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November 30, 2005
Propaganda, Perception, and Human Behavior
Go read this, but ignore the part that you see normally and read everything after the "read more" link. It's fantastic.
Staged Hostage Taking?
I could be wrong, but given that the four hostages taken in Iraq were anti-American activists, it is certainly possible that the hostage taking was staged with the cooperation of the hostages, or in that event "hostages". It will be interesting to see how this plays out.
UPDATE: Rusty Shackelford has more here, and seems to agree, speculatively, here.
That Looks Familiar
The White House has released a strategy document on Iraq that is well worth reading. But the most overlooked sentence is the first one:
The following document articulates the broad strategy the President set forth in 2003 and provides an update on our progress as well as the challenges remaining.
I have been saying for some time, and other bloggers (notably Steven Den Beste and Wretchard) have also noted, the strategy is apparent and has been talked about for years, but there are some things the President just can't say while there is a chance for the enemy to undermine the strategy. What is most important about this document is the fact that it has been released at all, which indicates that the administration now thinks that, without a tectonic shift in conditions, we have already passed the point where the enemy can defeat our strategy in Iraq.
InstaPundit links to some other bloggers writing on this.
UPDATE: Fixed the Belmont Club link.
November 28, 2005
Good Customer Service
I am supposed to be in the air, nearing Atlanta, on my way to Flint, MI. Since I'm typing this from DFW, you can guess how that plan is working out. (Yay, weather in Atlanta.) Knowing I'm going to be hours late getting into Flint, and well past their normal closing time, I called Hertz's customer service number. I got a real person immediately, who gave me the direct number to the Bishop Airport Hertz center at my request. Again, I got a real person immediately, and then explained when I would be getting in. The agent thanked me for letting her know I was definitely going to make it, because she had already been planning on waiting for me, and was hoping it wouldn't be in vain.
Kudos, Hertz.
Civilian Casualties in Iraq
I've long figured that Iraq Body Count, an anti-war site that chronicles civilian casualties in Iraq since Saddam Hussein was deposed, was very far off in its numbers, even though they are reasonable given the intensity of fighting and the fact that the enemy hides among civilians (and for that matter, frequently kills civilians to terrorize others). But it's interesting to see how far off they appear to be. Apparently, they count even police killed by the enemy as victims of the US occupation (and they don't distinguish between the period before handing sovereignty to the new Iraqi government and after, either.
November 27, 2005
PFC Daniel McClenney, USMC
McQ and QandO has his second tribute to an American hero posted: PFC Daniel McClenney. I could not find his Silver Star citation online, but there is a partial transcription in this article.
In brief, PFC McClenney was part of a fire team that was ambushed in Kunar Province, Afghanistan by a much larger enemy force that was moving into position to attack a coalition firebase. PFC McClenney was wounded in the initial enemy fire, but stayed in the fight. After his team leader was killed, PFC McClenney took over radio communications, and half an hour was both fighting and calling in fire support and medical evacuation on the radio. Despite a critical abdominal wound and a broken arm, PFC McClenney fought hand to hand until he was mortally wounded. PFC McClenney's actions were instrumental in preventing the enemy from staging a large attack that would have killed many of our troops.
Thank you, PFC McClenney, for fighting so bravely for the nation. Resquiat in pacem.
November 26, 2005
Staying the Course, and Paying for It
Dave Schuler carries forward a discussion started by Dan Darling: whether you think we should stay in Iraq or leave, or something in between, what are the costs?
I personally feel that we should stay. In part, this is because of the downsides of withdrawing. More than that, though, are the benefits of staying, most importantly that our current apparent grand strategy has a chance of working. Sadly, neither the President nor the media has done a good chance of explaining our grand strategy, so let me start with that. (Note: I could easily be wrong here; the lack of communications on our grand strategy is understandable, but makes this kind of discussion hazardous.)
When you look at the enemy, it is clear that terrorism is not what we are at war with. While terrorism is abhorrent, it is a tactic that is neither unique to our enemy nor even the most abhorrent thing about our enemy. (In my book, their inability to coexist with anything or anyone that doesn't share their ideology is the worst thing about them.) Rather, it is militant fascist theocrats with an extremist Islamic flavor — the jihadis — that we are at war with. The jihadis have expansive goals: restoring or creating theocratic control (led, of course, by them) over all of the lands that have ever been governed by Muslims, and the spreading of that theocracy to every place where Muslims live or have lived. The jihadis are willing — indeed, eager — to kill every person in their way, and every person who doesn't believe the way that they do: women who "don't know their place", homosexuals, Jews, Christians, pagans, other non-Muslims, ex-Muslims, any Muslim who is not sufficiently extremist or sufficiently ideologically pure (note that the Shi'a in Iraq are bombed more than "collaborators" or Americans or other coalition troops), intellectuals, communists, atheists, and so forth. In other words, the jihadis are an implacable enemy: we cannot surrender to them except by becoming them, and joining them. We cannot run from them or hide from them: they will come until they are dead, or we are dead. They believe that god is on their side. They are not driven by poverty.
Considering these facts, and the actions of the Bush administration in fighting the enemy, I hypothesize that our grand strategy is as follows: remove the sanctuaries of the jihadis (in order of size) to disrupt their ability to carry out large-scale plans; remove the state sponsors of jihadi terror groups (in order of risk of transfer of WMD to the jihadis) to ensure that small terror cells cannot carry out raids with consequences disproportional to the size of the cell; eliminate the terror cells person by person and by disrupting the cohesion of the network, both by direct action and by, for example, cutting funding and transport links; and undercut future recruiting efforts by creating and expanding democracy within the Muslim world.
Now, if this is indeed the grand strategy, then how does Iraq play into it? First, Iraq was a potential sanctuary for the jihadis. The combination of Salman Pak and Iraq's tendency to give refuge to terrorists is sufficient to indicate that Iraq was at least potentially a sanctuary. But the combination of these with the payments made to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, the sanctuary given to Abu Nidal and other terrorists, and various other things makes it certain that Iraq was (was) a major state sponsor of jihadi terror. Since Iraq was also believed to possess chemical and biological weapons and to be developing nuclear weapons, this made the perceived risk of WMD transfer quite large. Further, Iraq had a largely secular population, with a minimum of overt jihadis and sympathizers. All of these factors made Iraq an ideal target after Afghanistan was neutralized.
All of that is, however, fairly irrelevant to what we do now, except to the extent that we might regress — or worse — by pulling out. So let's assume that I get my way and we stay in Iraq, building democracy and killing jihadis. What then, are the costs of that course, and what must we be prepared to do? What challenges do we face?
First, we have to realize that our reserves and in particular the National Guard are near the breaking point. We have deployed so many, so often and for so long that we are nearing the statutory end of our ability to deploy the Guard as units, though some individuals will be able to be deployed for some time to come. Second, we cut the military dramatically after the end of the Cold War; in essence we cut about half of our combat forces. This means that we are able to sustain deployments much smaller than we might like: perhaps 125000 ground troops indefinitely, 300000 for up to three years (after which training and morale issues would leave us unable to fight large campaigns for as much as 5 to 7 years). Our commitments in Kosovo, Korea and other areas make this even harder than it would otherwise be. Military transformation increases the number of deployable combat units, but not sufficiently to drastically change those numbers for some time to come. Third, we are nearing the point where large fractions of our equipment are getting worn out from use. This will require a replacement cycle, with the corresponding investments. Finally, we have to realize that we are not done with the war even when the Iraq campaign ends: at the least we will almost certainly have to deal with Iran by use of force, and we may have to deal forcefully with Syria, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as well.
In order to fix these problems, and be prepared for ongoing campaigns, we need to make many changes, and they are going to cost. We have to extend transformation to include changing the role of the Guard and reserves, so that we can fight extended wars without calling up Guard and reserve units and troops on a continual basis. We must increase the size of the military, particularly the Army. The Army, in fact, needs to be expanded by at least 50% in order to undertake continuous operations and occupations and still maintain our other commitments. This should have been done soon after 9/11, and not having done so is perhaps the largest mistake the Bush administration has made in the war. We must also be prepared to replace much of our military equipment (particularly trucks and personal equipment, but also including armored vehicles). All of this is going to cost. Worse, all of this is going to take significant expenditures of political effort, and cutting of non-military programs and pork in large swathes.
Two other questions that Dave raises are metrics (how do we know when we're done?) and usable subsets (what do we get along the way, even if we fail to reach our final goal?).
As far as metrics go, that is a very difficult question. Enemy casualties is useful as a side effect (it makes the future enemies we fight less well trained, less capable), but not as a metric, because the enemy does not need large numbers of people to stay in the fight. More useful is the amount of territory under enemy control in various degrees. When we get to the point where the enemy controls no territory at all, though, the enemy might still be able to fight, because he doesn't have to control territory to carry out attacks, though controlling territory makes carrying out attacks much easier. Another useful metric is the number of Iraqi government security forces capable of carrying out operations with US logistical and heavy weapons support, and the number capable of carrying out operations without such support. But again, this is not a complete metric, because the operations have to be effective. The number of Sunnis involved in the political process is also a useful metric. But the reality is that none of us are in a position to really know what metrics are useful; for that we actually have to trust those we've elected to run wars for us.
But I believe that Dave is wrong in saying that there are no usable subsets of our actions in Iraq. In fact, we have already accomplished several of these: we have ended the torture and killings that Saddam used to maintain control are ended; Iraq is no longer a state sponsor of terrorism; Iraq definitively no longer has WMDs nor the capability to make them; the United States has gained useful bases in the heart of the Middle East. Some or all of these might be undercut if we leave too soon, while others will not. If we do stick it out, as I hope, until the Iraqis effectively control all of Iraq, we will gain other benefits besides democratization of Iraq. These include, not least, dealing a body blow to the idea that the US will just cut and run when things get tough.
Are there costs? Yes. But as Dave points out, there are costs to cutting and running, too, and in my estimation those costs are much, much higher.
November 24, 2005
Yes, That's it Exactly II
Sometimes, someone says something so perfectly it cannot be improved.
November 23, 2005
The NY Times and Iraq
Marc Schulman is demonstrating a point I've long held: the NY Times opinion page is nothing more or less than a mouthpiece for the American progressive movement. I suspect that this traces back to long, long before Viet Nam, even, back to the late 1800s. There's nothing wrong with that, but it does kind of put the lie to statements often heard from the Left that the media is basically conservative. In any case, I'd love to see this analysis expanded to cover other issues that are very dependent, in policy terms, on which party holds power at any given time. I suspect that you would find, for example, that the Times is relatively hard-line on the Iranian theocrats when Carter is in power and when Clinton is in power, and not so much when Reagan or either Bush is in power.
UPDATE: Part 2 is here.
November 22, 2005
Right Move
José Padilla has been indicted. Excellent, and about time. While I realize that this was, in large part, to head off a battle in the Supreme Court, it is still the right thing to do. The rules should be simple:
An American who is not in the military, wherever taken and under whatever circumstances, should be subject to the jurisdiction of US civil courts. If he's fighting for the enemy, he's committing treason, and should be charged with it. (This covers Padilla, who if guilty of conspiracy to set off a dirty bomb (the original reason he was said to have been arrested) has committed treason and if not guilty should be charged differently or released.)
An American who is in the military, wherever taken and under whatever circumstances, should be subject to US military courts. In the case of SGT Hasan Akbar, for example, who attacked his fellow soldiers, a summary trial and field execution would have been appropriate: he got more access to the justice system than he deserved.
A non-American, taken in the US and not having attacked the US (presumably such a one would be charged with conspiracy), should be subject to a determination by civil courts whether or not he is an enemy combatant, and after that to US military courts.
A non-American, taken in the US in the act of attacking the US or after an attack on the US, should be subject to US military courts so far as is necessary to determine his status. If he is determined to be an illegal combatant, he should have no further access to US justice systems. Summary execution is just fine in such a case.
A non-American who is a member of a regular armed force, taken overseas under any circumstances, should be subject to the provisions for POWs.
A non-American who is not a member of a regular armed force, taken overseas under any circumstances other than in the act of attacking the US, should be subject to a military tribunal to determine his status, and if an illegal combatant should have no further access to any system of justice.
A non-American who is not a member of a regular armed force, taken overseas in the act of attacking the US, should have access to no system of justice. Summary execution in this case is just fine, should we decide to do so.
Of course, these are entirely my opinions, and I suspect the courts might differ on some of them.
Confused and Off the Deep End
Kos is both confused and deranged (I know, little change) about white phosphorus. (Thanks to Rusty Shackleford for the heads up) So I wish to set him a little straighter, at the sad expense of actually giving him a link and a small increment of publicity (that he doesn't need).
White phosphorus is a chemical, as is salt or magnesium. In the case of WP, it burns quite brightly (useful as illumination when fired into the air) and smokily (useful both as a smoke generator and to drive people out of hiding places when fired on the ground) and in its most common weaponized form burn spontaneously on contact with air. WP is used, when fired at the ground, on a point target, and as such is not remotely a "weapon of mass destruction" as those are, by definition, area weapons. There is quite a bit about chemical weapons here, and you'll note that not only is WP not listed as a chemical weapon, it also doesn't share characteristics with chemical weapons.
Perhaps Kos is thinking of phosgene? Phosgene is a chemical weapon that disperses over a wide area and kills on inhalation, by destroying the respiratory system. (It reacts with water in the respiratory tract to form strong acids. Nasty, nasty stuff.)
As far as WP goes, one might as well accuse the US of using chemical weapons on the assumption that we kept the swimming pools at captured palaces chlorinated. Chlorine gas is, after all, the first chemical weapon used in warfare (phosgene came soon after).
Why the Pentagon document used the phrase "WHITE PHOSPHOROUS (WP) CHEMICAL WEAPONS " I do not know, unless it was simply another bad attempt at propaganda. It is classed by the military as an incendiary. Perhaps they were referring to a complex chemical munition, that mixed WP and carbon tetracholoride. I seem to recall human rights groups talking about Saddam using complex chemical munitions on Halabja, including some that had a cocktail of chemical agents, to make treating the injuries much more difficult. This was, of course, when Saddam was not an enemy of the United States, and the memory hole seems to eat those kinds of statements when circumstances change.
In any case, here is the summation Kos gives:
Saddam tortured, we torture. Saddam used WP chemical weapons against insurgents and civilians, we use WP chemical weapons against insurgents and civilians.
I have always found Kos to be annoying in the past, when I've noticed him at all. Now, I'm simply ashamed to think of him as an American at all. He is certainly an immoral ass, but then, we knew that already.
Two additional observations: to Kos, if your thesis is correct and WP is a chemical weapon, is it not then true that Saddam had massive stocks of chemical weapons and that therefore President Bush did not lie (by your own standards) about the justification for war? Can't have it both ways.
To Rusty: Kos' feelings towards America do not seem to me to be like an abusive husband towards his wife. Rather, I believe Kos and his ilk truly love America: an idealized, fictional America in which there are no actual people, just automatons carrying out roles preordained by the priestly progressive elite (which is to say, Kos himself; see Michael Totten on that one), towards an end that is as impossible as it is inhuman. It seems always to be the intellectual children of Rousseau, in search of the perfect "system", that slaughter by the millions in their efforts to remake men — and nations — into the perfect image, without ever considering that the nature of a man is mutable, but the nature of mankind is not. Yes, Kos loves America, but it is an America that does not and never can exist. And all us proles that get in the way, well, we'll learn the folly of our ways come the revolution. Oh yes, we will.
November 21, 2005
Why the "Cut and Run" Proponents are Morally Bankrupt. In Pictures.
If you want to understand the moral bankruptcy of the "cut and run" faction on Iraq, consider the people they would condemn to death and slavery, without any moral qualms at all.
The Federal Catechism
The American Spelling Book, by Daniel Webster, published in the late 1700s/early 1800s, included in some editions a federal catechism. (Hat tip: Steph) I reproduce it here in full and without commentary:
A FEDERAL CATECHISM
Containing a short EXPLANATION of the CONSTITUTION of the
UNITED STATES of AMERICA, and the Principles of
Government.
For the Use Schools. [sic]
Q. WHAT is a constitution of Government?
A. A constitution of government, or a political constitution,
consists in certain standing rules or ordinances, agreed upon by a
nation or state, determining the manner in which the supreme powers
shall be exercised over that nation or state, or rather how the
legislative power shall be formed.
Q. How many kinds of constitutions are there; or in how many
ways may the sovereign power be exercised over a people?
A. Constitutions are commonly divided into three kinds; monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy.
Q. Explain these sorts of governments?
A. When the sovereign power is exercised by one person, the
constitution is a monarchy. When a few rich men or nobles,
have the whole supreme power in their hands, the constitution is an
aristocracy. When the supreme power is exercised by all the
citizens in a general meeting or assembly, the constitution is a
democracy.
Q. What are the faults of despotic governments?
A. In a despotic government, a whole nation is at the disposal
of one person. If this person the prince, is of a cruel or
tyrannical disposition, he may abuse his subjects, take away their lives,
their property or their liberty.
Q. What objections are there to aristocracy?
A. In an aristocracy, where a few rich men govern, the poor
may be oppressed, the nobles may make laws to suit themselves
-----
p. 149
and ruin the common people. Besides, the nobles having equal
power one with another, may quarrel and throw the state into
confusion; in this case there is no person of superior power to settle
the dispute.
Q. What are the defects of democracy?
A. In a democracy, where the people meet for the purpose of
making laws, there are commonly tumults and disorders. A small
city may sometimes be governed in this manner; but if the citizens
are numerous, their assemblies make a crowd or mob, where
the debates cannot be carried on with coolness or candour, nor can
arguments he heard: Therefore a pure democracy is generally
a very bad government. It is often the most tyrannical government
on earth; for a multitude is often rash, and will not hear
reason.
Q. Is there another and better form of government than
any of these?
A. There is. A REPRESENTATIVE REPUBLIC[,] in which the
people freely choose deputies to make laws for them, is much the
best form of government hitherto invented.
Q. What are the peculiar advantages of representative
governments?
A. When deputies or representatives are chosen to make laws,
they will commonly consult the interest of the people who choose
them; and if they do not, the people can choose others in their
their room. [sic] Besides, the deputies coming from all parts of a state,
bring together all the knowledge and information necessary to show
the true interest of the whole state; at the same time, being few
ion number, they can hear arguments and debate peaceable on a
subject. But the great security of such governments is, that the
men who make laws are to be governed by them; so that they
are not apt to do wrong wilfully. When men make laws for themselves,
as well as for their neighbours, they are led by their own
interest to make GOOD laws.
Q. Which of the former kinds of government is adopted by
the American States?
A. The states are all governed by constitutions that fall under
the name of representative republics. The people choose deputies
to act for them in making laws; and in general, the deputies, when
assembled, have as full power to make and repeal laws, as the
whole body of freemen would have, if they were collected for the
purpose.
Q. By what name may we call the United States in their
political capacity?
A. A federal representaive republic.
-----
[page image]
p. 150
Q. How are the powers of government divided?
A. Into the legislative, judicial, and executive.
Q. What is meant by a legislative power?
A. By legislative is understood that body or assembly of men
who have the power of making laws and regulations for governing
state. [sic]
Q. Where does the power of making laws for the United
States reside?
A. By the constitution of the United States, the power of making
laws is given to the representatives of the people chosen by
the people or their legislatures, and assembled in two distinct
houses. This body of representatives so assembled, is called "the
Congress of the United States."
Q. What are the two separate houses called?
A. One is called the Senate, the other the house of Representatives.
Q. How i[s] the senate formed.
A. By two delegates from each state, chosen by the legislature
of the state, for six years.
Q. Why are not senators chosen every year?
A. Because one branch of Congress is designed to be distinguished
for firmness and knowledge of business.
Q. How is the house of representatives formed?
A. This branch of the national legislature is composed of
delegates from the several states, chosen by the people, every second
year.
Q. Can every an in the states vote for delegates to
Congress?
A. By no mans. In almost every state some property is
necessary to give a man a right to vote. In general, men who have
no estate, pay no taxes, and who have no settled habitation, are not
permitted to vote for rulers, because they have no interest to
secure, they may be vagabonds or dishonest men, and may be
bribed by the rich.
Q. Why is congress divided into two houses?
A. When the power of making laws is vested in a single assembly,
bills may often pass without due deliberation. Whole assemblies
of men may be rash, hasty, passionate, tumultuous, and whenever
this happens it is safe to have some check to their proceedings,
that they may not inure the public. One house therefore
may be a check upon the other.
Q. Why may Congress regulate the election of its own members
or why is not this power left entirely to the states?
A. For this good reason; a few states might by neglect, delay
or wilfulness, prevent the meeting of a Congress, and destroy the
-----
p. 151
federal government. It is necessary that Congress should have
power to oblige the State to choose delegates, so that they may
preserve their own existence.
Q. It is not unjust that all should be bound to obey a law,
when all do not consent to it?
A. Every thing is JUST in government which is NECESSARY to
the PUBLIC GOOD. It is impossible to bring all men to think alike
on all subjects, so that if we wait for all opinions to be alike
respecting laws, we shall have no laws at all.
Q. How are the members of Congress paid?
A. Out of the treasury of the United States, according to a
law of Congress.
Q. Would it not be politic to refuse them a reward, and let
them serve their country for the honour of it?
A. In such a case none but rich men could afford to serve as
delegates; the government would then be wholly in the hands of
the wealthy; whereas there are many men of little property, who
are among the most able, wise and honest persons in a state.
Q. How far do the powers of Congress extend?
A. The powers of Congress extend to the regulation of all
matters of a GENERAL NATURE, or such as concern ALL the United
States.
Q. will not this national government in time destroy
the state governments?
A. It is not probable this w[i]ll be the case; indeed the national
government is the best security of the state governments; for each
state has pledged itself to support every state government. If it
were not for our union a powerful state might conquer its weaker
neighbour, and with this addition of power, conquer the next state,
and so on, till the whole would be subject to one ambitious state.
F I N I S.
Writing Unmaintainable Code
This is a brilliant discussion of how to code badly. Sadly, a few of my favorite examples have been left out. For example:
- In the interest of efficiency, unroll subroutines and methods. Not only does this avoid the overhead of a method call or a JMP instruction, it also allows you to write, for example, your logging code with subtle differences based on where it is called. Make use of the latter property.
- Object orientation is so confusing. Use large objects filled with procedural code — preferably code related to several different subproblems — so that you can instantiate the minimum number of objects. However, every single utility method should have its own class, as an efficiency. You don't need logging all the time, for example, but you always want to be able to get your hands on an employee, and if you need an employee you will probably also need to know about the building the employee works in. This is particularly useful when someone is trying to reuse your code without truly understanding it.
- If you program in an object oriented language, and store your data in a SQL database, you can arrange things so that you can create objects like Employees — iterate the structure to find the one you need, and be sure to maintain the array reference to which employee that might be — rather than having an Employee object with the one employee you want. Clever use of this technique can make it impossible to get one row of data, or even all data related to one particular entry, at any one time.
- Use design patterns, but not for their designed purpose. Create a data access object that contains all of the SQL queries you might need, but open and close the database in your main logic, and be sure to have a separate data access object, complete with application logic, for LDAP queries. If the maintenance programmer doesn't understand how the data is stored, how can he use it properly?
- Lie to introspection routines.
- Document a method as follows:
// MUST return a FOO, or misc. calculations of financial returns will be subtly wrong
Then return anything other than FOO. Make the maintenance programmer figure out if its a bug or a bad comment. As a bonus, a multi-billion dollar bank might lose confidence in years worth of calculations, requiring much manual audit work to determine whether or not the calculations are correct. Be sure not to mention, anywhere, which calculations might be subtly wrong.
- Create two methods that do the same thing, in different ways. The arguments should be in different orders, and the names entirely dissimilar. Use the methods interchangeably.
- Be stylistically inconsistent about blocks. Use all of:
abc {
}and
abc { }and
abc { }Feel free to mix and match.
- He mentions using tabs instead of spaces, but neglects the joy of having tabs used in some cases, and spaces used in others. This is particularly fun with odd tab sizes, like '3'.
November 20, 2005
1LT Brian Chontosh
McQ of QandO has taken on a project I've been meaning to do for some time: honoring the heros in the war, by printing the citations for their medals. Since McQ is doing so, I'll link to him instead. The first honored hero is 1LT Brian Chontosh, who was awarded the Navy Cross (the only higher medal for valor is the Congressional Medal of Honor) for:
For extraordinary heroism as Combined Anti-Armor Platoon Commander, Weapons Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, I Marine Expeditionary Force in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM on 25 March 2003. While leading his platoon north on Highway I toward Ad Diwaniyah, First Lieutenant Chontosh's platoon moved into a coordinated ambush of mortars, rocket propelled grenades, and automatic weapons fire. With coalition tanks blocking the road ahead, he realized his platoon was caught in a kill zone. He had his driver move the vehicle through a breach along his flank, where he was immediately taken under fire from an entrenched machine gun. Without hesitation, First Lieutenant Chontosh ordered the driver to advance directly at the enemy position enabling his .50 caliber machine gunner to silence the enemy. He then directed his driver into the enemy trench, where he exited his vehicle and began to clear the trench with an M16A2 service rifle and 9 millimeter pistol. His ammunition depleted, First Lieutenant Chontosh, with complete disregard for his safety, twice picked up discarded enemy rifles and continued his ferocious attack. When a Marine following him found an enemy rocket propelled grenade launcher, First Lieutenant Chontosh used it to destroy yet another group of enemy soldiers. When his audacious attack ended, he had cleared over 200 meters of the enemy trench, killing more than 20 enemy soldiers and wounding several others. By his outstanding display of decisive leadership, unlimited courage in the face of heavy enemy fire, and utmost devotion to duty, First Lieutenant Chontosh reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
Thank you, LT Chontosh, for fighting so bravely for the nation.
Posted by jeff at 9:45 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Too Soon to Tell
... but Abu Musab al-Zarqawi may have been killed in Mosul. If so, it's good news for us, the Iraqis and in fact anyone who is not a jihadi, so I'm hoping it's true. Sadly, I first saw the report on CNN at the gym, so I have to assume that it's false until I hear it from more reputable news agencies.
UPDATE: This makes me wonder if the tip that led to the house didn't come from Jordan. After all, it is certainly the case that the Arabs have better intelligence in other Arab countries than, say, we do.
UPDATE: Bummer.
The Military and Political Implications of Disclosing Strategy
There is a critical point that needs to be made, that the media and the administration's opponents have been glossing over, and that the administration has characteristically not been making, or has made badly. The iron law of warfighting is this: the leaders of a country at war can publicly explain neither the underlying strategy being used nor the full extent of their successes and mistakes.
To see why this is so, consider two historical examples of grand strategy, and how knowing the actual strategy could have enabled the enemy to win: the American Civil War and WWII in the Pacific.
The Union strategy in the Civil War was known as the Anaconda Plan. This plan, developed by Winfield Scott (hero of the War of 1812 and commander of the Mexican War), essentially consisted of two elements: the first was to divide and isolate the Confederates by blockading the entire Southern coast and occupying the Mississippi river valley; the second was to then sit back and wait for pro-union sympathizers to rise up and force the rebel governments out of power. President Lincoln adopted the first principle, but the second was not enough when the Union public was clamoring for aggressive action to bring the South back into the Union. Instead, the Union adopted a plan to destroy Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and take Richmond.
The Confederates could have countered the second part of the Anaconda Plan. To do so, they would have had to conserve the Confederate armies, risking them as little as possible, while cutting Union communications along the periphery. While the Confederacy could not have overcome the blockade, they could have used their advantage of interior lines to frustrate Union attacks intended to either take Richmond or destroy the Confederate armies, while simultaneously inflicting great costs on the Union just to stay in the fight: it's hard to ship goods and people thousands of miles today; it was much, much more difficult in the 1860s. Eventually, the Union would have been exhausted if they had been unable to retake the Confederate states, and it's likely that the Confederate states would have been able to gain their independence.
Instead, the Confederates — Lee, at least — appear to have thought the key to victory was to take Washington. As a result, Lee was constantly fighting, and constantly pushing into Northern territory. And it was in doing so, at a small Pennsylvania town, that Lee's army was finally defeated so badly that it could never recover. There were still two years of war to go, but the South had passed the point where it could win without a massive Union blunder or failure of will. (General Longstreet recommended that the Confederacy instead use its railroads and interior lines to relieve the siege of Vicksburg, which would in fact, if successful, have both demolished General Grant's career and likely have led to a failure of the Anaconda Plan: the Confederacy could have kept the lower part of the Mississippi open.
But since the Confederacy did not know the strategy, they made fundamental errors that cost them the war.
The second example is WWII in the Pacific. The US intended to enter the war as soon as reasonable cause could be found. President Roosevelt knew that despite the anti-war (and in some cases actively pro-fascist) sentiment in the US, it would be necessary to defeat Germany; he was looking for a pretext, and the constant submarine warfare in the Atlantic had come close to supplying him one by late 1941. Apparently, Japan was seen as a considerably more minor problem — or at least one to be solved further in the future.
But Japan didn't know that. Japan saw the cutting off of raw materials shipments from the US as a clear provocation, and decided that it needed to act in order to maintain its ability to run a modern industrial economy. This required Japan to control a large part of the Pacific and SE Asia, where significant oil, rubber, mineral and other resources were located. This would inevitably bring Japan into conflict with Australia, which was actively defending New Guinea, in particular, which was a significant problem for the Japanese. The Japanese figured that the US would come to the defense of Australia (likely, but not certain), and that would pose a problem of major proportions: the US territory of the Philippines lay across the route of Japanese expansion southwards.
Looking at it from Japan's point of view, it was necessary both to keep the US from supporting Australia, and to keep the US from blocking Japanese expansion. This meant that the Philippines had to be captured, and the US Pacific Fleet destroyed, disabled, or kept away from the theater. And that is why Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Guam and other US installations in the Pacific on December 7, 1941, after which their defeat was as close to inevitable as war ever gets.
But had Japan understood that America saw Germany as the main enemy, Japan could have waited six months. By that time, the US would almost certainly have joined the war against Germany, and in the process would have transferred significant resources from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet. This would have given Japan the ability to advance southwards without worrying about the US. Already involved in a war taking all of its resources to fight, the US would not have been likely to intervene in Japan's expansion. By the time US attention could have been focused on Japan — probably 1944 at the earliest — Japan would have been much more powerful, perhaps too powerful for the US to see intervention as useful, absent a Japanese attack on Guam and the Philippines.
So as a practical matter, while a free society must always debate its goals in order to come to consensus (required for maintaining any policy over the long term), discussing strategy openly — at least on the part of those charged with developing or implementing it — is folly. Yet this is precisely what the opposition in the US demands. Absent this complete disclosure of the strategy well in advance, the opposition claims that there is no strategy, and that's why so much "needless" losses are happening in places that simply "have nothing to do" with the "real war". Why do they do this, knowing as they must that the administration cannot get involved in a deep discussion of strategy without possibly losing the war?
The iron law of political opposition in a representative country in wartime is this: the opposition can make use of the iron law of warfighting to undermine the government, if it is more concerned with its own power position than with the country's success or failure in the war. The way that the opposition does this is to challenge the administration to account for funds it cannot admit to spending without tipping off the enemy to our plans, to bring forth evidence of intelligence the government cannot disclose without allowing the enemy to stop that source of intelligence, to detail the strategy in ways the government cannot do without telling the enemy how to fight us more effectively, and to constantly beat the drum of incompetence and irrelevance of the leaders of the government.
If you think that the US is bad about this now, you should read up on the political infighting in England during the Napoleonic wars. The Democrats are amateurs compared to the Radicals, or even the Whigs.
It might be possible to publish milestones for our success in Iraq, at this point, since we've mostly won that fight in real terms (assuming, of course, that we don't just give up, as we did after militarily winning in Viet Nam). But it would be a grave mistake for the government to talk about the wider strategy in the war, and why Iraq is so important as a campaign in the war. Yet that is precisely what the Democrats want to debate, because they know it's a one-sided debate: the government cannot answer without giving vital information to the enemy. It's a cowardly and self-interested and treacherous. And yes, I am questioning their patriotism: patriotism consists in putting the interests of the country above your narrower self-interest, and the Democrats right now are (at least rhetorically) doing the opposite. I am glad the Republicans called them on it.
November 19, 2005
Comprehensive Foreign Policy Discussion
Mark Safranski notes Commentary's gathering of 36 of the most impressive thinkers on foreign policy, in order to ask them what they think about the Bush doctrine. More specifically:
1. Where have you stood, and where do you now stand, in relation to the Bush Doctrine? Do you agree with the President’s diagnosis of the threat we face and his prescription for dealing with it?2. How would you rate the progress of the Bush Doctrine so far in making the U.S. more secure and in working toward a safer world environment? What about the policy’s longer-range prospects?
3. Are there particular aspects of American policy, or of the administration’s handling or explanation of it, that you would change immediately?
4. Apart from your view of the way the Bush Doctrine has been defined or implemented, do you agree with its expansive vision of America’s world role and the moral responsibilities of American power?
It's going to take me a while to get through all of these, and I will probably comment on several of them as I go. However, I'd like to note up front that this is the kind of debate we need to be having in America.
Posted by jeff at 10:19 PM | TrackBack
Hopefully the last on Joel Hinrichs
Jeff and I have both commented on Joel Hinrichs, the University of Oklahoma student who killed himself outside the packed football stadium. The FBI has finally unsealed their records on the subject. It's plain he intended to kill himself, but the possibility of his being a suicide bomber is inconclusive. As I said originally, there's no reason to believe he was anything other than young man commiting suicide in a dramatic fashion. I had hoped they would have totally cleared up the "suicide bomber" notion, just because of the conspiracy nuts out there, but at least the information is now out there for everyone to see.
New details emerged Friday when U.S. Magistrate Valerie Couch made public the records on the FBI search of Hinrichs' apartment, his e-mail account and nine OU computers.Posted by Nemo at 7:43 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBackFederal prosecutors told the magistrate "there is no longer any necessity" for the documents to remain sealed.
FBI officials have said in the past that the probe did not uncover any links between the student and terrorist organizations. They have said they may never know whether the student wanted to get inside the stadium.
...
During the search of Hinrichs' apartment after the blast, the FBI found the student's laptop computer was still on and had on the screen notes apparently written by Hinrichs to himself, the records show. At the cursor was a phrase that began with profanity and continued " ... all this. None of you are worth living with. You can all kiss my ass."
Short History of a Long War
Greyhawk gives a timeline of the events in Iraq, primarily focusing on the war that began in 1990, simmered through the Clinton administration, and continues through today. (hat tip: InstaPundit)
Goblet of Fire
Just got back from seeing Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire.
I suppose the best description of this film is "compressed". There's just too much story to go around. It really makes me wonder how they are going to get Order of the Phoenix done.
Still, they did a good job with the film overall. A few parts (like how Krum was bewitched) were glossed over, and required knowledge of the book to realize what was happening. However, the young leads did an admirable job. They played a real range in this movie - from general teenage confusion to fear and then grief. I truly felt for Harry after he returns to Hogwarts through the portkey.
Michael Gambon is much better as Dumbledore in this movie as well. In Azkaban he just seemed out of place. I really was worried that such an important character was getting left behind. However, while still not Richard Harris, at least now Gambon seems to be playing the part more naturally.
The first two movies suffered by focusing too much on action and not enough on character. Azkaban and this movie have been changing that. Since they don't have to redevelop the wizarding world over and over they have the time to focus on the people. It's a welcome change to say the least. It doesn't take more than a few scenes to do it right - Neville dancing (and perhaps more importantly watching the Cruciatus curse), Hermione coming nervously down the stairs, Ron and Harry arguing, etc.
I suppose my only complaint about the rushed feeling of the film is the resurrection scene. While adequate, the scene didn't really build to the rebirth - it just came about quickly. A little anticipatory fear would have helped the scene quite a bit.
As for the PG-13, I think it's probably about as graphic and tense as Fellowship of the Ring. Not too much, but perhaps enough for the really young ones who might be frightened by snakes, blood or transformations.
Next movie up: The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe
Posted by Nemo at 12:06 AM | Comments (2) | TrackBackNovember 18, 2005
Nemo Maximus???
I really disliked this movie, but being tied with Spidey isn't half-bad.....
 | You scored as Maximus. After his family was murdered by the evil emperor Commodus, the great Roman general Maximus went into hiding to avoid Commodus's assassins. He became a gladiator, hoping to dominate the colosseum in order to one day get the chance of killing Commodus. Maximus is valiant, courageous, and dedicated. He wants nothing more than the chance to avenge his family, but his temper often gets the better of him.
Which Action Hero Would You Be? v. 2.0 created with QuizFarm.com |
Why is it Called the Ninth Circus?
Well, here is a bit of clue. The Ninth Circuit court — the court that thinks that the word "god" should not be in the Pledge of Allegiance (despite its non-sectarian connotations) because it "promotes religion" — apparently thinks that the government forcing children to pretend to be Muslim (to the point of taking on Islamic names and reciting lines from an Islamic prayer and simulating fasting) does not promote religion.
While I don't think that parents have any automatic rights to control what is taught to their children in public schools or how — that is an administrative decision, and the school board and legislature are the places to argue that — it is quite pointedly the courts' responsibility (as it is every citizens' responsibility) to yank the government up short when it goes off violating the Constitution. And this clearly does violate the Constitution, based on the common meaning of the words in the First Amendment, and based on prior precedent from the courts (the 9th Circuit, ironically enough, in particular).
Maybe the court would have found the courage to rule correctly if the students had been similarly introduced to Judaism, or if the students had been required to recite the Pledge of Allegiance first.
Consequences
The change of heart today by Congessman Murtha (D-PA) on support for the war is very troubling, the more so because he did not change from supporting the war to suggesting we should eventually withdraw from Iraq: he changed from supporting the war to suggesting that we should run from with our tails between our legs, claiming victory of some sort:
The United States and coalition troops have done all they can in Iraq, but it is time for a change in direction. … We can not continue on the present course. It is evident that continued military action in Iraq is not in the best interest of the United States of America, the Iraqi people or the Persian Gulf Region.[snip]
The threat posed by terrorism is real, but we have other threats that cannot be ignored. We must be prepared to face all threats.
[snip]
I said over a year ago, and now the military and the Administration agrees, Iraq can not be won “militarily.” I said two years ago, the key to progress in Iraq is to Iraqitize, Internationalize and Energize. I believe the same today. But I have concluded that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is impeding this progress.
Our troops have become the primary target of the insurgency. They are united against U.S. forces and we have become a catalyst for violence. U.S. troops are the common enemy of the Sunnis, Saddamists and foreign jihadists. I believe with a U.S. troop redeployment, the Iraqi security forces will be incentivized to take control. A poll recently conducted shows that over 80% of Iraqis are strongly opposed to the presence of coalition troops, and about 45% of the Iraqi population believe attacks against American troops are justified. I believe we need to turn Iraq over to the Iraqis.
I believe before the Iraqi elections, scheduled for mid December, the Iraqi people and the emerging government must be put on notice that the United States will immediately redeploy. All of Iraq must know that Iraq is free. Free from United States occupation. I believe this will send a signal to the Sunnis to join the political process for the good of a “free” Iraq.[snip]
Our military has done everything that has been asked of them, the U.S. can not accomplish anything further in Iraq militarily.
While, as InstaPundit notes, and as the Congressman himself notes, the Congressman's change of heart is not new, the sentiment is certainly becoming more widespread. Ignoring for the moment that the Congressman's reasoning (that I largely did not reproduce, but encourage you to read) is largely specious (quick example: how does withdrawal improve our intelligence services?) and while his claimed facts are open to question, the call for total and immediate withdrawal is worrying, because it is part of a major offensive on the part of the Left to force the US to concede defeat, and thus needs to be addressed. I would like to address it in part, by looking at the consequences of US withdrawal.
To begin, it should be remembered that the best case and the worst case almost never happen. So it is unlikely that the terrorists would throw down their arms and stop attacking the US; our friends and allies would rally to our side with support and assistance in achieving our foreign policy aims without our using force against well-defined enemies; Iran would stop developing nuclear weapons; China would suddenly come around and see us not as a competitor but as a friend; and the world would march on in freedom and peaceful coexistence. It is equally unlikely that the terrorists would immediately take down the Iraqi government; the Israelis would use their nuclear weapons against Iran and (since they would face incredible isolation and political pressure after such an act) against nearer enemies and potential enemies as well; the US would be unable to act abroad unilaterally; Afghanistan would fall; and Musharraf would bow to the inevitable and start giving nuclear weapons to terrorists in order to avoid being assassinated. But what is likely?
First, let's look at what the Congressman apparently hopes will happen: the military will be able to fight elsewhere and sustain that fight; recruitment will increase, and the recruits will be of better quality; procurement will increase, both in replacing worn out equipment and in getting new gear; there will be less military spending, easing the deficit; fewer Americans will be killed and wounded; fewer Iraqis will be killed and wounded; the insurrection and terrorism in Iraq will stop; terrorism globally will decline; the Sunnis will join the political process. (All of these are inverse statements of what the Congressman declares to be wrong; presumably he believes that our withdrawal will put them right.)
And the Congressman has a plan:
To immediately redeploy U.S. troops consistent with the safety of U.S. forces.
To create a quick reaction force in the region.
To create an over- the- horizon presence of Marines.
To diplomatically pursue security and stability in Iraq
So let's look at his plan, and his hopes, and whether his hopes are likely to be fulfilled or his plan is likely to work to fulfill those hopes. Also, let's look at the things that he didn't mention that might happen on the other side of the ledger.
In the very short term, as we were withdrawing, attacks on Americans would dramatically increase. By attacking us in this way, the enemy could plausibly claim to have driven us out by force, not because we lost our will. Given the, um, interesting ideas that are widely believed in the fantasist Arab culture already, this idea would have wide currency. And how could we refute it? By saying not that we were defeated, but are cowards? This would not only lead to the revival of the jihadi movement, which has taken some major body blows in the region because (a) they can't drive us out and (b) they are killing lots of Muslims instead of lots of Americans and Jews, it would also lead to the essential collapse of reforms towards democracy or at least political concessions on the part of the other Arab states in the region. It would also destroy any chance of a peace in Israel, because it would confirm the thesis that a Western power, including Israel, could be driven out by persistent and violent terrorism. In Iraq itself, of course, the government would face a problem with the terrorists and insurgents already operating in Iraq.
What the US military presence in Iraq provides the Iraqi government currently, besides more people and weapons to conduct operations against the enemy, are two capabilities: the ability to relatively precisely target the enemy, and defense against foreign invasion. Without the US, Iraq could probably manage sufficient logistics and support to protect its oil infrastructure, keep the Shia and Kurd areas relatively peaceful, and ensure its continuation in power absent a foreign invasion. The Iraqi government can also defeat the enemy in country, but the methods will be different. Absent US air power, electronic assets, heavy weaponry like artillery and tanks, and exquisitely-trained soldiers, the only option for the Iraqi government is slaughter. Not only would more pro-government Iraqis die in the bloodbath that would follow American withdrawal, but more civilians — by far — would be killed, particularly Sunni civilians. Given their capabilities, it's the only way the Iraqi government could stay in power. And since the Iraqi government and other "collaborators" would be killed by the Sunnis and the terrorists if they were defeated, the government has a powerful incentive to kill first and thoroughly. The idea of "diplomatically pursu[ing] security and stability in Iraq is laughable: who in Iraq would listen to us after we abandoned them?
If Syria or, much more likely, Iran were to invade Iraq, the government would almost certainly collapse. The Iraqi military and police have been being tuned for counter-insurgency, with the US providing defense against foreign invasion. The Iraqi military simply doesn't have the capability to defend the country against an invader who has tanks and artillery and even a few aircraft. The government would fall, probably within months, and likely to be replaced by a Shia theocracy satellite to Iran. This could even kick off a regional war, because the Saudis, Syrians and even Jordanians would be unwilling to let Iran have the Iraqi oil fields.
But with Iran the regional power, and the US uninvolved, it's a certainty that the US would lose pretty much all of its regional bases except perhaps in Afghanistan. The Saudis have already kicked us out. The premise is that we would withdraw from Iraqi bases. The Gulf states would kick us out, probably all of them would, because they know we wouldn't defend them, but our presence would draw terrorists and Iranian ire. The latter, in particular, would be a problem, because again Iran would be the regional power, and could get its way pretty easily.
And the idea that our "quick reaction force" (which would not be "in the region" for the reasons noted above) or our "over-the-horizon presence of Marines" would deter anyone after we ran from Iraq is ridiculous. Why would we use the military where we would undoubtedly take more casualties for less gain, after we showed in Iraq that we weren't willing to take a trickle of casualties for a huge gain? And why would we intervene to save Iraq after we had abandoned it?
Domestically, of course, the Republicans would be turned out of power in a way that would rival the post-Watergate gains made by the Democrats. The Republicans have not been socially conservative enough to excite the social conservative part of the Party, while not being fiscally conservative enough to excite the libertarian part of the Party. The only thing that's kept the Republicans in the majority domestically has been support for the war. If the war is abandoned, the Republicans will be seen as uncommitted to principles domestically or economically, as feckless and ineffective, and they will be (rightly) turned out in droves. (And make no mistake, this is the end that the Democrats most hope for and cherish; in the process, they tend to not see or to discount all of the other things that would follow our defeat in the war.)
Beyond domestic and Iraqi issues, there would be a number of secondary effects. Our ability to get our way in international fora would be even more reduced than it is now: with what would we threaten or promise? Few people fear our economic retaliation, because WTO rules make that virtually impossible, at least on a large scale. And no one would consider our military, because we would have proved that we could be beaten. Would we collapse, as the USSR did, after it was beaten? Clearly not. On the other hand, our ability to conduct diplomacy would collapse, as the USSR's did, and for the same reasons.
Iran, of course, would get its nuclear weapons eventually. The US certainly would not have the political will to act in Iran when it had lost that will in Iraq. Iran would be a tougher fight altogether, and there would be less provocation (no string of UN resolutions or of firing at US warplanes enforcing those resolutions), while attempting to use intelligence of Iran nearing nuclear capability would be laughed out of the forum of public opinion, since that was part of the justification for intervening in Iraq, and is being painted as the entire justification for intervening in Iraq. What it would do with them is anyone's guess, but a very good guess is "destroy Israel". Whether Israel would attempt to keep Iran from getting them is not clear, though I suspect that they would, knowing what the Iranians have said about losing several Muslim cities being worth destroying Israel. If Israel did attempt to stop Iran from completing nuclear weapons development, their only real option is preemptive nuclear strikes. The Israeli aircraft don't have the range, and they do not have the refueling capacity, to keep up a sustained conventional strike against the Iranians.
So now let's go back to the Congressman's hopes, and pitilessly demolish them.
Would withdrawing from Iraq increase the military's ability to fight elsewhere and sustain the fight? In purely military terms, yes. Since we would no longer be involved in one fight, those resources would be available elsewhere. Of course, politically that would be a non-starter, unless the US or, say, Western Europe were directly attacked, which means that our ability to fight elsewhere would be irrelevant. For at least a decade, the US would be unable to intervene militarily virtually anywhere in the world. And would we then get our second Reagan, or our second Carter? Would we resurge or decline? It's impossible to tell.
Would recruitment increase, and recruits be of better quality? Um, no. First, the morale of the military would be shattered. Experienced troops and officers would flee the military at their first chance to do so, and the result would be more unfilled slots. Recruiting is a kind of economy, with the demand being unfilled slots, the supply being recruits, and the cost being the quality of the recruits. With a booming economy (which, despite the MSM's continual gloom seeking, we have), shattered military morale, the inevitable budget cutting (see below for more) and so on, means that the demand would far outrun the supply. This would be made up by raising the cost, that is, by lowering the standards. We would likely end up with the kind of recruiting situation we had in the late 1970s: extraordinarily low quality coupled with constant retraining because of high turnover rates. That was horrible in the late 1970s; with today's demands from both technology and doctrine, it would be unsustainable: the Army would lose the ability to effectively conduct low-casualty wars.
Would procurement increase? Would there be less military spending, easing the deficit? Of course, these two hopes of the Congressman are pretty much mutually exclusive: you cannot cut the budget and increase procurement at the same time. During the 1990s, we were burning through Cold War surplus (our military is about half the size, in fighting units, as it was in 1991) to replace equipment. That equipment will be burned through in the next few years, and so we will face using worn out equipment or raising military spending. We cannot do both. Well, we could, if we again dramatically cut the military, probably by half again. In the process, we would get rid of a lot of capabilities, likely including sufficient amounts of our capabilities that we would be unable to mount an Iraq-sized intervention without a couple of years of rebuilding first. We would be limited to small-scale missions, because we wouldn't have the troops, equipment and logistics to support a large-scale operation. Current weapons systems are expensive, and you cannot both cut the budget and keep current, especially when you have to replace a generation of the most expensive weapons (aircraft, ships and armored vehicles) all at the same time.
Would fewer Americans be killed and wounded? In the very short term, while we are withdrawing, no. More Americans would be killed because, as noted above, the enemy would attack more in order to claim they beat us, rather than our will collapsed. In the medium term, probably, because we wouldn't be fighting in Iraq and it would take the terrorists a little time to recover. But within two years or so, our casualties would increase. First, the terrorists would be intent on driving us completely out of the region, so they would be attacking our troops in Afghanistan, as well as our embassies, American universities, and corporate and military interests throughout the region. Even if the terrorists did not resume attacks in the US on the scale of 9/11, our casualties in civilians and non-military government agents in the Muslim world would likely exceed our current military casualties.
Would fewer Iraqis be killed and wounded? Clearly not, as explained above. But who would notice, since it wasn't Americans dying? While 30000 civilians in two years seems like a lot of dead people, it wouldn't surprise me to see the Sunnis put down with civilians dying at a rate of 30000 every few months. Again, the Iraqi government's options are limited. And like the killing in Cambodia and Viet Nam, I expect that the Left would not notice; and to the extent that it did notice, it would be to blame it on the US for not protecting the enemy after we abandoned our friends.
Would the insurrection and terrorism in Iraq stop? Probably. Absent a foreign invasion, I suspect that the Iraqi government could kill terrorists, insurgents, sympathetic civilians and uninvolved civilians at a high enough rate to end the terrorism and insurgency. Assuming, of course, that the army and police don't desert en masse out of fear after we leave. If they do, then the terrorism and insurgency would likely continue until either foreign invasion intervened, or the government of Iraq collapsed.
Will terrorism decline globally? Um, not hardly. Why would a tactic that had proven successful be scaled back or abandoned? In short order, there would be a sharply increased amount of terrorism in the Muslim world. Shortly thereafter, there would be increased terrorism on the periphery of the Muslim world, Islam's bloody borders. And if the terrorists were to succeed in pulling down some governments and establishing a caliphate (a possibility the Congressman is either unaware of or simply declines to mention), there would likely be serious attacks against Western and Jewish targets generally. For that matter, it's not even necessary to establish a rump caliphate to do this: the Syrians, Iranians, Saudis and Pakistanis would probably be willing to provide sufficient support to the terrorists to ensure that they could plan, train for and carry out attacks in Europe and the US.
Would the Sunnis join the political process in Iraq? No. The Sunnis are increasingly participating because it looks like we are going to win handily. If it begins to look like we are going to lose (or if we simply announce we've lost and run away), there would be no incentive to counter the strong disincentive of being killed for "collaborating". So the Sunnis would withdraw from the political process, and turn to violence. And they would have to do it quickly, to avoid the slaughter the Shia and Kurds would try to inflict on them, both for revenge and for the practical reason of not putting themselves back in the position they were in under the Sunnis last time.
There are two other significant downsides of withdrawal not addressed by the Congressman even in the negative: international cooperation and Korea. International cooperation, both on terror and on other matters, would become a much more rare commodity. First, the US would be seen as needing the cooperation more, and so (politics also being an economy) the price would go up. In many cases, the price would be out of our reach, because better deals could be found by cooperating with our enemies than with us. Ask the French, or George Galloway, about "oil for food" deals and how much you can profit, with essentially no risk, by adhering to US enemies.
As to Korea, China has been allowing North Korea to slowly starve. This would not continue. The South would know it could not count on the US for the harder task of fighting or occupying North Korea, since we were unwilling to take on the easier task of occupying Iraq, and so the South would likely build up its military significantly. China does not want a free North Korea to encourage the Chinese people towards freedom, so they would prop up the regime. With nothing to fear from the US, the Chinese would have every incentive to do so and would see little in the way of downsides. Japan and Taiwan and South Korea, realizing they have to fend for themselves, would likely develop nuclear weapons as fast as they could. There would almost certainly be a series of wars, probably including China invading Taiwan, over territory in SE Asia.
It has always been the case that most casualties are suffered not in the battle, but in the rout afterwards. If we allow ourselves to be routed, the likely consequences are severe. We should be aware of them, and ready to face them, before we incur them.
UPDATE: Instapundit has lots of concurring opinions. In particular, read Pejman Yousefzadeh.
UPDATE: Dave Schuler also has thoughts on this, and in particular on what responsibilities grown ups in a free society should have when their nation is at war.
My own preferences are that Congressional Democrats should alter their current trajectory from withdrawal to establishing a lasting peace in Iraq, the White House (and Congressional Republicans) should alter their stance from counter-confrontation to fixing whatever is wrong and speeding the pace of strengthening the Iraqi government’s position (even if doing that has political cost), and that bloggers would start confronting each others’ arguments rather than each other. Tain’t gonna happen.
Dave also points to Joe Gandelman's excellent roundup of opinion on this.
UPDATE: Kevin Aylward has also read Murtha's plan.
UPDATE: Ralph Peters has bitter words about the Democrats' electoral be-damned-to-the-consequences maneuvering.
The Memory Stick Nightmare
Bob Sullivan points out a real story of data loss - and what is certainly going to be increasingly common the next few years in HELP! I LEFT MY IDENTITY IN THE BACKSEAT OF A TAXI:
Last month, Wilcox Memorial Hospital in Kauai had to inform 120,000 past and present patients that their private information had been misplaced. Their names, addresses, Social Security numbers, even medical record numbers had been placed on one of those tiny USB flash drives -- and now, according to a letter sent home, the drive was missing.
I've thought I've lost my own personal USB widget any number of times. Most recently, I thought I had left it in Philadelphia. I found it two days later in the bottom of my briefcase. On the widget is a variety of things both business and personal: a Quicken file with personal finances (encrypted), resume, remote access certificate for the office, pictures, etc. No customer data from the office, but the certificate could have been a problem. It's password protected, but within another 3-4 days, I was going to get my certificate revoked if I hadn't found it (I'm just that anal about it).
I expect that as more stories like the hospital become public, more of these flash drives will use encryption - which I'm starting to see in the marketplace, but not commonly yet. I would guess that within 12-24 more months, it will be standard. In the meantime, more letters like the one the hospital sent home will be happening.
Posted by Nemo at 8:32 AM | Comments (1) | TrackBackNovember 17, 2005
Where is Sanity?
I've asked before where the thinking anti-war bloggers are. That is, where are the people who opposed the war at the beginning, who still oppose the war, and who can convince me they are right. Where is the Left's Steven Den Beste or Bill Whittle? And every time I've gotten recommendations, they've turned out to be a bust. Demosophist takes apart one of those recommendations (that I had long abandoned): Josh Marshall. There are some who were anti-war to start, but believe that as a practical matter we should win. There are some who were pro-war to start, but who have become defeatists on the grounds of unrelated issues (like gay marriage) turning them against the administration. But where are the Den Bestes and Whittles of the Left? Are there any?
Corporate Sponsorship - of Towns?!
And here I thought it couldn't get any worse.
However, if Mercedes were to make this offer to our town, I might have to go for it :)
Dishing themselves up a treat in Texas
A Texan town has changed its name to Dish in exchange for 10 years of free satellite television service.Posted by Nemo at 12:30 PM | TrackBackAll 125 residents of the town formerly known as Clark will get basic service and a free digital video-recorder and satellite-TV receiver, a move that has some people joking the Fort-Worth suburb will become a town of couch potatoes.
November 16, 2005
Et tu, Harry?
On November 14, 2005, Harry Reid had this to say:
Tired rhetoric and political attacks do nothing to help us bring the troops home or achieve success in Iraq.
On November 1, 2005 (the day the Dems shut down the Senate), Harry Reid had this to say: [note: these are individual statements taken from one speech]
"This indictment raises very serious charges. It asserts this Administration engaged in actions that both harmed our national security and are morally repugnant.
"The Libby indictment provides a window into what this is really about: how the Administration manufactured and manipulated intelligence in order to sell the war in Iraq and attempted to destroy those who dared to challenge its actions.
"As a result of its improper conduct, a cloud now hangs over this Administration. This cloud is further darkened by the Administration's mistakes in prisoner abuse scandal, Hurricane Katrina, and the cronyism and corruption in numerous agencies.
"The record will also show that in the months and years after 9/11, the Administration engaged in a pattern of manipulation of the facts and retribution against anyone who got in its way as it made the case for attacking Iraq.
"There are numerous examples of how the Administration misstated and manipulated the facts as it made the case for war. Administration statements on Saddam's alleged nuclear weapons capabilities and ties with Al Qaeda represent the best examples of how it consistently and repeatedly manipulated the facts.
Playing upon the fears of Americans after September 11, these officials and others raised the specter that, left unchecked, Saddam could soon attack America with nuclear weapons.
"What has been the response of this Republican-controlled Congress to the Administration's manipulation of intelligence that led to this protracted war in Iraq? Basically nothing. Did the Republican-controlled Congress carry out its constitutional obligations to conduct oversight? No. Did it support our troops and their families by providing them the answers to many important questions? No. Did it even attempt to force this Administration to answer the most basic questions about its behavior? No.
"Unfortunately the unwillingness of the Republican-controlled Congress to exercise its oversight responsibilities is not limited to just Iraq. We see it with respect to the prisoner abuse scandal. We see it with respect to Katrina. And we see it with respect to the cronyism and corruption that permeates this Administration