To Provide for the Common Defense

Trent Telenko at Winds of Change has a must-read article for those who care about the long-term strategy of the War on Terror.

This ties in with General Franks' testimony to Congress about our length of stay in Iraq, as well as to many different bloggers' comments on the matter, particularly those of Steven Den Beste and Porphyrogenitus. (I will refrain from specific article links here, since I've commented on it before, with links, and since Trent's article has many links to the same or similar sources.)

I think that there are a few things becoming very clear about the long-term War on Terror, and our position now, and I'll try to summarize them all here. First, our current position:

1. We have enough heavy combat troops in the Regular Army and National Guard to handle any forseeable contingency. Should we be required to fight a war in Korea, we have sufficient forces available to commit to handle that mission, assuming the immediate activation of several National Guard divisions (as these have a six-month training cycle, and many of their most experienced personnel are currently committed to active duty units).
   
2. We do not have enough active duty troops to occupy Iraq, fight a war in Korea (or be prepared to do so) and do anything else of consequence.
   
3. With the exception of the Poles, British, Australians and possibly the Spanish and Italians, there are no countries with significant forces who are both capable of providing forces for foreign conflict/peacekeeping, and willing to do so in support of the War on Terror.
   
4. We cannot as a consequence intervene in Syria/Lebanon, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Libya, sub-Saharan Africa or Venezuela - any or all of which may require our intervention in the next few years - until and unless we can either pull combat units out of Iraq, or nationalize the Guard heavy divisions.
   
5. Our only light/rapidly-deployable forces are the 101AB, 10Mtn, 82AB and 25ID. 101AB and 82AB are committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, 10Mtn is committed in Afghanistan, and 25ID is strategic reserve and likely cannot move due to the Korean situation. The Marines are not heavily committed right now, but are really only useful in littoral interventions, rather than for long-term occupation duties. This means that the US does not have sufficient rapidly-deployable forces to intervene should, say, Iran go all to hell with a revolution (or Congo take on dimensions that threaten our security, or Zimbabwe do the same) - without abandoning either Korea or Iraq or undercommitting (fatally?) to both.
   

Given these facts, I think that the following conclusions are inescapable:

1. We need at least one more field force the size of the one currently deployed in Iraq, but specifically designed to occupy a nation. In other words, we need 3 to 5 light infantry divisions, with small armored and artillery components for heavy firepower, and with extra contingents of MPs, logisticians, civil affairs troops and the like.
   
2. Such a force could likely be raised without a draft, if the political will were available to fund it. That is to say, we would either have to raise taxes again (which I abhor), or cut spending on popular programs (which politicians in general abhor). We must shift to a war footing, which means shifting funding and raising additional troops, or we will be unable to fight at a pace that will defeat our enemies. The President must make this case, and must be willing to take the political risk for it. He should not wait until after the election to do so.
   
3. Should we choose to, we could use foreign auxiliaries and US officers to raise such units, in exchange offering the troops American citizenship at the end of their tours of duty. This is likely not politically doable at this time, though it may be in a few years.
   
4. Were we to raise occupation troops, and employ them in Iraq, this would free up our combat troops to take on Syria, or be ready for contingency intervention in Iran or elsewhere. Such an expansion of our occupation would, of course, require more occupation troops. At current rates of pay and unemployment, it is likely that we would be unable to raise more than an additional 250000 troops (educated guess, and could be way off) without resorting to foreign auxiliaries or a draft.
   
5. We must therefore economize with our forces, and in particular we must avoid pointless interventions (such as Liberia) and pull out of commitments which others could take up (such as Bosnia). This will annoy the Europeans and the American Left. So be it. The Western Europeans have made clear that they have nothing to offer (aside from the nations mentioned above) us except neutrality or vague friendship - and I include Canada in this, sadly. Since we cannot rely on their help, we will have to see to our own needs, and that means leaving them to see to their own needs, and to humanitarian interventions.
   
6. We need to organize local militias, in order to provide local self-defense. These militias should have no law-enforcement powers, but purely serve as anti-terror units. During the Washington sniper case, such a militia, with a pair of obviously-armed and alert sentries on each corner, would have proven invaluable. There will be other such cases where this will be needed.
   
7. We will have to drop the "war on drugs" in order to free up government resources to fight the real war. It may be possible to do both, but given the budget environment we are now in, it is foolish at least to fight drugs as a Federal matter. Should we maintain prohibition, we need to at least let the States enforce those laws (outside of Customs inspections at the borders).
   

I don't realistically think that we have the political will to switch to a war footing right now. Absent another major attack, the only way to build that will is for the President to make it the issue he is pursuing. Certainly, short-sighted political opponents will deride him for this, and the Europeans and the press will wail loudly and long, but this is a case that the American public seems to want made to them. It's about time the President does so.

In reality, I don't expect that we will have the political will to go to a true war footing until after the next major terrorist incident on American or European soil.

UPDATE: Fixed the ending. (Thanks to Flit, and to Mog in the comments.) Seems to have been cut off when I saved the post; and I was dealing with kids and didn't notice the error.

Posted by Jeff at July 11, 2003 02:53 PM | Link Cosmos