Transformation

Foreign Affairs has an excellent article by Max Boot, which has a fantastic summary of combat operations in the Iraq campaign and draws lessons from this about transformation of the military. (Hat tip: Belmont Club) I can't really summarize by quoting a page and a half, so please read the entire article. I would like to quote the most important paragraph, though:

The army needs to tackle the task of "imperial" policing -- not a popular duty, but one that is as vital to safeguarding U.S. interests in the long run as are the more conventional war-fighting skills on display during the second Gulf War. The Army War College's decision to shut down its Peacekeeping Institute is not a good sign; it means that the army still wants to avoid focusing on noncombat missions. The army brass should realize that battlefield victories in places like Afghanistan and Iraq can easily be squandered if they do not do enough to win the peace.

Yes, the Air Force and Navy need to realize that a big part of their job - perhaps the biggest part after logisitical support - is combat air support of Army and Marine forces on the ground, including when those forces are in contact with the enemy. This cannot be done with seconded fighters with nearly the effectiveness that it can be done with dedicated attack aircraft (for close-contact fights) and bombers (for interdiction and strategic weakening). Certainly, fighters need to be dual-role, and need to be used for bomb delivery, but the heart of ground support should be dedicated aircraft.

But that is not the heart of the military's need, just an important issue. The heart of the need is to develop an understanding of, and force structure for, the policing of conquered nations and failed states. It is that which the Army needs to transform itself into being capable of. And that requires that we maintain our heavy forces - you have to conquer before you occupy - and add medium and light forces. In an occupation, the light forces, walking mostly, are the ones who really bring about the necessary order for political and infrastructural rebuilding to occur. The medium forces, in addition to being survivable quick reaction forces for strategic intervention, could also provide easy-to-support firepower to back up light forces in an occupation.

Right now, we seem to be trying to push off that mission on Third World forces, through some kind of UN umbrella or by getting those nations directly into "coalitions of the willing." We need to get serious, though, and realize that we will be occupying more than just Iraq and Afghanistan, and we (and by extension, our Army) will be bearing the major burden, and we will be doing it for a long time to come. We probably don't need to go back up to 18 divisions, but we certainly need more than ten.

Posted by Jeff at September 4, 2003 08:22 PM | Link Cosmos