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April 18, 2006

General Questions

While I think the six retired generals who came out publicly calling for SecDef Rumsfeld to retire were wrong on many counts, it is still good to keep in mind that these men have decades each of military experience, and not all of them are Title X guys (that is, political generals); these guys deserve to be listened to before being simply dismissed, and we all know the news tends to miss most of the important parts of any story in their quest for the right soundbite. So I have a few questions for them, and if there's any way I can get time to do this, I'll try to track down contact information for the generals and get answers to these particular questions:

1. One common criticism of SecDef Rumsfeld has been that he committed insufficient troops to the Iraq campaign. How many troops would you have suggested were required for this campaign? For how long would they be required and when would they be phased in and out? What missions would extra troops have been tasked with, and where deployed? How would these additional troops have been supplied, given the lack of both Turkey and Saudi Arabia as supply routes/sources and the political impossibility of using a route through Israel/Jordan? How would the additional supplies and supply routes have been protected both during the invasion and during the occupation?

2. Let us say that your advice from the first question had been taken, and the campaign had been fought with these forces, logistics plans and so forth. What additional risks would have been introduced, and what risks mitigated, by campaigning in this manner vice the manner in which the campaign was actually conducted?

3. Would the use of a larger footprint lessened the duration or severity of the terrorism, or given the terrorists more targets, or some mix of the two? Would the Sunni insurrection have been larger, smaller or the same? Would the Shi'a and/or Kurds have joined the insurrection? Would it have been possible, with this larger footprint, to build up Iraqi security forces who would have a will and interest in securing their country? How much time would this have taken in contrast to the way that it has turned out in reality? Was removing Saddam Hussein from power sufficient to end the war, or were other goals required to be achieved before the situation in Iraq could be declared

4. How does this plan align with the political goals outlined by the President? Would it have been possible to have stood up an Iraqi government in sovereign control of the country? How much time would that have taken, and how much buy-in from Iraqis - particularly Sunni Iraqis - would be expected? Would any such government, wholly owing its existence and form and security to American forces, ever be seen as anything other than a puppet government? Would it ever be anything other than a puppet government?

5. If you believe that engaging in the Iraq campaign was a mistake in the first place, and that the President's goals were not sufficient, were too audacious, or were simply not worth the cost to achieve, what goals do you believe would have been correct to pursue? Is it the place of the military or the civilian leadership to determine the goals to be pursued in undertaking a war? If it is the place of the civilian leadership to determine goals, and the military does not support those goals, should it be the military or the civilian leadership whose decision is final?

6. Should the Secretary of Defense be held accountable for the errors of his superiors? That is, should the Secretary of Defense be responsible for, say, the disastrous CPA results, even though those were largely at the hands of the State Department after the President's decision to implement the CPA in this manner? If the President should bear the blame for that, rather than the Secretary of Defense, then in what way did the Secretary of Defense mismanage the occupation (another common complaint)? What could have been done differently, knowing what we knew at the time and without benefit of hindsight? Where and how had such measures been tried in the past, and with what results?

7. Assuming that the larger levels of force had been used, a fairly large callup of the reserves and National Guard - much larger than was actually done - would have been needed. This would have been politically difficult, which is part of the Secretary of Defense's job to defend. What arguments could have been made to make such a large callup politically palatable?

8. Given such a large callup, national reserves would have been next to non-existent. If another crisis had come to a head in, say, mid-2004, with the vast bulk of the American military committed in Iraq, with what forces could we have influenced the crisis? Would any inability to influence the crisis, let alone meaningfully intervene, be politically defensible? Would it be morally defensible?

9. You spoke out after your normal retirement, rather than resigning during the run-up to the war, or in its immediate aftermath. While it would be extraordinary for a serving officer to speak publicly against the civilian leadership, did you consider any other measures while on active duty, such as resigning your commission or taking early retirement? In what other ways did you attempt to influence the Secretary of Defense and the CINCCENT to do things your way? Is there anything that, in hindsight, you wish you had done to bring attention to these deficiencies at an earlier time?

10. To what degree have you considered that you might be wrong?

As I said, these men deserve to be listened to. They might, after all, be right. But how can we know until they've been asked, and answered, tough questions? So far, all we've heard is unbecoming carping. I for one would like to know more.

Posted by jeff at April 18, 2006 10:12 PM

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Comments

Posted by: Vulgorilla at April 19, 2006 7:26 AM

Posted by: Dave Schuler at April 19, 2006 9:40 AM