland security right. Partially, this is because we are acting like threatened cats: puffing ourselves up to look bigger and scarier than we really are. Hence the inconveniences at airports, many of which add more to the appearance of security than to its actual efficacy. Partially, too, this is because we don't know what we are doing yet. There are a lot of lessons to learn. And partially, this is because we are facing an unprecedented threat: any of the uncountable soft targets in our very infrastructure-dependent society can be attacked by a small number of determined people, with easily-acquired and concealed weapons, at the time of their choosing.
Large, complex and distributed systems - whether deliberately-created like our electrical system or created as a side-effect of something else like our cities and towns - are the result of competing forces. There are four major forces to consider, particularly in deliberately-created systems: scalability, redundancy, managability and cost. Scalability requires local control; redundancy requires excess capacity; managability (or, more often, the appearance of managability) improves with centralized control; cost increases with excess capacity and overheads incurred to put layers of management (or accountability, if you want to phrase it a bit differently) on top of a distributed system. Cost also includes non-monetary costs, particularly in non-deliberate systems. Obviously, any such system will be a compromise.
Our government (itself a large, complex and somewhat distributed system) is, like all governments I am aware of, highly centralizing: all problems are taken to the highest possible level, and the solutions generated there are filtered down to the lower levels. (I realize that this is not how we were supposed to be, and it's not how the Constitution envisions things, but think for a moment about the Federal government's power over education alone - one of the most local issues possible - and tell me that I am wrong about the reality.) This is because being able to put the finger of blame on a guilty party (or a plausible scapegoat) requires centralization, and this is more important in the government than anything else, including the efficacy of any particular program. This is even true of the Department of Defense during wartime - look at the headhunting for who was "at fault" for the pause in operations during the sandstorms of the Iraq campaign's second week.
It so happens that a natural emergent feature of free-market democracies is a tendency to create very distributed systems. This arises out of people having similar entreprenurial ideas, which then grow together over time as they mutually reinforce. The resulting systems, as they tie together, are often chaotic, spread over large areas, with no central locus of control and typically an unusual amount of excess capacity. Such systems are very vulnerable to terrorist attack, because the critical points of the system are so numerous that it is impossible to defend them all all of the time, yet a successful attack on any one will cause great damage. Note that this works for the population as a whole in democracies as well, where freedom of movement and freedom to choose where you live combine to create a difficult-to-control pattern of population. Will the attack come on a bus? At a mall or a supermarket? At the theater? Which one?
In some systems, particularly those with high up front costs to enter the market, and low marginal costs to operate, the tendency is towards corporate monopoly. The government tends to regulate in such a way as to increase accountability and extract either politcal points or revenue or both from the system (both of which are disincentives to running a system that is not as lean as possible), rather than to decrease central control and add excess capacity. Finally, the profit motive leads costs to be cut on any system wherever possible, and excess capacity costs money.
The result of all of these tendencies is that a single bit of equipment at a single switching station at the right place on the power grid can shut down power for several states, and a single pumping station at a single pipeline, chosen correctly, can leave a major metropolitan area without water. Any large, complex, widely-distributed system has such vulnerabilities, and any such system is virtually impossible to defend. Winds of Change has an article listing several such systems and linking to analyses well worth reading. They also link to an article which has a quote which sums up the problem:
As they do not see, behind the benefits of civilisation, marvels of invention and construction which can only be maintained by great effort and foresight, they imagine that their role is limited to demanding these benefits peremptorily, as if they were natural rights. - Jose Ortega y Gasset from The Revolt of the Masses
Actually, though, it is possible to build complex, widely-distributed systems which are capable of withstanding terrorist attacks, or even nuclear attacks. In fact, the Internet was designed to survive and retain some capability during a nuclear attack. It should be noted that the Internet was originally known as ARPAnet, and was created by the same agency that thought up the idea of a futures market for predicting terrorist attacks.
The way that the Internet was intended to work is that each network would be connected to multiple other networks, and the traffic would flow freely through all of the networks. This ensured that there were multiple paths for data to travel. If Dallas were offline, the packet would be automatically routed around Dallas. If the network segment between two points was overloaded, a more circuitous route would be taken to equalize the load. This model was abandoned, however, when companies took over the Internet to all practical purposes, and it was abandoned for two reasons: cost and security. You see, how do you explain to the boss that it's a good idea to route someone else's traffic through your network, and to let them do the same? Wouldn't it be better - cheaper and safer - to allow internal traffic out any connection, but not to allow outside traffic in unless its destination was inside the company itself? And if you filter the traffic through DMZs protected by firewalls, so much the better, because that makes it more difficult to have your systems hacked.
The problem is, though, that this dramatically reduces connectivity, because your traffic will only flow out through the connections you have to your providers, and along their networks to their destinations. And of course, it wasn't long before the backbone providers cut their costs by combining capacity into larger (usually shared) cables for long-distance hauls, and putting switching for several providers all in the same few locations, so that they could exchange traffic with each other in order to connect the whole Internet. As a result of the corporate actions to seal off their networks (effectively making themselves leaf nodes, even if they were leafs on multiple branches), and the backbone providers' actions to limit their costs and increase their interconnections with other backbone providers, I suspect I could eliminate about 75% of the US Internet connectivity by attacking just 2 to 4 NAPs. In fact, it might be possible to do most of this just by attacking MAE-East. There's nothing inherent in the technology which prevents us from adding the additional wire capacity, switching locations and routing to make the Internet impossible to take down except in a purely local sense. There are cost and control reasons that prevent us from doing it, though.
The electrical system has similar problems, as we've recently had demonstrated yet again. The energy distribution system has similar problems. The water system has similar problems, although they would be more difficult to fix, because of the limited sources of supply. This would require the government to focus on scalability and redundancy, allow for further decentralization of resource control and management, and offset the portion of the costs which would not be commercially recoverable (rather than mandating a hidden tax on businesses to comply with regulations). Sadly, the natural tendency of government is in the opposite direction.
For defending the people, though, the problem is somewhat different, because you cannot "add redundancy" in a meaningful sense. You must defend the population. The government is certainly doing a good job, as far as I can tell, going after the current and emerging terrorists, but it has not taken some critical steps to allow the population to defend itself. The government realizes that it cannot be everywhere - certainly that is a point that Secretary Rumsfeld has made more than once - but it has not taken the step to trusting the people to defend themselves, and encouraging them to do so.
And this is where the Bush administration has failed us in homeland defense. The administration is attempting to defend all of these systems by itself, and in general is doing so the way a government would: it is trying to increase controls and accountability, without concern for costs, scalability or redundancy. Worse, the government is actively interfering in a great many activities (mostly gun-related) that people could undertake in their own defense. Since these kinds of actions are the kinds that would be naturally appealing to a conservative administration, this makes the situation doubly-damned.
I first saw the key to solving these problems stated by Glenn Reynolds:
So the snipers that paralyzed and terrorized the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area are caught now. But it's worth thinking about how they were caught. After repeatedly slipping through the fingers of law enforcement, John Muhammad and Lee Salvo were caught because leaked information about the suspects' automobile and license number was picked up by members of the public, one of whom spotted the car within hours and alerted the authorities - blocking the exit from the rest area with his own vehicle to make sure they didn't escape. "You can deputize a nation," said one news official after the fact.
Yes. With proper information, the public can act against terrorists - often, as we found on September 11, faster and more effectively than the authorities. The key, as Jim Henley noted, is to "make us a pack, not a herd."
The problem is that this goes against the very grain of intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, and so on. Within bureaucracies in general - and doubly within intelligence and law enforcement bureaucracies - information is power, and power isn't something you want to share. And if you deputize a nation, doesn't that make the official deputies just a little bit less special?
The problem with this mindset is that it's all about bureaucratic turf, and not about getting the job done. Otherwise we'd have learned the lesson long ago.
To coin a phrase: indeed.
The actions the government should be taking in homeland defense should be focused on giving individual citizens the power to defend themselves and their infrastructure.
For the infrastructure, excess capacity beyond what the market may support normally must be built in, and this capacity must be linked through a highly-redundant web of distribution channels. In some cases, such as with the water supply, the necessary work can be done entirely by the government, since it is governments (mostly local, in this case) which control the existing systems. In other cases, such as with the electrical systems, the government needs to give incentives for building in additional capacity and distribution channels to make the systems more robust.
For the population, the government needs to encourage the population to arm itself with handguns and long arms; to offer training in spotting bombs, recognizing vulnerabilities, emergency medical care, planning in advance for contingencies and the like; and to give us the information we need to understand and react to threats. Note: the government should not try to control or direct these activities, just to encourage them. If the government were to pick a one-size-fits-all solution, we'd be no better off than we are now.
For example, when the DC snipers were on the loose, I marvelled that we didn't have pairs of armed citizens on every street corner, with more patrolling the spaces between. At the very least, such an active defense would have made the snipers' jobs more difficult, and might have forced them out of the area entirely. We don't have a militia in this country any more, but we need one. A pack, not a herd.
UPDATE (8/19): Armed Liberal comments, and I have a brief response in the comments section there.
(And no, the National Guard is not a successor to the militia; it is a state-controlled reserve force for the Federal military, with additional duties for disaster relief.)
July 24, 2003
Beaten Like Rented Mules
Note: this is a post recovered from my old blog, before it died of an insufficient backup. Any comments/trackbacks on it have not been brought over, but can be seen with the original. The date is that of the original posting.
When President Carter came into office, the military was in utter shock. Viet Nam had been a military victory over the original enemy, the Viet Cong; but the victory had been so pyrrhic, so domestically divisive, and so fragile (in that we never removed the threat of invasion by the N. Vietnamese army) that most Americans didn't realize that it was a military victory at all. When this was combined with the political defeat - not rearming the South, nor remaining to defend them, followed by President Ford abandoning them altogether (not even offshore air support) in the face of the North Vietnamese invasion of 1975 - it led to a complete collapse of confidence in the ability of the military to function. This loss of confidence was prevalent throughout the military at all ranks, in the society at large, and in particular in the foreign/defense policy community.
The Democrats had made their decision by the early 1970s: the military was to blame for all the evils of the Viet Nam war, no credit was to be had by anyone - and particularly not by the Republicans, who had extracted us from Viet Nam (as promised by Nixon in 1968). There is a bit of irony here, in that it was the muscular liberal Democrats - the Harry Truman/Scoop Jackson wing - which had gotten us into Viet Nam, continually escalated our involvement and then refused to carry the war to the North (thus eventually costing us the war). But this wing of the Democratic party was also in the doldrums - in shock at the conduct and outcome of the war, and sidelined by the McGovernites and the radical fringe groups he had brought with him into control of the party.
Carter immediately set about gutting the military, and purging its ranks. This was done by the simple expedient of cutting funding, ignoring his military advisors and publically and frequently talking down to the military establishment.
The foreign/defense policy expertise built up by the Democrats resided in the now-discredited Scoop Jackson wing of the party, and the Carter administration ignored their advice on almost every policy issue of substance. As a result of this and the cost of fighting the war, by the end of the Carter administration, the military had lost a generation of equipment upgrades, had had their warfighting doctrine shattered, and had their reputation publically trampled by their Commander in Chief. The military was in total shock, and the country was not far behind. The economy was also in the toilet (double digit inflation, unemployment and interest rates), and the word most used to describe America was "malaise."
President Reagan was not elected by such a broad margin because of the Iran hostage crisis; that was just a symptom of the malaise. Reagan offered hope. Reagan pointed to the vision of our better selves, to the "shining city on a hill," and called on America to become that city. He made us believe that we were better than we thought of ourselves. It really felt like morning in America, after a long, dark night.
One of the things Reagan did was to make it clear that we were going to defeat Communism, to win the Cold War, and that to do this we needed a robust and confrontational foreign policy, and a large, well-equipped and well-led military. Reagan remade the military command structure, brought pride back into military service, upgraded the military's equipment, fixed a large number of logistical problems and gave the military a mission, which brought forth the Air-Land Battle doctrine. In doing all of this, Reagan reached out to the Democrats' Scoop Jackson wing. Today's neo-cons were called "Reagan Democrats" in the early 1980s.
Schools, and even colleges, don't really teach foreign and defense policy. The closest most get is history, and that field has largely been taken over at the academic level by people who fear and distrust not just America, but the idea of America. The foreign and defense policy cadres of a party are trained by the generation that preceeded them. Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle and the like were trained by the foreign/defense policy wonks of the Johnson administration, who had themselves been trained by the Truman administration.
Because the "Reagan Democrats" left the party in droves, and came over to the Republicans, there was a generational break in policy development within the Democratic party. Perle and Wolfowitz and the like have trained not Democratic, but Republican policy makers. The Democrats simply don't have much expertise left.
The prominent names in the Democratic party for foreign and defense policy would have to be Sam Nunn, Leon Fuerth, and Richard Holbrooke. Sam Nunn seems to be out of politics. (He had been involved with a program at Georgia Tech, but that seems to have been cancelled, or at least scaled back, in the last year or so.) There is no Democratic equivalent to the think tanks and sponsorship and mentoring that allow Republicans to develop and hone the skills and gain the experience needed to craft policy at the highest levels.
Porphyrogenitus comments as well, though I think he misses one point. The pool of people who develop the national grand strategy is very small, and non-partisan. Note that the current grand strategy, that of bringing democratic self-government to failed states, began to take shape under Clinton, with the policies of pre-emption (then called forward engagement) and regime change taking shape. Note that President Bush came in disavowing that strategy, yet has since 9/11 not just embraced it, but extended it, to include the concepts of equivalence (treating sponsors of terrorism as terrorists), denial of nuclear weapons to dictatorships (still being worked out in regards to North Korea, which obtained them before Bush came into office) and ad-hoc coalitions to settle specific problems (replacing reliance on the UN, NATO and other permanent internationalist organizations). Because of the nature under which the grand strategy is developed, it is likely to change slowly and infrequently. By and large, both parties will adopt the goals the grand strategy sets.
The problem is at the level of strategy to implement those goals. It is here that Steven Den Beste's overview plays out. If you accept Steven's summary, as I would venture to say most supporters of the Iraq campaign would, as being plausible, then you basically align with the President's method of waging the greater war on terrorism so far. If not, and most opponents of the war apparently would not, you would want to take a radically different approach. And this is the level at which the Democrats have totally failed to be able to make coherent policy, likely to improve America's security situation.
Instead, this is what passes for Democratic thought on foreign policy. The whole focus is on how wrong America is, how much we are to blame, how irresponsible we are, how we need to make room for the adults (the UN and Europeans) to rule the world. This is just not a policy that the broad majority of Americans will accept. It is the policy that brings people into the streets to protest capitalism, democracy and personal liberty, and it is a policy relies on the hatred of not just America, but the idea of America.
This is not just, as Trent would apparently have it, a problem for the Democrats; it is a problem for America. It's a problem for America precisely because, as long as we are at war and the Democrats don't have a serious foreign policy team, the Republicans will "beat[] them like rented mules." The political competition between the two parties is what keeps the Right from imposing social conformity according to their religious doctrine, and the Left from imposing dictatorship and tearing down capitalism according to their political doctrine. This competition is good for us, and we as a nation will suffer for the lack of it.
Yet there will be little competition in national elections as long as we are at war, and the Democrats are unserious about national security. The Democrats had a chance to figure this out in 2002, but instead chose to go with the fantasy ideology of believing that they weren't pure enough on the Left, and immediately elevated Nancy Pelosi to control of the Democrats in the House. This was a sure signal, and it was followed by the appearance of Dean and Kucinich and Kerry as contenders in the presidential nomination process. The Democrats will have another chance to figure this out after their forthcoming humiliation in 2004. I really hope that such a beating is sufficient to get the Democrats to change direction, because if they don't we could all be "dead and damned" - not just the Democrats.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackJuly 23, 2003
The War on Bad Philosophy
Note: this is a post recovered from my old blog, before it died of an insufficient backup. Any comments/trackbacks on it have not been brought over, but can be seen with the original. The date is that of the original posting.
Armed Liberal termed this conflict we are in, in all of its manifestations, the War on Bad Philosophy. Prime Minister Blair has laid out a very strong, classically liberal, Enlightenment-derived case for what we must do to win the war.
I initially approached this war from a very pragmatic and realpolitik viewpoint: we were attacked, and we have to kill those who attacked us. I still believe that that is a valid viewpoint, but I have been beginning to think that it is an incomplete view - in fact that it is the lesser view. The greater, the more important view is that we - not just Americans, but we free peoples who inherited the Enlightenment, who built true freedom and prosperity not only here, but in nations once our enemies - we all have an idealistic responsibility to make all people free. Only when all people are free - when all nations are able to stand up proudly and say that they chose their government and their government serves them - then and only then will we be able to call this war done.
It is a huge undertaking, and it requires two precursors to bring it about: a stated philosophy, and an institution dedicated to achieving the principles of that philosophy. So here are my questions:
What are the hallmarks of a free person? What must a person be able to truthfully say, that differentiates him from a person who is not free?
What would an organization look like, whose goal was to bring freedom - personal, political and economic - to the entire world?
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackJuly 21, 2003
Come and Get Us
Note: this is a post recovered from my old blog, before it died of an insufficient backup. Any comments/trackbacks on it have not been brought over, but can be seen with the original. The date is that of the original posting.
In the comments to this CalPundit post (on the unmourned deaths of Udai and Qusay Hussein), "Mike" says:
We attack, invade, and conquer a country without U.N backing, lying repeatedly to justify our action, then we hunt down and slaughter members of the former ruler's family. If this isn't a war crime to be charged to Bush and his regime, it ought to be.
In the words of my lovely wife:
This is a war crime? Fine! If Saddam wins he can try us for it.
I love my wife.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackJuly 20, 2003
The End of the World
Note: this is a post recovered from my old blog, before it died of an insufficient backup. Any comments/trackbacks on it have not been brought over, but can be seen with the original. The date is that of a really good post in this week's Carnival of the Vanities, talking about how 9/11 changed international relations, and asking the important question, of whether we should grant the demands of the radical Islamists. After all, he notes, the demands are rather scary:
And yet, if we were to grant some of them (such as disfavoring Israel), would that be enough to satisfy the Islamists' rage against us? In other words, should we listen to the Islamists and give them what they want? And if not, then what should we do?
The Surreal World of Iraq
Note: this is a post recovered from my old blog, before it died of an insufficient backup. Any comments/trackbacks on it have not been brought over, but can be seen with the original. The date is that of the original posting.
Victor Davis Hanson writes yet another great column, this time on the contraditions and unreality of Iraq, and our soldiers' ability to do their jobs through it all.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackJuly 18, 2003
Liberia
Note: this is a post recovered from my old blog, before it died of an insufficient backup. Any comments/trackbacks on it have not been brought over, but can be seen with the original. The date is that of the original posting.
There has been a great deal of discussion in the blogosphere and the mainstream press of the potential for US intervention in the Liberian civil war. (See for example the LA Times, Porphyrogenitus, Right Wing News, Michael Totten, Fox News, Courtney, the New Republic, and this related Winds of Change article on the Congo)
I have been undecided on this issue - actually, a bit conflicted. There are two arguments I would buy for intervention. The first is that we need to bring peace and stability to the entire world in order to truly guarantee the peace and stability of the first world nations, especially ourselves. Given that, and that Liberia is certainly in need of peace and stability, and that people are actually happy with the concept of US intervention there, Liberia is a reasonable place to go now. The second is that Africa needs an example of nationbuilding along the lines of what we are trying to do in Iraq, and Liberia has timber and diamonds and seaports that can be used to bring an inherent wealth to the country, absent civil war and criminal exploitation of the resources to enrich the area's elites (as opposed to serve as a foundation of a national economy).
However, I don't think that these are truly compelling, in the way that the counterarguments are. First, we are deeply committed already in numerous places around the globe. In addition to Afghanistan and Iraq, we are in Korea and continue to maintain contingency forces for a possible Korean conflict; we are in the Balkans; we are (with SOF at least) in Colombia, and that mission could grow larger if Venezuela falls apart; and we still have a number of other missions (like sea control and training rotations) that we have to maintain. In other words, we are stretched to the point that our active duty ground combat force that remains uncommitted is basically the bulk of the Marine Corps. The last thing we want to do right now is to start committing that force to long-term peacekeeping missions in a variety of disconnected hellholes which don't fit into our security strategy.
Secondly, we currently have no real dog in the Liberian fight. Arguments about "America's historical connection to Liberia" are both true and irrelevant. That connection was brief, and more than 150 years ago. Liberia is not a "little America" in Africa; it is a typical West African coastal country, no more connected to America (in any real sense) than is its neighbor, Sierra Leone. If we intervene, even as a backup to ECOMOG, you can be assured that we will suddenly be responsible for every aspect of the security of Liberia and all of its neighboring states, at least in the eyes of "the international community". We would get all of the blame for decades of conflict since the end of European colonialism in Africa, without any credit for anything that goes right. In other words, we'd be expending blood and treasure and reputation - all needed for the War on Terror - for no gain to us.
Third, the problem in the region appears to be Charles Taylor, the Liberian president. A traditional peacekeeping mission would simply freeze the situation in place, which would have the effect of keeping Taylor in power, capable of interfering throughout the region as he sees fit. At the least, such a mission would slow down the necessary process of change that will remove Taylor from power and his followers permanently from the field.
One lesson forgotten by the Europeans is how much fighting and horror had to go on over 300 years for Europe to sort out its borders, economy and forms of government. It is not likely the case that such solutions can be imposed by fiat on sovereign nations, presuming we grant that any internationally-recongized border defines a sovereign nation. It is certainly not true that such impositions have worked in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, or Asia - all places where they have been tried. (Note the contrast to South America, North America and Europe (excluding the Balkans), where the borders formed organically via struggles among the various peoples and interests involved. In all of those places, the borders are commonly accepted, and the nations are generally at peace with one another.)
So, all taken together, I don't believe that there is a case for intervention by the US. What does interest me, though, is why such notables as the European elites, Kofi Annan, the Congressional Black Caucus, Dennis Kucinich and others who were resolutely opposed to American intervention in Iraq, are calling for American intervention in Liberia. I think that it comes down to the most cynical motive of all: anti-Americanism (and, in the US, anti-Republicanism). What would the Left get out of an American intervention in Liberia?
Well, for one thing, the UN would regain legitimacy it lost in the Iraq crisis. Iraq would become seen as an aberration, rather than the first step in a process of UN decline in relevance. UN peacekeeping operations would similarly be religitimized, as the US recognized both their intent and their form, no matter how disconnected from American interests.
For another, America would be engaged in another Balkans-like intervention, which would drag on for years with no reasonable end. The precedent thus set would embolden the UN and EU to demand intervention be initiated or maintained by the US in a number of other hotspots, "to prevent a human catastrophe" of course. The net effect would be to slowly but surely tie American forces down, to prevent or make more difficult US interventions in Korea, Iran, Syria or other places where our national security might actually be threatened, or where we might need to go in a long-term struggle to remove the social and economic underpinnings of terrorism. This reduced freedom of action would make America less activist.
Also, there would be a sudden cost shift almost entirely onto American shoulders, as we became responsible for all of the logistics, equipment, pay and what have you, not only of the other peacekeeping forces which we would lead, but also of the UN operations and NGOs who swoop around such tragedy like vultures. As a benefit, no matter what the UN and NGOs did, the responsibility for any problems would fall on America, while any credit for success would go to the UN and NGOs. Not a bad package, really, if you are the UN or the NGOs.
For the Democrats, this would certainly be an issue used against President Bush in next year's elections. After all, will go the chorus, if President Bush were really serious about the War on Terror, why did he intervene in Liberia when we so evidently needed those forces elsewhere? And what about these petty interventions driving up the debt during a time of deficits and war? Like Kerry's vote in favor of Iraqi intervention, a million reasons will be given for why the Democrats didn't need to see this coming, and the Bush administration did. This barrage of criticism and self-absolution would be used to cloud the issue and paper over the Democrats' own calling for intervention. And best of all, if the intervention failed, look what a political bonanza that would be for the Democrats!
So I can see why the Left wants to intervene. But they won't get my support.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackJuly 17, 2003
Mark Steyn on Liberia
Note: this is a post recovered from my old blog, before it died of an insufficient backup. Any comments/trackbacks on it have not been brought over, but can be seen with the original. The date is that of the original posting.
This is why Mark Steyn gets paid to write out opinions, and I don't:
With Iraq, there was no agreement on what the thing was about: it's all about oil, said the anti-war crowd; it's about the threat Saddam represents to the world, said the pro-crowd. But with Liberia there's virtually unanimous agreement: the US has no vital national interest in the country; its tinpot tyrant is no threat to anybody beyond his backyard; the three warring parties are all disgusting and none has the makings of even a halfway civilised government. For many on the Right, these are reasons for steering clear of the place. For the Left, they're why we need to send the Marines in right now.Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackIt's precisely the lack of any national interest that makes it appealing to the progressive mind. By intervening in Liberia, you're demonstrating your moral purity. That's why all the folks most vehemently opposed to American intervention in Iraq — from Kofi Annan to the Congressional Black Caucus — are suddenly demanding American intervention in Liberia. The New York Times is itching to get in: "Three weeks have passed since President Bush called on the Liberian President, Charles Taylor, to step aside, and pledged American assistance in restoring security. But there has been no definitive word here on how or when. "
...
Three weeks! And Bush is still just talking! The Times spent 14 months deploring the "rush to war" in Iraq, but mulling over Liberia for three weeks is the worst kind of irresponsible dithering.
July 14, 2003
Self-Contradiction
Note: this is a post recovered from my old blog, before it died of an insufficient backup. Any comments/trackbacks on it have not been brought over, but can be seen with the original. The date is that of the original posting.
One of the most-read Leftist bloggers is Hesiod, of Counterspin, who writes in this post:
We are so overextended, militarily, that we can't even afford send more than a few dozen marines to guard the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia.[UPDATE: We have just positioned 4,500 troops near Liberia for possible depolyment]."
Now, I'll be the first to admit that we're overstretched militarily, but it just amuses me to no end to see the difference between the correction and the statement. I'm not ragging on Hesiod here (I might do that later, since I find his arguments on pretty much every subject to be repellant); I was just amused. Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBack
To Provide for the Common Defense
Note: this is a post recovered from my old blog, before it died of an insufficient backup. Any comments/trackbacks on it have not been brought over, but can be seen with the original. The date is that of the original posting.
Trent Telenko at Winds of Change has a must-read article for those who care about the long-term strategy of the War on Terror.
This ties in with General Franks' testimony to Congress about our length of stay in Iraq, as well as to many different bloggers' comments on the matter, particularly those of Steven Den Beste and Porphyrogenitus. (I will refrain from specific article links here, since I've commented on it before, with links, and since Trent's article has many links to the same or similar sources.)
I think that there are a few things becoming very clear about the long-term War on Terror, and our position now, and I'll try to summarize them all here. First, our current position:
- We have enough heavy combat troops in the Regular Army and National Guard to handle any forseeable contingency. Should we be required to fight a war in Korea, we have sufficient forces available to commit to handle that mission, assuming the immediate activation of several National Guard divisions (as these have a six-month training cycle, and many of their most experienced personnel are currently committed to active duty units).
- We do not have enough active duty troops to occupy Iraq, fight a war in Korea (or be prepared to do so) and do anything else of consequence.
- With the exception of the Poles, British, Australians and possibly the Spanish and Italians, there are no countries with significant forces who are both capable of providing forces for foreign conflict/peacekeeping, and willing to do so in support of the War on Terror.
- We cannot as a consequence intervene in Syria/Lebanon, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, sub-Saharan Africa or Venezuela - any or all of which may require our intervention in the next few years - until and unless we can either pull combat units out of Iraq, or nationalize the Guard heavy divisions.
- Our only light/rapidly-deployable forces are the 101AB, 10Mtn, 82AB and 25ID. 101AB and 82AB are committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, 10Mtn is committed in Afghanistan, and 25ID is strategic reserve and likely cannot move due to the Korean situation. The Marines are not heavily committed right now, but are really only useful in littoral interventions, rather than for long-term occupation duties. This means that the US does not have sufficient rapidly-deployable forces to intervene should, say, Iran go all to hell with a revolution (or Congo take on dimensions that threaten our security, or Zimbabwe do the same) - without abandoning either Korea or Iraq or undercommitting (fatally?) to both.
Given these facts, I think that the following conclusions are inescapable:
- We need at least one more field force the size of the one currently deployed in Iraq, but specifically designed to occupy a nation. In other words, we need 3 to 5 light infantry divisions, with small armored and artillery components for heavy firepower, and with extra contingents of MPs, logisticians, civil affairs troops and the like.
- Such a force could likely be raised without a draft, if the political will were available to fund it. That is to say, we would either have to raise taxes again (which I abhor), or cut spending on popular programs (which politicians in general abhor). We must shift to a war footing, which means shifting funding and raising additional troops, or we will be unable to fight at a pace that will defeat our enemies. The President must make this case, and must be willing to take the political risk for it. He should not wait until after the election to do so.
- Should we choose to, we could use foreign auxiliaries and US officers to raise such units, in exchange offering the troops American citizenship at the end of their tours of duty. This is likely not politically doable at this time, though it may be in a few years.
- Were we to raise occupation troops, and employ them in Iraq, this would free up our combat troops to take on Syria, or be ready for contingency intervention in Iran or elsewhere. Such an expansion of our occupation would, of course, require more occupation troops. At current rates of pay and unemployment, it is likely that we would be unable to raise more than an additional 250000 troops (educated guess, and could be way off) without resorting to foreign auxiliaries or a draft.
- We must therefore economize with our forces, and in particular we must avoid pointless interventions (such as Liberia) and pull out of commitments which others could take up (such as Bosnia). This will annoy the Europeans and the American Left. So be it. The Western Europeans have made clear that they have nothing to offer (aside from the nations mentioned above) us except neutrality or vague friendship - and I include Canada in this, sadly. Since we cannot rely on their help, we will have to see to our own needs, and that means leaving them to see to their own needs, and to humanitarian interventions.
- We need to organize local militias, in order to provide local self-defense. These militias should have no law-enforcement powers, but purely serve as anti-terror units. During the Washington sniper case, such a militia, with a pair of obviously-armed and alert sentries on each corner, would have proven invaluable. There will be other such cases where this will be needed.
- We will have to drop the "war on drugs" in order to free up government resources to fight the real war. It may be possible to do both, but given the budget environment we are now in, it is foolish at least to fight drugs as a Federal matter. Should we maintain prohibition, we need to at least let the States enforce those laws (outside of Customs inspections at the borders).
I don't realistically think that we have the political will to switch to a war footing right now. Absent another major attack, the only way to build that will is for the President to make it the issue he is pursuing. Certainly, short-sighted political opponents will deride him for this, and the Europeans and the press will wail loudly and long, but this is a case that the American public seems to want made to them. It's about time the President does so.
In reality, I don't expect that we will have the political will to go to a true war footing until after the next major terrorist incident on American or European soil.
UPDATE: Fixed the ending. (Thanks to Flit, and to Mog in the comments.) Seems to have been cut off when I saved the post; and I was dealing with kids and didn't notice the error.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackJuly 12, 2003
Goal->Strategy->Plan->Task
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Steven Den Beste brings up a point that a friend and I have tried to make repeatedly, and to anyone who would listen, over the years: first you develop a goal, then a strategy, then a plan, then you accomplish the tasks.
Your goal states what must happen in order to be successful. For example, the US goal in the war on terror is that no group will exist capable of attacking the United States domestically, or American citizens or interests abroad, using terrorist tactics, and that America will continue to exist as a free nation with a representative government. Should the US do nothing, and this aim come about, then the US has achieved its goal. Should the US perform all kinds of actions, which in the end do not remove terrorism from the pantheon of weapons capable of striking at Americans, we will have lost the war, regardless of all other factors.
Your strategy is one of (usually) many possible ways to achieve the goal. For example, the US could have chosen any of the following strategies (and likely others) to achieve the above goal:
- kill or capture all known and discoverable terrorists
- destroy the states and other entities which sponsor terrorist organizations
- buy off the states and other entities which sponsor terrorist organizations
- buy off the terrorists themselves
- convince other countries to pursue one or more of the above strategies
- do nothing, and hope it will all blow over
- destroy Al Qaeda, and their Taliban protectors, and then stop and pursue a different strategy (such as doing nothing, or buying off remaining groups and terrorist sponsors)
Each of these strategies has associated costs, monetary and otherwise, risks and benefits, and each has some capability to (at least theoretically) help us attain our goals. In the end, we chose to destroy all the terrorists we could find, and destroy their sponsors, and pressure other countries to help (though we haven't used our ultimate weapon of cutting them off a la Cuba if they don't cooperate to our satisfaction). For the purposes of this discussion, the wisdom of this choice is irrelevant. What is relevant is that this is the strategy the US is pursuing. The strategy will change, though, if it turns out that the strategy is not able to achieve the goals.
A plan is a set of steps which need to be accomplished, complete with the estimates of what resources will be needed to put the plan into operation and how the plan's elements will be sequenced. A plan generally consists of subplans, each a complete plan in and of itself, which are executed sequentially, simultaneously, or if a contingency arises. For example, our subplan for Iraq would have had steps to be executed if Iran intervened, if Syria intervened, if we were stopped short of Baghdad and the like. These are the famous "audibles" that General Franks spoke of. They do not indicate that the plan failed, but that we did a good job of planning for contingencies. (If the plan would have failed, there would have been a stopping point where we consolidated our position and created a new plan. It's obvious when this actually happens.)
Once a strategy has been chosen, there are many ways to make a plan to carry out that strategy. Each of these potential plans are evaluated for their ability to attain the goal, costs and other resource requirements, risks, and side benefits. Our plan in the war on terror over the long haul is not yet clear, but we can see the outlines: first remove Afghanistan as a sanctuary for the Taliban; then remove the terrorist sponsor states, starting with Iraq; then (presumably) remove other potential sanctuaries for terrorism by "fixing" failed states; throughout hunting down known terrorists and strengthening our organizational ability to detect, resist or respond to terrorist attacks. Obviously, contingency plans will be activated as the situation changes (for example, if Korea erupts into war). The plan will change, though, if we learn something which invalidates the plan or if we discover that the plan we have is not a good fit to our strategy.
Tasks are the atomic elements of a plan. They are those things which do not have smaller parts. For example, our Iraq plan had a subplan to get 3ID to Baghdad. This subplan had a plan for taking the bridges over the Euphrates. Each of the subplans consisted of tasks: sieze objectives A, B and C to get to the bridge; then lay down covering fire on any enemy units on the other side of the river; then establish a bridgehead by rushing units across the bridge; then expand the bridgehead; then remove any explosives affixed to the bridge.
The reality is that the President can control the goals; choose the strategies; and influence, approve and reject the plans. The JCS and the SecDef can advise on the goals; develop the strategy options; and select the appropriate plans for the chosen strategy. The operational commanders (like General Franks) can influence the strategies; develop the plans; and influence, approve and reject the subplans. This process continues down to the individual private soldier, who can influence the plans of his NCOs, and carry out the tasks assigned to him.
This is why it is ridiculous for opponents of the President to carp about him "failing" in the war on terror, because something went wrong with one small group of soldiers carrying out the 3rd or 5th or 9th level of subplanning of a particular contingency subplan of the plan for fighting opponent X. It is also why we have a very successful system of winning wars: authority to plan and execute is pushed down as far as possible. This means that the President is responsible for things he cannot control, but at the same time it means that we can react to changing or unanticipated situations without needing one person, or a small group of people, to approve or come up with every action that needs to be taken.
It seems to me that if people want to criticise the President's performance, they should focus on whether or not the goals are appropriate and doable; whether or not the strategy holds the best chance of achieving the goals; and whether or not the President's appointed subordinates are planning and setting policies which will accomplish those strategies. This, on the other hand, is meaningless.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackGive 'em What They Want
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Michael Totten has a Tech Central Station column up, in which he asks if it is possible - or at least wise - to allow any measure of victory for the Palestinians. If we give the Palestinians anything that can be interpreted as a victory, doesn't that simply encourage their tactics, particularly suicide bombings?
Ordinarily, I'd say "yes." However, I've been thinking a lot about this problem, and I think that the answer is actually "yes, but..." In order to show why that is, I'll have to start with some axiomatic statements. If you disbelieve any of the following list, then my conclusion will make no sense to you. The axioms of the Israeli-Palestinian situtation are:
- The aim of the Palestinian and other anti-Israeli terrorsts, and in particular of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Fatah (including the Al Aqsa Brigade) and possibly the Palestinian Authority as a whole, is to defeat Israel. While the Palestinians would like to live in peace, this is less important to them than victory.
- The Palestianians, at least the very large fraction represented by the groups named above, define victory as minimally including the destruction of Israel, and the creation of a Palestinian state in the entire area encompassed by Israel, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the Gaza Strip. Some groups (including Fatah) appear to define victory as the victory of Arab Nationalism, with them at the head of the Arab nation. (In this way, they are not unlike the Ba'athists of Syria and Iraq, Moamar Gadafi, or the former Nasser regime in Egypt. Each of these groups want or wanted the formation of a single Arab nation, under their leadership and control.)
- The Palestinians don't state this as their goal very often. Instead, they state their goal as a fully autonomous and contiguous Palestinian state in the entire Gaza Strip and the West Bank, with a Palestinian-controlled corridor through Israel, connecting Gaza to the West Bank, and without any remaining Israeli settlements or other presence; the return of refugees from the Israeli War of Independence and their descendents to Israel proper, along with restitution, support from the welfare state, restoration of their former property, and eligibility for Israeli citizenship - including most importantly free movement and voting rights; release of all Palestinians held by Israel on "political" charges (that is to say, for killing or attempting to kill Israelis); the formal establishment of a legal right for Palestinians to work in Israel; and destruction of any physical barriers between Israel and the putative Palestinian state.
- The Palestinians are incapable of imposing their will on Israel by force of arms, and thus attempt to obtain victory (in the more expansive sense) by baby steps, using international pressure, easily-duped NGOs, and Israeli reluctance to fully engage, in order to make it more expensive to Israel to continue the current situation than it would be to give in to Palestinian demands.
- The Israelis would love to live in peace, but it is more important to them to simply live.
- If the Israelis met the demands of the Palestinians, Israel would cease to exist. The "right of return" would ensure that the Jews would become a minority in Israel in very short order, at which point the Palestinians would use their electoral power to take control of, and thus destroy, Israel. (If Israel denied returned Arabs the vote, they would have destroyed themselves as a representative democracy.) The return to 1967 borders would ensure that Israel would be unable to defend against conventional military threats, while also cutting large parts of Jerusalem (including Israel's only international airport) off from Israeli control. The destruction of physical barriers between Israel and the putative Palestine would ensure easy access for terrorists into Israel, and the "right to work" would ensure that Palestinians would not be unusual inside Israel, thus allowing terrorists to work with much less chance of drawing attention to themselves. This is precisely the point, from the Palestinian point of view, to their demands. These are not unintended side-effects.
- Israel could, of course, defeat the Palestinians utterly and in short order, by the use of overwhelming military might against the Palestinian terrorists wherever and whenever they are found, without regard to Palestinian civilians in the area. This would be met with utter revulsion by Israelis, and any government which attempted it would be unceremoniously booted from office. Further, such actions would almost certainly cause the US to cease open support for Israel, while Europe would almost certainly institute a boycott against Israel similar to what the US maintains against Cuba. This would economically devastate Israel, as well as sapping their morale and weakening them militarily. Thus, Israel will not take this tack.
- Israel could, of course, defeat the Palestinians by the simple means of annihilating Gaza City, Ramallah, Jenin and one or two other cities with nuclear weapons. This would have effects not dissimilar to the previous option.
- Israel could, of course, defeat the Palestinians by deporting every single Palestinian from the West Bank, either to the Gaza Strip or simply by forcing them into Jordan. The damage to the Israeli psyche of seeing Israeli troops loading people into boxcars to be shipped out would be incalculable.
- As a result of all of this, the Israelis do not see a way of defeating the Palestinians, nor of giving in to their demands. Israel's strategy is, therefore, to try to keep the violence in Israel proper at the lowest possible level, for the lowest possible cost, while at the same time trying to find a way to change the situation by getting the Palestinians to, in essence, take somewhat less than their critical demands. In particular, Israel would be willing to grant something akin to the offer made by Ehud Barak - a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with no right of return, borders altered from 1967 to allow Israel a defensible border and control of most of Jerusalem, no guaranteed right of Palestinians to enter Israel, and with security corridors to allow Israel to defend the Jordan River.
- This strategy depends on the Palestinians being willing to accept less than 100% of what they are asking, and the Palestinians refused an offer to meet 98% of their demands. The situation for the Palestinians is improving, as European money (in particular) flows in, and the US exerts pressure on Israel to bend further and further. The Palestinians, therefore, have no incentive to agree to any concessions at all.
Yes, it would be unwise to give the Palestinians what they want, since that would mean the destruction of Israel in short order, and the use of suicide bombings en masse everywhere Muslims find themselves disputing with a non-Muslim foe in even shorter order. I think that up until this point, at least, Mr. Totten and I would be in agreement.
Where I take issue with Mr. Totten is with his plan. The steps he proposes are "First, defeat terrorism. Second, nurture democracy. Third, negotiate a settlement."
The first phase should be simple. Terrorism must be punished. And anti-terrorism must be encouraged. The Palestinian Authority should be given one last chance to eliminate terror. And if the PA refuses, the U.S. must do the following:
- Classify the Palestinian Authority as a terrorist organization.
- Declare "regime change" in the West Bank and Gaza the official United States policy.
- Support to the hilt every anti-terror operation by Israelis short of war crimes.
The first phase would not be complete until the enemies of peace are defeated, deported, imprisoned, or killed. These include Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Yasser Arafat's Fatah, the Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It may also include the Palestinian Authority.
The Palestinian Authority will be no more hampered by being declared a terrorist organization than have Hamas or the PFLP. Arafat sees himself as a martyr - he wants to be a martyr - and would welcome a US attempt to depose him, which even (perhaps especially) if successful would actually strengthen the hand of the terrorists, by enraging the Palestinian population. The Israelis themselves cannot defeat the Palestinian terrorists, even if supported "to the hilt" by the US, as long as the Palestinians are essentially a subject population. This is because any actions Israel could take that would involve sufficient force to actually defeat the terrorists, would be impossible for the reasons given above.
There is, however, another way. This way would be risky, because it would give the Palestinians a temporary victory, and over the short term would almost certainly make use of the Palestinian suicide bomb tactics more prevalent. This would be to compel a Palestinian state along Israeli-determined lines. Specifically:
- Israel should complete the fence between the West Bank and Israel proper, taking a path conducive to easy defense and walling off Jerusalem in such a way that Israel would have definitive control.
- Then, Israel could declare that the settlements are not defensible, and tell the settlers that they have to return to Israel proper by a certain date, or the army will no longer be able to offer them protection. On that date, Israel should pull every soldier and policeman out of the territories.
- One day later, Israel should declare that Israel has no presence in the Gaza Strip or West Bank, and has no interest in establishing one. Those areas would then be de facto under the authority of the Palestinian Authority. Israel should not recognize a Palestinian state formally, though of course much of the world immediately would, and Palestine would almost certainly be admitted to the UN within days.
- Israel should not allow Palestinian workers into Israel in any way regardless of pressure to do so - there are plenty of others willing to work who would come to Israel for the low-wage jobs. Nor should Israel allow Palestinian refugees to return, nor should Israel in any way negotiate about the fences, or a land corridor between Gaza and the West Bank, or anything else. Simply declare that Israel has no interest in the West Bank and Gaza, and close the borders.
This would result in a non-viable Palestinian state. Without the job engine of Israel, Palestine is an economic basket case. The split territory, with no land connection between Gaza and the West Bank, would leave Palestine wholly dependent on Jordan for access, and it would be expensive and difficult to travel from one to the other. While the Palestinians would bitch about this, it is also true that the Europeans and even the US would pour in money in an attempt to make the Palestinian state work.
It is almost certain that the Gaza Strip would become, effectively, a separate state (though not in name) under Hamas control, with the West Bank being under PA control. This split leadership, combined with the difficulty of working together practically, would divide the Palestinians into two separate cases from Israel's point of view. It is possible that there could be bloody struggles for control in one or both Palestinian areas. It is certain that there will be massive political infighting to try to get control over all of the money coming in. All of this would tend to distract the Palestinians.
However, it is almost certain that within a short period of time, someone in one of the areas is going to try to attack Israel. Since the option of suicide bombing would be effectively foreclosed by the security fences, the attack would most likely either be by boat infiltration or by rocket/mortar attacks over the walls.
At this point, Israel could make a very effective demonstration. Since Israel no longer has any duty as occupier, the attack would be an act of war. Israel could invade, though doing so would not be very profitable. The better method would be to determine which region the attack came from (if there were any doubt), and take out some high-profile targets in that area. For example, let's say that the attack were by rockets from the area of Beit Hanun. OK, then the Gaza Strip loses the airport and seaport (assuming they'd been built by then) to Israeli bombers. Or if the attack were from the West Bank, the bridges over the River Jordan could be dropped by Israeli bombers. In either case, don't target the other area, because you want to show that peaceful coexistence doesn't invite attacks, while attacks invite immediate and disproportionate retaliation.
If both areas are involved in attacks, or if the strategy of bombing high-profile targets doesn't work, then the Israelis could send in ground troops, surround a Palestinian town, evacuate the residents, and then completely level the town with bulldozers, artillery, bombs or whatever method seemed best. The Israelis would then withdraw, leaving the Palestinians and NGOs to cope with the needs of the resulting homeless. While such an attack would not be politically possible now, since Israelis feel a duty to the Palestinians, this would likely not be the case once Israel was no longer in control of the Palestinians.
Ideally, the situation for Israelis would improve, and the Palestinians would find themselves prospering in exact proportion to how peacefully they acted towards Israel. Almost certainly, though, the Palestinian areas would fall into infighting and ruin, and would strike out at Israel. The ruin, infighting, and Israeli disproportionate retaliation could very well put paid to suicide bombings as a useful tactic in this situation.
In any case, it would be better than the other option for settling the issue, which is a genocidal attack on the Palestinians by Israel.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackJuly 10, 2003
Liberian History
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The Christian Science Monitor has an interesting look at Liberia's history. In outline: freed American slaves set up a country stating the best parts of America's legacy, implemented the worst parts of America's legacy, then mixed in the disaster that is most of West Africa to create an appalling result. Bussora is right: is there anyone there worth saving?
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackReconstruction
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If you think that the reconstruction of Iraq is going badly, and that the US isn't getting anything accomplished, you should pay attention to this. The reality is that we are rebuilding a country from scratch, and we have to be concerned not just about governning institutions, but about such daily activities as making sure that the streets are clear of trash. It will take a long time to build up a functioning society, but it seems like we're on a good track to do that.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackClash of Cultures
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It annoys me to realize that Osama bin Laden is right in one way: this war is a culture clash between fundamentalist Islam (militant Islamism, for lack of a better term) and the Enlightenment West. Both civilizations will come out of the clash changed, and one will come out overthrown and replaced with a culture more like that of their foes. The possibility of militant Islamism winning is terrible to contemplate, and so I focus on how the West can defeat the Islamists, preserving our Liberal, Enlightenment culture and reforming their repressive and backwards-focused culture.
I hope that Tarek Heggy's ideas of Muslim alternatives to Islamic fundamentalism are being voiced in the Middle East, as well as in the West. I hope that we have the wisdom to recognize those voices, and to support them where we find them.
I think that it's inevitable that Islamic societies will have to undergo a reformation, and it's good to know that there are Islamic traditions which would facilitate this - and even the more radical reform of an Islamic Enlightenment. The alternative is terrible to contemplate, because the US is not going to leave the Arabs alone, sitting on a sea of oil (and thus cash), with the will to acquire nuclear weapons, and with an inimical hatred of Outsiders (including, of course, us).
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackJuly 9, 2003
An Apology for Jewish Terror
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Sort of, from Ipse Dixit. Quoted here in its entirety:
Following the latest atrocity in Jerusalem, Secretary of State Powell urged the Palestinians to issue some form of denunciation.
Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas complained that only the Palestinian side is ever required to denounce terror.Predictably, the Palestinian denunciation later mumbles that they "deplore the murder of civilians on both sides."
Perhaps the Palestinians have a point, and so to set the record straight, I do hereby denounce the following in the name of the Jewish People:
1. All Jewish suicide bombers who have ever acted against Arabs.
2. All Arab buses blown up by Jews.
3. All Arab pizza parlors, malls, discotheques and restaurants destroyed by Jewish terrorists.
4. All airplanes hijacked by Jews since 1903.
5. All Ramadan feasts targeted by Jewish bombs.
6. All Arabs lynched in Israeli cities; all Arab Olympic athletes murdered by Jews; all Arab embassies bombed by Jews.
7. All mosques, cemeteries and religious schools fire bombed or desecrated by Jews in North Africa, France, Belgium, Germany, England or any other country.
8. The destruction of American military, governmental and civilian institutions in Kenya, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Yemen - along with the murder of U.S. Marines and diplomatic personnel.
9. All Jewish school books which claim that Arabs poison wells, use Christian blood to bake pita, control world finance, and murdered Jesus; or that Arab elders meet secretly to plot a world takeover.
10. And I am particularly ashamed at the way my fellow Jews attacked the World Trade Center, Pentagon and civilian aircraft on September 11th, and danced in the streets to celebrate the act.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBack
July 8, 2003
I'll Take 100 Lots on a Suicide Bombing at a Mall
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This is a brilliant idea. Futures markets are incredibly efficient ways of predicting events that a lot of people have small knowledge of. Terrorism certainly fits into that category. While I wouldn't rely on this alone, it certainly would be a good bit of information to use as a guide for targetting other resources. Of course, the usual small-minded suspects are wailing and gnashing teeth at the idea that the Pentagon might be trying something innovative, but that is to be expected, and is criticism easily dismissed.
UPDATE: And like far too many ideas, and as in far too many other cases, the whiff of criticism has caused this program to be scrapped. Way to show some balls, Poindexter.
On another note, what is to prevent private citizens from setting up such a market? Charge a transaction fee of a few cents per contract dollar, and the enterprise would most likely be profitable. In addition, it would certainly be useful to the government, since the market is by its nature open information. Setting up the financial background for this shouldn't be terribly difficult or expensive. Man, yet another idea I'd take up if I had more time to work on it. Oh, well, maybe someone else will.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackJune 19, 2003
The State of Iraq
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It seems to me that there is a perfectly reasonable solution about what to do with Iraq politically, which would settle for once and all the question of occupation, as well as giving our actions an unprecedented amount of legitimacy. We should announce that we will give the Iraqis the opportunity to become the 51st State.
We will need to completely restore order, to the point of being able to ensure that political violence and intimidation would be minimized, conduct a census of the people of Iraq, and when both of these are complete, hold a referendum, which I imagine could be held within a year. If a majority of Iraqis vote to accept territoriality, then the United States would appoint a Governor, and would proceed to do everything necessary to prepare Iraq for statehood, including the establishment of all of the freedoms, structures and order that we have here, with local laws being decided by the Governor and such officials as he appoints. At this point, the US would assume Iraqi national debt and contracts, would begin the payment of such benefits and collection of such taxes as are appropriate to a territory, and would in all ways make Iraq as much a part of the US as is Guam or the US Virgin Islands. This would include the right of Iraqi registered voters to vote for President, and presumably for non-voting representatives (such as DC has).
During the period of preparation, perhaps 10 years, we would also be conducting massive public education of both adults and near-adults in the theory of American governance. Part of this would be to progressively elect governments, starting at the local level and continuing up through an Iraqi legislature. At the end of this preparatory period, when a set of conditions made public before the conduct of the first referendum was put forward has been met, we would conduct put to the legislature a bill to request a statehood referendum.
If the legislature passed that bill, and the Iraqi people agreed by referendum, then the Iraqi legislature would write a State Constitution to be submitted to the Congress with a petition for statehood, which I imagine the Congress would grant.
The nice thing about this plan is that we win either way. If the Iraqis decide in the first referendum not to become a territory, we concur, do what we need to do to stabilize and pacify Iraq, and then step out of local politics. If the government they form asks us to leave, we leave. If the Iraqis decide to become a territory, but reject statehood, then we concur, step out of local politics, and offer them commonwealth status. If they reject that as well, we concur. If the newly-formed government asks us to leave, we leave. In any case, either we will gain a new State and an infusion of new ideas and citizens, or we will gain immense goodwill by being willing to offer such a massive benefit, and by being gracious in accepting the refusal of such an offer, if it comes.
Actually, while we're at it we might offer statehood to the Canadian provinces from Manitoba westwards. But let's not advertise it with 54-40 or fight, I think.
UPDATE (6/4): Michael Totten has a different take.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackJune 18, 2003
Imperialism
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Michael Totten agrees with Joe Katzman about what needs to be done in places like the Congo, but doesn't like calling it colonialism or imperialism. OK, fair enough. I can see the need for a different word.
Imperialism is the notion of taking adjacent possessions in order to protect the Imperial core (since the outer possessions would be attacked first). Not really appropriate here. Colonialism is the notion of taking possessions generally distant in order to exploit their resources to the economic, political and military benefit of the core. The tactics for establishing and maintaining order are very similar.
What Joe is discussing is a little different: taking possessions in order to stabilize and rationalize them for the benefit of those already there, and in order to prevent the rot from spreading. The tactics would be similar to imperialism and colonialism at first, as the territories are stabilized. The rationalization - bringing freedom, liberal democracy, economic freedom and individual rights to the occupied territory - would have very different tactics. In particular, the occupying power would leave in the end. Effectively, this would mean establishing a temporary empire, and then giving it up. How about "Interventionism"?
UPDATE (6/11): Joe Katzman article by Paul Johnson, who calls this process "moral imperialism". Michael Totten prefers "democratic imperialism", which actually strikes me as fairly wrong - we don't want to create democracies, per se, but federal republics; and given that the territories wouldn't have a vote in the start of the process, that makes the term "democratic" rather misleading. However, I've thought of an even better term, I think: how about "internationalism"? We are, after all, trying to bring these territories into the international system of trade and representative government, and it co-opts the very people within our society who would otherwise argue against the idea by taking a term they already lionize and using it in a new way. Hmmm....
UPDATE: I forgot to mention Michael Totten's other suggestion: "nation building". While this certainly describes the process, it has a historical problem in that most of the places where this needs to be done aren't nations, per se. They are generally collections of tribes whose only common identity is a map drawn by the colonialists of the 19th century. Actually, now that I think about it, that works, too, since we'd be trying to build a common identity. OK, I'll go with "nation building".
June 15, 2003
Strange Concept
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Apparently, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is peeved that they are being "persecuted" by the government of the Phillipines, against which the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has been waging war lo these many years. Herewith, an article (courtesy of the Command Post) detailing the group's story. I don't know what to call this post, since I'm not fisking the article, but the group the article is about. Anyone got a term for this?
THE secessionist group Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) will file a formal protest before the United Nations Human Rights Commission regarding the alleged religious persecution being done by the military and its "baseless" accusations against the group.OK, first of all, d'you guys know what MILF also stands for? Let's just say I'm not linking to a representative site. Go to Google yourself!
More importantly, are you actually contending that since you view your war as a holy war, and since therefore planning the overthrow of your enemy is a religious act, then the enemy resisting by, say, hunting you down and killing you constitutes persecution for your religion, as opposed to just trying to keep you from killing them?
In a telephone interview, MILF spokesman Eid Kabalu accused the Armed Forces of waging a "despicable pattern of attacking alleged MILF camps while a religious performance is going on."
Well, yes, apparently that is your claim. Strange concept of "religious" you have there.
"Our lawyers are drafting a formal protest and we will submit it to the United Nations as soon as possible. This is in order to put a stop to all these violations against us and the entire Muslim community," Kabalu told The Manila Times.
Of course, during this time you will undoubtedly be killing as many Phillipinos, foreigners and government officials as possible, natch. After all, it's your religious duty, no?
He cited five incidents in which government forces launched offensives on MILF areas while the Muslims were deep in their early-morning prayers. These were the attacks on Sharif Aguak in Maguindanao on January 8, 1999; in Matanog, Barira Area in Camp Abu Bakar, sometime in 2000; in Buliok Complex in Pikit, North Cotabato on February 11; in Liguasan March on March 14; and in Sabacan in Kabuntalan, Maguindanao on June 20.These attacks, Kabalu said, happened while they were having their Eid Ul Adha, or the Muslim's early-morning prayer.
"Clearly this is religious persecution. They [military] always time their attacks during our early-morning prayers," Kabalu said. He noted that a military officer was even quoted in a newspaper as saying that the best time to attack the MILF was during its prayer gatherings.
Ah, I get it. You can't be attacked because you called "time out" and the evil Phillipine Army is not respecting your prayers to kill more soldiers. On the other hand, it seems to me that this is a great strategy. They know when y'all pray, after all, so that makes it easier to get you then. Excellent plan, and kudos to the Phillipines for thinking of it.
The officer in question was Brig. Gen. Orlando Buenaventura, former commander of the 3rd Marine Brigade and the new Armed Forces deputy chief of staff for education and training (J8).The Times tried to get Buenaventura's comment but he was unavailable.
Was it, perchance, dawn? I'm just asking.
Rear Adm. Edgardo M. Israel, the new Civil Relations Service commander of the Armed Forces, said, however, that Kabalu is merely trying to deceive the people by releasing "untruthful information."
No doubt MILF would take Rear Admiral Israel's name for proof of its allegations.
"From what Kabalu has been saying, it appears that the MILF is either not sincere [to resume peace negotiations] or the MILF high command has no control over its spokesman," Israel said.
Three guesses, I give you.
Besides the alleged religious persecution, Kabalu said the MILF hopes that the UN will also shed light on the government's accusation that the MILF possesses C4 (Composition four), a dangerous explosive not available in the global market.Around 450 kilos of C4 were allegedly recovered by the military in a recent raid on an MILF camp in Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. Kabalu insisted that the explosive was planted by the military to put the MILF in a bad light.
Yeah, 'cause after killing so many people, it's the possession of military-quality explosives that really makes you look bad.
"This matter could only be clarified through a third party," Kabalu said.Also expected to be cleared up by the UN is the government's accusation that the MILF is linked with terrorist groups like the Abu Sayyaf and the Jemaah Islamiah, he said.
What are the odds that an extremist Muslim political movement which kidnaps and murders innocents in order to terrorize the remaining non-Muslim population and force the government into giving valuable concessions in exchange for promises of future action, would be aligned with extremist Muslim political movements which kidnap and murder innocents in order to terrorize the remaining non-Muslim population and force the government into giving valuable concessions in exchange for promises of future action? I don't see the connection at all, here.
The MILF has no legal personality before the world body and may use member nations of the Organization of Islamic Conference to represent its interests.
Any organization which would present a legal front for MILF would be making themselves complicit in the actions of MILF. Of course, I wouldn't put it past many "respectable" Muslim organizations to do this. CAIR would be right up there, for example. I don't know about OIC, though. Maybe they actually are a mainstream Muslim group.
On Monday the MILF urged President Arroyo to issue a "clear" written policy statement on the government's stance to resolve the rebellion problem in Mindanao.
If I were the President of the Phillipines, my clear written policy statement to resolve the problem would be to hunt down and kill every member of MILF, burn their houses, and salt their fields. Some say I'm a bit extreme, but I feel it's important to make a point about such things.
Michael Mastura, MILF peace panel member and former Maguindanao representative, said the President's written statement would put an end to remarks on the Mindanao problem by top Malacañang officials, including presidential spokesman Ignacio Bunye.
Somehow, I doubt it. Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBack
June 14, 2003
France
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I was going to link to all of Steven Den Beste's recent articles on France, but Winds of Change has saved me the effort, as well as adding some additional information. In additon to these, the Dissident Frogman and Merde in France have additional (and ongoing) information, and Innocents Abroad also has frequent information.
What is happening in France is scary. I do not believe that France is on the verge of collapse. Rather, I believe that one of two scenarios is likely: either France will decline (relative to the rest of the liberal democracies) over the next 20 years, leading to a series of increasingly-appalling crises and possibly concluing in a civil war between the native-born French and the unassimilated Muslims; or France will actually convince Europe to go along with the EU superstate concept, which will drag all of Europe into the French crisis, but at a slower pace. Demographics is destiny, and the piper will be paid.
Slightly less likely than either of these two outcomes is the possibility of a revolution and formation of a new Republic, some time in the next dozen years or so. While this would be violent, it would be on the order of massive strikes and the associated intimidation and beatings, rather than outright civil warfare. France has done this repeatedly, and there is a deep revolutionary character in France. If this happens, the most likely outcome is a radical socialist (not social democratic) regime with an aggressive foreign policy and a domestic policy towards Jews, Muslims and other minorities resembling fascism more than liberal democracy. In actual fact, such a government would, even if it allowed large amounts of personal freedom for the native French, rapidly deteriorate into nationalism and tyranny. Please note that this would be without doubt a popular and populist revolution, and the resulting government would be fully legitimate in every meaningful sense. I'm not suggesting an insurrection fomented by outside powers, here.
The third outcome I can see happening in France is less likely, but would be more immediate. It is certainly possible that the EU could collapse as an attempt to form a superstate, reverting to a mostly-economic arrangement. It is also possible that the resulting loss of face for France, as well as loss of superpower-level influence, would cause the French voters to turn out the government and bring in Le Pen or a similar nationalist. Such a government would almost certainly attempt to bust the most powerful unions, which would most likely lead to the revolution and institution of outright socialism described above. However, it is possible that the nationalists would be successful in breaking the power of the trade unions. If that were to happen, and then the French were to turn out the nationalists for a social democratic government, and that government were willing to attempt to assimilate the Muslims at the same time they were reducing the welfare state, it is possible that France could come through without the massive dislocations described above.
The other thing that I keep thinking, reading about the trade unions in France, is how glad I am that Reagan broke up the air traffic controllers strike in the early 1980s. Had he caved, the results would have been catastrophic in the long-term.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackJune 13, 2003
Guerrilla
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Tacitus posted a speculation that what is happening in Iraq right now - the daily attacks, and the US response - is the beginning of an organized guerilla war, with substantial support from the population. He asks where others who supported the war stand on this.
My opinion: Tacitus is mostly correct. Events in Iraq today are mostly a result of the fact that the Iraqi power structure was not really defeated in their own mind. Certainly, the government was thrown down and the army and police disbanded, but Saddam and his sons are still at large, and the people who had the power before the war still have it now to a large extent, though the scope of their power is much reduced. This, combined with the large caches of small arms, machine guns and RPGs in Iraq, means that the ingredients for an uprising in central Iraq - particularly the area between the rivers to Tikrit - are all in place: leadership, a grudge, fighters, weapons, a target.
But I don't think that the situation is going to get bad, unless the military has suddenly become willfully blind to reality on the ground. In Iraq, we have all of the capabilities and rules of engagement to end this quickly. We can remove the leadership by killing, capturing or determining the fate of Saddam Hussein and his sons, and by rousting out the Ba'athists, who are largely well-known - and we are doing this. These operations remove many of the fighters as well, though foreign fighters will continue to be a problem until we kill them and figure out how to stem the supply.
We can remove the grudge by building local governments and putting forth a set of concrete steps towards Iraqi independence. We have not done this very well yet, and time is running down on this. We have to make clear what is necessary for us to turn Iraq back over to the Iraqis - not a time frame but a sequence of steps - before we become the enemy to the broad mass of Iraqis.
The weapons are a problem, because Iraqis have a legitimate need to own them in a society where there is not good order. That said, I think at the very least, we need to round up the RPGs. That will reduce the lethality of attacks on us without undermining legitimate self-defense by Iraqis. If we were to form local militias, along with the local governments, and give them the power to enforce good order in their areas, this would go a long way to removing the grudge, the weapons and the fighters and putting people more on our side. I don't think that we can disarm Iraq in time otherwise. We need to get locals disarming those who cannot be trusted with the arms, rather than having US troops do so (except in exceptional circumstances, as where the nascent guerillas are too strong for the local militia to handle).
As long as we are there, and as long as we show real power in the street, we will be a target. The only fix for this - short of leaving the job undone - is to do the job. Until and unless we fix Iraqi society for real, we are going to be targets.
Where I think we've been falling down, as far as I can tell from existing reports, is in allowing local self-government, and only stepping in to fix the local issues when it's obvious that the local governments are failing or have to learn how to govern properly. If we set up a clear set of rules, including the rights we expect to be respected for all Iraqis, and then let the local governments figure out how to govern, we'll come out ahead of the game. If we don't - and indications are we are not - let local governments form organically under a defined set of rules, we are risking the long-term objective of stabilizing Iraq, because we are setting up conditions where we would just leave and let a new strongman take over. This would undermine the entire war on terror, so it cannot be allowed to happen.
As a side note, the situation in Iraq, as with the situation in Afghanistan, shows the downside of the American way of warfighting. We win very quickly, but very lightly. We throw down the enemy, but we do not kill large numbers of people or destroy large amounts of national wealth. This is good, in that it is humane, but it is bad, in that it drags out the endgame. By not being brutal, we leave the enemy undefeated in his own mind. He has lost nothing, in his mind, but position. He is still intact, and his country is still intact. Much of the good will he had - to the extent that it was present before the war - is unchanged, and his supporters are often powerful in the followon regimes.
This is OK, I think, in cirumstances where we don't care what happens after we solve the immediate problem (vis Kuwait in 1991, or Haiti any time we've intervened there, or arguably in Afghanistan). It is not so good where we want to build a functioning society before we leave. In those cases, we more troops dedicated to nation building and civil administration - in other words, a ready-to-go occupation force, to replace the heavy divisions once they've done their work.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackJune 1, 2003
Overcommitment
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Steven Den Beste (repeatedly), Donald Sensing and Tacitus have all noted how overcommitted the military is currently, particularly in low-density high-demand forces (MPs, SOF, Civil Affairs and the like) and heavy ground forces. We built our force around two theater commitments, plus minor operations, and now we have them in spades. We have a major occupation in Iraq, minor occupations in Afghanistan and the Balkans, and a requirement for contingency reserves for Korea in case the North acts up. We most likely will rotate some of the Korean reserves into Iraq later in the year (particularly 1Cav and 25Inf are good candidates) replacing 3ID and later 1AD or 4ID.
But then what? The truth is, we are going to need one to two full divisions in Iraq for the next five years at least, and we'll need more than that until we can get an Iraqi police force and army off the ground. For the next two years at least, while we're building Iraqi institutions, we'll need three to four divisions in Iraq. We have commitments for another two to three divisions worth of troops in various hotspots, and another two to three divisions to reinforce Korea. Then we're out of troops, and we don't have any more to spread around.
We do have additional commitments to take care of, though. We will possibly fight in one or all of Syria, Iran and Korea in the next three to five years. It is almost a certainty that we will fight in one of those countries. (I expect it to be Syria. Iran and North Korea can be resolved short of war.) In addition to that, there is a possibility of us needing to commit some forces to Africa. And who knows what might crop up that we can't anticipate from the current world situation?
But we do have options. One that I don't hear being bandied about much, though it's been mentioned a few times, is raising new active duty divisions and special-purpose troops. This would certainly be expensive. In fact, it would require either significant spending cuts, or significant tax increases (more than reversing the last three years' cuts) or perhaps some of both. I do not believe that there would be a shortage of people willing to volunteer or to stay in, so that no draft would be needed, provided that they would not have to maintain today's high optempo for an indefinite period of time. This option would also take significant time as well. The good part, though, is that it would fix the problem, and during this time of economic uncertainty, it would be a far better expenditure of government money than most of the ways the government tries to boost employment.
Another option would be to make the strategic decision that Korea is no longer our problem. After all, it is not as if South Korea cannot defend itself. In the absence of the Cold War reasons for being in Korea, we could easily back out of that commitment. That alone would fix a huge amount of our force structure problems, though we would have to be very careful to avoid the appearance of just abandoning South Korea.
It's possible that regional organizations like OSCE or OAS could create regional forces, along with the support units to deploy and support them. Using the UN of course would lend the pretense of legitimacy, though the UN has proven a totally incompetent intervenor in a crisis. I just don't see it happening, though. While lots of countries like the theory of international intervention to prevent disasters, the Congo is a good example of why this kind of intervention doesn't typically work. Basically, you can't wage war by committee.
I really don't see us activating the Guard and Reserve. Let's face it, that would be problematic in the extreme. While we could do it (and would if we had to), the economic disruption of activing a unit like 49AD (from my home State of Texas) would be immense. The political problems would be huge, as well, though I believe they would be surmountable. I suspect that 10 years or so down the road, when the active part of the war on terror is over, we'll transition more heavy forces into the Guard and Reserve, and put more light and medium forces in the active duty Army.
Another way we could bridge the gap would be to create a sort of permanent coalition of the willing. The idea would be to create an organization of liberal democracies, with its own armed forces not subject to direct control of any nation, but with strong national controls to prevent rash use of those forces. In particular, the mission of this organization would be limited to fighting terrorism and nation building. This needs its own post, because the idea needs a lot of explaining and cautions, but if such an organization existed (basically a UN with a far more limited mission, but real teeth to carry it out, and a far more exclusive membership), it would free up a lot of the US forces for use elsewhere. The trick would be to avoid the problems (mostly philosophical) that prevent the UN from being in any way useful in a crisis).
In any case, it's clear we have to do something, and I hope that President Bush makes clear soon what that is to be.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackMay 23, 2003
UN Moral Validity? Hah!
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David Warren makes an interesting point about the evolving Bush Doctrine:
The U.S. is not ruling out future roles for the United Nations or its agencies, in the reconstruction of Iraq or on any other front. The Bush administration has simply ceased, as a matter of routine, to recognize the legal or "moral" validity of U.N. pronouncements.
Good. Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBack
Towards a Final Solution
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Little Green Footballs has this article in the JPost. The money quote from the JPost article is this:
The US administration prepared a list of sanctions it would impose against Israel if Israel refuses to implement the 'road map'.
US officials said the sanctions list includes a reevaluation of Israel's use of US-made weapons in the Palestnian [sic] territories, and the withholding of emergency aid, reported Army Radio.
This is pretty scary, if true, because what it actually does is push Israel towards barbarism. You see, if you are an Israeli leader, you have to be thinking right about now that the Palestinians sincerely want to kill you, your entire family, all of your actual and potential descendants, your fellow citizens and in fact everyone who shares your religion, race or nationality. As a result, you might be unwilling to give substantial concessions in return for vague Palestinian promises of future consideration of possibly making a symbolic gesture. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the same authority which is making those promises is simultaneously awarding money and accolades to Palestinians who kill themselves in an attempt to kill you. This is even more particularly true since the US has spent the last decade pressuring Israel into doing just this, and Israel has given up numerous real concessions and has so far gotten virtually nothing in return.
Now, since Israel is vastly more powerful than the Palestinians, it is reasonable for you to believe that it's worth the cost for the small chance of real peace. But consider, what happens if there comes a demand upon you which would be considered by every Arab to be a capitulation; like, say, removing your security forces from the Palestinian areas? Since it is only through this presence that you've been able to keep the violence from escalating out of control, removing the troops would almost certainly lead to an immediate killing spree.
This demand actually comes fairly early in the "roadmap" process, and is only predicated on the Palestinians stopping the attacks within Israel proper (not within the Gaza Strip or West Bank). Given that the history of "the peace process" has been that if the Palestinians agree to something, they are given credit for it even when they are clearly not living up to their agreements, you as an Israeli leader might think that it is likely that pressure will be brought to bear on you to remove your best protection against Palestinian attacks even while the Palestinians are still attacking you.
In that case, would you refuse to pull back your security, knowing that it would cause the US to impose sanctions against you, or would you withdraw, knowing that you were thus condemning dozens or (more likely) hundreds of Israeli men, women and children to a grisly death? For myself, I know I would keep my security in place, because as an Israeli leader, I would not allow my people to be once more led to the charnel house. If the US actually imposes sanctions in such a case, it is clear that Israel will become weaker over time. The US can impose real restrictions and costs on Israel, and these costs and restrictions would surely weaken Israel at the same time that the Palestinians would be growing stronger, due to the inevitable influx of cash and weaponry that happens every time the "peace process" seems to be making headway.
Now, again assuming you are the Israeli leader in such a situation, do you allow your country to grow weaker while your mortal enemy grows stronger, or do you take action? The reality is, the Israelis are incredibly moral people, and they would almost certainly take a substantial increase in civilian casualties before they would do anything drastic. But eventually, if Israel were to continue both to weaken and to suffer more losses, the time would come to make The Choice: it's us or it's them. This would have to be done before the balance of power shifted too far, and before any external power began to station "peacekeepers" on the ground, or Israel would be unable to take such action without risking its own destruction from its neighbors or from outside forces committed to the "peace process" at any cost.
When the time comes to make The Choice, no human would ever willingly watch his people destroyed, shattered, driven out into a hostile world. Where would the Israelis go, if forced to leave? There is no other place where they would actually be welcomed - not even in the US (not by the millions). At that point, I would rather be anything than a Palestinian, because the might of Israel loosed in such a small area against a lightly armed population would be Old Testament Biblical in nature.
And the blood would not be on Israel's hands, but on America's.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackMay 21, 2003
Fallen Patriot Fund
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The Fallen Patriot Fund collects money, and distributes it to families of military personnel killed or seriously wounded during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The fund is part of the Mark Cuban Foundation, and all money is to be disbursed to families. I work for the Bank of America, which is in some way associated with this (at the very least, you can donate at a branch), and I am going to check tomorrow to see if they will match funds. If they will, I will take up a collection, to maximize the matching. Otherwise, I'll just donate individually. You can too.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackMay 19, 2003
Journalism and War
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Phil Carter at Intel Dump points to this fantastic article by David Zucchino, who was an embedded reporter in the war. (use laexaminer/laexaminer to read the article) The article makes a few interesting points:
Not since the Vietnam War have journalists worked so closely with soldiers in combat. The embed, in which reporters live 24 hours a day with their assigned units, was instituted on a limited basis in Afghanistan after the heaviest fighting had ended. Expanded, it was to be the grand journalistic experiment of the Iraq war
Actually, it was pretty rare in Viet Nam for reporters to work closely with units in the field. Instead, the reporters would usually drive out from Saigon or wherever they were based (at least some were in other cities) to find a firefight to report on, then drive back in the evening. Obviously, there were exceptions to this rule.
The coverage of the blatantly anti-war reporters in Viet Nam (possibly it would be more accurate to note that there were decent reporters there as well, who frequently were edited out by the newsrooms back in the States) led to the military deeply distrusting the media. Of course, the military had been in a position of lying to itself through much of the Viet Nam war, because of political pressures from the Johnson White House, and so the military also lied to the journalists. There was bad blood both ways. In the end, though, it was the American people who lost out. There were no reporters at Desert One, or with the troops in Panama or with the troops in Desert Storm or with the troops in Mogadishu. Because of this, the American citizens lost out on the ability to really see what our military was doing. I think that a huge amount of credit has to go to Secretary Rumsfeld for overturning this long-established animosity and integrating journalists into the forefront of combat operations.
During seven weeks spent with half a dozen units, I slept in fighting holes and armored vehicles, on a rooftop, a garage floor and in lumbering troop trucks. For days at a time, I didn't sleep. I ate with the troops, choking down processed meals of "meat, chunked and formed" that came out of brown plastic bags. I rode with them in loud, claustrophobic and disorienting Bradley fighting vehicles. I complained with them about the choking dust, the lack of water, our foul-smelling bodies and our scaly, rotting feet.
Frankly, I think that this is the genius of the program of embedding journalists. It will be more true in the future than in any generation since WWII, that our journalists will empathize with the troops. While those journalists may disagree with some future policy, it will be very hard to get someone who has served alongside the troops to criticize those troops themselves unless there is serious cause. This can only be a positive for our nation.
Most important, I wrote stories I could not have produced had I not been embedded -- on the pivotal battle for Baghdad; the performance of U.S. soldiers in combat; the crass opulence of Hussein's palaces; U.S. airstrikes on an office tower in central Baghdad; souvenir-hunting by soldiers and reporters; and the discovery of more than $750 million in cash in a neighborhood that had been the preserve of top Iraqi officials.Yet that same access could be suffocating and blinding. Often I was too close or confined to comprehend the war's broad sweep. I could not interview survivors of Iraqi civilians killed by U.S. soldiers or speak to Iraqi fighters trying to kill Americans. I was not present when Americans died at the hands of fellow soldiers in what the military calls "frat," for fratricide. I had no idea what ordinary Iraqis were experiencing. I was ignorant of Iraqi government decisions and U.S. command strategy.
Embedded reporters were entirely dependent on the military for food, water, power and transportation. And ultimately, we depended on them for something more fundamental: access. We were placed in a potentially compromised position long before the fighting began, and we knew it.
This is a tradeoff of course. The viewpoint that the embeds brought to the public was one which most of us hadn't seen before, hadn't even in most cases read about. The thing to remember is that there are still reporters who are not embedded, who are capable of reporting on the broad sweep, on policy issues and so forth. And if the journalists are skilled and resourceful, there will be journalists reporting from the enemy trenches as well. Reporters have proven that they will take risks to get the story. It is surely a greater risk, and also a rarer story, to be in the enemy positions under American attack. Such an enterprising reporter could find stories about civilians after being caught in a fight, or of the defeated (or even victorious, in some cases) enemy.
The US military has provided reporters with that which the military can provide: access to US military operations. It's a bit of an overstretch to ask the US military to provide access to the enemy military operations. It's also possible to cover the grand sweep of the story - but not while you are embedded. That viewpoint brings home the immediacy of operations, not the sweep of vision of the war planners or the civilian strategists. The article points this out, in fact.
This newspaper, like many, also assigned reporters and photographers to Iraq who were not embedded with U.S. troops. They covered what we could not -- the Iraqi government, civilian casualties, humanitarian crises, military strategy, political fallout and everything else beyond our cloistered existence.
I think that, as we begin to unravel the unprecedented access journalists had to cover this war, we will find that we have the most personal story we've ever before had of a war. I believe that this can only be for the good. Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBack
May 16, 2003
Prospects for Peace West of the Jordan
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The good Emperor is a tad bit miffed at the Palestinians, which reminded me that I was going to comment on the Israel/Palestine situation.
It is inherent in human nature that, when a dispute arises, each side will attempt to meet as much of its goal as possible. In civil society, where each party feels a responsibility to the other, or to be fair, or at least to avoid violence, such disputes are negotiated away until each side gets some of what they want. This is true both in interpersonal relationships, and in relationships between nations.
This is why, when the US and Canada wrangle over fisheries protection, neither side is completely happy when its done. On the other hand, relative power of the nations notwithstanding, neither side is ready to fight over the issue either. Similarly, if France and Germany have a policy dispute, they no longer resort to force of arms, but go to the European Court or some similar body to get the issue worked out. Neither gets everything they want, but both get some of what they want.
This system only works when both sides believe that they cannot get any more through negotiation, and are unwilling to resort to violence. Usually, when one side of a dispute is vastly more powerful than the other, the less powerful side will give in, and hope for the best, because that's better than being forced to give up not only what the dispute was about, but more besides. When both sides are nearly evenly matched, and at least one side cannot obtain their minimum demands, there is a serious chance of war. Obviously, if the situation is that the less powerful side refuses to meet the minimum demands of the more powerful side, there is also a serious chance of war.
But there is one circumstance when the weaker side has an advantage: if the stronger side is a liberal Western representative democracy, and if that state repeatedly suffers the opprobrium of the rest of the world (which it cares about, because it is after all a liberal Western representative democracy), then it is possible that the stronger side will not be as willing to take, or even inflict, losses on the weaker side. It is possible that the stronger side will suffer moral doubts about its right to resort to violence to solve the issue. It is possible that the stronger side will not be convinced that the losses in blood and treasure are worth the benefit to be gained.
In the dispute between Israel and the Arabs, the positions are frequently fogged over, but are really fairly clear-cut. Israel's minimum demands are:
- Sovereignty - Israel must continue to exist as a sovereign state
- Security - Israelies must not be at risk simply living in Israel; further, Israel must have defensible boundaries
The minimum demands of the Arabs are a little less clear, because there are multiple parties to the dispute on the Arab side. Here are some of them:
- Territory - the Syrians want the Golan heights back, to protect Damascas; the Egyptians don't want the Gaza Strip back; the Jordanians don't want the West Bank back; Hezbollah, Hamas and similar groups want all of the territory west of the Jordan river; the Palestinian Authority may or may not be satisfied with the lines prior to the 1967 war
- Destruction of Israel - as mentioned above, most of the terrorist groups, and probably the Palestinian Authority, want Israel to cease to exist; on their way to that, they might be willing to take a partial settlement, as long as it is so odious that the Palestinian people won't decide that's good enough and stop there. "Right of return" is just a way of destroying Israel more slowly, and so falls into this category.
- Convenient Distraction - for all of the Arab states, but perhaps none more pressingly than Syria and Iran (now that Iraq is out of the picture), Israel's mere existence provides an escape valve for domestic pressure. We're not the ones oppressing you, our brothers; it is the Israelis. Once the Israelis are stopped, we will be able to share with you the riches we have plundered from you, so go and kill Israelis instead of overthrowing us.
- A Sovereign Palestinian state - The Palestinians have repeatedly made clear that they will not accept a separate state politically, but disarmed (with Israeli armed forces operating as freely in that state as in Israel).
So let's take it from the top: how could Israel meet its minimum demands, without infringing the minimum demands of the Arabs? There is an immediate conflict between the Israeli demand for sovereignty and the demand of some Arabs for the destruction of Israel. The other issues appear amenable to some compromise, so let's start with the other issues.
Israel is already at peace with Jordan and Egypt, leaving Syria/Lebanon and the Palestinian Arabs as the only sticking points. (Believe it or not, the current situation is a distinct improvement over 1973, for example.) Of the two, Syria seems at least somewhat rational, so let's look there first. In order for Israel and Syria to reach an accomodation, there would have to be a territorial compromise on the Golan Heights. As this would likely leave Israel pretty vulnerable, it will be necessary to make this peace a very strong one.
But, it is also the case that Syria would then have to deal with the issue of its own people, as well as Hezbollah and other terrorist groups it supports. These groups and people have been conditioned for 55 years to think of Israel as a disease that must be eradicated. If Syria were to make peace with Israel, it would have to find some way of pacifying its own population and hosted terrorist groups, or those groups would organize that population to overthrow the Syrian leadership. In other words, the prerequisite to peace between Israel and Syria/Lebanon is that Syria must cease supporting terrorism, evict terrorists from Syria and Lebanon (no proxy warfare allowed) and open up its own society somewhat. It may or may not be possible to do this without a Syria-US or Syrian-Israeli war. Clearly, if a US invasion were to replace the Syrian regime with a representative federal republic, peace between Syria and Israel (as well as the creation of an independent and non-aggressive Lebanon) would be a virtual certainty.
So, even the easiest option for an improvement of the situation will require Syria to take some fairly hefty steps towards domestic liberalization and shutting down terrorists. This is pretty risky for Syria, as it could literally lead them into a civil war. For that reason also, should Israel have to deal harshly with the Palestinians in order to resolve the situation, Syria would be unable to liberalize or cease support for terrorism, as the risks to them would become too great. Even if there were already a peace agreement which included neutering of Syrian support for terrorism, it is likely that Syria would reverse course on that issue in the face of public pressure, should Israel actively attack the Palestinians.
Can Israel make peace with the Palestinians? As the rocket attacks show, even if the terrorist war is ended, Israel cannot go back to its pre-1967 borders. Virtually all of Israel's vital center would be subject to rocket attacks. Israel will therefore have to hold some territory captured in 1967 and later, including most of East Jerusalem, parts of the West Bank south of Afula, between Jerusalem and Netanya, and southwest of Jerusalem (east of Qirya Gat). Since such territorial concessions will not be granted by the Palestinians (see the Clinton attempt at creating a map) and since the Palestinians will not allow Israeli security control over an otherwise-independent state, it does not seem that territorial compromise is possible, at least while Arafat has any measure of control.
Even if the territorial concessions were to be granted, however, there would still be the issue of terrorism. As long as the Palestinian fringe groups think that terrorism will keep the war alive, they will continue to use terrorism. In a land of peace, those groups will have no influence, and that is unacceptable to those who wish to destroy Israel entirely. Such a situation would prevent them from reaching their goals. Since Israel cannot have security without the cessation of terrorism, there is an impasse.
Clearly, then, there is little chance for peace without a violent solution, since neither side will accept the minimum demands of the other. So what is the way forwards?
Syria must cease supporting terrorism. If Syria is unable to cease support for terrorism, because it is unable to liberalize enough to do so and not get Bashar Assad and his government hung from the lamp posts, then the US must invade Syria and bring about a regime change as has been done in Iraq.
Israel must deal harshly with the Palestinians. This will be politically difficult for Israel, because basically Israelis don't want to lower themselves to brutality, no matter what the press reports say. If the Israelis were truly brutal monsters, they would have ended this a long time ago. However, it is not necessary for the Israelis to either exterminate the Palestinians, nor to expel them wholesale. Instead, Israel should draw a set of boundaries which are acceptable to it. It should then make clear that any terrorist act within those borders would be met by a very specific kind of retaliation.
After each such act, one Palestinian village, or a significant part of a large city or camp, would be given 24 hours to evacuate. No restrictions would be placed on who could leave (except that wanted terrorists and criminals would be detained), but no vehicles would be allowed to leave (too much risk of car bombs) and each person and back would be quarantined so that they could be searched for weapons and explosives, after which they could go where they want, within the areas they are already legally allowed to travel to. Once the time limit has passed, the Israeli army would then procede to level the town. Since it would undoubtedly be boobytrapped, this would be done with bulldozers and explosives. In the end, the town's remnants would be plowed under, and no Palestinians would be allowed to rebuild there.
If necessary, this could go on until every single Palestinian village was levelled, and every city was levelled, and every Palestinian was living in tents. All along, the Israelis should make clear what their chosen settlement offer is, and it should be generous, within the minimum limits set out by the Israelis for security and sovereignty, and should certainly include rebuilding cities and towns for the Palestinians, starting up a meaningful Palestinian economy and ensuring that the Palestinians would have political control over as much as possible of their own lives. At some point, the Palestinians would have to either see that their interests were better served by accepting the Israeli offer. If this did not happen, and every Palestinian were eventually reduced to living in tents, with no means of feeding themselves, then it would be time to consider evicting the Palestinians by force into neighboring countries.
I realize just how stark and awful this is. I do think, though, that is is marginally less awful than what is happening now. I certainly think that it is less awful than any other settlement I can think of which would allow Israel to continue to exist and be secure within its borders. I'd love to have someone come up with a better answer, though. (Sticking with the current slow bleed of innocent lives (not to menation the Israeli economy) is not a better situation, as far as I am concerned.)
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackMay 15, 2003
Axis and Allies
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Over at Winds of Change, D. Lee guest blogs about US-European relations. In the comments, Maxim has a long post, quite critical of the US, in which he gives a European view of the situation: "so not germans changed foreign policy between the aftermath of 9-11 and now, but the US."
But, Maxim, that is the entire problem. The United States spent the entire decade of the 1990s, as bin Laden and others gathered their power and attacked US interests overseas, believing that terrorism was a really minor problem, and that the long-term issues of Israeli-Palestinian peace and of maintaining our ability to contain dangerous regimes like N. Korea and Iraq - and the consequent need to consort/"engage" with oppressive dictatorships such as China and Saudi Arabia - were more important than the minor pinpricks of attacks against the US by Islamic radicals. Europeans spent the 1990s in much the same fog, too obsessed with European integration to really notice the rot in the unassimilated immigrant communities within their own borders.
September 11 exposed the falsehood of that, and gave the US a strong motive to solve the problem of Islamist terrorism. At the same time, our attention was decisively focused on the intersection of "irrational actors" and their support of terrorism, as well as the pursuit of several of them - Iran, Iraq and North Korea - of nuclear weapons. This we could not allow, or we would be threatened with utter destruction in less than a generation.
And so the US thought through its options, and came up with the following list, as far as can be publically seen:
1) organized terrorism focused on global action had to be destroyed as a threat, starting with destroying its best basing and operatives in Afghanistan
2) the "axis of evil" states must be isolated and brought down, whether by military or other means, as quickly as possible and at any cost and risk
3) other state supporters of terrorism must be redirected to either act against terrorism or at least cease support for it
4) any terrorist organizations which had not by that time been co-opted or destroyed would then have to be destroyed
(I believe that this is a lot of what's going on behind the "roadmap" as well - an attempt to co-opt the Palestinians so that we will not have to destroy them later.)
Other nations also reevaluated their positions after 9/11, and in Germany, France and the low countries, the problem of unassimilated immigrants began to be realized in a way it had not before. Now, the increasing anger of the young men among these populations begins to look like a basis for a possible civil war in Germany and France some time in the next 20 years, unless either the Muslims assimilate or demographic trends alter radically.
Strategically, the problem for the French and Germans was to decide how to prevent such a civil war. Their ideology prevents them from simply deporting the unassimilated immigrants, their economies and inability to build public support for funding a strong military deprives them of the ability to confront the problem from a position of strength, and their racism prevents them from allowing the immigrants to assimilate, and thus gain economic and political power which would give them a hopeful future. So the French in particular, and to a lesser extent the Germans, chose the path of Saudi Arabia, and find an external enemy.
This was somewhat natural, as they had already been doing a lesser version of the same thing for a decade by demonizing Israel. Why not simply adopt bin Laden's/Saddam's lie that Israel and the US were objectively the same entity? Then, you could build your own popularity by feeding the forces of dissent at home by bashing on the US, while giving the Muslim immigrants a better target (from the European point of view) in the US than they had in France or Germany. Best of all, the US is such a forgiving nation that we had never spent a lot of energy in the past punishing other nations that stooped to this level, so why would we now?
But the US has changed since September 11, and we're not willing to be either the target of terrorism or the tool of political cowards like Schroeder and Chirac. And this is where the Weasels have fundamentally failed: by not understanding that the US is not content to play the silent victim, they picked the wrong path. Had the French and Germans stood up and said that removing Saddam was necessary, due to Saddam's regrettable actions, they would have been able to not only have a role in reshaping the Middle East, which could have created a society that the immigrants could return to, they would also have had our support if a civil war in Europe did break out. As it is now, I suspect that if such a civil war were to break out, the only concerns the US would have would be preventing the spread beyond France, Germany and the low countries; and ensuring that the French nuclear arsenal were brought into US/UK hands or were destroyed. Frankly, other than that they can go rot.
Note that I am not saying that I have anything against the majority of the French and German people individually; we'd welcome them as immigrants here. But I don't think we'd risk our blood and treasure to save their diseased political cultures for a third time.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackWell, That's a Shocker
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Between the museum that was not looted much and the library that was not looted, one has to wonder if maybe, just maybe, the US wasn't so dumb after all in how it chose to deploy its troops? I would guess that these guys won't think so. Notice how they stopped updating their links right around the time that we started figuring out that the reports were overblown?
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackMay 14, 2003
Hayba
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Thanks to Winds of Change for the link to this article by Reuel Marc Gerecht. Too good to excerpt, the article discusses the American psychological position in the Middle East, and the threats to it (hint: most of them are internal to the US).
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackWhy Make them Lighter?
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This article, which I got via The Command Post, contains a bit that doesn't make a lot of sense to me.
it wants to upgrade the forward-deployed 2nd Infantry Division to SBCT (Stryker Brigade Combat Team) status, to make its forces lighter and more mobile. America is also studying plans to send an SBCT unit to South Korea this summer for a military exercise.A USFK official said the transformation to SBCT was in line with America's long-term plans to reorganize and reduce its troop count here while strengthening its fighting power and deterrence effect at the same time. He denied that the plans were related to the nuclear issue with North Korea. But some experts said the moves seemed to be designed to prepare for a possible worsening of the crisis.
The whole point of a Stryker brigade is to be easily deployable and very mobile, while having a lot of hitting power. It seems that you want for divisions already deployed in Korea to be as heavy as possible, given the threat, terrain, and lack of need to deploy them (as they are already deployed). I can only think of a few scenarios:
- I'm reading more into this article than is really there.
- The article got wrong what is happening.
- The actual reference should be to 2IDs 3d Brigade, which is stationed in the US and would have to be deployed.
- The actual reference should be to additional forces being deployed to Korea in the event of war, and the prepositioning is for such forces (although, again, if you're going to preposition shouldn't you preposition heavy equipment)?
- We actually intend within the next couple of years to pull USFK - at least the land component - out of Korea to Japan or elsewhere in the region, but want them to be versed in operating as a medium force in Korea before we leave.
None of these seem like really good reasons to me, so what am I missing here? What's the rationale for using SBCTs in Korea instead of heavy divisions? Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBack
May 13, 2003
Multilateralism
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Calpundit has an interesting article on multilateralism. He mentions US use of multilateral methods in Korea, Afghanistan and Israel/Palestine, and then asks:
These are all good reasons for multinational collaboration in foreign policy. They are also reasons put forward by conservatives and by a conservative administration. So why is that Iraq, uniquely in the world, seems to be the one place where none of this matters?
Well, the trite answer is that we have lots of tools in our toolkit, and it's not good to assume that every problem is a nail.
The more serious answer is related to national interests. In the Korean situation, the countries neighboring North Korea have far more interest in the situation than does the US. China and Japan do not want a nuclear-armed North Korea. China does not want Japan and Taiwan to obtain nuclear weapons, which a failure to rid North Korea of nuclear weapons would almost certainly lead to. South Korea does not want to lose Seoul, and does not want to have to pay for bringing North Korea back from the brink. (It would much rather the US pay to keep North Korea barely intact.) The US, on the other hand, just wants the region to be peaceful, and for the representative and capitalist South Koreans and Japanese to remain representative and capitalist. Frankly, we don't have a strong and immediate interest here, which is why we're considering pulling our troops out of South Korea.
In Afghanistan, we use other nations to help keep the peace and to help reconstruct for a few reasons. Mainly, we wanted at the start to keep NATO involved and relevant (it's no longer clear that this is a long-term US goal, after France's stonewalling on defending Turkey), share the costs and give other nations reasons to keep Afghanistan peaceful and on an upward path. The US only has a security interest in keeping Afghanistan from returning to being a base for terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, and we have plenty of troops on hand for that. I would argue that we have a moral obligation to Afghanistan, but I also realize that morality is almost never actually in play in international politics.
In Israel, I think that our main reason for being involved is to keep a lid on the conflict. I don't know that we care if it gets resolved or how, as long as the other Arab nations are not incited to cease co-operating with us in the War on Terror, with selling oil and with other genuine US national interests. We certainly want Israel to remain representative and capitalist, and want to convert other nations in the region to that model, but I don't know that this has anything to do with our involvement in the peace process. I suspect that if we weren't engaged heavily in the region because of the war on terror, we would have completely withdrawn from the process once it became clear that the Palestinians were not negotiating or acting in good faith. As it is, we are making ourselves a target of Arab rage for no good reason. So using the Quartet is useful to somewhat deflect that rage and to give the Palestinians' non-Arab supporters (the UN, Russia, the EU) reasons to actually pressure the Palestinians to stick up to any agreements.
The US has a direct financial interest in Europe. We want Europe to remain representative and capitalist, certainly, and in order to do that the Europeans have to be defended. It costs us a lot of money to defend them, that we'd rather spend elsewhere. There is a raft of indications that the US is about to do just that, whether Europe spends on its own defense or not. This is risky, in that if Europe remains undefended, and an aggressive nation appears in in midst or on its borders, that nation may be able to capture Europe or pressure it in ways that are bad for our interests.
Iraq is a very different matter. In addition to our short-term interests in the War on Terror (Iraqi support for Palestinian radicals, development of weapons of mass destruction, training terrorists and the like), Iraq is a largely secular and educated state. This makes it a perfect place to try to set up a federal, representative republic with a capitalist economy. This would make a fine example for the rest of the Arab world to emulate (by popular demand, and almost certainly against the wishes of the rulers of those other Arab/Muslim nations), so that we would be forced to fight fewer wars in order to end support of terrorism from Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia (and to a lesser extent some other Arab/Muslim nations). Thus, it is heavily in our interests to resolve the Iraqi situation in the way most favorable to us. On the contrary, the UN, France, Germany, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt all have reasons to want us to fail. The UN needs us to fail to prove that only UN-sponsored intervention works. Germany, France and Russia need us to fail for economic reasons (and, in the case of France, for face-saving reasons). Iran, Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia want us to fail to preserve their interests in Iraq, prevent us from coming after them, and not incite their own people to try to emulate an Iraqi success by overthrowing their current leaders. Turkey needs us to fail so that they will be able to continue intervening in Kurdish territory. As a result, it will be the US, Britain, Poland, Australia and a few other countries who rebuild Iraq.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackMay 12, 2003
Putting a Stake in the Heart of Interservice Rivalry
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The A-10 Warthog is the most amazing aircraft in our arsenal, and it may be scrapped by Air Force politics. While I can't agree with Trent that "what is good for the USAF Brass (bomber pilots then and fighter pilots now) is bad for America, and vice versa," it is certainly true that the Air Force has too disparate a group of missions to fly. The Air Force's missions include strategic nuclear strike, air superiority, deep attack, tactical air support of ground forces, reconaissance, electronic intelligence gathering and warfare and a host of other missions. This is too broad of a mission set, and what ends up happening is that the "sexiest" jobs - fighter pilots - get to make all of the rules, and oddly enough they keep making rules that favor fighters over everything else.
In the area of actual warfighting, Goldwater-Nichols fixed the problem of inter-service rivalry. Since all theaters are commanded by a joint warfighter, to whom all elements report, the various military organizations operate as a single team. This is a huge improvement over earlier eras, where (for example) troops on the ground couldn't talk to their air support, because the radios were different. However, the various services still are in charge of deciding what equipment to buy, how to train the forces, what to actually send to a particular theater and so on. This leads from time to time to situations where a combatant commander wants a certain resource, say A-10s, and it is denied to him or watered down, largely in order to prevent that resource from gaining acclaim which would make it harder to kill off in favor of, say, more fighters. For some reason, the Air Force is really bad about this kind of thing.
It seems to me that we need another reorganization similar to that which followed Goldwater-Nichols. In this case, though, what we would want to do is look not at how we fight, but how we prepare to fight. What I would suggest as a first cut is looking at the military in terms of where it fights and what it needs to fight well. We fight in four arenas currently: inland, at sea, in the air and in the littorals. We could soon add in space to that list. Services and capabilities needed to fight well divide into those things that we must do before we decide to deploy troops, those things which are necessary to deploy troops and sustain them after they are deployed, and those things other than combat forces which are necessary to allow them to fight effectively. Those things that are necessary before we decide to deploy include procurement, administration (including legal staff, accounting and the like), doctrine and training, rear-area medical facilities, family support and so forth. Those things that are necessary to deploy and sustain troops include capabilities to move troops and supplies, as well as management and distribution of the supplies themselves. Those things which enable the combat forces to fight effectively include intelligence, psyops, reconnaisance, field medical support and the like.
The would lead to the combat forces dividing much as they are today: Army for inland combat, Navy for deep-water warfare, Air Force for air superiority and deep strike/strategic bombing and Marines for fighting along the coastlines. I see three minor changes to mission that would be involved in implementing this. The Army should take over the ICBMs and related strategic and theater nuclear missiles, on the grounds that these are no more aerial weapons than is a bullet. They go from the ground to the ground. The Army should also take over the CAS role currently provided by the Air Force (the Marines already have their own CAS, and would keep it). This means integrating the A-10s into the Army, as well as any other aircraft used strictly for close air support. The Marines would absorb the Coast Guard, whose mission would expand rather dramatically - closer to its WWII mission than its current mission.
One thing we need to be careful of is multirole capabilities. For example, we currently have a lot of aircraft which can switch roles. In the early days of a war, while we are gaining air supremacy, we need the F-15s and F-16s to fight enemy fighters and counter-air missions. Later, these can be incrementally switched to support of the ground troops. This is a useful and cost-saving way to implement the capabilities, and we don't want to lose it. It turns out that this distinction is fairly easy to draw, though. We simply would use the Army's aircraft for operations in areas where the Army forces are operating; Marine aircraft for where Marine forces are operating; and Air Force aircraft for interdiction and deep strike. F-16s could still plink tanks; they would just be doing that to units not actually in contact with Army or Marine units.
The non-combat forces could be put into three "services:" joint administration and readiness, covering the things we need to do before we deploy; logistics, covering deployment and sustainability; and joint combat support, covering those non-combat capabilities which enhance the theater commander's ability to employ his combatant units.
This would be a large shakeup, to be sure, and would be politically messy to implement. I think, though, that it would focus the non-combat parts of the military more on how to support our ability to fight, rather than on what got them to where they are. In other words, it would not be a fighter jock deciding if fighters could do it all, but rather a procurement officer deciding what capabilities are necessary and in what amounts to allow the Army's combatant forces to do their jobs as well as possible.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackMay 11, 2003
Understanding
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It used to be the case that many of the soldiers whose bodies were buried overseas, or returned to the US for burial, were of unknown soldiers. That is, we knew they were American soldiers, but did not know which ones they were. For all but the most advanced nations, this is still the case. The last unknown soldier that the US interred was from Viet Nam, but he was disinterred and identified using DNA analysis. The US will never again recover the body of a soldier and not be able to identify him.
What is amazing about this story (hat tip, Transterrestrial Musings) is not the fight and bravery (I expect that from all American soldiers) but that we are putting so much effort into completely understanding what amounts to a minor incident. Almost no one else will go to these lengths: in war it is inevitable that soldiers will take a wrong turn, and get ambushed and killed. Mistakes, friction, the "fog of war" are everpresent realities.
But not necessarily forever. The US is turning vast amounts of attention to understanding every single aspect of every event in a war zone - no matter how trivial. We are studing who was in what vehicles when, and how they decided to fight, and how they died - and not just on the American side. We also study civilian deaths and enemy deaths.
We are putting such an intense spotlight on the fog of war that we are burning away the confusion, a little at a time. It will never be completely gone, of course; that is an impossibility. But we are reducing it dramatically. Since Viet Nam, we have sought to understand every single aspect of the circumstances of combat, and to correct for those that work to get people killed. We've been willing to pour exceptional resources into understanding events that, in Viet Nam or Korea or WWII or even the Phillipine occupation after the Spanish-American war, would have not even merited footnotes. In the end, I think that it is this focus on the exact circumstances of the death of every American soldier, and the willingness to pay exhorbitant sums to prevent it from happening again, which have led to the exceptionally small number of deaths in wars since Viet Nam.
(By the way, in order to give an idea of how small our number of deaths is, it is useful to look at casualty models. By the models that were in use in 1991, we should have suffered about 8000 to 10000 casualties, about a 3000-4000 of them dead. But we suffered only 146 dead out of less than 650 total casualties. By those same models, we should have lost about 25000 to 35000 troops in the latest war (about 9000 to 12000 dead), rather than under 150 dead and less than 500 wounded.)
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackLayered Warfare
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Unlike the Noble Pundit, I'm not dismissive of China's newest tank design. If it pans out, it will be a serious piece of weaponry, which demands a bit of battlefield respect. While larger gun calibers are of somewhat limited utility in anti-tank terms, having a 152mm gun does give the tank better capability against infantry and hardened positions than the Abrams has. It will be interesting to see if this design includes the armored internal bulkheads and other features designed to maximize crew survivability in modern Western designs. Most importantly, this weapons system will be a threat to Taiwan, equipped with older tanks, should China ever develop a credible amphibious capability before Taiwan can acquire more modern weapons.
In order to successfully beat the US on the battlefield, a country will need to field a broad range of capabilities: a heavy tank capable of defeating US missiles and tanks; either a formidable air force or a powerful mobile high-speed high-altitude air defense; some naval, air or missile force to compel the US Navy to stand far offshore; and a professional NCO corps in an Army organized for independent small-unit action and large-scale coordinated combined arms. This combination of capabilities would make an enemy competitive with us. I believe that this tank might well fulfill the first requirement for the Chinese. The Chinese could easily develop the submarine capability to make the USN nervous. It would be a huge and risky undertaking to get the Chinese air force up to standards, and I'm not convinced that China can do this in the next ten to fifteen years. (They have size, but not quality or doctrine.) They may be able to develop a mobile air-defense capability, though, to put a bubble of airspace denial around their maneuver units, sometime in the next ten years or so.
Where the Chinese will really fall down, though, is in the last element. No Communist society devolves the necessary authority far enough downwards. That requires a level of trust not present in such a society. As a result, it is almost certainly the case that, even should China achieve a weapons parity, they would not have the battlefield flexibility to beat the US. They might be able to slow us down, though, and in that case we might be in trouble. If the Chinese could draw us into a war on their territory, we probably could not compete in a war of attrition, because the Chinese could turn out a lot more soldiers than we could. Even so, the conditions for the Chinese to defeat us basically are: war in China, with the Chinese vastly improved and the US standing still.
Overall, I still don't see a short- or medium-term threat, to us or to Taiwan.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackMay 10, 2003
Core Principles for a Free Iraq
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Don Rumsfeld has an article in today's WSJ that is worth reading, on the future of Iraq.
It is now just seven weeks since Iraq's liberation--and the challenges are there. As Thomas Jefferson put it, "we are not to expect to be translated from despotism to liberty in a featherbed." It took time and patience, but eventually our Founders got it right--and we hope so will the people of Iraq--over time.We have a stake in their success. For if Iraq--with its size, capabilities, and resources--is able to move to the path of representative democracy, the impact in the region and the world could be dramatic. Iraq could conceivably become a model--proof that a moderate Muslim state can succeed in the battle against extremism taking place in the Muslim world today.
We are committed to helping the Iraqi people get on that path to a free society. We do not have an American "template" we want to impose: Iraqis will figure out how to build a free nation in a manner that reflects their unique culture and traditions.
Rumsfeld lays out current and future Coalition activities. I must say that I've been a bit worried about the focus of the occupation, because it would be very easy to give in to the Scylla of turning Iraq over to Iraqis and getting out as fast as we can, or to the Charybdis of imposing forms and methods of governance on Iraqis. Reading Rumsfeld's list of principles, I am more confident now than ever that the Bush administration is steering a good course. Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBack
April 29, 2003
Prerequisites for a Stable and Free State
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David Plotz has a good article on MSNBC (originally from Slate, with a hat tip to Porphyrogenitus for the link) about the prerequisites for a stable, free state in Iraq. I like a lot of what he said, but would like to take issue with a few of his contentions, and point out some things he didn't mention.
Mr. Plotz's sixth (of seven) pre- or co-requisites is to "[l]et the United Nations organize the political process." The intent is to show that the new government is not a puppet of the US. This is an odd way to show that. Given the UN's corruption, ineptness and beholdenness to autocrats, they are unlikely to be able to rebuild Iraq as a free nation in any sense - even as far as guaranteeing free elections. Worse, many Iraqis deeply distrust the UN, because the UN wanted Saddam to remain in power. I don't think that any real legitimacy in Iraq will flow from the UN, and history suggests that such a course would be ruinous.
Wouldn't it be better, overall, if we were to organize elections at the local level, using Iraqi poll workers, getting ballots printed in Iraqi print shops and the like, with the US just providing the organization and advice as to how to do it? The US would probably have to conduct a census first, and set up a system for voter registration. Since all of the workers doing the job would be Iraqi, the US would have no hand in choosing who would run as candidates or who would be elected; we would just provide the organization and resources (and security) to allow it to happen. We should provide bodyguards, by the way, to all of the candidates, with no option for the candidate to refuse. This would not only prevent the assassinations of pro-Western figures in the South, it would also make the radical Islamist candidates accept US military bodyguards, removing an argument they could use to make the pro-Western candidates look like puppets.
Once the local elections were held, and the local governments set up, we could move onto regional governance. The local governments would decide which of their powers were delegated upwards to the regional governments. We would probably require a few powers to be delegated up in whole or in part, but for the most part each region would decide for themselves how much power they want to remain local, and how much they want to centralize. There would be significant time requirements to set up the electoral bodies and organize the elections. This would provide the delay recommended by Mr. Plotz's first point. In addition, this would provide time for the polity to settle out, while allowing people to taste freedom slowly, rather than drinking it from a firehose. After the regional elections were held, the national government could be set up, on a similar process. In other words, the regional governments (I believe the Iraqis call them provinces) would send the delegates who would make up the constitutional convention for the national government, in the same way that local governments would send the delegates for the regional constitutional conventions.
Again, at the national level we would have certain requirements that we would compel into the Constitution (certain freedoms necessary to the maintenance of the society, some kind of federalism, separation of powers, as well as prohibitions on weapons of mass destruction - we would probably also force a 10-year or so ban on modifying the Constitution to remove those parts we required to be there). For the most part, though, at each level, it would be the Iraqis determining not only who will govern, but to what extent and in which ways they can govern. By putting a time limit into the national Constitution which would require some period to pass before necessary limitations and freedoms could be removed, we would both show that we are committed to keeping the Iraqis free, and that we don't intend to indefinitely force them into our model of governance. The time limit would allow Iraq, for example, to get rid of freedom of speech later and replace it with a more limited form (banning criticism of Mohammed, for example, by Constitutional amendment would almost certainly occur in an Islamic nation). While we may not like these choices, we are showing that we do not intend to prevent the Iraqis from making them, and we tell them when that time will come.
Mr. Plotz left out a couple of preconditions, too, that I think need to be addressed. A free market, with transparency at all levels, is a pre-requisite for democracy to succeed. Without this, the ability of individuals to act in their own best interest is at best strongly curtailed. And since it is the freedom we are hoping to establish in Iraq, we will first have to set up a banking system and financial markets (not necessarily elaborate ones) and these institutions will need to be trusted.
Freedom of travel between regions and into and out of the country are prerequisites. That way, if the South wants to impose Sharia law, they can (at least to an extent, as moderated by freedoms granted in the putative national Constitution). But they cannot prevent you from leaving the area, and so not being subject to those laws. Since you could retain your residence there, and vote absentee (I assume we'd set this up as part of the election system), those laws would not necessarily be permanent. That's life in a free country, guys.
Restriction of the vote will be necessary, but not in the way that is traditional in Islamic countries that allow any kind of voting. That is to say, we won't disqualify women, homosexuals and such from voting. We would disqualify high-ranking Baathists, torturers and the like. We would disqualify violent criminals, clearly. We would likely want to find a way to bar clerics associated with Iran. In other words, we'd seek out and prevent from voting (at least until Iraq completely controls its own destiny ten years or so down the line) those people who would work hardest to overthrow the free society and replace it with a tyranny.
Some way will have to be found of giving the Iraqis more to lose by handing control to an autocrat than they stand to gain by having a free society. One way to handle this would be to create a state oil revenue sharing program, similar to what happens in Alaska, with modifications to take local conditions into account. Anyone who was registered to vote would gain a share in the oil wealth of the nation, and the profits would be doled out periodically (quarterly is preferable to annually, since people see the money as more of a steady income) based on the shares one holds. It would be necessary to prevent the sale or transfer of those shares for some time, so that people would not take a quick, raw deal (as happened in the former USSR) rather than an uncertain future profit. They need a history of getting money from the share to realistically evaluate offers made to them to sell the shares. In addition to the economic benefit so provided, such a program would have the benefit of making it important to the Iraqi people to keep governments in charge which wouldn't expropriate the oil "for the nation" or "for the people."
Finally, I believe that it will be necessary to provide regulatory and enforcement authority to government agencies (including police, property registration, etc) before the indigenous executive agencies are formed. There's a lot to say for habit, and if we set up procedures while those agencies are reporting to American or British governors, those procedures will likely carry over once the Iraqis themselves run the executive branch of government. This would go a long way towards ensuring against the immediate erosion of the "small liberties" which are so vital to people feeling free.
Posted by jeff at 10:41 AM | TrackBackApril 25, 2003
Civil Reconstruction
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Phil Carter of Intel Dump asks, Does the Army need more military police? He gives a reasoned analysis.
So many of the missions the Army has today are to do things that MPs are good at: nation-building, peacekeeping, anti-terrorism/force protection, and other police-style missions. In the Balkans, we've succeeded by hammering square infantry units into round MP holes for a long time, with significant training and institutional costs. I've thought for some time that the right answer would be to create larger, rapidly-deployable MP units that could be used for these kinds of missions. Current practice is to give peacekeeping missions to a large combat unit (e.g. an infantry brigade) with 1-3 MP companies attached in support. The MPs just get used for specialized missions, like riot control, while the infantry do the bulk of the MP-style missions like running checkpoints, patrols, etc. It might make more sense to invert this relationship, and build more MP brigades capable of managing peacekeeping missions with an infantry company as a quick-response force.Furthermore, moving units from the reserves to the active force isn't that simple either. It costs money to do so, and it would require an adjustment in the military's end strength (or cutting of personnel from other areas). Privatizing law enforcement on military bases sounds good, but it would have a real impact on MP training. The reason MPs are so good is because they practice their peacekeeping skills every day they're doing law enforcement. Granted, there's a big difference between patrolling Fort Hood and patrolling Baghdad. But there's a lot of similarity too, especially in the abilities to work within restrictive rules of engagement and employ forceful interpersonal communication skills. So it's not clear this is the answer either.
It is clear that the UN model of civil reconstruction has failed. UN humanitarian assistance is generally welcomed, but frequently stolen or embargoed by power forces in the areas the UN is trying to serve (witness Iraq, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia). UN peacekeeping, in order to secure the humanitarian aid, only works when at least the largest of the factions fighting decide to stop fighting (witness Lebanon, Sinai, Cambodia, Congo). When the factions don't want to stop fighting, you have to make them (witness Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia). It so happens that the only nation capable of doing this anywhere in the world is the United States, though some nations are capable of doing so in their region. (Note that the examples given include both positives and negatives.)
So, when it comes time to stop the fighting, it is generally the US that is called on. This call is begun with admonitions that the US isn't doing enough to secure world peace, and ended with accusations of imperialism and "trying to be the world's policeman." The exact point of criticism on the imperialism scale is inversely proportional to how interested the US is in actually expending blood and treasure to secure an area. The more we want to be involved, the more imperialistic we are, and the less we want to be involved, the more isolationist and arrogant we are. Either way, we are to be called stupid, jingoistic and unilateralist.
When fighting is ended, the UN wants to be in charge of the aftermath (none of the blame if it went badly, all of the credit if it went well), in order to bring in aid and reconstruct a working society. The UN is generally good at providing aid, though it is massively inefficient. However, it is manifestly incompetent at constituting an efficient, responsive, representative and tolerant government (witness Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan (too early to call - and the US might step back in more), Cambodia, Rwanda, Haiti). The record, as the list of countries just given demonstrates, is uniformly pathetic. At best, the UN is no help. At worst (and usually), it actively prevents such a government forming. Here's an interesting bit about Cambodia, just as an example. (If blogspot's archives are broken, it's the article from April 25 titled DEMOLISHING THE OLD CANARD OF " MORAL EQUIVALENCE ".)
So given that the UN model depends at its base on US power, and given that the points where the UN takes over almost always result in a breakdown (are there counterexamples that don't involve the US?), and given that the UN is going to continue to actively oppose the US attempt to lift the Middle East out of its self-imposed medievalism, the question needs to be, "How will the US rebuild failed states when it intervenes?" To answer that question requires a broader answer than Phil Carter gave, and turns his assumption a little on its head.
First, it is a given, I think, that the US military will be the primary instrument creating the conditions for recreating the state, whether that be toppling a tyrannical government, or imposing order on anarchy. In the wake of that military intervention, however, we have a few viable options. Phil Carter's argument, to create company-sized units of MPs specifically for the purpose, using civilian contractors or some other means to take over current non-combat MP duties, is one of those options. I think that there is a better answer.
In the aftermath of war, in most of the situations I've ever studied, there are several situations overlayed on each other simultaneously. First, there is active combat going on in some places, frequently against small bands of guerillas. Second, there is civil anarchy in most areas that are not in the immediate zone of control of the armed forces. Third, some areas have a spontaneous arising of civil leadership, and relatively quick return to peaceful conditions, even without outside assistance. Fourth, there is massive infrastructure damage. Fifth, food, water and medical care are in short supply. Sixth, the range of reactions to the situation spans the range from joy through relief to unease to outright animosity. Seventh, there are criminals, agents of other nations, agents of the deposed faction(s) and agents of formerly-repressed factions all trying to grab as much power as they can as quickly as they can.
The military is good at the combat aspects of this. For the non-combat aspects, there are combat engineers and civil affairs and military police units, as well as the special forces, which are good at much of rest, but they are in short supply and have combat-support missions in most cases. There are generally not any units skilled in building civil governments at any levels other than the very local. I believe, given these factors and how much we will (at least for the next generation) be having to rebuild failed states, that we should create a specialist organization specifically for that purpose.
While this organization could be placed in the State Department or as a stand-alone agency, I contend that its best place to be is as part of the Defense Department, as a branch of service co-equal with the Army, Navy or Air Force. This would allow the combat commander direct control over and call on the organization, so that they would be integrated into the combat plan; would allow separate but integrated equipment acquisition, training and doctrine; and would place the organization in a position to operate as a matter of course in warzones (which would be very handy, and which the State Department for example couldn't provide). As a side benefit, it would also avoid the problems caused by career civil-service protections, particularly of ossification of ideas. Finally, it would make it easier to beef up security patrols, when needed, with soldiers or Marines, than if the organization were not part of the Defense Department.
Such an organization would need engineers of all kinds to rebuild infrastructure; security forces to impose and maintain order; huge amounts of translators to facilitate communications; administrators to quickly set up a functioning government; lawyers and courts to establish and maintain the rule of law; constitutional scholars and historians to advise the newly-liberated on how to set up an Enlightenment-based state within their local customs and traditions; doctors and nurses and medics to establish health care; and a host of other skills. Basically, what we would be creating would be the nucleus of a functioning state, which can be put rapidly in place just behind the front lines - when an area is secure but not necessarily completely in our control.
If we were to do this, I believe that the amount, severity and duration of anarchy in the wake of our military operations would be minimized. In addition, factional fighting not directed at our military would also be reduced. Because of these, the prospects for a successful state rapidly arising in the wake of our military action would be dramatically improved, and the reception we get from the local population would also be improved.
This kind of organization would have been invaluable in Kosovo, Panama and Iraq, and will be invaluable in the future. I think it's a better solution than the narrower one of increasing the amount and role of MPs, though obviously it incorporates that idea within it.
UPDATE: I forgot to mention funding. We pay $2.4billion or so to the UN every year, and billions more to other agencies that would be undertaking activities made redundant by having a US agency for civil reconstruction. The net cost would be small, really.
Posted by jeff at 8:07 PM | TrackBackApril 22, 2003
Honor and Dishonor
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The Weekly Standard has an article on winners and losers in the war, and where honor is granted. It has this interesting paragraph (actually the whole article is interesting):
The funhouse of the postmodern academics was built around the two closely related themes of postmodernism and multiculturalism. Together they displaced the idea of truth and its cousin, empirical evidence, with the notion of "narrativity." All the world was simply words. There was no reality, just a series of competing stories all of which were mere social constructs and none of which was more correct than any other. In political terms, the campus postmodernists identified with the pre-modern rebels against modernity in the Arab world. But with the war in Iraq, those on campuses who, like Al Jazeera, believed "Baghdad Bob's" account of events discovered that lo and behold there is such a thing as an empirically grounded reality.Posted by jeff at 12:06 AM | TrackBack
April 18, 2003
Great Article on Europe
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This article, written by a French formerly-radical leftist, discusses in great detail the contemporary failings of Europe. Here's a taste to whet your appetite:
"By the evening of September 11, a majority of our citizens, despite their obvious sympathy for the victims, were telling themselves that the Americans had it coming. Make no mistake: the same argument would have been made if the terrorists had destroyed the Eiffel Tower or Notre Dame."
"Europe gave birth to monsters. No doubt. But by the same token, it created the ideas that enable us to analyze and to destroy those monsters."
"Obsessive attention to past abominations has blinded us to the horrors of the present. Repentance is not a policy, and the continent of Europe cannot model its relationship to the past on that of Germany. Neither the status of victim nor that of executioner is hereditary. The duty to remember implies nothing about the purity or guilt of descendants."
"How can we command respect if we do not respect ourselves, if we constantly depict ourselves, in literature and the media, in the darkest colors?"
"When a crisis erupts, we do our utmost to delay. We temper our indignation with cynicism and treat the aggressor and his victim as equals, as though, in light of our own disenchantments, nothing made any difference."
"It is hard to tell what is most hateful in present-day anti-Americanism; the stupidity and bitterness it manifests or the willing servitude that it presupposes toward a superiority it denounces-in order not to change it."
"The "USAers" may experience moments of great solidarity or bursts of patriotism, but they are not made to rule the world like Romans because the "message" of America is self-fulfillment and love of life."
"We Europeans can challenge the dominance of the English language and the finance capitalism of Wall Street (with its extraordinary compassion for the rich), we can easily denounce the ambiguities of the melting pot and the ravages of communitarianism, and we can reject a world made in the image of American society. But then we have to offer in its place something more than mockery and reproof. We must really construct better models of social justice, economic efficiency, and ethnic coexistence. We are far from doing so. We lag far behind the Americans, out of breath. We still imitate their mistakes after they have devised remedies. Some Europeans place their hope in a theory of reverse genesis. America, the offspring of the Old World that has surpassed its progenitor, would witness the birth of a new Europe that would then put the United States in its place. For now, since geopolitics is the contemporary form of fortune telling, this is nothing but wishful thinking. The bitter truth is that Europe lags behind our transatlantic cousin in almost every area. But our possibilities are enormous if we enact a genuine intellectual revolution. Europe is today's largest contemporary political and cultural laboratory; something unprecedented is happening there without its inhabitants' even being aware of it. Europe has to recover its civilizing capacities and its pride, not in blood and battle, but primarily in spiritual conquests. Europe holds its own cards. Either it will build a counterforce endowed with credible political and military tools or it will be vassalized, willingly. In the latter case, an aging and declining Old World will reduce itself to being a luxurious vacation resort, coveted by predators, and always prepared to abdicate its freedom for a little more calm and a little more comfort."
I cannot agree with everything he says, but Bruckner has a lot of great insights into both Europe and America. Read the whole thing. (many thanks to Michael Totten for the link)
Posted by jeff at 1:34 PM | TrackBackWeasel - Not What You Think
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This is, if true, remarkable. (hat tip: Tim Blair) The fact that we would be willing to attempt it, that so many nations and NGOs would be willing to help, and that we would be successful, all are somewhat surprising. In a good way.
Nauru has been in the news a lot lately.
UPDATE: Here is a link that works. Operation Weasel is detailed in a sidebar.
Posted by jeff at 12:43 PM | TrackBackApril 17, 2003
Advantage: Me
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In the wake of the successful war in Iraq, Israelis are rereading Basil Liddell Hart. (hat tip, Winds of Change)
Posted by jeff at 2:25 PM | TrackBackHow we Win so Easily
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A lot of people are trying to figure out how America wins its wars so easily. The most trivial reasons are technological, and they are also the most widely discussed. Consider this, though, does anyone doubt that the US military, fighting with the type of equipment Iraq was using, would not have beaten the Iraqi military, fighting with the kind of equipment we were using? Some people talk about logistics, which is of course vital. FedEx has done as much for US warfighting in the last two decades as has General Dynamics. Many, many people talk about the quality and dedication of our forces, and a few point out that this arises from their being all-volunteer. Many people also point out the quality and responsibility of our long-service NCOs. All of these are important, and together certainly would give us an advantage over most armies. There are more subtle reasons, though, which are more important as well.
Glenn Reynolds yesterday wrote a column discussing the warfighting advantages we get by having an open and free society. Victor Davis Hanson discusses a number of features of our military, and brushes up against what I believe to be a very important point:
More importantly still, the old idea of separate branches of the military is itself becoming obsolete. It is not just that there are Army, Marine, and Navy pilots or that Seals and Air Force controllers fight on land. Rather there is such instantaneous integration between land, air, and sea forces that it is hard to sort out who is doing what when enemy tanks explode out of nowhere, GPS-guided bombs go into the windows of Baathists, and special-forces hit teams take out generals before they can order counterassaults.
It is very neglected - in fact almost unknown - but the key architects of the US war machine of today were Senators Goldwater, Nichols and Nunn, whose 1986 Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act changed US warfighting in a few key ways.
First, it was this Act that changed the status of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from arbitrator among the services to the President's primary military advisor, with operational responsibility for all branches of service. (The service chiefs retained organizational, training and equipment responsibilities.) The Act also streamlined the chain of command, with the individual services not in the chain of command at all for operational issues. Instead, the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the various joint commands were given total operational authority over all force assets assigned to them. In other words, one officer (General Franks in CENTCOM, which is responsible for the Middle East and Africa) in any given region has control over all of the combatant forces, regardless of which service they are attached to.
This has had the effect of eliminating the distinction between the services in combat. No more do we have the kind of interservice arguments that doomed the attempted 1980 rescue mission of the hostages in Iran. Instead, forces are assigned as needed to do what they do best, in pursuit of a single overall operational plan. Decisions about funding various services, and what programs proceed and which get cut, and so forth, still involve a great deal of political infighting in the Pentagon. They do not involve political infighting in the field.
This focus on joint operations has taken a long time to mature. Initial problems began to be worked out in the late 1980s, and the invasion of Panama, while successful, demonstrated some notable issues. By the Desert Storm campaign, many of these issues had been worked through, and the result was an amazing, well-coordinated campaign which overthrew the Iraqi Army with minimal coalition casualties. After Desert Storm, resistance within the military to the joint operations concepts largely disappeared, though not entirely.
Our technological advantages, troop quality advantages and so forth are critical factors that allow us to win wars. I believe, though, that the critical factor that allows us to win at low cost is the ability of our forces to work as a single entity, rather than a collection of different priorities, towards a single commander's intent. This ability comes directly from the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
Posted by jeff at 12:23 PM | TrackBackWhy Free Nations Don't Fight
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There is a reason why nations with free trade, free markets, a free press and representative governments do not go to war against each other. Here is an example of why that is. Since there is relatively free trade between France and the US, the amount of trade is fairly large and makes up a good proportion of the French economy (and not an insignificant proportion of the US economy - Michelin for example is huge, and it's not alone).
When we are annoyed at the French, we switch away from their products to alternatives from other places. Because of this, the French wine growers (and soon, no doubt, tire makers and others) put pressure on the French government to shape up. Eventually, this pressure will grow to the point that the French government will change its behavior. (Rest assured, if the US starts to suffer because of French actions against us, we'll put pressure on our government, too.)
Free trade gives people a personal reason to care about the opinions of other nations. Free markets give them a way to act on their concerns against other nations. A free press gives people the information they need to know when and how to act. Representative government allows the people to change the government's behavior to correct imbalances and irritations. Thus is peace maintained.
Fascism denies all of these mechanisms, as for that matter do communism and most other kinds of dictatorship. Government interference in these mechanisms tends to dampen correcting influences, and to that extent makes wars more likely. This is one reason why France swung so dangerously away from the US, and will take a long time to swing back, and it is why it is dangerous that the EU is looking to be so unrepresentative. With the markets heavily regulated and subsidized, the feedback mechanism is slow for France. With the EU policies being subject to the bureaucrats, rather than voters, the response mechanism will be very, very weak.
Posted by jeff at 9:42 AM | TrackBackApril 16, 2003
One Person at a Time
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Read this article from Arab News where the journalist recounts her experiences as an embed with Marines. (Hat tip: InstaPundit)
Posted by jeff at 10:19 AM | TrackBackApril 14, 2003
Turn and Face the Change
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Before 9/11, Don Rumsfeld was not well-liked in the Pentagon. Brash and self-assured, Rumsfeld tended to challenge, in blunt language, long- and deeply-held assumptions in the military bureaucracy. The questions that Rumsfeld was wanting answered - about the mission, organization, and size of the force - made a lot of people unhappy, because the answers didn't speak well of their assumptions.
For example, the question the procurement guys wanted asked was "If our mission is to fight two regional wars, why do we only barely have the forces to fight those wars, and not maintain our peacekeeping and other commitments?" This question would have led to increased procurement of weapons systems, which the procurement guys, and the gadget generals for that matter, like. Instead, Rumsfeld asked "Why is our mission to fight and win two regional wars simultaneously, when we can't even lift enough forces to fight one without a six month buildup?" This changed to focus to mission and logistics, away from toys. In other words, it was a harder question to answer, because it required a change in thinking.
On 9/11, Rumsfeld went to the scene of damage, and pitched in until dragged off by officers pointing out that he was in very grave personal danger, and there were plenty of people already there to help. This willingness to risk himself gave the desk jockeys a new respect for Rumsfeld, which bought him some time. Afghanistan, and in particular Rumsfeld's willingness to let his General Staff plan the war while he made sure they had everything they needed, increased that respect. The Iraq conflict will similarly increase Rumsfeld's respect within the military.
But Rumsfeld's mission to change the Defense Department to be relevant to the modern world did not go away. Part of the answer to Rumsfeld's challenge to the military was to make the force lighter, more deployable. This includes the new Strykers, as well as cancelling the unfortunately-named Crusader artillery piece. I suspect that it will soon include a medium tank, less well-armored than the Abrams, but much lighter and more easily-deployed. Doctrines are similarly under review, and will probably include a focus on low-intensity conflicts in distant theaters in the presence of large numbers of non-combatants. This will take a lot from the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the Balkans.
Now, Rumsfeld has asked Congress for the authority to change the personnel policies of the military. These changes include giving people longer time in a particular job, especially at higher levels, and making it less likely that reservists will be called up for "routine" contingincies. There will certainly be some whisper campaigns arising from this, with stories in the media about how Rumsfeld is "alienating senior officers in the Pentagon" and such.
Taken together, it appears that Rumsfeld is attempting to change the US military from a sledgehammer to a rapier. Heavy forces are being reduced or moved to the Reserves and Guard. Lighter forces are being improved, and medium forces are being fielded for the first time since Viet Nam (the unsuccessful Sheridan light tank). At the same time, procurement cycles are being reduced, personnel policies are changing to focus on flexible thinkers and doctrine is changing to focus on rapid operations far from friendly bases of support. In other words, Rumsfeld is refocusing the Pentagon away from the Cold War, and towards the vicious little fights in the failed states of Africa and Asia.
Posted by jeff at 1:19 PM | TrackBackLessons to Learn
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Our enemies are quickly learning that facing our combat units is not a winning proposition. However, that is not going to make them suddenly stop being our enemies, in most cases. So the question becomes, how will they fight us. Since we've removed any possibility of combat success against our front-line units, the enemy will be forced to take up guerilla warfare, the one part of Saddam's defense that had any success at all against us.
The most vulnerable targets we have during an invasion are our supply convoys. (This has been the case for every army since at least WWII, by the way.) Because our way of fighting, as well as the necessity for most of our enemies to rely upon guerilla warfare, tends to blur or erase the concept of a front line, these convoys will become more exposed.
We will almost certainly have to devote more resources to convoy duty. This has to be a judgement call, because resource you use to guard the columns cannot be used in actions elsewhere. On the other hand, if the columns don't get through, your lead elements don't fight. The fact that some Marines were down to one chow a day for three days (during or right after the sandstorms) is pretty inconsequential militarily. The fact that units in contact in Baghdad were low on ammunition was far more worrying.
During one of the more intense operations of the war, the initial push into Baghdad along Hwy 8, then back out towards the airport, some of the heaviest fighting was by a supply convoy, trying to reach the front-line units, who were running low on ammo and fuel after 10 hours of continuous combat. The convoy was repeatedly ambushed. Here is some footage of one of these ambushes. Note the soldier hopping into the fuel truck to drive it away from the adjacent burning ammo truck.
I think that one meaningful lesson that we will draw from this war is that we need to better train and equip our rear-area troops for combat. They will never and should never be the specialists that the combat arms are, but it is a given that supply convoys and maintenance yards will be targets in the future, because the enemy has identified them as weaker than the combat units. As a result, even without convoys making wrong turns (the event that led to the capture of 6 POWs and the deaths of many more of our soldiers from the 507th), we can expect to see more fighting by rear area forces. We need to be prepared for this.
There is one other lesson, as well. A lot of our losses came from vehicles hit by RPGs. In close-quarters combat, the RPG is a fearsome weapon against buildings, helicopters, and unarmored or lightly-armored vehicles. Given that there are millions of them throughout the Third World, we can expect to see a great deal of action against them. As a result, we need to be very careful with our deployment of medium forces. The Stryker combat vehicles are certainly lighter and easier to deploy than our heavy forces, and require less load in combat. For most of the combat that occurred in the countryside, there would have been no problem using them. For the urban combat we faced, such a unit would have been torn up pretty badly, unless significantly more infantry was available to us than was the case here.
There are cases where the time savings in the deployment of troops make the risk of additional casualties worthwhile. Initial deployments into a combat zone, such as Desert Shield, could benefit from rapidly-deployed light armor, as could operations such as that conducted by the 173d AB Bgde in northern Iraq. However, when heavy forces can get in, they should get priority in shipping and should be put ashore as soon as possible. Without this, our casualty rates will rise sharply, which I don't think any reasonable American wants to see. My fear in this area is that political forces would get us to deploy medium forces in situations where they aren't a good fit, because they won't be seen as being as threatening as a heavy unit, or because they are cheaper than heavy units. We must maintain a heavy unit infrastructure, even if we shift more of the heavy units into the Reserves and Guard as we bring medium units on line in the regular force structure.
Posted by jeff at 10:58 AM | TrackBackApril 11, 2003
Ramifications II
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Porphyrogenitus, in a post which has to win the "Steven Den Beste Very Long Post Making Many Important Points and Pretty Much Settling That Issue" award, covers the State Department bureaucracy's wrangling over how the rebuilding of Iraq will come out, an issue I noted earlier, and how we should deal with those countries who opposed us. He goes into great depth on issues in Europe and how that should inform our post-war foreign policy. You should read Porphyrogenitus' article.
Posted by jeff at 1:04 PM | TrackBackRamifications
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Porphyrogenitus writes about rebuilding Iraq and how soon we should be holding elections. He is unconvinced by Aleksander Dardeli's argument in the Financial Times that we should first build institutions of law and order, then move towards elections. I also wrote about this earlier.
Here is the crux of Dardeli's argument:
Iraq represents an opportunity for a better approach. The initial emphasis should be on humanitarian assistance, economic reconstruction and building the rule of law. No matter how much the enthusiasts cringe at the idea, the US should delay elections until conditions improve and there is a better chance of a government operating fairly and effectively. Justifying early elections by saying that the Iraqis are a proud people, or that Iraq is not Kosovo, is silly. Iraq's institutions have been steadily battered by Saddam Hussein's regime into a state of dysfunction that will take time to mend.
I feel that we would do well to listen to Dardeli. While the immediate judgement of the international community would be that immediate elections (and pretty much only that) would produce a legitimate government, they also felt that way about Kosovo. Further, international opinion was that Saddam's government should not be removed. I'm more interested in three other judgements: the judgement of the Iraqi people, the judgement of the American people and the judgement of history.
There will doubtless be some in Iraq who will want immediate elections. Let me make a quick prediction: these will mostly be people who want to use quick elections to gain power that they would not have otherwise over institutions that will enrich them over the longer term. This has been the pattern in most places where democracy sprouted too rapidly (see Russia for instance). Legitimacy arises from the consent of the governed, but elections alone do not signify the consent of the governed. Note that Iraq and Cuba both had elections in the past year. They were meaningless because the institutions of freedom which make elections meaningful do not currently exist in either Cuba or Iraq.
For the American people, what is going to matter is not what we do now, but whether the Iraqi people are free in four or five years, or at least well on their way. If we betray the Iraqis into despotism - or even an elected shambles - the Republicans will be out on their ears for allowing it to happen, and rightly so. This issue will be minor in the run-up to the next election, unless we really fail miserably and quickly, but will be very important in the next two elections after that. We must keep our word to the Iraqi people to create a free self-governing society, and we will not be able to do that if they have self-government with no free society to govern.
The judgement of history will not rest on where Iraq is in six months, but in six decades. Note that the successes in Japan and Germany were not truly apparent until the 1960s at the earliest, and really it was only in the late 1980s that Germany showed how far it had come by reabsorbing the East without collapsing. The right-wing nationalists were there, waiting, but their opportunity never came. Look, for further example, at South Korea and Taiwan, both of which were not truly free until the 1980s, though they had elections for quite some time before that.
I believe that we will be seeing regional and local elections within a few months, for positions of limited authority over a limited region. But it will be a year at least before the basic institutions of law and order, protection of property, a free economy and a free press have really begun to be effective. It will be longer still - perhaps three or four years - before these institutions will have really taken hold in a way that makes them hard to reverse. Somewhere between that one year and those three or four years would be the right time to begin having national elections for a representative body, and once that body has taken hold, they can arrange for the election of an executive. This amount of time also gives time for what Iraq really needs: a consitutional convention to decide, based on the experiences of themselves and others whom they wish to emulate, how they want to govern themselves.
Posted by jeff at 10:06 AM | TrackBackApril 8, 2003
Europe's Core Issues
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Innocents Abroad addresses the core issues which lead to Europe's cognitive dissonance. One aside in the article really made me think:
Europeans are more Kantian than Kant, they are Nietzschean last men. This isn’t to say that they are principled pacifists. Indeed, they aren’t really principled at all. They will send their armies, such as they are, to fight, but not with any particular sense of pride.
If you are interested in the Euro-American relationship, you should read the whole thing. (If Blogspot lets you, that is. If not, go to Innocents Abroad and scroll down to Europe, Anti-Europe.) Posted by jeff at 12:39 PM | TrackBack
Not Since the Iran-Iraq War
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Tim Blair contrasts a quote from Robert Fisk and one from Mark Colvin, who was on the same inspection trip. Fisk says that "Not since the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War have I seen the Iraqi Army deployed like this."
I believe that this is the first time I've ever seen Fisk get it right:
Here is an Iraqi tank from the Iran-Iraq war.
Here is an Iraqi tank from the current campaign.
April 7, 2003
Heading South
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We stopped to buy gas today. Across the highway from the gas station are train tracks. Since my 2 year old likes trains, I got him out of the van to watch the train go by. It was filled with heavy tank transporters, headed South. With trucks, headed South to the Army base. With command vehicles, headed South to the Army base where my friend has been activated. With supply trailers, headed South to the Army base where my friend has been activated, and waits to load them on ships. With ambulances, headed South to the Army base where my friend has been activated, and waits to load them on ships, and take them to war.
Posted by jeff at 3:47 PM | TrackBackDiplomatic Notes
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The Agonist points to this Hurriyet article to the effect that if the US does not prevent the Kurds from moving on Kirkuk and Mosul, then Turkey will intervene militarily in northern Iraq.
There was an interesting incident in the late 1800s, which I sadly do not have a current reference to. This is therefore a probably-flawed account of what happened.
A dissident from Serbia, I believe, came to the United States on a speaking tour, to raise funds for the Serbs to fight their Austro-Hungarian overlords. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador, outraged, demanded that the United States extradite this "criminal" to Austria-Hungary for trial, and included some rather blustery threats against the US if we failed to comply. The Secretary of State responded with a note bluntly stating that the United States values freedom of speech, that this person had committed no crime in the United States, and that "Furthermore, compared to the United States, the domain of the Hapsburgs is but a speck on the map."
A similar note is probably in order to Turkey, something along the lines of: "Any armed forces in the territory of Iraq and not under the command of the coalition, will be considered enemies and will be attacked and destroyed." Really, nothing more needs to be said, and I have to think Turkey would believe us. (Perhaps this should be sent a few hours after a note which indicates that PKK armed groups would not be tolerated in Kurdish areas, and that the territorial integrity of Iraq will be maintained. The note on the inadvisability of Turkey's armed forces entering Iraq, though, should stand alone in a separate communique.)
Posted by jeff at 10:22 AM | TrackBackDeclaration of War
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When the Constitution was written, there was not a lot of middle ground between war and peace. The primary armed force of the United States was the militia, which consists of armed male citizens of a certain age (I think 15 to 35 years, but I haven't read the definition in a long time). The army, in fact, could only be funded for two years at a time (this is still true, but now pretty much meaningless) in order to prevent the existence (and related dangers) of a large standing army. In order to make war in anything other than local self-defense, the army would have to be mobilized. In order to mobilize the army, there had to be a Congressional declaration of war.
Beginning during the campaigns to occupy the American West, and continuing with such operations as the putting down of the Moro rebellion in the Phillipines and the occupations of several Latin-American nations during the time before WWII, this line became blurred. Viet Nam was the war that finally muddied the line to invisibility. When Kennedy committed military advisors in a non-combat role, did that require a declaration of war? When Kennedy later authorized them to shoot in self-defense, did that require a declaration of war? When those advisors went on patrol with their trainees, and fired on VC groups setting up machine guns to kill them, did that require a declaration of war? When larger formations were deployed to pacify areas behind the front lines (to the extent they could even be defined), essentially acting as well-armed police, did that require a declartion of war? When those troops were then engaged by large enemy formations, did that require a declaration of war? And so on. The frog was well and truly boiled by that point, yet there had been no declaration of war either by Congress, or via delegated authority (as through the UNSC or invokation of the North Atlantic Treaty's article V). The closest it came was a Congressional resolution, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which amounted to a declaration of war, but without giving the President clear targets or undisputed authority to prosecute the war.
Finally, America recognized that warfare had become a spectrum. Absolute war and absolute peace rarely exist in the world. Most of the time, in most places, there is some kind of in-between situation. Transportation and the falling cost of increasingly powerful weapons means that ill-clothed tribesmen living in a 12th century culture in mountain caves without a road in a 500km radius could launch rockets with ranges of 30km and large high-explosive warheads. In this kind of world, how do we decide when and how the President can deploy troops in protection of American interests, while still maintaining the Congressional authority and accountability to decide when and where we commit those forces that could result in our destruction, should we lose? The answer to this question was the War Powers act.
Setting aside whether or not the Act is Constitutional (possibly not) or should have instead been passed as a Constitutional amendment with additional details supplied by enabling laws (probably), the War Powers act defined the conditions under which the President could act without the explicit authority of Congress. There are, under the War Powers act, only three conditions under which "the President as Commander-in-Chief [may] introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances:"
- pursuant to a declaration of war
- pursuant to specific statutory authorization
- or in "a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces"
The President must: advise Congress in advance and regularly thereafter, report specific information to the Congress every six months (more frequently if required by statute), immediately withdraw troops if Congress so requires by concurrent resolution, and "shall terminate" the combat use of the military "unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States."
Clearly, the President is authorized to make war in Iraq, by the second test established in the War Powers act. In October, 2002, the Congress passed a resolution which states in relevant part:
SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.(a) AUTHORIZATION- The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to--
(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
While this resolution did not immediately declare a state of war to exist between the United States and Iraq, it did authorize the President to commit acts of war at a time of his choosing, as long as certain conditions were met. I am unaware of any way to construe a difference between authorizing the President to commit acts of war that are not necessary for national self-defense, and declaring that a state of war exists, that would make any Constitutional difference. As a result, this resolution was a declaration that a state of war could be brought into existence, should the President decide that this was necessary and appropriate.
I believe that this is why the President did not ask for, and Congress did not pre-emptively make, a declaration of war. A declaration of war is a recognition that a state of war already exists. Since the President still hoped to pursue a diplomatic solution to the Iraq crisis, this form of resolution removed the Constitutional obstacle to war without also demanding a war, as an outright declaration of war would have done.
What this all comes down to is that the Congressional resolution of last October 2002 is Constitutionally equivalent to a declaration of war.
Posted by jeff at 12:51 AM | TrackBackApril 5, 2003
Brothers in Arms
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These mist covered mountains
Are a home now for me
But my home is the lowlands
And always will be
Some day you’ll return to
Your valleys and your farms
And you’ll no longer burn
To be brothers in arms
Through these fields of destruction
Baptism of fire
I’ve watched all your suffering
As the battles raged higher
And though they did hurt me so bad
In the fear and alarm
You did not desert me
My brothers in arms
There’s so many different worlds
So many different suns
And we have just one world
But we live in different ones
Now the sun’s gone to hell
And the moon’s riding high
Let me bid you farewell
Every man has to die
But it’s written in the starlight
And every line on your palm
We’re fools to make war
On our brothers in arms
- Dire Straits
Thanks to Lyrics Heaven for the lyrics.
The images came from War Photos and Free Republic.
Posted by jeff at 1:43 PM | TrackBackThe Trouble with Maps
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Iraqi Minister of Disinformation, Day 1: The evil invaders have been repulsed at the border.
Day 2: The infidel foe has been utterly defeated at Umm Qasr.
Day 3: The enemy dead litter the field around Basra. Allah is merciful.
Day 4: Our brave, courageous and loyal soldiers have repulsed the enemy at An Nasiriyah.
Day 5: Allah has given us victory at An Najaf, and the enemy plan is in tatters. Surely the kaffir will soon realize the error of his ways.
(Time passes)
Day 14: Al Kut has been the burial ground of thousands of infidels as our brave Arab nation has beaten the enemy with pickup trucks.
Day 15: The ground quakes beneath the wrath of Allah as he slaughters the sons of pigs and monkeys at the Saddam airport.
Day 16: Our brave 10-year old soldiers have repulsed the enemy from the outskirts of Baghdad.
Day 17: No press conference today.
When I become the Dark Overlord, the first thing I'm going to do is burn all of the maps, just in case I get invaded. Wouldn't want the people to lose heart that way.
Posted by jeff at 11:32 AM | TrackBackRisky Business
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There is no nation on Earth which can win a stand-up fight against the US, even on their home territory, assuming that nuclear weapons are not used. China would make us bleed from sheer numbers. N. Korea would make us bleed from numbers and terrain. Britain or Israel would make us bleed from competence. Anyone else would be a fairly low-casualty win (at least based on the size of the task) for the US. The US enjoys an amazing superiority in doctrine, technology, numbers, and industrial base over every other nation on Earth. Some can match us in one or another of those areas, but no other nation can match us in all of them.
This asymmetry between our hard power and everyone else's has led to new concepts in warfare by everyone else, either to try to gain some measure of global power or simply to defend themselves. For the Frankenreich (as Porphyrogenitus calls the French-German-Belgian group of nations), the strategy appears to be to emphasize soft power; that is to say, culture and nuance (if you are kind) or sneering condescension (if you're not). The underlying point is to take advantage of our desire to be liked, by using alliances (NATO, for instance) and international organizations (the UN, for example) as methods of binding us via the threat of disapprobation. (Of course, they also have to pass laws forcing French TV stations to show a minimum amount of French-produced programming, or they'd show almost exclusively American fare.)
Al Qaeda, of course, and the nations which support terrorism in general, have adopted, writ large, the Palestinian strategy of making war on civilians, rather than the military. Of course, as events have shown, this strategy only works if the US military doesn't come to get you. Non-state armed groups still depend upon states to house them, fund them and provide them with cover, equipment and people. Taking out the Taliban has removed Al Qaeda's best location to plan, train and recuperate. The current war against Iraq will remove financial support, as well as a source of diplomatic cover and such necessary gear as weapons and explosives.
Other nations also provide support to Al Qaeda and related groups. These include Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. I have not yet worked out Syria's strategy, though it may simply be to take advantage of the threat they pose to Israel to scare us into not attacking them. Certainly Syria is offering real support to Hezbollah and other terrorist groups, and political support to Iraq. Saudi Arabia seems to be attempting to play both sides, funding and supporting terrorism while co-operating in fighting terrorism when they must, and retrenching when they can, and loosening up politically when it is expedient, and cracking down again when they can. Iran, though, seems to have developed an activist strategy: infiltration of agents after a US conquest of Iraq, to destabilize the country and make our occupation costly and long. North Korea has opted to obtain nuclear weapons, and other nations will almost certainly attempt the same thing. (Iran is apparently trying.) The most frightening thing about that strategy is that North Korea is crazy enough that they may supply nuclear weapons to others.
Canada appears to have adopted the strategy of becoming irrelevant. On the other hand, Great Britain, Australia and the Eastern European countries have adopted the strategy of being on our side, and by doing so actually do have an influence on the way we behave.
I think that Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia will provide a test for the US. How far will we allow nations to go before we get irritated enough to attack them? I suspect that if Iran does go ahead with trying to instigate guerilla warfare against us in Iraq, while continuing their efforts to keep Afghanistan unstable, we will be at war with Iran within two years. This will happen even faster if Iran appears to be making real progress on obtaining nuclear arms. Saudi Arabia will probably be successful in keeping us from attacking them directly, but in the process they will have to liberalize somewhat, and also lower their level of support for terrorism (and in the course of this, they will need to lessen their attempts to export Wahabbism).
Syria is the real mystery to me. Certainly we have reason to go after them, if only because eliminating Syria's support for terrorism in Israel would make more likely a real possibility for peace in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On the other hand, lacking a concrete and fairly immediate threat, Congress is unlikely to authorize the use of force against Syria. Although strategically Syria would be the best next target to eliminate the threat of terrorism against the US, Iran appears to be following the more risky strategy against us, and is therefore more likely to be our next target.
UPDATE (6/20/05): I'm not sure how I omitted India, both competent and numerous, from the list.
Posted by jeff at 12:30 AM | TrackBackApril 4, 2003
Building Democracy in Iraq
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The Winds of War today has a report that the CIA and top State Department officials are profferring a nationalist named Adnan Pachachi to head the interim Iraqi government that will be installed after the war ends. The article paints him in rather ugly terms in comparison to Ahmad Chalabi, who is head of the Iraqi National Congress.
I know nothing about Mr. Pachachi, and only a little more about Mr. Chalabi. I don't think that Mr. Chalabi is the person to head up the interim Iraqi government, based on what I do know. That is beside the point, though. All of the maneuvering going on now is not about Iraq; it is about domestic political empires and vendettas. Right now, all of the organizations, and the different factions within those organizations, of the executive branch are trying to get primacy over who will be the ones to pick the new Iraqi government.
This is a mistake, and the Congress will compound it if they turn over control to the Department of State. Despite the claims made in the article, reconstruction and nation building is not "traditionally diplomatic territory." Generally, in our history, we have placed military governorships (led by governors general, who are serving military officers) in charge of this process. The reason for this is twofold. First, there is a huge security problem that has to be addressed, and the military is far better able to do this, even in non-military ways, than the diplomats, because to a diplomat everything is negotiable. Second, democracy doesn't work when it drops into your lap.
The second point is key: there are a large number of preconditions to true liberal democratic rule, which is why it doesn't happen much. There need to be institutions which give individuals power over their own lives. These include banks, for financial power (ability to borrow, pool resources, etc); a trusted police force and court system, for individual safety without resorting to individual use of force; and orderly and well-understood laws which provide safety (life), freedom of expression and action (liberty), and protection for private property (which is a cornerstone of the pursuit of happiness).
The only process which has been successful is to first build these institutions; then build elected legislatures at various levels, starting from the bottom up; then finally move the power of the state executive to an elected position. In every case I've ever come across where that path was followed, it has led to eventual liberal democracy in some form, while in every case of democracies which have failed, a different method has been attempted. Generally, you can overlap these steps quite a bit. In particular, giving local control to local officials can be done quite quickly. But even here, you have to have a strong power above the local level which can step in, so as to prevent the gangsterism seen in Russia, and the corruption seen almost everywhere outside of North America, Europe, Japan and Australia/New Zealand.
I fear that our Congress is going to put this in the hands of the State Department, which will then fritter away this vital opportunity. It should be remembered that if we fail to build at least a Turkish-style democracy, if not better, then our effort will be a failure overall. We must provide a positive example for other state sponsors of terrorism which rule despotically over their people. To do that, we have to be able to focus on what is important: building a stable democracy which won't collapse or turn into a meaningless non-entity (or worse, become a tyranny with the trappings of democracy). The State Department, by its very nature as conciliators, is unprepared to do this. Instead, the State Department's history is one of giving in to the demands of every nation and every faction which we want to make happy, regardless of the long-term impact. Stability is our goal here, but not the stability of the tyrant.
At least it appears that we aren't turning reconstruction over to the UN, which would be many orders of magnitude worse.
UPDATE (4/7): For an example of UN redestruction in Kosovo, look here. (Hat tip: Winds of Change)
Posted by jeff at 1:47 PM | TrackBackGeneral Franks
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UPI notices something I pointed out over a week ago: the US has perfected the blitzkrieg.
They go on to say, talking about the upcoming battle to control Baghdad:
The U.S. commanders know what the cities of Leningrad and Stalingrad did to the blitzkrieg experts of 1940. To avoid that fate, and demonstrate the flexibility in the face of new challenges that really tests an army's mettle, the victors of Blitzkrieg 2003 have to learn some asymmetric tactics of their own.
There are two kinds of generalship needed in an army, political and battlefield. Eisenhower was a political general, who was able to bring together the staff and generate the plans and arrange the political conditions with allies and do all of the other things to set the conditions for victory. Patton, in contrast, was a battlefield general, capable of executing his commander's intent brilliantly to bring about victory even when the conditions weren't quite set correctly. Political generals wage campaigns, and battlefield generals fight them out on the ground. General Franks is the political general for the war on terror.
General Franks has planned two brilliant campaigns now in the last three years. Afghanistan was a guerilla war by special forces and proxies, with limited conventional army support and extensive air support, to bring down an entrenched government in forbidding mountainous terrain, and it succeeded quickly and at low cost. Iraq is a conventional stand-up fight, with elements of guerilla combat in the rear areas (this time with the enemy acting as guerilla), and will come to be seen as one of the most brilliant armor campaigns ever conceived. In other words, General Franks has fought and won two very different campaigns in very different circumstances in three years, both done brilliantly with great speed and low cost, and both with the end of toppling hostile regimes.
General Franks will be remembered along with Grant, Eisenhower and Creighton Abrams as among the most successful theater commanders America has ever produced. His most important accomplishment, in my opinion, has been to show our enemies that there is no safe terrain, no safe situation, in which the US military cannot fight and win quickly and at low cost. The one thing he has not yet shown is that we can do this in large-scale urban combat. I have a feeling, though, given his record, that he is about to teach our enemies quite an interesting lesson about urban combat.
UPDATE (6/20/05): I should note that I never meant political general in the sense of what Franks himself calls "Title 10 Motherfuckers", but rather those generals whose combat job necessarily involves interaction with foreign allies at the ministerial level. The Title 10 generals are just military bureaucrats, really, rather than what I tend to think of as useful general officers. The second thing that's interesting is that, in retrospect, it was not General Franks, but a few captains, majors and a colonel who reinvented urban warfare by sending in armored columns to unhinge the Baghdad defense. This should be regarded as a supreme achievement of our military: mid-level officers felt comfortable upending both doctrine and history to do what was right.
Posted by jeff at 8:50 AM | TrackBackApril 3, 2003
What France is Playing At
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"Jane Galt" asks the question: "what were the French thinking?"
I believe that the French were influenced by four very strong forces:
- Philosophy
- Mollification of Arab Immigrants
- Economics
- European Power Politics
Philisophically, the French elites are deeply committed to transnational progressivism. They believe that the United States is dangerous, because not only are we a "nationalist" entity, who insists on doing things which are in our own interests, we are also mighty and frequently successful. The combination of our power and our lack of willingness to be ruled by our "betters" in the transnational camp means that the United States is likely to run around like a bull in a china shop, and break a lot of things in international relations. This can only be to the detriment of the transnational elites, because their philosophy derives a lot from Marxism, and we should have already collapsed from our own internal contradictions. If we are successful, and everything points to our being so, in pushing our national interests, and in the process we lift other nations to political and economic success, the elites will be (once more) discredited, and will likely lose their power.
Equally as important, France and Germany have a large Arab/Muslim immigrant community. The Algerians, Palestinians and Libyans in France, and the Turks and others in Germany, provide a large group of culturally unassimilated (thanks to multiculturalism) unemployed young men. If these Arab/Muslim immigrants were to rise up against the government, there would be a massive resurgence of nationalism in France and Germany in particular. This would result in a wave of brutality against the immigrants (who would certainly lose in the end) and a devastation of large parts of urban central Europe. This would be a disaster for western Europe. The French, Germans and Belgians have thus chosen to use a tactic which the Arab governments have successfully used for decades: turn the mob against the Americans and the Jews. The result of this is that WWI Allied cemeteries have been desecrated.
More importantly, or at least more immediately, than either of those reasons is that France has massive interests in Iraq. In addition to selling $9B worth of arms to Iraq, there are the TotalFinaElf contracts for oilfield exploitation, and numerous other large economic links. This is a significant proportion of France's economy, and that economy is struggling, and there are many groups (including the one which wrote that article) who are trying to make it worse, but not allowing any kind of employment or benefit reforms.
Probably most importantly of all of the four factors driving the French, Belgians and Germans is European power politics. Most of the Franco-German resistance to the war, beyond the limits of what sane people could consider reasonable, is driven by the need to humiliate Tony Blair. England is the single most dangerous nation to France and Germany right now, because England leans towards the US, and is strong enough militarily and politically to support and sustain the other European nations (the Vilnius 10, for example) who also lean towards the US. Since France and Germany want Europe to coalesce around a Franco-German core, in order to have some kind of political status above their intrinsic weight, the British political tendency to not cling blindly to Franco-German policies threatens the Franco-German aspirations to international power status. To the French in particular, the risk of destroying the UN is worthwhile if it provides a good chance of removing the British impediments to a European Constitution that would put France and Germany in control of virtually all of Europe.
Posted by jeff at 1:52 PM | TrackBackMarch 31, 2003
Weasels
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You know, I'm really tired of hearing about how sad it is that we have strained relations with Germany and France, after 50 years of cooperation and close relations in the Cold War. OK, let's get this straight: 1/3 of what is now Germany was on the other side in the Cold War. And France, while nominally a member of NATO, was not a part of the military alliance, just the political alliance, because they withdrew from NATO because it was too closely aligned with America.
Posted by jeff at 10:34 PM | TrackBackMarch 28, 2003
NGO's Want Theirs
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Apparently, the various NGO's, which have largely been shut out of postwar aid operations, are not above criticising the aid we're providing (hat tip: the Agonist), in what looks like an attempt to discredit it. Of course, if our aid programs were discredited, it would be these very same NGO's which would get the money (from the US) and the PR credit.
Posted by jeff at 6:22 PM | TrackBackMarch 27, 2003
Scratch a Fedayeen
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There are numerous reports of Iraqi exiles returning to fight for the regime now that the US is there. I don't buy it. First, why would they return after 12 years running from Saddam to fight for him? Wouldn't they fear the same things they feared when they left?
Some of the tactics the Saddam Fedayeen are using are interesting, too. They hide amongst assumed civilians who are waving at the helicopters passing overhead, then stand up from under the tarp that covered them and fire at the helicopter's tail section. They apparently kidnap children in order to compel their parents to fight the coalition forces. They put women and children between them and us.
This all reminds me of the way the Al Qaeda-trained Somali militia fought - right down to the "technicals" (pickups armed with machine guns, rockets or similar). It reminds me of the way that the Taliban fought, and of the way that the Hezbollah fight.
Coupled with the unlikelyhood that the "returning Iraqis" are really returning Iraqis, I wonder if we won't find, when all this is over, that the Saddam Fedayeen is largely staffed by Al Qaeda fighters having escaped from Afghanistan.
March 26, 2003
Send for Blix
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The AP reported yesterday that Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa Miro of Syria, who voted for UNSCR 1441 and then demanded an essentially infinite amount of time for inspectors to verify that Iraq had "immediately and unconditionally" disarmed, is now calling for "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of U.S. and British invading troops from Iraqi territory."
I know I speak for the President when I say that we in the US are certainly respectful of the international community and the rule of law, and we are prepared to immediately and unconditionally begin discussions on the process of deciding who will decide how to define who will inspect our units in Iraq to ensure that they have withdrawn. You can call me any time.
Posted by jeff at 1:16 PM | TrackBackPalestine in Iraq?
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Reading things like this:
Jordanian-Iraqi border :: Martin Asser :: 1152GMTWe've just spoken to two Iraqi young men who've come to the border - just in an ordinary Jordanian taxi - who say they're going to Basra to take part in the war.
(from the BBC's embedded reporters journal) makes me wonder if Saddam's strategy might be to poison the well. He has to know he will be defeated, and captured or killed. It is natural that he would resist with every means available to him, but reports like the above are disturbing.
It appears that soldiers and irregulars are switching into civilian clothes, moving around in civilian vehicles, then switching back into uniform at their destination. In many cases, they are fighting in civilian clothes, and among civilians (in one instance at least, putting women and children in front of them). This will make the coalition troops very wary of Iraqi civilians, leading to frequent stops, searches and interrogations. Each of these tiny humiliations will, as the Israelis found out in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, push the civilian population a little closer to riots and resistance, which pushes our military to be even more suspicious of the civilians, which escalates to suicide bombings and the like.
I used to think that we had to be very careful to not take out civilian targets, and to not kill civilians even if it meant we had to take more casualties. I am changing my mind, though, and slowly coming around to a Machiavellian principle: perhaps we should not regard civilians, hospitals, mosques and the like as sacrosanct in the war itself. Afterwards, when resistance has been crushed, we can be magnanimous in victory. However, if we allow resistance to fester, we could truly become bogged down in an endless repeat of the Israeli situation. And as the Israelis found out in Lebanon, you can't withdraw; that just makes you look weak and emboldens the enemy.
I'm not yet convinced that we should be brutal and remorseless during the phase of putting down the enemy, but I'm moving that way.
Posted by jeff at 11:11 AM | TrackBackMarch 25, 2003
Nomenclature
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What should we call this war? Well, first let's realize that it's not a war per se, but a campaign within the wider War on Terrorism. Afghanistan was the same thing: not so much a separate war as a campaign in the larger war. So I nominate we call this action the Iraq Campaign, and the Afghanistan conflict the Afghanistan Campaign.
By the way, I think that we need to get a broad declaration of war from Congress defining the War on Terrorism, and turning loose the President and armed forces within that context. We will not be able to keep up a consistent effort if we have to go through six-month public relations campaigns every time we need to make a new move.
Shocking and Awesome
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I believe I have figured out the basic operational maneuver plan of the Coalition in Iraq. It appears that we are attempting to win the war without actually engaging the enemy.
In the 1930's, in the aftermath of WWI and its horrible slaughter, generals in many nations began to come to grips with what would be necessary for an attacking army to overcome the defenses which technology had made impregnable to the methods of warfare developed in the 19th Century. BH Liddell Hart and Heinz Guderian, in particular, began to see an offensive in terms of not just its weight in manpower (and later in firepower), but also its agility. It was Guderian who invented "Lightning War" - or Blitzkrieg - though it was the Allies who coined the term, after its employment in Poland and France. Hart and Guderian saw that equipping each tank with a radio, massing the tanks in armored formations (contrary to the conventional usage in England and France, which was to spread them among the infantry units still considered the backbone of the armies of the time), motorizing their supply lines, and combining their assaults with artillery and airpower, with infantry to hold the land taken or to help out in constricted terrain, would allow the armored formations to advance rapidly, and bring pressure to bear on the enemy at a time and place of the attackers choosing.
The Blitzkrieg was remarkably effective. In Poland, France and the USSR during the initial stages of Barbarossa, the Allied armies were rapidly unhinged by advancing German armored formations. The German armor would break through the front line Allied formations, then maneuver deep into the rear by exploiting the seams between adjacent Allied units. The Allies would then be faced with a German armored formation in their rear, and would have to either reorient to face the threat, or withdraw to protect their supplies. If they reoriented to face the threat, then they would be hit in the back by the German followon forces and destroyed. If they attempted to orient forces in two directions at once, they did not have enough firepower to hold against the attack. So they retreated, and the Germans did it again. Eventually, this would turn into a rout.
The problem, for the Germans, was that their speed of advance was limited. First, their transport was largely horsedrawn, which limited the speed of advance of the armor. Second, the infantry was largely on foot, which in practice meant that they were able to move at the same speed as their supplies. The combination meant that deep exploitation was possible tactically, but not strategically. The Wehrmacht was forced to advance broadly across the USSR, rather than having three or four narrow corridors of advance. The narrower corridors, policed with airpower and follow-on infantry at the flanks, would have allowed the Germans to outrun their adversary, which would have meant that the core of the Soviet Army would not have survived the first year. As it was, they almost didn't, and it was only the massive amounts of reinforcements that a nation of that size could train, and their ruthless willingness to sacrifice young men by the tens of thousands, which allowed the USSR to get to the Winter, when deep advances were impossible due to weather. In the Winter, they were able to increase their KV and SU tank production, and get the T-34 into mass production. This turned the tide, and made it increasingly more difficult for Germany's technically superior army to exploit against the numerically superior Soviets. After the second year of Barbarossa, Germany lived on borrowed time.
Looking at the US Army's AirLand battle doctrine, we see a lot of borrowing from Hart and Guderian. We now have fully motorized transport, and infantry that is universally moved in vehicles, most of which are armored and have powerful weaponry of their own. Our armor (US and British) is the best in the world, and our crews are among the best trained, and are possibly the best trained. We have an army which is built on NCOs and the delegation of command authority downwards, and we have unlimited ability to control the air and see the entire battlefield. In other words, we have a virtually perfect theater and force for operational maneuver warfare as conceived by Hart and Guderian.
In contrast, our enemy has inferior equipment, ill-maintained. He has minimal communications to ill-trained and ill-supplied troops. He has troops which are of questionable loyalty and morale, part of whose job is to maintain order over the civilian population in the areas where they are stationed. The only advantages he has are ruthlessness and interior lines. We are equipped to handle his CBW capabilities, mooting that aspect of his ruthlessness. We are willing to take additional casualties rather than kill civilians, which makes the irregulars he is currently deploying against our rear nothing more than an annoyance. This means that his only remaining advantage is interior lines: he can move troops and supplies from place to place within his sphere of control more easily than we can, because he doesn't have to go as far.
Let me amplify a bit: Saddam wants us to kill civilians, so as to turn the already anti-war Leftists to real action, and the easily-panicked Western press into an incoherent and angry (at us) beast on the rampage. This is his only hope: that we lose the will to prosecute the war against him. The only way we as a culture could really do so is to give in to our fears that we are really as bad as the anti-Enlightenment, postmodernist, transnationalist Left tells us we are. If our troops lose their cool, and start killing civilians to get at the irregulars, we will be sickened and disgusted, and many would indeed put pressure on the US and UK to do something stupid, like hand control of the reconstruction to the UN. (The outcome of the war itself is not in doubt. The aftermath still is.)
But back to the main point. Since Saddam's army is basically incapable of sustained maneuver, he has adopted a basically static defense, with regular army troops in the far South and North, and Republican Guards around Saddam's power centers in Baghdad and Tikrit. The question for General Franks was: how do you take down a still-large army, given its advantages and disadvantages, with minimal casualties amongst Iraqi civilians, our troops and the regular Iraqi troops? I believe that his answer was to neutralize the advantage of interior lines enjoyed by the Iraqis, and maneuver the remainder of the Iraqi army into dissolution with minimal fighting.
Part of the method for doing this has been with PsyOps: dropping leaflets and sending emails and in general negotiating with Iraqi troops and officers for their surrender. Part of it has been to ensure that supplies can come in to the Iraqi people by taking Um Qasr. Part of it has been to drive a wedge between the regular Iraqi army and the Republican Guards by attacking North of Basra and using Kurds and special forces to isolate the Iraqi units NE of Baghdad. These efforts leave the only really organized opposition capable of engaging our main thrust as the Republican Guards.
The Republican Guards have a problem. They can stand in place, and get killed from the air and artillery, or they can move, and lose cohesion. There are indications that as the Medina division pulled back from an Nasariyah, it was unable to arrive at Karbala in good order, and as a result has not taken up good defensive positions. This is making the fighting for Karbala easier for 3rd Infantry than it otherwise would have been. On top of this, Medina cannot retreat further without running into Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar divisions. Adnan is pretty much fixed near the Tigris, because the Marines are driving up that way. The only way out for the Republican Guards, assuming that they wanted to abandon their static defense in order to have a fighting chance of survival, would be to go West along the Jordan to Baghdad highway. However, the 101st Airborne is currently moving to cut that route, and it is likely that the Republican Guard will therefore be unable to maneuver.
This means that the Iraqi army can maneuver, and become unhinged, or stay in place, and be destroyed more slowly by air and artillery strikes. My guess is that we'll see the US engage in round the clock combined arms attacks on the Republican Guard beginning in the next 24 hours, in which we hit and then back up. We will repeat this for a few days, making the RG's situation increasingly more desperate. This will eventually either cause the troops to give up and melt into the population, or it will cause the RG to attempt to maneuver in order to defeat the 3rd Infantry in the SW of Baghdad, and the 1st Marines in the SE of Baghdad, rather than be bled to death in place. At the point that they begin to maneuver, we will likely retreat, staying in contact. This will hopefully cause the RG commanders' fangs to grow too long, and the RG will attempt to fight us in the field. At that point, we switch back to the attack, but on his flanks, and the RG will become unhinged and will basically dissolve.
Of course, I could be very, very wrong about this. General Franks has been nothing if not unconventional, both in the Afghanistan campaign and in the Iraqi campaign to date. However, he could easily decide to simply attack the RG divisions in place, counting on our superior troop and equipment quality, and superior artillery and air support, to be sufficient to reduce the RG divisions without massive casualites to ourselves and the Iraqi civilians.
UPDATE (3/26): Or they could be suicidal and attack right into us!
Posted by jeff at 4:18 PM | TrackBackMarch 23, 2003
Troop Deployments and Their Implications
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I've been watching the diplomatic maneuvering at the UN and in Turkey and the buildup of troops around Iraq, and I have been wondering what is going on. From a standpoint of what we say we are attempting to achieve, the US government's actions raise all kinds of questions.
We claim that we are going to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, and that no amount of inspections will be able to do that, unless Hussein is willing to let it happen. He's not, and I don't see him changing his mind. More importantly, I don't see us trying to change his mind. We also claim that we are doing this in order to remove a major supporter of terrorism, to bring democracy to Iraq and hopefully by extension to its neighbors, and to get ourselves in position to tackle Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Actually, we don't publicly claim the last motivation, but it's really obvious given our long-term goals in destroying terrorism that we have to have a base to launch attacks which is not dependent on the charity of other nations.
We claim that we are going to go with or without the UN's approval, but we are continuing to dither with the UN long past the time when it's become obvious that the UN is unwilling to act to enforce its past resolutions, and many nations in the UN would prefer to hurt the US diplomatically than to have the US remove Hussein from power. Further, any motivation of helping Prime Minister Blair has quite obviously run past its uses. Any help or harm to the good Sir has been done, and so any delay for that reason is worse than useless, as it not only provides assistance to an ally, but also allows our enemies time to act against us.
We claim that we have more than enough troops already in place to invade and occupy Iraq with relative ease, and enough troops to have reserves in case of untoward happenings. We further claim that we will have a northern attack with or without Turkey's blessing (well, the blessing of their Parliament, at least). Yet we are only now deploying heavy units like 1st Armored and 3rd Cavalry, which won't be in place until after the window of reasonable action (that is, before the Summer starts in the desert) has passed.
So:
- We claim we will occupy Iraq in order to: disarm Iraq, particularly of weapons of mass destruction; stop Iraqi material and logistical help to terrorists; and bring democracy to an Arab state, both for its own good and as an example to its autocratic or theocratic neighbors.
- We have a long-term interest in establishing a large base of operations in the middle of the states supporting terrorism, which base is not subject to the political whims of states who frequently support terrorism themselves, albeit less directly than, say, Iraq or Iran do.
- We claim that we will do this with or without UN support.
- France has made absolutely clear, and other nations have made somewhat clear, that the UN will not even declare that Saddam has not lived up to Resolution 1441, which stated four months ago that Saddam had to disarm "immediately."
- We keep going back to the UN over and over and over again, to no avail.
- We claim to have sufficient forces available to conquer and occupy Iraq, with or without the British or the Turks (should either government be constrained by Parliamentary maneuvering).
- We claim to be able to have a northern invasion option regardless of the actions of the Turkish Parliament.
- We are still moving large numbers of heavy ground units, at great cost, from their long-term bases in the US and Europe (Germany, in particular) into the theater.
- Our window of easy operations closes in less than six weeks, particularly since we expect chemical and biological agents to be used on the battlefield by the Iraqis, which means our troops will be wearing MOPP suits. Wearing MOPP suits in combat in the desert in the Summer is going to cause additional casualties from heat exhaustion, fatigue and impaired judgement.
- It will take longer than six weeks to get the recently-deployed heavy units into position, so they are useless in terms of an attack on Iraq.
Given all of these things, why is our government seemingly standing still? Why have we not already attacked? If we set a timeline based on UN negotiations, this should still end by the President's declared deadline of Monday, yet the government is apparently willing to let events continue on past that without committing to the attack. Why? Where are the additional heavy units we are deploying going, and what is their mission?
I have come up with three basic scenarios which fit the facts as I know them. It could be that we are going to use the newly-deploying units for occupation duty in Iraq, so that we can refit and rearm the units which fight the war, and give them a rest before their next major commitment. The second option that I see is that we intend to roll straight through Iraq, using the combat units for occupation duty, and the followon units to attack into Syria or Iran or even Saudi Arabia (much less likely than the first two), or, as a variant, they could be used for a serious northern option by invading through Syria into Iraq. It could also be that we are going to send the newly-deploying units to some other theater. Either Korea or Zimbabwe stand out as fine places to go. Each of these scenarios has different implications for what US action in the UN means, as well as what our long-term strategy might be.
Basically, our maneuver elements in theater are:
- 2nd BCT, 82nd Airborne
- 3rd ACR
- 3rd Mech Infantry
- 101st Airborne
- elements of 10th Mountain
- 1st Marines
- 1 (UK) Armored
- 16 (UK) Air Assault Bde
- a Royal Marine Commando
- 4th Infantry (waiting on permission to deploy through Turkey)
And in transit or on notice, we have:
- 1st Armored
- 1st Cavalry
- 1st Infantry
- 173rd Airborne Bde
- 2nd ACR
- 26th MEU
Note that we have as much combat power in transit or alerted to move as we actually have in theater. So let's look at scenarios.
The first scenario is that most commonly discussed in the news media and blogs, and seems to be the assumed wisdom: the additional troops are to act as reserves, or even as part of the attack if we wait long enough, and we'll garrison these units in Iraq (moving them out of Europe, mostly), and refit the units who did the brunt of the fighting.
If this is the intent, the implication is that the military expects the war and occupation to be more difficult than military officials are publicly saying. After all, it's pretty amazing to use more troops for the occupation of Iraq than for its conquest! This also implies that there will be no real ability to wage regional wars faster than every 18 months, since the amount of time it would take to refit, retrain and redeploy this amount of force out of area is large. Once the units are tied down with occupation duties, it will be difficult to turn them back into an offensive force.
It seems to me more likely that we will use a small force for occupation - down to a few brigades after the first year - and a locally-derived army and police force trained, equipped and possibly even led by the US. Not only is this more cost-effective, it also begins the process of US withdrawal, which is almost certain to happen within 5 years after the war ends. Moreover, that approach would free up the limited number of heavy units the US maintains for combat in other places, and would make it easier to rapidly return reservists and guardsmen to their civilian lives.
The problem with the logic of using the currently-deploying forces to occupy Iraq is that it doesn't fit with the other events now occurring. How does this explain the dithering in the UN? While it does allow us an easy way to get our major units out of Germany, which is certainly nice in the long run since Europe is no longer the central theater in which our force will likely be exercised, there are other ways to do this that wouldn't strain our transport units at the same time we're trying to support a war in Iraq. In fact, we could use this same excuse after the war is over, using the ships in a three-legged pattern: troops from Iraq home, empty to Europe, troops from Europe to Iraq. Given the logistical strain of moving the units, it is fair to say that we are going to use those units for something that can't be done otherwise, and soon.
It is certainly true that we might want to have a large force in Iraq, but the real reason for that force is to put pressure on the surrounding states to reform. Iran, of course, is part of the Axis of Evil for its support of terrorism and militant Islamic revolution combined with its active programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. Syria is equally complicit in terrorism with Iran - particularly in its support of Hezbollah and Hamas - and is occupying Lebanon, exercising effective control over the entire country. Saudi Arabia is one of the key states in funding terrorist groups, supplying terrorist cadres, and propagandizing for militant Islamic Fundamentalism in general. Each of these states needs to reform or fall to our control. This leads to the second possible scenario, which I happen to think is fairly likely.
This would actually account for the US/UK time spent in the UN in two ways. First, the delay gives us a way to get forces in position to achieve real strategic surprise by effectively not pausing between taking down Iraq and taking down one of its more troublesome neighbors. Second, by constantly reinforcing in the public mind the fecklessness of the UN - even the threat that the UN could pose to US and British citizens by preventing action to remove threats against them - it becomes easier for the US and UK to jointly withdraw from the UN, which would be a necessary prerequisite for further action that doesn't take years to get approved.
Overall, this makes some sense, although it leaves the US in an odd position. It would mean that the President would be exceeding his mandate from Congress to only fight Iraq, and could lead to a serious Constitutional crisis. However, there is one way in which a Constitutional crisis need not arise: an unexpected northern option.
Stick with me here, because this is a pretty brittle line of reasoning. In fact, it is almost certainly not what the US and UK have in mind. Still....
OK, let's say that the US is actually trying to use Turkey's internal politics as well as the UN's politics in order to delay the attack on Iraq. With the combat units for the Iraq attack basically in place and supplied, the sealift exists to move the deploying heavy units listed above. What if the US had decided to go to northern Iraq through Syria? I have been unable to find out what Marine units are afloat in the Mediterranean Sea, but I suspect that there are at least two MEUs. This would be enough to create a friendly beachhead to unload and form up the heavier units which would exploit that beachhead.
This could be justified as covered under the war declaration passed last year in the same way that the Allies attacked Morocco in WWII to get at the Germans in N. Africa. These units would quickly end up in pretty heavy combat with the Syrian army, because that army would resist a US invasion. This would almost certainly result in the US doing to Syria what it is going to do to Iraq. In other words, we would solve the longer-term problem of Syria without having to go back to Congress and to convince the Congress and the US public of the need to fight Syria. It would also be a powerful lesson to Iran and Saudi Arabia, which I think are the two most important state targets in the region in terms of actually ending terrorism permanently, and preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
OK, so that's not very realistic. President Bush would almost certainly not take that kind of liberty with acts of Congress. But it does at least give a plausible reason for delaying and delaying the attack while getting shredded in the UN.
The third option, that the troops are intended for another theater, is actually fairly likely. It would make sense to reinforce American troops in Korea, given the tense situation there, but it is odd to think of us doing that at the same time as Donald Rumsfeld is saying that we could withdraw our troops from Korea altogether (especially with the S. Korean hostility to the US troops right now). It is unlikely that we'd spend the effort to move this much force anywhere except the Mideast or the Koreas, although Africa cries out for democratization.
In the end, though, this still does not explain what we are doing in the UN. There is something that does, though: perhaps the reality is that we have been preparing the US and British populations for a simultaneous US/UK pullout from the UN. This would free the US and UK for action elsewhere with a much faster turnaround than would be the case otherwise. I don't think, though, that this action would come anywhere other than in the Mideast. We certainly don't want to fight a nuclear-armed N. Korea, and any country not in the Mideast would be difficult (politically) to attack without first going to Congress. Given that we don't need the troops for Iraq in the short term, my best guess is that we'll be at war in either Syria or Iran next, and soon.
UPDATE (3/16): I understand from three different sources now that some units are being issued desert camoflage, and others the green (European 1?) scheme. This indicates to me that we do not plan on attacking Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya or in the horn of Africa with these units; or on using them for Iraqi occupation duty. Syria/Lebanon is a possibility still, given their terrain, as is N. Korea.
Posted by jeff at 12:00 AM | TrackBackMarch 21, 2003
Attitude
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Here is an image sent to me in email, that I hope you enjoy. It shows the attitude of the American warrior pretty well, I think. The ship, by the way, is the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). (click on the pic for the 1300x860 pixel full-size image)
Casualty Counts
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It appears that a US Marine was lost in combat near Umm Qasr, the Iraqi port near the Kuwait border. In other news, a war protester was killed when he fell off a bridge where he was hanging a banner. (hat tip: Winds of Change)
What if they gave a war, and the casualties among the protesters outnumbered the military casualties?
Posted by jeff at 8:48 AM | TrackBackMarch 2, 2003
Schisms
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Current domestic and international politics are in a great state of flux in this post-Cold War world. Just as the 20th Century was dominated by the struggles of Collectivism (Nationalism, Socialism, Communism, Fascism, Unionism) against Individualism; so the next century will be dominated by the struggles now playing out in the world around us. In the 20th century, a series of political and economic collectivist movements were in turn marginalized by the will of the Individualists in, primarily, the United States and the United Kingdom. In contrast, this century will be a time in which the Western nations attempt to define themselves, while simultaneously fighting off an existential threat from the Arab/Muslim worlds, which are themselves engaged in a deep and long-term struggle to define themselves.
In this post, I will summarize the two schisms. There will be further articles delving into each schism in more detail, and describing how it will be possible to preserve the Enlightenment. The specific topics of these articles are listed at the end of this post. I am writing this because I care deeply that the Enlightenment values win over the pomo/tranzi values, and that the West win over the Arab/Muslim world. In either case, defeat means at best a new Dark Age, and at worst it means the destruction of classical liberalism in the world. It is my hope that I will be able to help both in framing the debate, and in winning over converts to the side of classical liberalism and Enlightenment values.
In the Western nations, the schism is over how to secure freedom. On one side are the Classical Liberals, who champion the Enlightenment values of Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. On the other side are the Postmodernists and Transnationlists (henceforth Pomo/Tranzi), who champion the values (lifted from the French Revolution) of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. Since each of these factions shares a history and culture, they frequently use each other's memes and mores to their own ends.
The Western Struggle is, in the end, nothing more than a refinement and extension of the conflicts of the 20th century. The primary difference is that, while the 20th century struggles were between nations which each espoused different political and economic principles, the 21st century struggles will be within nations, between global movements with like ideologies. The nations themselves will influence and be influenced by this struggle, but this is less of a struggle of nation on nation than was the case in the last century. Now, the struggle is between groups of differing ideological bases which, thanks largely to television and the Internet, spread across many nations. In other words, there is a large-scale ideological struggle, which is mirrored in the actions of nations, based on which group is strongest in any given nation at any given time.
This struggle is taking place within the Western cultures, which include the European nations, their former colonies which retained European values (including the Americas, South Africa, Australia/New Zealand and India) and those nations which adopted Western values (including Israel, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan - and possibly including China). Another struggle, similar in some ways, is taking place within the Arab and Muslim worlds. These worlds do not overlap completely. The Arab nations are those which have predominantly Arab or assimilated populations, stretching from the Atlantic coast of northern Africa along the southern rim of the Mediterranean and across to Iraq, Syria/Lebanon and the Gulf States. The Muslim world is composed of the Muslims within the Arab world; non-Arab Muslim countries such as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia; and Muslims in non-Muslim societies such as Europe. Not all Muslims are Arabs, and not all Arabs are Muslims. These worlds, too, are struggling with internal conflict.
In the Arab/Muslim worlds, the schism is over how best to restore and complete the Caliphate. One one side are the Arab Nationlists, who want to restore the Caliphate by uniting all Arabs into a single nation under the leadership of whichever Arab Nationalist is holding forth on the issue. Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Syria and the Palestinians fall into this camp. On the other side are the Militant Muslim Fundamentalists, who want to restore the Caliphate by uniting all Muslims into a single community under Sharia Law as interpreted and guided by whichever Militant Muslim Fundamentalist is holding forth on the issue. On this side are the Ayatollahs of Iran (and Hezbollah, under Iranian influence), the Taliban, the Wahabbi sect in Saudi Arabia and Al Qaeda and related groups (including Hamas - apparently the only significant Fundamentalist sect in the Palestinian conflict). As in the Western conflict, each side is deeply entwined in the history of the other, and often uses the memes and mores of the other side to their own ends.
The restoral of the Caliphate entails uniting all Arabs (for the Arab Nationalists) or Muslims (for the Militant Muslim Fundamentalists) into a single entity, then enlarging that entity to cover the world, either directly through control or indirectly through domination. For the Arab Nationalists, a resurgent Arab nation under their control would be sufficient, as long as it was a major power in the world. For the Fundamentalists, believing as they do that it is a religious obligation to convert every person in the world to either Islam or dhimmitude, there is no possibility of stopping with the unification of the Muslims.
Because it is generally forbidden for Muslims to kill Muslims, it is not possible for the Arab Nationalists and the Muslim Fundamentalists to directly fight each other. They could - it's not like there are not many, many, examples of Muslims killing each other in internecine conflicts - but in doing so they would alienate the vast majority of Muslims, who are more interested in trying to live a good and happy life than in being political. Since each movement needs the goodwill of the Muslim community generally, each has chosen to focus on the politically acceptable method of keeping score by who kills the most Infidels - with Jews counting for more than Gentiles as a general rule. (There is, after all, a religious component involved; though I believe that Militant Muslim Fundamentalism should be regarded as a political movement using religious memes for its source of legitimacy, rather than as a religious movement.) This goes a long way to explaining why each side calls Americans "Jews", even when it's a obviously meaningless thing to say. The goal of each of these movements is to boost their support within the Muslim community against the other movement, and killing Jews is a guaranteed way to get "street cred" in the Muslim world.
While each of these worlds is in internal conflict, the worlds are also in conflict with each other. This need not have been so; the West was content to navel gaze as long as we were allowed, and we'd happily go back to it if we thought that doing so wouldn't get us killed. September 11 woke the West to the fact that the Arab/Muslim struggle was using us as a scorecard. Well, at least, the Enlightened part of the West woke up; the pomo/tranzi crowd seems to be trying to slip back into a self-involved somnambulance. The story of this century - certainly of its first several decades - will be the story of how each of the two schisms is mended, and how the two cultures evolving out of those schisms interact and eventually fall into a stable relationship.
At the core of all of this is the inescapable conclusion that Osama bin Laden is correct in one important way: we are in the midst of a clash of civilizations, between the West and the Arab/Muslim worlds. Each of these cultures, though, is itself engaging in a struggle for internal definition. It is going to be a complicated and dangerous century. To quote Fezzik, in "The Princess Bride:" I hope we win.
This is the first of a series of planned posts. These posts will deal in much more depth with the issues raised here. Although this could change as I develop the ideas, right now I plan to write posts on the following topics:
- The Enlightenment, Slavery as a disfigurement of the Enlightenment, and the struggles of the 19th century
- Postmodernism and Transnationalism
- The conservative/neo-conservative journey from reactionary preservation of the previous struggle to a real grasp of the Enlightenment and the (hopeful) liberal equivalent, from reactionary preservation of the collectivist struggle to a real grasp of the Enlightenment
- The riddle and centrality of China - western (collectivist) in outlook, but becoming more and more Enlightened as they struggle to modernize
- Why it's necessary for pomo/tranzi philosophy to be defeated and how to do it
- Arab Nationalism, Militant Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernism in the Arab/Muslim worlds
- Arab Nationalism
- Muslim Fundamentalism
- defeating the two enemies; including playing them off against each other
- a summary of all that has gone before
UPDATE: Please note that I have decided not to continue this series per se. I'll write on these topics, but other writers are doing a better job of covering this than I can, and so this particular series would be not very useful, I think. Let me know if you disagree, and I'll revisit the idea.
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